Section 180
Original German
180 Das Princip, daß die Glieder der Familie zu selbstständigen rechtlichen Personen werden (§. 177.), läßt innerhalb des Kreises der Familie etwas von dieser Willkühr und Unterscheidung unter den natürlichen Erben eintreten, die aber nur höchst beschränkt stattfinden kann, um das Grundverhältniß nicht zu verletzen.
Die bloße directe Willkühr des Verstorbenen kann nicht zum Princip für das Recht zu testiren gemacht werden, insbesondere nicht insofern sie dem substantiellen Rechte der Familie gegenüber stehet, deren Liebe, Verehrung gegen ihr ehemaliges Mitglied es doch vornemlich nur seyn könnte, welche dessen Willkühr nach seinem Tode beachtete. Eine solche Willkühr enthält für sich nichts, das höher als das Familienrecht selbst zu respectiren wäre; im Gegentheil. Das sonstige Gelten einer Letzten-Willens-Disposition läge allein in der willkührlichen Anerkennung der Andern. Ein solches Gelten kann ihr vornemlich nur eingeräumt werden, insofern das Familienverhältniß, in welchem sie absorbirt ist, entfernter und unwirksamer wird. Unwirksamkeit desselben aber, wo es wirklich vorhanden ist, gehört zum Unsittlichen, und die ausgedehnte Gültigkeit jener Willkühr gegen ein solches enthält die Schwächung seiner Sittlichkeit in sich. — Diese Willkühr aber innerhalb der Familie zum Haupt-Princip der Erbfolge zu machen, gehörte zu der vorhin bemerkten Härte und Unsittlichkeit der römischen Gesetze, nach denen der Sohn auch vom Vater verkauft werden konnte und wenn er von Andern freygelassen wurde, in die Gewalt des Vaters zurückkehrte, und erst auf die dritte Freylassung aus der Sklaverey wirklich frey wurde, — nach denen der Sohn überhaupt nicht de jure volljährig und eine rechtliche Person wurde und nur den Kriegsraub, peculium castrense, als Eigenthum besitzen konnte, und wenn er durch jenen dreymaligen Verkauf und Loslassung aus der väterlichen Gewalt trat, nicht mit denen, die noch in der Familienknechtschaft geblieben waren, ohne Testamentseinsetzung erbte, — eben so daß die Frau (insofern sie nicht in die Ehe als in ein Sklavenverhältniß, in manum conveniret, in mancipio esset, sondern als Matrone trat) nicht so sehr der Familie, die sie durch die Heyrath an ihrem Theile gestiftet und die nunmehr wirklich die ihrige ist, als vielmehr der, aus der sie abstammte, angehörig blieb, und daher vom Erben des Vermögens der wirklich ihrigen eben so ausgeschlossen, als die Gattin und Mutter von diesen nicht beerbt wurde. — Daß das Unsittliche solcher und anderer Rechte bei weiterhin erwachendem Gefühle der Vernünftigkeit im Wege der Rechtspflege, z. B. mit Beyhülfe des Ausdrucks: von bonorum possessio, (daß hievon wieder possessio bonorum unterschieden ist, gehört zu solchen Kenntnissen, die den gelehrten Juristen ausmachen) statt hereditas, durch die Fiktion, eine filia in einen filius umzutaufen, eludirt wurde, ist oben schon (§. 3. Anm.) als die traurige Nothwendigkeit für den Richter bemerkt worden, das Vernünftige pfiffigerweise gegen schlechte Gesetze, wenigstens in einigen Folgen einzuschwärzen. Die fürchterliche Instabilität der wichtigsten Institutionen und ein tumultuarisches Gesetzgeben gegen die Ausbrüche der daraus entspringenden Uebel, hängt damit zusammen. — Welche unsittliche Folgen diß Recht der Willkühr im Testamentmachen bey den Römern hatte, ist sattsam aus der Geschichte und Lucians und anderer Schilderungen bekannt. — Es liegt in der Natur der Ehe selbst, als der unmittelbaren Sittlichkeit die Vermischung vom substantiellen Verhältniß, natürlicher Zufälligkeit und innerer Willkühr; — wenn nun der Willkühr durch das Knechtschaftsverhältniß der Kinder und die andern bemerkten und sonst damit zusammenhängenden Bestimmungen, vollends auch durch die Leichtigkeit der Ehescheidungen bei den Römern, gegen das Recht des Substantiellen der Vorzug eingeräumt wird, so daß selbst Cicero, und wie viel Schönes hat er nicht über das Honestum und Decorum in seinen Officiis und allenthalben anderwärts geschrieben! die Speculation machte, seine Gattin fortzuschicken, um durch das Heyrathsgut einer neuen seine Schulden zu bezahlen, — so ist dem Verderben der Sitten ein gesetzlicher Weg gebahnt, oder vielmehr die Gesetze sind die Nothwendigkeit desselben.
Die Institution des Erbrechts, zur Erhaltung und zum Glanz der Familie durch Substitutionen und Familien-Fidei-Commisse, entweder die Töchter zu Gunsten der Söhne, oder zu Gunsten des ältesten Sohnes die übrigen Kinder von der Erbschaft auszuschließen, oder überhaupt eine Ungleichheit eintreten zu lassen, verletzt theils das Princip der Freyheit des Eigenthums (§. 62.), theils beruhet sie auf einer Willkühr, die an und für sich kein Recht hat, anerkannt zu werden, — näher auf dem Gedanken, diesen Stamm oder Haus, nicht sowohl diese Familie aufrecht erhalten zu wollen. Aber nicht dieses Haus oder Stamm, sondern die Familie als solche ist die Idee, die solches Recht hat, und durch die Freyheit des Vermögens und die Gleichheit des Erbrechts wird eben sowohl die sittliche Gesinnung erhalten, als die Familien vielmehr als durch das Gegentheil erhalten werden. — In solchen Institutionen ist, wie in den römischen, das Recht der Ehe (§. 172.) überhaupt verkannt, daß sie die vollständige Stiftung einer eigenthümlichen wirklichen Familie ist, und gegen sie das, was Familie überhaupt heißt, stirps, gens, nur ein sich mit den Generationen immer weiter entfernendes und sich verunwirklichendes Abstractum wird. (§. 177.) Die Liebe, das sittliche Moment der Ehe, ist als Liebe Empfindung für wirkliche, gegenwärtige Individuen, nicht für ein Abstractum. — Daß sich die Verstandes-Abstraction als das weltgeschichtliche Princip des Römerreichs zeigt, s. unten §. 356. — Daß aber die höhere politische Sphäre ein Recht der Erstgeburt und ein eisernes Stammvermögen, doch nicht als eine Willkühr, sondern als aus der Idee des Staates nothwendig herbeyführt, davon unten §. 306.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
180 The principle that the members of the family become self-sufficient legal persons (§ 177) lets something of this arbitrary choice and distinction among the natural heirs enter within the circle of the family, which can, however, take place only within the narrowest limits, so as not to violate the fundamental relation.
The mere direct arbitrary choice of the deceased cannot be made the principle for the right to make a will, especially not insofar as it stands opposed to the substantial right of the family, whose love and reverence toward its former member could alone chiefly be what would heed his arbitrary choice after his death. Such an arbitrary choice contains in itself nothing that would have to be respected as higher than the right of the family itself; on the contrary. The otherwise valid force of a last-will disposition would lie solely in the arbitrary recognition of the others. Such validity can be conceded to it chiefly only insofar as the family relation, in which it is absorbed, becomes more remote and less effective. But ineffectiveness of that relation, where it is actually present, belongs to the unethical, and the extended validity of that arbitrary choice against such a relation contains within it the weakening of its ethical character.—To make this arbitrary choice within the family the chief principle of succession belonged, however, to the hardness and unethical character of the Roman laws noted earlier, according to which the son could also be sold by the father, and if he was set free by others returned into the father's power, and became truly free only upon the third emancipation from slavery—according to which the son in general did not become of age by law and a legal person, and could possess as property only the spoils of war, peculium castrense, and if through that threefold sale and release he left the father's power, did not inherit without testamentary appointment together with those who had remained in family bondage—likewise that the wife (insofar as she did not enter marriage as into a slave relation, in manum conveniret, in mancipio esset, passing into her husband's hand and being held in bondage, but as a matron) remained belonging not so much to the family which she had for her part founded through marriage and which was now truly her own, as rather to the one from which she descended, and was therefore excluded from inheriting the wealth of the family that was truly her own, just as the wife and mother was not inherited from by its members.—That the unethical character of these and other rights, as the feeling for rationality awoke in the course of time, was evaded by way of the administration of justice, for example with the help of the expression bonorum possessio, possession of an estate (that possessio bonorum, possession of goods, is again distinguished from this belongs to such knowledge as makes the learned jurist), instead of hereditas, inheritance, through the fiction of renaming a filia, a daughter, into a filius, a son, has already been remarked above (§ 3, Remark) as the sad necessity for the judge of smuggling in the rational cunningly against bad laws, at least in some of its consequences. The fearful instability of the most important institutions, and a tumultuous legislating against the outbreaks of the evils springing from it, is connected with this.—What unethical consequences this right of arbitrary choice in making a will had among the Romans is sufficiently known from history and from the portrayals of Lucian and others.—It lies in the nature of marriage itself, as immediate ethical life, that the substantial relation, natural contingency and inner arbitrary choice are mixed together;—if now arbitrary choice, through the bondage relation of the children and the other determinations noted and otherwise connected with it, and finally also through the ease of divorce among the Romans, is given precedence over the right of the substantial, so that even Cicero—and how much that is beautiful has he not written on the honorable and the seemly in his On Duties and everywhere else!—made the speculation of sending his wife away in order to pay his debts with the dowry of a new one, then a legal path is paved for the corruption of morals, or rather the laws are the necessity of it.
The institution of the law of inheritance for the preservation and the splendor of the family through substitutions and family entails, whether to exclude the daughters from the inheritance in favor of the sons, or the other children in favor of the eldest son, or generally to let an inequality enter, violates partly the principle of the freedom of property (§ 62), partly rests on an arbitrary choice that has in and for itself no right to be recognized—more closely, on the thought of wanting to maintain this stock or house, not so much this family. But it is not this house or stock, but the family as such, that is the idea that has such a right, and through the freedom of wealth and the equality of the law of inheritance the ethical disposition is preserved just as much as the families are preserved better than by the opposite.—In such institutions, as in the Roman ones, the right of marriage (§ 172) is in general misjudged, that it is the complete founding of a peculiar, actual family, and that over against it what is called family in general, stirps, gens, stock and clan, becomes only an abstraction, ever more remote with the generations and ever more unreal (§ 177). Love, the ethical moment of marriage, is as love a feeling for actual, present individuals, not for an abstraction.—That the abstraction of the understanding shows itself as the world-historical principle of the Roman Empire, see below § 356.—That the higher political sphere, however, brings with it a right of primogeniture and an iron family estate, yet not as an arbitrary choice but as necessary from the idea of the state, on this see below § 306.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
180 The principle that the members of the family become independent legal persons (§ 177) lets some of this arbitrary choice and some distinction among the natural heirs enter within the circle of the family. But this can happen only within very narrow limits, so as not to violate the basic relationship.
The mere direct arbitrary choice of the deceased cannot be made the principle for the right to make a will. This holds especially where that choice stands opposed to the substantial right of the family. It could really only be the family's love and respect for its former member that would pay attention to his arbitrary choice after his death. Such an arbitrary choice contains in itself nothing that should be respected as higher than the family right itself. On the contrary. Otherwise the validity of a last-will disposition would lie only in the arbitrary recognition of others. Such validity can be granted to it mainly only to the extent that the family relationship, in which it is absorbed, becomes more distant and less effective. But ineffectiveness of that relationship, where it actually exists, belongs to the unethical. Extending the validity of that arbitrary choice against such a relationship carries within it a weakening of its ethical character. — To make this arbitrary choice the main principle of succession within the family belonged to the harshness and unethical character of the Roman laws noted above. Under those laws the son could also be sold by his father. If he was set free by others, he returned to his father's power, and he became really free only at the third release from slavery. Under those laws the son in general did not become of age de jure and a legal person. He could hold as property only his spoils of war (peculium castrense). If he left the father's power through that threefold sale and release, he did not inherit together with those who remained in family bondage, unless he was named in a will. Likewise the wife (when she did not enter marriage as a slave relationship, in manum conveniret, in mancipio esset, that is, came into the husband's hand or was held in bondage, but as a matron) remained a member not so much of the family that she had helped found by her marriage and that was now truly her own. She remained rather a member of the one she came from. So she was excluded from being heir to the fortune of the family that was truly hers, just as she, as wife and mother, was not inherited from by them. — The unethical character of such and other rights was evaded, as the sense of rationality woke up further, by way of the administration of justice. For example, it was evaded with the help of the term bonorum possessio (possession of goods) instead of hereditas (inheritance). (That possessio bonorum is again different from this belongs to the kind of knowledge that makes the learned jurist.) It was also evaded through the fiction of renaming a filia (daughter) a filius (son). This was already noted above (§ 3, Remark) as the sad necessity for the judge of smuggling the rational in cunningly against bad laws, at least in some of its consequences. The terrible instability of the most important institutions, and a tumultuous legislating against the outbreaks of the evils arising from it, go along with this. — What unethical consequences this right of arbitrary choice in making wills had among the Romans is well enough known from history and from the descriptions of Lucian and others. — It lies in the nature of marriage itself, as immediate ethical life, that the substantial relationship, natural accident and inner arbitrary choice are mixed together. Now, among the Romans arbitrary choice was given preference over the right of the substantial. This came about through the bondage of the children and the other provisions noted, and others connected with them, and finally also through the ease of divorce. The result was that even Cicero (and how much that is fine he wrote about the honorable (honestum) and the fitting (decorum) in his Offices and everywhere else!) speculated on sending his wife away in order to pay his debts with the dowry of a new one. So a legal path was opened for the corruption of morals, or rather the laws were its necessity.
The institution of a law of inheritance, aimed at the preservation and splendor of the family through substitutions and family entails, either excludes the daughters from the inheritance in favor of the sons, or excludes the other children in favor of the eldest son, or lets inequality in at all. This partly violates the principle of the freedom of property (§ 62). Partly it rests on an arbitrary choice that in and for itself has no right to be recognized. More closely, it rests on the thought of wanting to maintain this clan or house, rather than this family. But it is not this house or clan, it is the family as such, that is the idea having such a right. By freedom of fortune and equality in the law of inheritance, ethical attitude is kept up, and the families are better kept up than by the opposite. — In such institutions, as in the Roman ones, the right of marriage (§ 172) is in general misunderstood. Marriage is the complete founding of a distinct, actual family, and against it what is called family in general, stirps (stock), gens (clan), becomes only an abstraction. Over the generations that abstraction moves ever further away and becomes unreal (§ 177). Love, the ethical moment of marriage, is, as love, feeling for actual, present individuals, not for an abstraction. — That the abstraction of the understanding shows itself as the world-historical principle of the Roman Empire, see below § 356. — But that the higher political sphere brings in a right of primogeniture and an iron-bound family estate, not as an arbitrary choice but as necessary from the idea of the state, on this see below § 306.
About this section
Section 180 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 182 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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