Section 137
Original German
137 Das wahrhafte Gewissen ist die Gesinnung, das, was an und für sich gut ist, zu wollen; es hat daher feste Grundsätze; und zwar sind ihm diese, die für sich objectiven Bestimmungen und Pflichten. Von diesem, seinem Inhalte, der Wahrheit, unterschieden ist es nur die formelle Seite der Thätigkeit des Willens, der als dieser keinen eigenthümlichen Inhalt hat. Aber das objective System dieser Grundsätze und Pflichten und die Vereinigung des subjectiven Wissens mit demselben, ist erst auf dem Standpunkte der Sittlichkeit vorhanden. Hier auf dem formellen Standpunkte der Moralität ist das Gewissen ohne diesen objectiven Inhalt, so für sich die unendliche formelle Gewißheit seiner selbst, die eben darum zugleich als die Gewißheit dieses Subjects ist.
Das Gewissen drückt die absolute Berechtigung des subjectiven Selbstbewußtseyns aus, nämlich in sich und aus sich selbst zu wissen, was Recht und Pflicht ist, und nichts anzuerkennen, als was es so als das Gute weiß, zugleich in der Behauptung, daß was es so weiß und will, in Wahrheit Recht und Pflicht ist. Das Gewissen ist als diese Einheit des subjectiven Wissens, und dessen was an und für sich ist, ein Heiligthum, welches anzutasten Frevel wäre. Ob aber das Gewissen eines bestimmten Individuums, dieser Idee des Gewissens gemäß ist, ob das, was es für gut hält oder ausgiebt, auch wirklich gut ist, dieß erkennt sich allein aus dem Inhalt dieses Gutseynsollenden. Was Recht und Pflicht ist, ist als das an und für sich Vernünftige der Willensbestimmungen, wesentlich weder das besondere Eigenthum eines Individuums, noch in der Form von Empfindung oder sonst einem einzelnen, d. i. sinnlichen Wissen, sondern wesentlich von allgemeinen, gedachten Bestimmungen, d. i. in der Form von Gesetzen und Grundsätzen. Das Gewissen ist daher diesem Urtheil unterworfen, ob es wahrhaft ist oder nicht, und seine Berufung nur auf sein Selbst ist unmittelbar dem entgegen, was es seyn will, die Regel einer vernünftigen, an und für sich gültigen allgemeinen Handlungsweise. Der Staat kann deswegen das Gewissen in seiner eigenthümlichen Form, d. i. als subjectives Wissen nicht anerkennen, so wenig als in der Wissenschaft die subjective Meinung, die Versicherung und Berufung auf eine subjective Meinung, eine Gültigkeit hat. Was im wahrhaften Gewissen nicht unterschieden ist, ist aber unterscheidbar, und es ist die bestimmende Subjectivität des Wissens und Wollens, welche sich von dem wahrhaften Inhalte trennen, sich für sich setzen und denselben zu einer Form und Schein herabsetzen kann. Die Zweydeutigkeit in Ansehung des Gewissens liegt daher darin, daß es in der Bedeutung jener Identität des subjectiven Wissens und Wollens und des wahrhaften Guten vorausgesetzt, und so als ein Heiliges behauptet und anerkannt wird, und eben so als die nur subjective Reflexion des Selbstbewußtseyns in sich, doch auf die Berechtigung Anspruch macht, welche jener Identität selbst nur vermöge ihres an und für sich gültigen vernünftigen Inhalts zukommt. In den moralischen Standpunkte, wie er in dieser Abhandlung von dem sittlichen unterschieden wird, fällt nur das formelle Gewissen, das wahrhafte ist nur erwähnt worden, um seinen Unterschied anzugeben und das mögliche Mißverständniß zu beseitigen, als ob hier, wo nur das formelle Gewissen betrachtet wird, von dem wahrhaften die Rede wäre, welches in der, in der Folge erst vorkommenden sittlichen Gesinnung enthalten ist. Das religiöse Gewissen gehört aber überhaupt nicht in diesen Kreis.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
137 True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself; it therefore has firm principles, and these are for it the objective determinations and duties that exist for themselves. Distinguished from this its content, from truth, it is only the formal side of the activity of the will, which as this will has no content of its own. But the objective system of these principles and duties, and the union of subjective knowing with it, is first present at the standpoint of ethical life. Here, at the formal standpoint of morality, conscience is without this objective content; it is thus for itself the infinite formal certainty of itself, which for that very reason is at the same time the certainty of this subject.
Conscience expresses the absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness to know within itself and out of itself what is right and duty, and to recognize nothing except what it thus knows as the good, while at the same time asserting that what it so knows and wills is in truth right and duty. As this unity of subjective knowing and of what is in and for itself, conscience is a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to touch. But whether the conscience of a determinate individual accords with this Idea of conscience, whether what it holds or declares to be good is also actually good, is recognized solely from the content of what is supposed to be good. What is right and duty, as what is rational in the determinations of the will in and for itself, is essentially neither the particular property of an individual, nor in the form of feeling or of any other single, that is, sensuous, knowing, but essentially of universal, thought determinations, that is, in the form of laws and principles. Conscience is therefore subject to the judgment whether it is true or not, and its appeal only to its own self is immediately opposed to what it wants to be, the rule of a rational way of acting that is universal and valid in and for itself. For this reason the state cannot recognize conscience in its peculiar form, that is, as subjective knowing, any more than in science subjective opinion, the assurance and appeal to a subjective opinion, has validity. What is not distinguished in true conscience is nevertheless distinguishable, and it is the determining subjectivity of knowing and willing which can separate itself from the true content, posit itself for itself, and reduce that content to a form and a semblance. The ambiguity concerning conscience therefore lies in this, that it is presupposed in the sense of that identity of subjective knowing and willing with the truly good, and so is asserted and recognized as something holy, and yet, as the merely subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, lays claim to the entitlement which belongs to that identity only by virtue of its rational content, valid in and for itself. In the moral standpoint, as it is distinguished in this treatise from the ethical, only formal conscience falls; true conscience has been mentioned only in order to indicate its difference and to remove the possible misunderstanding that here, where only formal conscience is considered, the discussion concerns the true, which is contained in the ethical disposition that comes up only later. Religious conscience, however, does not belong in this circle at all.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
137 True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself. It therefore has firm principles, and these are for it the objective determinations and duties that exist in their own right. Distinguished from this content of its own, which is the truth, conscience is only the formal side of the activity of the will, which as this will has no content of its own. But the objective system of these principles and duties, and the union of subjective knowing with that system, exists only at the standpoint of ethical life. Here, at the formal standpoint of morality, conscience is without this objective content. It is, taken by itself, the infinite formal certainty of itself, and for that very reason it is at the same time the certainty of this subject.
Conscience expresses the absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness to know, within itself and out of itself, what is right and what is duty, and to recognize nothing except what it knows in this way as good. At the same time it asserts that what it knows and wills in this way is in truth right and duty. As this unity of subjective knowing with what is in and for itself, conscience is a sanctuary, and to violate it would be sacrilege. But whether the conscience of a particular individual matches this idea of conscience, whether what that conscience holds or claims to be good is actually good, can be known only from the content of what is supposed to be good. What is right and what is duty is what is rational in and for itself among the determinations of the will. Essentially it is neither the particular property of an individual, nor in the form of feeling or of some other individual, that is, sensory, kind of knowing. It is essentially made up of universal determinations that are thought, that is, it is in the form of laws and principles. Conscience is therefore subject to the judgment whether it is true or not. Its appeal to its own self alone directly contradicts what it wants to be, namely the rule of a rational way of acting that is universal and valid in and for itself. For this reason the state cannot recognize conscience in its peculiar form, that is, as subjective knowing. In the same way, in science a subjective opinion, an assurance or an appeal to a subjective opinion, has no validity. What is not distinguished in true conscience can still be distinguished. It is the determining subjectivity of knowing and willing that can separate itself from the true content, set itself up on its own, and reduce that content to a mere form and appearance. The ambiguity about conscience therefore lies in this. It is presupposed in the sense of that identity of subjective knowing and willing with the truly good, and so it is asserted and recognized as something holy. And yet, as the merely subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, it claims the entitlement that belongs to that identity only by virtue of its rational content, valid in and for itself. Only formal conscience belongs to the moral standpoint, as it is distinguished in this treatise from the ethical standpoint. True conscience has been mentioned only to show the difference and to remove a possible misunderstanding, as if, where only formal conscience is being considered, true conscience were being discussed. True conscience is contained in the ethical disposition, which comes up only later. Religious conscience, however, does not belong in this sphere at all.
About this section
Section 137 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 139 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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