Section 185

185 Particularity on its own account: on the one side, as the satisfaction of its needs, of contingent arbitrary choice and of subjective preference, discharging itself in all directions, it destroys in its enjoyments itself and its substantial concept; on the other side, as infinitely stimulated and, in its thoroughgoing dependence on external contingency and arbitrary choice no less than on the power of universality, restricted, the satisfaction of necessary and of contingent need alike is contingent. In these opposites and their realization, civil society presents the spectacle of excess, of misery, and of the physical and moral corruption common to both.

The independent development of particularity (compare § 124. Remark) is the moment that shows itself in the ancient states as the corruption of morals breaking in upon them and as the ultimate ground of their downfall. These states, resting partly on the patriarchal and religious principle, partly on the principle of a more spiritual but simpler ethical life, in general built upon original natural intuition, could not endure the division of that intuition and the infinite reflection of self-consciousness into itself, and they succumbed to this reflection as it began to emerge, first in disposition and then in actuality, because their still simple principle lacked the truly infinite power that lies only in that unity which lets the opposition of reason disperse to its full strength, and has overcome it, and so preserves itself in it and holds it together within itself.—Plato, in his state, sets forth substantial ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth, but he is unable to come to terms with the principle of independent particularity, which in his time had broken in upon Greek ethical life, otherwise than by setting against it his merely substantial state and excluding that principle entirely, down into its beginnings, which it has in private property (§ 46. Remark) and in the family, and then in its further development as the individual's own arbitrary choice and choice of estate, and so forth. It is this deficiency that also causes the great substantial truth of his state to be misjudged, and that state to be commonly taken for a reverie of abstract thought, for what people are often even inclined to call an ideal. The principle of the independent, inwardly infinite personality of the individual, of subjective freedom, which arose inwardly in the Christian religion and outwardly, and therefore bound up with abstract universality, in the Roman world, does not come into its right in that merely substantial form of actual spirit. This principle is historically later than the Greek world, and the philosophical reflection that descends to this depth is equally later than the substantial idea of Greek philosophy.

185 Particularity on its own destroys itself and its substantial concept in its enjoyments. On this side it gives free rein in every direction to the satisfaction of its needs, to contingent choice, and to subjective liking. On the other side it is endlessly stimulated, wholly dependent on external contingency and arbitrary choice, and restricted by the power of universality. So the satisfaction of necessary needs, as well as of contingent ones, is itself contingent. In these opposing sides and their realization, civil society presents a spectacle of excess and misery, together with the physical and ethical corruption common to both.

The independent development of particularity (compare § 124. Anm.) is the element that appears in the ancient states as an outbreak of ethical corruption and the ultimate cause of their downfall. These states were built partly on the patriarchal and religious principle, partly on the principle of an ethical life that was more spiritual but still simple—in general, on original natural intuition. They could not endure the division of that ethical life and the infinite reflection of self-consciousness within themselves. They succumbed to this reflection, first in their way of thinking and then in their actual reality, as it began to emerge. Their still simple principle lacked the truly infinite strength found only in a unity that lets reason's opposition develop to its full force, has overcome it, and so maintains itself within it and holds it together within itself. Plato, in his Republic, presents substantial ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth. But he could cope with the principle of independent particularity, which had broken into Greek ethical life in his time, only by opposing it with his merely substantial state. He excluded it entirely, even in its beginnings in private property (§ 46. Anm.) and the family, and therefore also in its further development as a person's own arbitrary choice and choice of an estate, and so on. This omission obscures even the great substantial truth of his state. It commonly makes that state seem a fantasy of abstract thought, something people often even call an ideal. The principle of the individual's independent personality, infinite within itself—the principle of subjective freedom—emerged inwardly in the Christian religion and outwardly, linked therefore to abstract universality, in the Roman world. It does not receive its due in that merely substantial form of actual spirit. Historically, this principle comes later than the Greek world. Likewise, philosophical reflection that descends to this depth comes later than the substantial Idea of Greek philosophy.