Section 152
Original German
152 Die sittliche Substantialität ist auf diese Weise zu ihrem Rechte und dieses zu seinem Gelten gekommen, daß in ihr nämlich die Eigenwilligkeit und das eigene Gewissen des Einzelnen, das für sich wäre und einen Gegensatz gegen sie machte, verschwunden, indem der sittliche Charakter das unbewegte aber in seinen Bestimmungen zur wirklichen Vernünftigkeit aufgeschlossene Allgemeine als seinen bewegenden Zweck weiß, und seine Würde so wie alles Bestehen der besondern Zwecke in ihm gegründet erkennt und wirklich darin hat. Die Subjectivität ist selbst die absolute Form und die existirende Wirklichkeit der Substanz und der Unterschied des Subjects von ihr als seinem Gegenstand, Zwecke und Macht ist nur der zugleich eben so unmittelbar verschwundene Unterschied der Form.
Die Subjectivität, welche den Boden der Existenz für den Freyheitsbegriff ausmacht (§. 106.) und auf dem moralischen Standpunkte noch im Unterschiede von diesem ihrem Begriff ist, ist im Sittlichen die ihm adäquate Existenz desselben.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
152 Ethical substantiality has in this way come into its right, and this into its validity, in that in it the self-will and the own conscience of the single individual, which would be for itself and make an opposition to it, have vanished; for the ethical character knows the unmoved universal, opened up in its determinations to actual rationality, as its moving purpose, and recognizes that its dignity and all subsistence of particular purposes are grounded in it, and actually has them in it. Subjectivity is itself the absolute form and the existing actuality of the substance, and the difference of the subject from it as its object, purpose and power is only the difference of form, which has at the same time vanished just as immediately.
Subjectivity, which makes the ground of existence for the concept of freedom (§ 106) and in the moral standpoint is still in difference from this its concept, is in the ethical the existence adequate to it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
152 In this way ethical substantiality has come to its right, and this right has come to its validity. In ethical substantiality the self-will and the own conscience of the single person, which would exist for itself and set itself against it, have disappeared. The ethical character knows the universal as his moving purpose. This universal is unmoved, yet opened up in its determinations to actual rationality. He knows that his dignity and the whole standing of particular purposes are grounded in it, and he actually has them in it. Subjectivity is itself the absolute form and the existing actuality of substance. The difference between the subject and substance, as the subject's object, purpose and power, is only a difference of form, which has at the same time just as immediately vanished.
Subjectivity makes up the ground of existence for the concept of freedom (§ 106). At the moral standpoint it is still different from this its concept. In the ethical it is the existence that fits the concept.
About this section
Section 152 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 154 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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