Section 135
Original German
135 Diese Bestimmungen sind aber in der Bestimmung der Pflicht selbst nicht enthalten, sondern indem beyde bedingt und beschränkt sind, führen sie eben damit den Uebergang in die höhere Sphäre des Unbedingten, der Pflicht, herbey. Der Pflicht selbst insofern sie im moralischen Selbstbewußtseyn, das Wesentliche oder Allgemeine desselben ist, wie es sich innerhalb seiner auf sich nur bezieht, bleibt damit nur die abstracte Allgemeinheit, hat die inhaltslose Identität, oder das Abstracte Positive, das Bestimmungslose zu ihrer Bestimmung.
So wesentlich es ist, die reine unbedingte Selbstbestimmung des Willens als die Wurzel der Pflicht herauszuheben, wie denn die Erkenntniß des Willens erst durch die Kantische Philosophie ihren festen Grund und Ausgangspunkt durch den Gedanken seiner unendlichen Autonomie gewonnen hat, so sehr setzt die Festhaltung des bloß moralischen Standpunkts, der nicht in den Begriff der Sittlichkeit übergeht, diesen Gewinn zu einem leeren Formalismus und die moralische Wissenschaft zu einer Rednerei von der Pflicht um der Pflicht willen herunter. Von diesem Standpunkt aus ist keine immanente Pflichtenlehre möglich; man kann von Aussen her wohl einen Stoff hereinnehmen, und dadurch auf besondere Pflichten kommen, aber aus jener Bestimmung der Pflicht, als dem Mangel des Widerspruchs, der formellen Ueberstimmung mit sich, welche nichts anderes ist, als die Festsetzung der abstracten Unbestimmtheit, kann nicht zur Bestimmung von besonderen Pflichten übergegangen werden, noch wenn ein solcher besonderer Inhalt für das Handeln zur Betrachtung kommt, liegt ein Kriterium in jenem Princip, ob er eine Pflicht sey oder nicht. Im Gegentheil kann alle unrechtliche und unmoralische Handlungsweise auf diese Weise gerechtfertigt werden. — Die weitere Kantische Form, die Fähigkeit einer Handlung, als allgemeine Maxime vorgestellt zu werden, führt zwar die concretere Vorstellung eines Zustandes herbey, aber enthält für sich kein weiteres Princip, als jenen Mangel des Widerspruchs und die formelle Identität. — Daß kein Eigenthum statt findet, enthält für sich eben so wenig einen Widerspruch, als daß dieses oder jenes einzelne Volk, Familie u. s. f. nicht existire, oder daß überhaupt keine Menschen leben. Wenn es sonst für sich fest und vorausgesetzt ist, daß Eigenthum und Menschenleben seyn und respectirt werden soll, dann ist es ein Widerspruch, einen Diebstahl oder Mord zu begehen; ein Widerspruch kann sich nur mit Etwas ergeben, das ist, mit einem Inhalt, der als festes Princip zum Voraus zu Grunde liegt. In Beziehung auf ein solches ist erst eine Handlung entweder damit übereinstimmend, oder im Widerspruch. Aber die Pflicht, welche nur als solche, nicht um eines Inhalts willen, gewollt werden soll, die formelle Identität ist eben dieß, allen Inhalt und Bestimmung auszuschließen.
Die weitern Antinomien und Gestaltungen des perennirenden Sollens, in welchen sich der bloß moralische Standpunkt des Verhältnisses nur herumtreibt, ohne sie lösen und über das Sollen hinauskommen zu können, habe ich Phänomenol. des Geistes Seite 550 ff. entwickelt; vergl. Encyklop. der philos. Wissenschaften §. 420. ff.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
135 These determinations, however, are not contained in the determination of duty itself; rather, since both are conditioned and limited, they bring about for that very reason the transition into the higher sphere of the unconditioned, of duty. Duty itself, insofar as it is the essential or universal element in moral self-consciousness, as that self-consciousness relates only to itself within itself, is thereby left with nothing but abstract universality; its determination is contentless identity, or the abstract positive, the undetermined.
As essential as it is to bring out the pure unconditioned self-determination of the will as the root of duty, and as much as the knowledge of the will first won its firm ground and starting point through the Kantian philosophy, by way of the thought of its infinite autonomy, just so much does the clinging to the merely moral standpoint, which does not pass over into the concept of ethical life, reduce this gain to an empty formalism and moral science to a rhetoric about duty for duty's sake. From this standpoint no immanent doctrine of duties is possible; one can indeed take in material from outside and thereby arrive at particular duties, but from that determination of duty as the absence of contradiction, as formal agreement with oneself, which is nothing other than the fixing of abstract indeterminacy, there can be no transition to the determination of particular duties; nor, when such a particular content comes up for consideration in action, does that principle offer a criterion for whether it is a duty or not. On the contrary, every wrongful and immoral way of acting can be justified in this manner. — The further Kantian form, the capacity of an action to be represented as a universal maxim, does indeed bring in the more concrete representation of a state of affairs, but it contains in itself no further principle than that absence of contradiction and formal identity. — That no property exists contains in itself just as little a contradiction as that this or that single nation, family, and so on, should not exist, or that no human beings live at all. If it is otherwise fixed in itself and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and to be respected, then it is a contradiction to commit a theft or a murder; a contradiction can arise only with something, that is, with a content which lies beforehand at the ground as a fixed principle. Only in relation to such a content is an action either in agreement with it or in contradiction. But duty, which is to be willed only as such and not for the sake of a content, formal identity, is precisely the exclusion of all content and determination.
The further antinomies and shapes of the perennial ought, in which the merely moral standpoint of relation only drifts about, unable to resolve them or to get beyond the ought, I have developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, page 550 ff.; compare the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 420 ff.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
135 But these requirements are not contained in the idea of duty itself. Both are conditioned and limited, and for that very reason they lead over into the higher sphere of the unconditioned, which is duty. Duty itself, so far as it is the essential or universal side of moral self-consciousness, relating only to itself within that self-consciousness, is left with nothing but abstract universality. Its defining mark is empty identity, or the abstract positive, which is to say, the lack of any definition.
It is essential to bring out the pure, unconditioned self-determination of the will as the root of duty. Indeed, our knowledge of the will first gained its firm ground and starting point through the Kantian philosophy, with its thought of the will's infinite autonomy. But if we hold onto the merely moral standpoint and do not go on to the concept of ethical life, this gain is reduced to an empty formalism, and moral science is reduced to mere oratory about duty for duty's sake. From this standpoint no teaching of duties can be developed from within. One can certainly take in some material from outside and so arrive at particular duties. But from that definition of duty, as the absence of contradiction, as formal agreement with itself, which is nothing other than fixing abstract indeterminacy, we cannot move on to determine particular duties. And when such a particular content does come up for consideration as a basis for action, that principle offers no test for whether it is a duty or not. On the contrary, every unjust and immoral way of acting can be justified in this manner. — The further Kantian form, the ability of an action to be conceived as a universal maxim, does bring in the more concrete idea of a condition of things. But in itself it contains no further principle than that absence of contradiction and that formal identity. — That there is no property involves in itself no more of a contradiction than that this or that single people, family and so on does not exist, or that no human beings live at all. If it is otherwise fixed in itself and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected, then it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder. A contradiction can arise only with something, that is, with a content that lies beforehand as a firm principle at the base. Only in relation to such a content is an action either in agreement with it or in contradiction. But duty, which is supposed to be willed only as such and not for the sake of any content, is the formal identity, and that identity consists precisely in shutting out all content and definition.
I have worked out the further antinomies and shapes of the perpetual ought, in which the merely moral standpoint of relation only goes round and round, unable to resolve them or to get beyond the ought, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, page 550 and following. Compare also the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 420 and following.
About this section
Section 135 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 137 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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