Section 187
Original German
187 Die Individuen sind als Bürger dieses Staates Privatpersonen, welche ihr eigenes Interesse zu ihrem Zwecke haben. Da dieser durch das Allgemeine vermittelt ist, das ihnen somit als Mittel erscheint, so kann er von ihnen nur erreicht werden, insofern sie selbst ihr Wissen, Wollen und Thun auf allgemeine Weise bestimmen, und sich zu einem Gliede der Kette dieses Zusammenhanges machen. Das Interesse der Idee hierin, das nicht im Bewußtseyn dieser Mitglieder der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als solcher liegt, ist der Prozeß, die Einzelnheit und Natürlichkeit derselben durch die Naturnothwendigkeit eben so als durch die Willkühr der Bedürfnisse, zur formellen Freyheit und formellen Allgemeinheit des Wissens und Wollens zu erheben, die Subjectivität in ihrer Besonderheit zu bilden.
Es hängt mit den Vorstellungen von der Unschuld des Naturzustandes, von Sitten-Einfalt ungebildeter Völker einerseits und andererseits mit dem Sinne, der die Bedürfnisse, deren Befriedigung, die Genüsse und Bequemlichkeiten des particulären Lebens u. s. f. als absolute Zwecke betrachtet, zusammen, wenn die Bildung dort als etwas nur Aeusserliches, dem Verderben angehöriges, hier als bloßes Mittel für jene Zwecke betrachtet wird; die eine wie die andere Ansicht zeigt die Unbekanntschaft mit der Natur des Geistes und dem Zwecke der Vernunft. Der Geist hat seine Wirklichkeit nur dadurch, daß er sich in sich selbst entzweyt, in den Naturbedürfnissen und in dem Zusammenhange dieser äußern Nothwendigkeit sich diese Schranke und Endlichkeit giebt, und eben damit, daß er sich in sie hinein bildet, sie überwindet und darin sein objectives Daseyn gewinnt. Der Vernunftzweck ist deßwegen weder jene natürliche Sitteneinfalt, noch in der Entwickelung der Besonderheit die Genüsse als solche, die durch die Bildung erlangt werden, sondern daß die Natureinfalt, d. i. theils die passive Selbstlosigkeit, theils die Rohheit des Wissens und Willens, d. i. die Unmittelbarkeit und Einzelnheit, in die der Geist versenkt ist, weggearbeitet werde und zunächst diese seine Aeusserlichkeit die Vernünftigkeit, der sie fähig ist, erhalte, nämlich die Form der Allgemeinheit, die Verständigkeit. Auf diese Weise nur ist der Geist in dieser Aeusserlichkeit als solcher einheimisch und bey sich. Seine Freyheit hat so in derselben ein Daseyn, und er wird in diesem seiner Bestimmung zur Freyheit an sich fremden Elemente für sich, hat es nur mit solchem zu thun, dem sein Siegel aufgedruckt, und von ihm producirt ist. — Eben damit kommt denn die Form der Allgemeinheit für sich im Gedanken zur Existenz, — die Form, welche allein das würdige Element für die Existenz der Idee ist. — Die Bildung ist daher in ihrer absoluten Bestimmung die Befreyung und die Arbeit der höhern Befreyung, nämlich der absolute Durchgangspunkt zu der, nicht mehr unmittelbaren, natürlichen, sondern geistigen, eben so zur Gestalt der Allgemeinheit erhobenen unendlich subjectiven Substantialität der Sittlichkeit. — Diese Befreyung ist im Subject die harte Arbeit gegen die bloße Subjectivität des Benehmens, gegen die Unmittelbarkeit der Begierde, so wie gegen die subjective Eitelkeit der Empfindung und die Willkühr des Beliebens. Daß sie diese harte Arbeit ist, macht einen Theil der Ungunst aus, der auf sie fällt. Durch diese Arbeit der Bildung ist es aber, daß der subjective Wille selbst in sich die Objectivität gewinnt, in der er seinerseits allein würdig und fähig ist, die Wirklichkeit der Idee zu seyn. — Eben so macht zugleich diese Form der Allgemeinheit, zu der sich die Besonderheit verarbeitet und herauf gebildet hat, die Verständigkeit, daß die Besonderheit zum wahrhaften Fürsichseyn der Einzelnheit wird, und indem sie der Allgemeinheit den erfüllenden Inhalt und ihre unendliche Selbstbestimmung giebt, selbst in der Sittlichkeit als unendlich fürsichseyende, freye Subjectivität ist. Dieß ist der Standpunkt, der die Bildung als immanentes Moment des Absoluten, und ihren unendlichen Werth erweist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
187 As citizens of this state, individuals are private persons, who have their own interest as their purpose. Since this purpose is mediated by the universal, which thus appears to them as a means, they can attain it only insofar as they themselves determine their knowing, willing and doing in a universal manner, and make themselves a member of the chain of this interconnection. The interest of the Idea in this—an interest that does not lie in the consciousness of these members of civil society as such—is the process of raising individuality and its naturalness, through natural necessity no less than through the arbitrary choice of needs, to formal freedom and to the formal universality of knowing and willing, and of cultivating subjectivity in its particularity.
It belongs together with the notions of the innocence of the state of nature and of the simplicity of morals among uncultivated peoples, on the one side, and on the other side with the disposition that regards needs, their satisfaction, the enjoyments and conveniences of particular life and so forth as absolute purposes, that culture is regarded there as something merely external, belonging to corruption, and here as a mere means to those purposes; the one view no less than the other shows unfamiliarity with the nature of spirit and with the purpose of reason. Spirit has its actuality only by dividing itself within itself, by giving itself in natural needs and in the interconnection of this external necessity that limit and finitude, and precisely by forming itself into them, overcoming them and therein gaining its objective existence. The purpose of reason is therefore neither that natural simplicity of morals, nor, in the development of particularity, the enjoyments as such that are attained through culture, but rather that the natural simplicity, that is, in part the passive selflessness, in part the crudeness of knowing and willing, namely the immediacy and individuality into which spirit is sunk, be worked away, and that this, its externality, first receive the rationality of which it is capable, namely the form of universality, the rationality of the understanding. Only in this way is spirit at home and with itself in this externality as such. Its freedom thus has a Dasein in the same, and in this element, foreign in itself to its determination to freedom, spirit comes to be for itself: it has to do only with what bears its seal impressed upon it and is produced by it.—Thereby the form of universality comes into existence for itself in thought—the form that alone is the worthy element for the existence of the Idea.—Culture is therefore, in its absolute determination, liberation, and the labor of the higher liberation: the absolute point of passage to the substantiality of ethical life that is no longer immediate and natural but spiritual, and equally raised to the shape of universality, infinitely subjective.—In the subject, this liberation is the hard labor against the mere subjectivity of conduct, against the immediacy of desire, and equally against the subjective vanity of feeling and the arbitrariness of preference. That it is this hard labor makes up part of the disfavor that falls upon it. But it is through this labor of culture that the subjective will itself gains in itself the objectivity in which, for its part, it alone is worthy and capable of being the actuality of the Idea.—At the same time, this form of universality to which particularity has worked itself up and formed itself, the rationality of the understanding, brings it about that particularity becomes the true being-for-self of individuality, and, in giving universality its fulfilling content and its infinite self-determination, is itself, within ethical life, infinitely self-existent free subjectivity. This is the standpoint that demonstrates culture to be an immanent moment of the Absolute, and shows its infinite worth.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
187 As citizens of this state, individuals are private persons whose end is their own interest. This end is mediated by the universal, which therefore appears to them as a means. They can reach it only by giving their knowledge, will, and action a universal form, and by making themselves links in the chain of this connection. The Idea's interest in this process is not present as such in the consciousness of these members of civil society. It is the process of raising their individuality and natural condition, through both the natural necessity and the arbitrary character of needs, to formal freedom and a formal universality of knowledge and will: the process of educating subjectivity in its particularity.
People sometimes regard education and cultivation as merely external, as something corrupting. This is connected with ideas about the innocence of the state of nature and the simplicity of the customs of uncultivated peoples. Others regard it as no more than a means to satisfy needs and provide the enjoyments and comforts of particular life and so on, which they treat as absolute ends. Both views show an unfamiliarity with the nature of spirit and the end of reason. Spirit has its actual reality only by dividing itself within itself. It gives itself this limitation and finitude in natural needs and in the connection of this external necessity. Precisely by forming itself within these conditions, it overcomes them and gains its objective existence within them. Reason's end is therefore neither that natural simplicity of customs nor, in the development of particularity, the enjoyments as such that cultivation provides. Instead, natural simplicity must be worked away: partly a passive lack of selfhood and partly the crudeness of knowledge and will—that is, the immediacy and individuality in which spirit is immersed. First, this external condition of spirit must acquire the rational character it is capable of: the form of universality, the quality of the understanding. Only in this way is spirit at home and with itself in this externality as such. Its freedom thus has an existence in it. In this element, which is in itself alien to spirit's determination as freedom, spirit becomes for itself, dealing only with what bears its stamp and has been produced by it. In this very process, the form of universality also comes to exist on its own in thought. This form alone is the element worthy of the Idea's existence. In its absolute determination, education and cultivation is therefore liberation and the work of a higher liberation. It is the absolute point of passage to the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life. That substantiality is no longer immediate and natural, but spiritual and likewise raised to the form of universality. For the subject, this liberation is hard work against the mere subjectivity of behavior, against the immediacy of desire, and against the subjective vanity of feeling and the arbitrary choices of liking. This hard work is part of what makes it unpopular. But through this work of education and cultivation, the subjective will itself gains within itself the objectivity in which alone it is worthy and capable of being the actual reality of the Idea. At the same time, this form of universality, which particularity has worked its way toward and developed into—the quality of the understanding—makes particularity into the true being-for-itself of individuality. Particularity gives universality its fulfilling content and its infinite self-determination. In ethical life itself, it is therefore infinitely self-sustaining, free subjectivity. This is the standpoint that demonstrates education and cultivation to be an inherent element of the absolute, and demonstrates its infinite value.
About this section
Section 187 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 189 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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