Section 203
Original German
203 a) Der substantielle Stand hat sein Vermögen an den Naturprodukten eines Bodens, den er bearbeitet, — eines Bodens, der ausschließendes Privateigenthum zu seyn fähig ist und nicht nur unbestimmte Abnutzung, sondern eine objective Formirung erfordert. Gegen die Anknüpfung der Arbeit und des Erwerbs an einzelne feste Naturepochen und die Abhängigkeit des Ertrags von der veränderlichen Beschaffenheit des Naturprocesses, macht sich der Zweck des Bedürfnisses zu einer Vorsorge auf die Zukunft, behält aber durch ihre Bedingungen die Weise einer weniger durch die Reflexion und eigenen Willen vermittelten Subsistenz, und darin überhaupt die substantielle Gesinnung einer unmittelbaren auf dem Familien-Verhältnisse und dem Zutrauen beruhenden Sittlichkeit.
Mit Recht ist der eigentliche Anfang und die erste Stiftung der Staaten in die Einführung des Ackerbaues, nebst der Einführung der Ehe gesetzt worden, indem jenes Princip das Formiren des Bodens und damit ausschließendes Privat-Eigenthum mit sich führt (vergl. §. 170. Anm.), und das im Schweifenden seine Subsistenz suchende, schweifende Leben des Wilden zur Ruhe des Privatrechts und zur Sicherheit der Befriedigung des Bedürfnisses zurückführt, womit sich die Beschränkung der Geschlechterliebe zur Ehe, und damit die Erweiterung dieses Bandes zu einem fortdauernden in sich allgemeinen Bunde, des Bedürfnisses zur Familiensorge und des Besitzes zum Familiengute verknüpft. Sicherung, Befestigung, Dauer der Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse u. s. f. — Charaktere, wodurch sich diese Institutionen zunächst empfehlen, sind nichts anderes als Formen der Allgemeinheit und Gestaltungen, wie die Vernünftigkeit, der absolute Endzweck, sich in diesen Gegenständen geltend macht. — Was kann für diese Materie interessanter seyn, als meines sehr verehrten Freundes, Herrn Creuzers, eben so geistreiche als gelehrte Aufschlüsse, die derselbe insbesondere im vierten Band seiner Mythologie und Symbolik, über die agronomischen Feste, Bilder und Heiligthümer der Alten uns gegeben hat, welche sich der Einführung des Ackerbaues und der damit zusammenhängenden Institutionen als göttlicher Thaten bewußt worden sind, und ihnen so religiöse Verehrung widmeten.
Daß der substantielle Charakter dieses Standes von Seiten der Gesetze des Privatrechts, insbesondere der Rechtspflege, so wie von Seiten des Unterrichts und der Bildung, auch der Religion, Modificationen, nicht in Ansehung des substantiellen Inhalts, aber in Ansehung der Form und Reflexions-Entwickelung nach sich zieht, ist eine weitere Folge, die eben so in Ansehung der anderen Stände statt hat.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
203 a) The substantial estate has its wealth in the natural products of a soil that it cultivates—a soil capable of being exclusive private property, and requiring not merely indeterminate wearing away but an objective forming. Against the attachment of labor and acquisition to single fixed epochs of nature, and the dependence of the yield on the changeable constitution of the natural process, the end of need sets itself up as a provision for the future, but through its conditions retains the mode of a subsistence less mediated by reflection and by one's own will, and in this generally the substantial disposition of an immediate ethical life resting on the family relation and on trust.
The true beginning and the first founding of states has rightly been placed in the introduction of agriculture, together with the introduction of marriage, since that principle brings with it the forming of the soil and thereby exclusive private property (compare § 170. Remark), and leads the wandering life of the savage, who seeks his subsistence in wandering, back to the repose of private right and to the security of the satisfaction of need; and with this the restriction of sexual love to marriage is bound up, therewith the expansion of this bond into a union that is enduring and universal within itself, of need into care for the family, and of possession into family property. Security, consolidation, duration of the satisfaction of needs, and so forth—the characters by which these institutions first commend themselves—are nothing other than forms of universality and configurations in which rationality, the absolute final end, asserts itself in these objects.—What could be more interesting on this matter than the disclosures of my greatly esteemed friend, Herr Creuzer, no less ingenious than learned, which he has given us especially in the fourth volume of his Mythology and Symbolism concerning the agronomic festivals, images, and sanctuaries of the ancients, who were conscious of the introduction of agriculture and of the institutions connected with it as divine deeds, and so devoted religious veneration to them.
That the substantial character of this estate brings modifications in its wake on the side of the laws of private right, and especially of the administration of justice, as also on the side of instruction and cultivation, and of religion too—not as regards the substantial content, but as regards the form and the development of reflection—is a further consequence, which holds equally in regard to the other estates.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
203 a) The substantial estate has its resources in the natural products of the land it works. This land can be exclusive private property. It requires not merely indefinite use, but objective shaping. Work and earnings are tied to particular fixed seasons, and the yield depends on the changing character of natural processes. So the aim of satisfying needs becomes provision for the future. But because of these conditions, it still has the character of a livelihood less mediated by reflection and one's own will. In general, it retains the substantial outlook of an immediate ethical life resting on the family relationship and on trust.
The introduction of agriculture, together with the introduction of marriage, has rightly been taken as the true beginning and first foundation of states. Agriculture brings with it the shaping of the land, and therefore exclusive private property (compare § 170. Anm.). It brings the wandering life of the savage, who looks for his livelihood as he roams, back to the calm of private right and the security of satisfying needs. This connects with the restriction of sexual love to marriage, and therefore with the expansion of this bond into a lasting union that is universal within itself. It also connects with the expansion of need into care for a family, and of possession into family property. Security, consolidation, and lasting satisfaction of needs, and so on—the features that first recommend these institutions—are nothing other than forms of universality and configurations in which rationality, the absolute final end, asserts itself in these matters. What could be more interesting on this subject than the explanations of my highly esteemed friend Mr. Creuzer, as ingenious as they are learned? He has given them to us especially in the fourth volume of his Mythologie und Symbolik, on the agronomic festivals, images, and sanctuaries of the ancients. These people became conscious of the introduction of agriculture and the institutions connected with it as divine acts, and therefore devoted religious reverence to them.
Private law, especially the administration of justice, as well as teaching, education, and religion, bring changes to the substantial character of this estate. These do not affect its substantial content, but its form and the development of reflection. This is a further consequence that applies just as much to the other estates.
About this section
Section 203 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 205 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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