Section 10
Original German
10 Dieser Inhalt oder die unterschiedene Willensbestimmung ist zunächst unmittelbar. So ist der Wille nur an sich frey, oder für uns, oder es ist überhaupt der Wille in seinem Begriffe. Erst indem der Wille sich selbst zum Gegenstande hat, ist er für sich was er an sich ist.
Die Endlichkeit besteht nach dieser Bestimmung darin, daß, was etwas an sich oder seinem Begriffe nach ist, eine von dem verschiedene Existenz oder Erscheinung ist, was es für sich ist; so ist z. B. das abstracte Außereinander der Natur an sich der Raum, für sich aber die Zeit. Es ist hierüber das Gedoppelte zu bemerken, erstens, daß, weil das Wahre nur die Idee ist, wenn man einen Gegenstand oder Bestimmung, nur wie er an sich oder im Begriffe ist, erfaßt, man ihn noch nicht in seiner Wahrheit hat; alsdann, daß etwas, wie es als Begriff oder an sich ist, gleichfalls existirt und diese Existenz eine eigene Gestalt des Gegenstandes ist, (wie vorhin der Raum) die Trennung des Ansich- und Fürsichseyns, die im Endlichen vorhanden ist, macht zugleich sein bloßes Daseyn oder Erscheinung aus, — (wie unmittelbar ein Beyspiel am natürlichen Willen und dann formellen Rechte u. s. f. vorkommen wird). Der Verstand bleibt bey dem bloßen Ansichseyn stehen und nennt so die Freyheit nach diesem Ansichseyn ein Vermögen, wie sie denn so in der That nur die Möglichkeit ist. Aber er sieht diese Bestimmung als absolute und perennirende an und nimmt ihre Beziehung auf das, was sie will, überhaupt auf ihre Realität, nur für eine Anwendung auf einen gegebenen Stoff an, die nicht zum Wesen der Freyheit selbst gehöre; er hat es auf diese Weise nur mit dem Abstractum, nicht mit ihrer Idee und Wahrheit zu thun.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
10 This content, or differentiated determination of the will, is initially immediate. Thus the will is free only in itself, or for us; in general, it is the will in its concept. Only when the will has itself as its object is it for itself what it is in itself.
According to this determination, finitude consists in this: what something is in itself, or according to its concept, is an existence or appearance different from what it is for itself. Thus, for example, nature’s abstract externality is in itself space, but for itself time. Two things must be observed here. First, because only the Idea is the truth, when we grasp an object or determination merely as it is in itself or in its concept, we do not yet have it in its truth. Second, something as it is as concept, or in itself, likewise exists, and this existence is a distinctive configuration of the object—as space in the preceding example. The separation of being-in-itself and being-for-itself that is present in the finite also constitutes its mere existence or appearance—as will shortly be exemplified in the natural will, and then in formal right, and so forth. The understanding stops at mere being-in-itself and accordingly calls freedom, in this being-in-itself, a faculty; as such, it is indeed only possibility. But the understanding regards this determination as absolute and permanent, and takes freedom’s relation to what it wills, to its reality in general, to be merely an application to a given material, not belonging to the essence of freedom itself. In this way it deals only with the abstraction, not with freedom’s Idea and truth.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
10 This content, or the differentiated determination of the will, is initially immediate. So the will is free only in itself, or for us. In general, it is the will in its concept. Only when the will has itself as its object is it for itself what it is in itself.
According to this determination, finitude consists in the fact that what something is in itself, or according to its concept, has a different existence or appearance from what it is for itself. For example, nature's abstract externality is in itself space, but for itself time. Two points must be noted here. First, because only the Idea is true, if we grasp an object or determination only as it is in itself, or in the concept, we do not yet have it in its truth. Second, something also exists as it is as concept, or in itself. This existence is a distinct shape of the object, like space in the preceding example. The separation of being-in-itself and being-for-itself found in what is finite also makes up its mere existence or appearance. An example will appear immediately in the natural will, then in formal right, and so on. The understanding stops at mere being-in-itself and, on this basis, calls freedom a capacity. As such it is indeed only a possibility. But the understanding regards this determination as absolute and permanent. It takes freedom's relationship to what it wills, and to its reality in general, only as an application to a given material, an application supposedly not belonging to the essence of freedom itself. In this way, it deals only with the abstraction, not with freedom's Idea and truth.
About this section
Section 10 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 12 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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