Section 126
Original German
126 Meine so wie der Andern Besonderheit ist aber nur überhaupt ein Recht, insofern ich ein Freyes bin. Sie kann sich daher nicht im Widerspruche dieser ihrer substantiellen Grundlage behaupten und eine Absicht meines Wohls, so wie des Wohls anderer, — in welchem Falle sie insbesondere eine moralische Absicht genannt wird, — kann nicht eine unrechtliche Handlung rechtfertigen.
Es ist vorzüglich eine der verderbten Maximen unsrer Zeit, die theils aus der Vorkantischen Periode des guten Herzens herstammt, und z. B. die Quintessenz bekannter rührender dramatischer Darstellungen ausmacht, bey unrechtlichen Handlungen für die sogenannte moralische Absicht zu interessiren und schlechte Subjecte mit einem seynsollenden guten Herzen d. i. einem solchen, welches sein eigenes Wohl und etwa auch das Wohl anderer will, vorzustellen; theils aber ist diese Lehre in gesteigerter Gestalt wieder aufgewärmt und die innere Begeisterung und das Gemüth d. i. die Form der Besonderheit als solche, zum Kriterium dessen, was Recht, Vernünftig und Vortrefflich sey, gemacht worden, so daß Verbrechen und deren leitende Gedanken, wenn es die plattsten, hohlsten Einfälle und thörigtsten Meynungen seyen, darum rechtlich, vernünftig und vortrefflich wären, weil sie aus dem Gemüthe und aus der Begeisterung kommen; das Nähere s. unten §. 140. Anm. — Es ist übrigens der Standpunkt zu beachten; auf dem Recht und Wohl hier betrachtet sind, nemlich als formelles Recht und als besonderes Wohl des Einzelnen; das sogenannte allgemeine Beste, das Wohl des Staates d. i. das Recht des wirklichen concreten Geistes, ist eine ganz andere Sphäre, in der das formelle Recht ebenso ein untergeordnetes Moment ist, als das besondere Wohl und die Glückseligkeit des Einzelnen. Daß es einer der häufigen Misgriffe der Abstraction ist, das Privatrecht wie das Privatwohl, als an und für sich gegen das Allgemeine des Staats geltend zu machen, ist schon oben bemerkt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
126 My particularity, like that of others, is a right only insofar as I am a free being. It cannot, therefore, assert itself in contradiction with this its substantial foundation, and an intention for my welfare, as for the welfare of others — in which case it is called in particular a moral intention — cannot justify a wrongful action.
It is pre-eminently one of the corrupt maxims of our time, which derives partly from the pre-Kantian period of the good heart and makes up, for example, the quintessence of well-known touching dramatic representations, to interest us, in the case of wrongful actions, in the so-called moral intention, and to present bad subjects with a supposedly good heart, that is, one that wills its own welfare and perhaps also the welfare of others; and partly this doctrine has been warmed up again in heightened form, and inner enthusiasm and the heart, that is, the form of particularity as such, have been made the criterion of what is right, rational, and excellent, so that crimes and the thoughts guiding them, even if they be the flattest, emptiest fancies and most foolish opinions, would be right, rational, and excellent for the very reason that they come from the heart and from enthusiasm; for more on this see below § 140, Remark. — Moreover, the standpoint on which right and welfare are here considered must be noted, namely as formal right and as the particular welfare of the individual; the so-called general good, the welfare of the state, that is, the right of the actual concrete spirit, is a wholly different sphere, in which formal right is just as subordinate a moment as the particular welfare and happiness of the individual. That it is one of the frequent errors of abstraction to make private right, like private welfare, count as in and for itself against the universal of the state has already been remarked above.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
126 My particularity and that of others is a right only insofar as I am a free being. It cannot therefore assert itself in contradiction to this, its substantial foundation. An intention to promote my welfare, or the welfare of others — in which case it is especially called a moral intention — cannot justify a wrongful action.
It is one of the corrupt maxims of our time, partly descended from the pre-Kantian period of the good heart, and forming for example the quintessence of well-known touching dramas, to take an interest in the so-called moral intention behind wrongful actions, and to present bad characters with a supposedly good heart, that is, a heart that wants its own welfare and perhaps also the welfare of others. Partly, though, this doctrine has been warmed up again in an exaggerated form. Inner enthusiasm and feeling, that is, the form of particularity as such, have been made the test of what is right, rational and excellent. The result is that crimes, and the thoughts that guide them, even if they are the flattest, emptiest fancies and the most foolish opinions, would be right, rational and excellent because they come from feeling and enthusiasm. For more on this see § 140, Remark, below. — Note, moreover, the standpoint from which right and welfare are considered here: namely, as formal right and as the particular welfare of the individual. What is called the common good, the welfare of the state, that is, the right of actual, concrete spirit, is an entirely different sphere. In it formal right is just as much a subordinate moment as the particular welfare and happiness of the individual. That it is one of the frequent mistakes of abstraction to assert private right and private welfare as valid in and for themselves against the universal of the state has already been noted above.
About this section
Section 126 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 128 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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