Book 8

CHAPTER 8.0

SECTION 8.0.1Compelled by your persistent urgings, Balbus, and because my daily refusal seemed to offer not an excuse based on the difficulty of the task but a plea born of indolence, I have undertaken a most difficult enterprise.

SECTION 8.0.2I have linked Caesar’s commentaries on his achievements in Gaul, though my preceding and subsequent writings cannot compare with his, and I have completed his last, unfinished work, continuing from the events at Alexandria to the close—not, indeed, of the civil dissension, of which we see no end, but of Caesar’s life.

SECTION 8.0.3Would that those who read these commentaries could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them; then I might more readily escape the charge of folly and arrogance for having interposed my work among Caesar’s writings.

SECTION 8.0.4For all are agreed that nothing has ever been produced by others with such care that it is not surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries.

SECTION 8.0.5They were published so that writers might not lack knowledge of such momentous events, and in the judgment of everyone they are so highly esteemed that Caesar seems to have taken away from writers the opportunity to treat the subject rather than furnished it to them.

SECTION 8.0.6Yet our admiration for this achievement is greater than that of others; for others know how well and faultlessly he wrote them, but we know also how easily and swiftly he completed them.

SECTION 8.0.7Caesar possessed not only the highest skill and elegance in writing, but also the most exact knowledge of how to explain his own designs.

SECTION 8.0.8Nor did it even fall to my lot to take part in the Alexandrian and African wars. Although these wars are partly known to us from Caesar’s conversation, still we listen in one way to things that captivate us by their novelty or wonder, and in another to things that we intend to relate as testimony.

SECTION 8.0.9But plainly, while I gather every possible excuse for not being compared with Caesar, I incur this very charge of arrogance by imagining that anyone could judge me capable of comparison with him. Farewell.

CHAPTER 8.1

SECTION 8.1.1Although all Gaul had been subdued, Caesar had allowed no respite from warfare since the previous summer and wished his soldiers to recover from such great exertions in the repose of winter quarters; yet reports came that several states were at that very time reviving plans for war and forming conspiracies.

SECTION 8.1.2A plausible reason for this was given: all the Gauls had learned that no multitude gathered in a single place could resist the Romans; but if several states began separate wars at the same time, the army of the Roman people would not have sufficient assistance, time, or forces to pursue them all. No state ought to refuse whatever hardship fell to its lot if, by causing such delay, it could enable the rest to reclaim their liberty.

CHAPTER 8.2

SECTION 8.2.1To prevent this belief of the Gauls from becoming established, Caesar places his quaestor Marcus Antonius in command of his own winter quarters. On the day before the Kalends of January, he himself sets out from the town of Bibracte with a cavalry escort for the Thirteenth Legion, which he had stationed in the territory of the Bituriges not far from the borders of the Aedui, and joins to it the Eleventh Legion, which had been quartered nearest.

SECTION 8.2.2Leaving two cohorts from each legion to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of the army into the most fertile districts of the Bituriges. Since they possessed an extensive territory and several towns, the winter quarters of a single legion had been unable to restrain them from preparing for war and forming conspiracies.

CHAPTER 8.3

SECTION 8.3.1Caesar’s sudden arrival produced the inevitable result among people unprepared and scattered abroad: while they cultivated the countryside without any fear, they were overwhelmed by the cavalry before they could take refuge in the towns.

SECTION 8.3.2For even the customary sign of an enemy incursion, ordinarily perceived from the burning of buildings, had been eliminated by Caesar’s prohibition, lest he lack abundant forage and grain if he wished to advance farther, or the enemy be alarmed by the fires.

SECTION 8.3.3After many thousands of men had been captured, the terrified Bituriges who had managed to escape the Romans’ first arrival fled into neighboring states, trusting either in private ties of hospitality or in the partnership of their designs.

SECTION 8.3.4In vain: by forced marches Caesar confronts them everywhere and gives no state time to consider the safety of others rather than its own. By such speed he both kept loyal allies steadfast and brought the wavering, through fear, to accept terms of peace.

SECTION 8.3.5When such terms were offered, the Bituriges saw that Caesar’s clemency left open to them a return to his friendship, and that neighboring states had surrendered hostages without suffering any punishment and had been received under his protection; they therefore did the same.

CHAPTER 8.4

SECTION 8.4.1In recognition of such great labor and endurance—for throughout the winter days the soldiers had persevered most zealously in their exertions amid the most difficult marches and intolerable cold—Caesar promises to grant each soldier two hundred sesterces and each centurion two thousand as prize money. He then sends the legions back into winter quarters and returns to Bibracte on the fortieth day.

SECTION 8.4.2While he is there administering justice, the Bituriges send envoys to ask his aid against the Carnutes, whom they accuse of having made war upon them.

SECTION 8.4.3On learning of this, although he had remained in winter quarters no more than eighteen days, he leads the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions out of their quarters on the Arar, where, as the preceding commentary has shown, they had been stationed to facilitate the grain supply. Thus he sets out with two legions to pursue the Carnutes.

CHAPTER 8.5

SECTION 8.5.1When word of the army reaches the enemy, the Carnutes, warned by the disaster of the others, abandon the villages and towns where they had been living through the winter in small buildings hastily erected to meet immediate necessity—for, having recently been conquered, they had relinquished several towns—and flee in all directions.

SECTION 8.5.2Because Caesar is unwilling to expose the soldiers to the exceedingly violent storms that broke out at that very time, he pitches camp in Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes, and crowds the soldiers partly into the houses of the Gauls and partly into shelters quickly built by laying thatch over the tents.

SECTION 8.5.3Nevertheless, he sends the cavalry and auxiliary infantry in every direction in which the enemy are said to have gone—and not in vain;

SECTION 8.5.4for our men usually return with great booty. Overwhelmed by the hardships of winter and the terror of danger, driven from shelter, afraid to remain long in any place, and unable to find protection from the most violent storms beneath the cover of the forests, the Carnutes scatter into neighboring states after losing a large part of their people.

CHAPTER 8.6

SECTION 8.6.1At this most difficult season of the year, Caesar was content to disperse the bands that were assembling, so that no beginning of war might arise; and, so far as calculation could determine, he had ascertained that no major war could be organized before the summer campaign. He therefore stations Gaius Trebonius with the two legions he had with him in winter quarters at Cenabum;

SECTION 8.6.2but Caesar himself was repeatedly informed by embassies from the Remi that the Bellovaci, who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in martial reputation, together with their neighboring states, were raising armies under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacan and Commius the Atrebatian and gathering them in one place, intending to invade in full force the territory of the Suessiones, who had been placed under the authority of the Remi. He judged it a matter not only of his honor but also of his security that allies who had rendered the republic outstanding service should suffer no disaster;

SECTION 8.6.3he therefore summons the Eleventh Legion once more from winter quarters, sends a dispatch to Gaius Fabius directing him to bring the two legions under his command into the territory of the Suessiones, and calls for one of Labienus’s two legions.

SECTION 8.6.4Thus, as the convenience of their winter quarters and the conduct of the war required, he imposed the burden of campaigning upon the legions in turn, while subjecting himself to unremitting exertion.

CHAPTER 8.7

SECTION 8.7.1After assembling these forces, he marches against the Bellovaci and pitches camp in their territory. He sends cavalry squadrons in every direction to capture men from whom he might learn the enemy’s plans.

SECTION 8.7.2The cavalry accomplish their task and report that only a few men have been found in the buildings, and that these had remained not for the purpose of cultivating the fields—for there had been a careful migration from every quarter—but had been sent back to act as scouts.

SECTION 8.7.3When Caesar asked them where the main body of the Bellovaci was and what their design might be, he learned that all the Bellovaci capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place,

SECTION 8.7.4as had the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Veliocasses, and Atrebates; that they had chosen for their camp a commanding position in a forest surrounded by marshland; and that they had carried all their baggage into the more distant woods.

SECTION 8.7.5He learned that several chiefs were responsible for the war, but that the multitude obeyed Correus above all, because they knew that he held the name of the Roman people in the deepest hatred.

SECTION 8.7.6A few days earlier, Commius the Atrebatian had departed from this camp to bring in German auxiliaries, whose territory was close at hand and whose numbers were boundless.

SECTION 8.7.7The Bellovaci had resolved, with the consent of all their chiefs and the eager approval of the common people, that if Caesar came with three legions, as was reported, they would offer battle, lest they later be compelled to fight his whole army on harsher and more wretched terms;

SECTION 8.7.8but if he brought larger forces, they would remain in the position they had chosen and, by ambushes, prevent the Romans from obtaining forage—which at that season was both scanty and widely scattered—grain, and all other supplies.

CHAPTER 8.8

SECTION 8.8.1When Caesar learned this from several sources whose reports agreed, and judged that the plans described to him were full of prudence and far removed from the usual rashness of barbarians, he resolved to shape all his measures so that the enemy, despising the small size of his force, might come out to offer battle all the sooner.

SECTION 8.8.2For he had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth, veteran legions of extraordinary valor, and the Eleventh, composed of picked young men of the highest promise. Yet even though it was now in its eighth year of service, it had not, by comparison with the others, acquired the same reputation for long experience and valor.

SECTION 8.8.3Accordingly, after summoning a council and laying before it all the reports that had reached him, he strengthens the confidence of the troops.

SECTION 8.8.4In the hope that the number of three legions might perhaps entice the enemy into battle, he arranges the order of march so that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions should go before all the baggage, while the Eleventh should close the column of the entire baggage train—which was nevertheless moderate, as is customary on active campaigns—so that the enemy might see no appearance of a larger force than they themselves had demanded.

SECTION 8.8.5With his column thus arranged in a formation nearly square, he brings the army into the enemy’s sight sooner than they expected.

CHAPTER 8.9

SECTION 8.9.1When the Gauls—whose plans had been reported to Caesar as full of confidence—suddenly saw the legions advancing in ordered ranks and at a measured pace as though already drawn up for battle, whether from fear of the encounter, surprise at his sudden arrival, or a desire to await the revelation of our plan, they drew up their forces before their camp and did not descend from the higher ground.

SECTION 8.9.2Although Caesar had desired battle, he was nevertheless astonished at the enemy’s vast numbers and pitched his camp opposite theirs, with a valley between them that was deeper than it was broad.

SECTION 8.9.3He orders this camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high and a parapet built upon it in proportion to its height; a double trench, each fifteen feet wide, to be sunk with perpendicular sides; and numerous towers, three stories high, to be erected and connected by bridges laid across and floored over, their fronts protected by wicker breastworks. Thus the defenses would be guarded against the enemy by a double trench and a double line of defenders,

SECTION 8.9.4of whom one line, stationed upon the bridges, would be safer because of its height and could therefore hurl its missiles more boldly and to a greater distance, while the other, placed upon the rampart itself and nearer the enemy, would be protected by the bridge from falling missiles. He fitted the gates with doors and higher towers.

CHAPTER 8.10

SECTION 8.10.1This fortification had a twofold purpose. Caesar hoped that the scale of the works and the appearance of his own fear would inspire confidence in the barbarians; and since it was necessary to travel some distance to obtain forage and grain, he saw that the camp could be defended by a small force through the strength of the fortifications alone.

SECTION 8.10.2Meanwhile, small parties frequently dashed out from either side and skirmished between the two camps, with the marsh lying between them. Sometimes, however, our Gallic and German auxiliaries crossed this marsh and pressed the enemy more vigorously; at other times the enemy crossed it in turn and drove our men back some distance.

SECTION 8.10.3Moreover, in the daily foraging expeditions—as was bound to happen when fodder had to be sought from scattered and widely separated farmsteads—the foragers, dispersed amid difficult ground, were surrounded;

SECTION 8.10.4and although this caused our men only moderate losses in pack animals and servants, it encouraged the barbarians in their foolish designs, all the more because Commius, whom I have said had gone to summon aid from the Germans, had arrived with cavalry. Though they numbered no more than five hundred, the barbarians nevertheless drew confidence from the coming of the Germans.

CHAPTER 8.11

SECTION 8.11.1When Caesar observed that for several days the enemy had remained in a camp protected by a marsh and the natural strength of the ground, that their camp could not be stormed without a ruinous battle, and that the position could not be enclosed by fortifications except by a larger army, he sent a letter to Trebonius, ordering him to summon with all possible speed the Thirteenth Legion, which was wintering among the Bituriges under the lieutenant Titus Sextius, and then to come to him by forced marches with three legions;

SECTION 8.11.2he himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, Lingones, and the other states, a great number of whom he had called out, by turns to protect the foraging parties and withstand sudden attacks by the enemy.

CHAPTER 8.12

SECTION 8.12.1As this happened every day, and vigilance had now been diminished by familiarity, as usually occurs with the passage of time, the Bellovaci, after learning the regular stations of our cavalry, selected a force of infantry

SECTION 8.12.2and placed it in ambush among the woods; on the following day they sent cavalry to the same place, first to draw our men out, and then to attack them when they had been surrounded.

SECTION 8.12.3The misfortune fell by lot upon the Remi, whose turn it was to perform that day’s duty. For when they suddenly caught sight of the enemy’s cavalry and, being superior in numbers, despised their small force, they pursued too eagerly and were surrounded on every side by infantry.

SECTION 8.12.4Thrown into confusion by this, they retreated more rapidly than is customary in a cavalry engagement, after losing Vertiscus, the leading man of their state and commander of their cavalry;

SECTION 8.12.5although on account of his age he could scarcely sit a horse, he had nevertheless, in accordance with Gallic custom, neither pleaded age as an excuse for declining the command nor been willing for the battle to be fought without him.

SECTION 8.12.6The spirits of the enemy were swollen and inflamed by their success in the engagement and by the death of the chief and cavalry commander of the Remi,

SECTION 8.12.7while our men were warned by their loss to reconnoiter the ground more carefully before posting their guards and to pursue a retreating enemy with greater restraint.

CHAPTER 8.13

SECTION 8.13.1Meanwhile, the daily engagements fought at the fords and crossing places of the marsh, in sight of both camps, did not cease.

SECTION 8.13.2In one of these encounters the Germans, whom Caesar had brought across the Rhine for the express purpose of fighting intermingled with the cavalry, crossed the marsh in a body with unusual resolution, killed the few who resisted, and pressed their pursuit of the remaining multitude with exceptional persistence. Not only those who were being overwhelmed at close quarters or wounded from a distance, but even those who had customarily remained farther back in reserve, took fright and fled disgracefully,

SECTION 8.13.3nor, though they repeatedly lost the higher ground, did they end their flight until they had either reached their own camp or, in some cases, been driven by shame to escape still farther away.

SECTION 8.13.4The danger in which these men were placed so disordered the entire force that it was hard to judge whether they were more insolent after the slightest success or more timid after a moderate reverse.

CHAPTER 8.14

SECTION 8.14.1After spending several days in the same camp, the leaders of the Bellovaci learned that the legions and the lieutenant Gaius Trebonius had drawn nearer. Fearing a siege like that of Alesia, they sent away by night all whom they regarded as inferior in age or strength, or who were unarmed, together with the rest of their baggage.

SECTION 8.14.2While they were disentangling this disordered and confused column—for even when the Gauls travel light, a great multitude of wagons customarily follows them—they were overtaken by daylight and drew up their armed forces before their camp, to prevent the Romans from beginning the pursuit before the long baggage train had moved farther ahead.

SECTION 8.14.3But Caesar judged that the enemy should not be attacked while offering resistance upon so steep an ascent, yet that the legions should be brought close enough to make it impossible for the barbarians to leave the place without danger while his soldiers pressed upon them.

SECTION 8.14.4Accordingly, seeing that the two camps were separated by a difficult marsh, whose troublesome crossing might delay the speed of pursuit, and observing that a ridge stretching beyond the marsh almost to the enemy’s camp was divided from their position by a shallow valley, he laid bridges across the marsh, led the legions over, and quickly reached the level summit of the ridge, which was protected on either flank by sloping ground.

SECTION 8.14.5There he drew up the legions, reached the far end of the ridge, and established his battle line at a point from which missiles discharged by artillery could be hurled into the enemy’s massed formations.

CHAPTER 8.15

SECTION 8.15.1The barbarians, trusting in the natural strength of their position and not refusing battle if the Romans should attempt to climb the hill, were unable to send their divided forces away little by little for fear that, once dispersed, they would be thrown into confusion; they therefore remained in battle formation.

SECTION 8.15.2When Caesar perceived their obstinacy, he drew up twenty cohorts and, after marking out a camp on the spot, ordered it to be fortified.

SECTION 8.15.3When the works were completed, he stationed the legions in formation before the rampart and posted the cavalry on guard with their horses bridled.

SECTION 8.15.4When the Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready to pursue, and realized that they could not pass the night or remain any longer in the same place without danger, they devised the following plan for retreating.

SECTION 8.15.5They passed bundles of straw and brushwood from hand to hand—for these materials were exceedingly abundant in their camp—and placed them before the battle line where they had been sitting, since Caesar’s earlier commentaries have explained that the Gauls customarily sit while drawn up for battle. At the very end of the day, upon a signal announced throughout the ranks, they set them all on fire at once.

SECTION 8.15.6Thus a continuous wall of flame suddenly concealed all their forces from the Romans’ sight. The moment this happened, the barbarians fled at full speed.

CHAPTER 8.16

SECTION 8.16.1Although Caesar could not see the enemy’s departure because the fires stood between them, he nevertheless suspected that the plan had been adopted to cover a retreat. He advanced the legions and sent cavalry squadrons in pursuit; but he himself proceeded more slowly, fearing an ambush, lest the enemy perhaps remain in the same place and try to entice our men onto unfavorable ground.

SECTION 8.16.2The cavalry were afraid to enter the thickest smoke and flames; and if any ventured in too eagerly, they could scarcely see even the heads of their own horses. Fearing an ambush, they therefore gave the Bellovaci every opportunity to retreat unmolested.

SECTION 8.16.3Thus, by a flight equally full of fear and cunning, the enemy advanced no more than ten miles without any loss and pitched camp in a strongly fortified position.

SECTION 8.16.4From there they frequently placed cavalry and infantry in ambush and inflicted heavy losses upon the Romans during their foraging expeditions.

CHAPTER 8.17

SECTION 8.17.1When this happened repeatedly, Caesar learned from a prisoner that Correus, the leader of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of the bravest infantry and one thousand cavalry from the whole body, intending to place them in ambush at a location to which he suspected the Romans would send men because of its abundance of grain and fodder.

SECTION 8.17.2Upon learning of this plan, Caesar led out more legions than usual and sent ahead the cavalry, which he customarily dispatched to protect the foragers. Among them he interspersed lightly armed auxiliaries, while he himself approached as closely as possible with the legions.

CHAPTER 8.18

SECTION 8.18.1The enemy posted in ambush had chosen for the action a plain extending no more than a thousand paces in any direction and protected on every side by woods or by a river exceedingly difficult to cross; they surrounded it with their ambush as though with a hunting enclosure.

SECTION 8.18.2Our men, having discovered the enemy’s plan, were ready in spirit and arms for battle. Since the legions were following behind, they would refuse no engagement, and so entered the place squadron by squadron.

SECTION 8.18.3At their arrival, Correus thought that an opportunity for action had been offered him. He first showed himself with a few men and charged the nearest squadrons.

SECTION 8.18.4Our men resolutely withstood the attackers’ charge and did not crowd together in large numbers at any one point, a thing that often happens in cavalry engagements through fear and causes losses by the very density of the men.

CHAPTER 8.19

SECTION 8.19.1While our squadrons, posted at intervals, fought in turn and did not allow their comrades to be surrounded on the flanks, the rest burst from the woods as Correus continued the fight.

SECTION 8.19.2A fierce and shifting battle followed. After it had continued for some time with the issue evenly balanced, the infantry gradually advanced from the woods in ordered ranks and forced our cavalry to give ground. They were swiftly aided by the lightly armed infantry whom I have said had been sent ahead of the legions; these men took their places among our squadrons and fought resolutely.

SECTION 8.19.3For some time the struggle continued with equal intensity. Then, as the nature of the fighting required, those who had withstood the first assaults of the ambush began to gain the upper hand for the very reason that they had suffered no loss through being taken unawares by the ambushers.

SECTION 8.19.4Meanwhile the legions drew nearer, and at the same moment repeated reports reached both our men and the enemy that the commander was at hand with his forces drawn up for battle.

SECTION 8.19.5When our men learned this, they trusted in the support of the cohorts and fought with the utmost vigor, lest, if they acted too slowly, they should seem to have shared the glory of victory with the legions;

SECTION 8.19.6the enemy lost heart and sought escape by different routes. In vain: they themselves were trapped by the very difficulties of the ground with which they had intended to confine the Romans.

SECTION 8.19.7Defeated and shattered, with the greater part of their force lost, they nevertheless fled in panic, some seeking the woods and others the river; yet even in flight they were cut down by our men, who pursued them vigorously.

SECTION 8.19.8Meanwhile Correus, unconquered by any disaster, could not be induced to leave the battle and seek the woods, or to surrender when our men called upon him to do so. Instead, by fighting with the utmost courage and wounding several men, he forced the victorious Romans, inflamed with anger, to shower their missiles upon him.

CHAPTER 8.20

SECTION 8.20.1After the action had ended in this manner, Caesar advanced over the fresh traces of the battle. Believing that after so great a disaster the defeated enemy would abandon their camp as soon as the news arrived—a camp said to be no more than about eight miles from the scene of the slaughter—he led his army across the river and pressed onward, although he saw that the crossing presented an obstacle.

SECTION 8.20.2But the Bellovaci and the other states suddenly received from the rout only a few survivors, and those wounded, who had escaped disaster under cover of the woods. With everything against them, their defeat known, Correus slain, their cavalry and bravest infantry lost, and the Romans believed to be approaching, they suddenly summoned a council by trumpet call and cried out with one voice that envoys and hostages should be sent to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.21

SECTION 8.21.1When all had approved this plan, Commius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries for that war.

SECTION 8.21.2The others immediately sent envoys to Caesar and begged him to be satisfied with the punishment the enemy had suffered—a punishment which, in keeping with his clemency and humanity, he would certainly never have inflicted had he been able to impose it upon them while their strength was unimpaired and without a battle.

SECTION 8.21.3The power of the Bellovaci, they said, had been crushed in the cavalry engagement; many thousands of their chosen infantry had perished, and scarcely even the bearers of the news of the slaughter had escaped.

SECTION 8.21.4Yet amid so great a calamity the Bellovaci had gained one considerable advantage from the battle: Correus, the author of the war and instigator of the multitude, had been killed. For while he lived, the senate had never possessed as much power in the state as the ignorant common people.

CHAPTER 8.22

SECTION 8.22.1In answer to the envoys’ entreaties, Caesar reminded them that at the same time in the previous year the Bellovaci and the other states of Gaul had undertaken war; that of them all, the Bellovaci had persisted most obstinately in their purpose and had not been brought to their senses by the surrender of the others.

SECTION 8.22.2He knew and understood, he said, that the blame for wrongdoing was most easily laid upon the dead. But no man could wield such power that, against the will of the leading men, in the face of the senate’s opposition, and despite the resistance of every honorable citizen, he could incite and conduct a war with the feeble support of the common people. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment they had brought upon themselves.

CHAPTER 8.23

SECTION 8.23.1The following night the envoys carried his answer back to their people and assembled the hostages. Envoys came hurrying in from the other states that had been watching to see what fate would befall the Bellovaci;

SECTION 8.23.2they gave hostages and carried out his commands, with the exception of Commius, whose fear prevented him from entrusting his safety to any man’s pledged word.

SECTION 8.23.3For in the preceding year, while Caesar was administering justice in Cisalpine Gaul, Titus Labienus had learned that Commius was stirring up the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar, and had judged that his treachery could be suppressed without any breach of faith.

SECTION 8.23.4Since he did not think that Commius would come if summoned to the camp, and did not wish to make him more cautious by attempting it, he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to arrange to have him killed under the pretense of a conference. For this purpose he assigned him centurions specially chosen as suitable for the task.

SECTION 8.23.5When they came to the conference and Volusenus, as agreed, seized Commius by the hand, the centurion—either unnerved by the unfamiliar undertaking or quickly prevented by Commius’s attendants—was unable to kill him. With the first stroke of his sword, however, he dealt him a grievous wound in the head.

SECTION 8.23.6Swords were drawn on both sides, but both parties intended less to fight than to scatter and escape: our men because they believed that Commius had received a mortal wound, and the Gauls because, now that they had discovered the ambush, they feared more than they could see. After this, Commius was said to have resolved never again to come within sight of any Roman.

CHAPTER 8.24

SECTION 8.24.1After defeating the most warlike peoples, Caesar saw that no state now remained that was preparing war in order to resist him, though some people were leaving the towns and fleeing from the countryside to escape his authority for the moment. He therefore decided to disperse his army in several directions.

SECTION 8.24.2He attached the quaestor Marcus Antonius to himself with the Twelfth Legion. He sent the lieutenant Gaius Fabius with twenty-five cohorts to the farthest opposite region of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were under arms and believed that the two legions commanded by the lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who was in those districts, were not sufficiently strong.

SECTION 8.24.3He summoned Titus Labienus to join him, but sent the Fifteenth Legion, which had been wintering with Labienus, into Gallia Togata to protect the colonies of Roman citizens, lest some disaster like that which had befallen the people of Tergeste the previous summer should result from an incursion by the barbarians; for they had been overwhelmed by a sudden raid and assault.

SECTION 8.24.4He himself set out to ravage and lay waste the territories of Ambiorix. Having abandoned hope of bringing the terrified fugitive into his power, he considered it the course most consistent with his dignity to devastate Ambiorix’s lands so thoroughly of inhabitants, buildings, and livestock that, hated by his own people, if fortune left any of them alive, Ambiorix would have no return to his state after such overwhelming calamities.

CHAPTER 8.25

SECTION 8.25.1After dispatching either legions or auxiliary troops into every part of Ambiorix’s territory and laying waste to everything with slaughter, fire, and pillage, killing or capturing a great number of people, Caesar sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri,

SECTION 8.25.2whose state, hardened by daily warfare because of its proximity to Germany, differed little from the Germans in its way of life and savagery, and never carried out commands unless compelled by an army.

CHAPTER 8.26

SECTION 8.26.1Meanwhile Gaius Caninius, Caesar’s lieutenant, learned from letters and messengers sent by Duratius—who had remained steadfastly loyal to Rome, although a certain part of his state had revolted—that a great host of the enemy had assembled in the territory of the Pictones; he therefore hastened to the town of Lemonum.

SECTION 8.26.2As he approached it, he learned more certainly from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and besieged by many thousands of men under Dumnacus, leader of the Andes. Not daring to commit his understrength legions against the enemy, he pitched camp in a fortified position.

SECTION 8.26.3When Dumnacus learned that Caninius was approaching, he turned all his forces against the legions and began an assault on the Roman camp.

SECTION 8.26.4After spending several days in the assault and suffering heavy losses among his men without being able to tear down any part of the fortifications, he returned once more to the siege of Lemonum.

CHAPTER 8.27

SECTION 8.27.1At the same time Gaius Fabius, Caesar’s lieutenant, received several states into allegiance, secured their loyalty with hostages, and was informed by a letter from Gaius Caninius Rebilus of what was taking place among the Pictones.

SECTION 8.27.2On learning of these events, he set out to bring aid to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learned of Fabius’s approach, he despaired of escape if he should be forced at one and the same time to withstand the Roman enemy advancing from outside and to keep watch upon and fear the townspeople. He therefore withdrew suddenly from the place with his forces and did not consider himself safe unless he led them across the Loire, which, because of its size, had to be crossed by a bridge.

SECTION 8.27.3Although Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy and had not joined Caninius, he had learned from men acquainted with the character of the country and felt certain that the frightened enemy would make for the place they were seeking.

SECTION 8.27.4He therefore hastened with his forces toward the same bridge and ordered the cavalry to advance only so far ahead of the column of legions that, after going that distance, they could return to the same camp without exhausting their horses.

SECTION 8.27.5In accordance with their orders, our cavalry overtook Dumnacus’s column and charged it. Attacking the enemy on the march as they fled in panic beneath the burden of their packs, they killed many and captured great booty. After this successful action they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 8.28

SECTION 8.28.1The following night Fabius sent the cavalry ahead, prepared to engage the enemy and delay the entire column until he himself could overtake it.

SECTION 8.28.2To ensure that the action was carried out according to his instructions, Quintus Atius Varus, the cavalry commander, a man of exceptional courage and judgment, exhorted his men; then, after overtaking the enemy column, he stationed some squadrons in suitable positions and joined battle with the remainder of the cavalry.

SECTION 8.28.3The enemy cavalry fought with greater boldness because their infantry came up in support, halting throughout the column and bringing aid to their horsemen against ours. A fiercely contested battle followed.

SECTION 8.28.4Our men despised an enemy they had defeated the day before, remembered that the legions were following, and, both from shame at yielding and from eagerness to finish the battle by themselves, fought with the utmost bravery against the infantry,

SECTION 8.28.5while the enemy, believing from what they had observed the day before that no further Roman forces would arrive, thought they had found an opportunity to destroy our cavalry.

CHAPTER 8.29

SECTION 8.29.1After the struggle had continued for some time with the greatest intensity, Dumnacus drew up a battle line that was to relieve his cavalry in turn, when suddenly the legions, marching in close formation, came within sight of the enemy.

SECTION 8.29.2At the sight, the squadrons of the barbarians were stunned and the enemy line struck with terror. Their baggage column fell into confusion, and with loud cries they scattered in every direction and abandoned themselves to flight.

SECTION 8.29.3But our cavalry, who shortly before had fought with the utmost bravery against an enemy still offering resistance, were now carried away by the joy of victory. Raising a great shout on every side, they surrounded the retreating foe and killed in that battle as many as the strength of their horses enabled them to pursue and the strength of their right arms to cut down.

SECTION 8.29.4Thus more than twelve thousand men were killed, some still bearing arms and others who in their terror had thrown them away, and the entire mass of the baggage was captured.

CHAPTER 8.30

SECTION 8.30.1It was learned from the survivors of this rout that Drappes the Senonian—who, as soon as Gaul had revolted, had gathered desperate men from every quarter, called slaves to freedom, enlisted exiles from every state, taken in brigands, and intercepted Roman baggage and supplies—had collected no more than two thousand men from the rout and was making for the Province. With him Lucterius the Cadurcan had formed the same design—the man who, as related in the preceding book, had intended at the beginning of the Gallic revolt to make an attack upon the Province.

SECTION 8.30.2Caninius hastened after them with two legions, lest the brigandage of these desperate men should bring great disgrace upon Rome by inflicting injury or alarm upon the Province.

CHAPTER 8.31

SECTION 8.31.1Gaius Fabius set out with the rest of the army for the territory of the Carnutes and the other states whose forces, as he knew, had been cut down in the battle he had fought against Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.2He had no doubt that their recent disaster would make them more submissive; but if they were granted space and time, they might be roused again at the instigation of the same Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.3In this undertaking Fabius enjoyed the greatest good fortune and speed in recovering the states.

SECTION 8.31.4For the Carnutes, who, though often afflicted, had never made any mention of peace, gave hostages and surrendered. The other states situated at the farthest boundaries of Gaul along the Ocean, which are called the Armorican states, were influenced by the authority of the Carnutes and, upon the arrival of Fabius and the legions, carried out his commands without delay.

SECTION 8.31.5Dumnacus, expelled from his own territory, was forced to wander and hide alone and to make for the remotest regions of Gaul.

CHAPTER 8.32

SECTION 8.32.1But when Drappes and Lucterius learned that Caninius and the legions were close at hand, they judged that they could not enter the borders of the Province without certain destruction while an army pursued them, and that they no longer had the freedom to range about and commit acts of brigandage. They therefore halted in the territory of the Cadurci.

SECTION 8.32.2There Lucterius, who in earlier and more prosperous days had possessed great influence among his fellow citizens and, as a constant advocate of revolutionary designs, still enjoyed great authority among the barbarians, occupied with his own and Drappes’s forces the town of Uxellodunum, which had been under his patronage and was exceptionally fortified by the nature of its position, and he brought the townspeople over to his side.

CHAPTER 8.33

SECTION 8.33.1Gaius Caninius came there immediately and observed that every part of the town was protected by exceedingly steep cliffs, which would have been difficult for armed men to climb even if no one defended them. He also saw that the townspeople possessed a great quantity of baggage and that, if they attempted to remove it in a secret flight, they could not escape even the legions, much less the cavalry. He therefore divided his cohorts into three bodies and established three camps on a position of the greatest elevation;

SECTION 8.33.2from these camps he began gradually, so far as his available forces permitted, to extend a rampart around the town.

CHAPTER 8.34

SECTION 8.34.1When the townspeople observed this, they were disturbed by the wretched memory of Alesia and feared a similar fate from the siege. Lucterius above all, having experienced the peril of that disaster, warned them that provision must be made for their grain supply. By unanimous agreement they therefore resolved to leave part of their forces there while they themselves set out with the unencumbered troops to bring in grain.

SECTION 8.34.2When this plan had been approved, Drappes and Lucterius left two thousand armed men behind and led the rest out of the town the following night.

SECTION 8.34.3After remaining away for a few days, they obtained a large quantity of grain from the territory of the Cadurci, some of whom wished to assist them with provisions, while others could not prevent them from taking what they needed. At times, moreover, they attacked our forts in expeditions by night.

SECTION 8.34.4For this reason Gaius Caninius delayed surrounding the entire town with fortifications, lest he should either be unable to defend the completed works or be forced to station weak garrisons at a great many points.

CHAPTER 8.35

SECTION 8.35.1After collecting a large supply of grain, Drappes and Lucterius established themselves no more than ten miles from the town, from which place they intended gradually to carry the grain into it.

SECTION 8.35.2They divided their duties between them: Drappes remained with part of the force to guard the camp, while Lucterius led the train of pack animals toward the town.

SECTION 8.35.3After posting guards along the route, at about the tenth hour of the night he began transporting the grain into the town by narrow paths through the woods.

SECTION 8.35.4When the sentries in the camps heard their noise and scouts who had been sent out reported what was taking place, Caninius swiftly led armed cohorts from the nearest forts and attacked the grain carriers at the first light of dawn.

SECTION 8.35.5Terrified by this sudden calamity, they scattered and fled toward the troops posted to protect them. As soon as our men saw these armed forces, they were spurred to attack them with greater fury and allowed not a single man of their number to be taken alive. Lucterius escaped from the slaughter with a few followers but did not return to the camp.

CHAPTER 8.36

SECTION 8.36.1After this successful action, Caninius learned from the prisoners that part of the enemy’s forces was with Drappes in a camp no more than twelve miles away.

SECTION 8.36.2When this information had been confirmed by several men, he realized that, since one leader had been put to flight, the terrified survivors could easily be overwhelmed. He considered it a great stroke of fortune that no one had escaped the slaughter and returned to the camp to carry Drappes news of the disaster they had suffered.

SECTION 8.36.3Since he saw no danger in making the attempt, he sent all the cavalry and the German infantry, men of the greatest speed, ahead to the enemy camp. He distributed one legion among his three camps and led the other with him, stripped for action.

SECTION 8.36.4When he had drawn nearer to the enemy, he learned from the scouts he had sent ahead that their camp, as is generally the custom of barbarians, had been brought down from the higher ground and placed on the banks of a river; but the Germans and the cavalry, while all the enemy remained unaware, had swooped down upon them without warning and joined battle.

SECTION 8.36.5On learning this, he brought up the legion under arms and drawn up for battle. Then, at a signal suddenly given on every side, the higher ground was seized.

SECTION 8.36.6When this happened, the Germans and the cavalry, at the sight of the legion’s standards, fought with the utmost fury. The cohorts immediately attacked from every direction, killed or captured every one of the enemy, and secured great booty. Drappes himself was captured in that battle.

CHAPTER 8.37

SECTION 8.37.1After this most successful action, in which scarcely a single soldier had been wounded, Caninius returned to besiege the townspeople;

SECTION 8.37.2and now that the external enemy had been destroyed—the enemy whose threat had previously prevented him from dividing his garrisons and enclosing the townspeople with fortifications—he ordered the work to be carried forward on every side. Gaius Fabius arrived there with his forces the following day and undertook the siege of one section of the town.

CHAPTER 8.38

SECTION 8.38.1Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, so that the Belgae might not again be given any opportunity to form revolutionary designs.

SECTION 8.38.2He himself visited the remaining states, demanded a greater number of hostages, and soothed their universal fear with words of reassurance.

SECTION 8.38.3When he came among the Carnutes, in whose state, as Caesar related in the preceding book, the outbreak of the war had originated, he perceived that their consciousness of guilt in the deed made them especially fearful. To free the state from fear as quickly as possible, he demanded that Gutruatus, the chief author of that crime and instigator of the war, be delivered up for punishment.

SECTION 8.38.4Although Gutruatus did not entrust himself even to his own fellow citizens, he was quickly hunted down through the efforts of all and brought into the camp.

SECTION 8.38.5Contrary to his own nature, Caesar was compelled to punish him by the great throng of soldiers, who held Gutruatus responsible for all the dangers and losses they had suffered in the war. He was scourged to death, and his lifeless body was then struck with the executioner’s ax.

CHAPTER 8.39

SECTION 8.39.1While there, Caesar was informed by frequent letters from Caninius of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterius and of the resolution in which the townspeople persisted.

SECTION 8.39.2Although he held their small numbers in contempt, he nevertheless judged that their obstinacy must be visited with severe punishment, lest all Gaul should believe that it had lacked not the strength to resist the Romans but only the constancy, and lest, encouraged by this example, the other states should trust in the advantages of their positions and assert their freedom,

SECTION 8.39.3since he knew that all the Gauls were aware that only one summer remained in his term of command, and that, if they could endure through it, they need fear no further danger.

SECTION 8.39.4He therefore left his lieutenant Quintus Calenus with the legions, with orders to follow by regular marches, while he himself hastened with all the cavalry to Caninius as swiftly as he could.

CHAPTER 8.40

SECTION 8.40.1When Caesar arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to everyone’s expectation, he saw that the town was enclosed by siegeworks and that the siege could not under any circumstances be abandoned. Learning from deserters that the townspeople possessed an abundant supply of grain, he began attempting to cut the enemy off from water.

SECTION 8.40.2A river divided the bottom of the valley, which almost completely encircled the mountain on which Uxellodunum stood, steep and precipitous on every side.

SECTION 8.40.3The nature of the ground prevented the river from being diverted: it flowed along the very foot of the mountain, so low that it could not be channeled away in any direction by digging trenches.

SECTION 8.40.4But the descent to it was so difficult and steep for the townspeople that, if our men opposed them, they could neither reach the river nor withdraw up the arduous ascent without wounds and danger to their lives.

SECTION 8.40.5When Caesar recognized their difficulty, he stationed archers and slingers at various points and even placed artillery opposite the easiest descents, thereby preventing the townspeople from drawing water from the river.

CHAPTER 8.41

SECTION 8.41.1Thereafter the entire body of those who went to fetch water gathered at a single place directly beneath the town wall, where a great spring gushed forth on the one side left open by the river’s circuit, at a distance of about three hundred feet.

SECTION 8.41.2While all the others wished that the townspeople might be cut off from this spring, Caesar alone saw how it could be done. Directly opposite it he began driving covered galleries up the slope and constructing a mound, amid great labor and continuous fighting.

SECTION 8.41.3For the townspeople ran down from their higher position and fought from a distance without danger to themselves, wounding many of our men as they stubbornly pressed forward. Yet our soldiers were not deterred from extending the covered galleries and overcoming the difficulties of the ground through labor and siegeworks.

SECTION 8.41.4At the same time they drove covered tunnels from the galleries toward the source of the spring, a kind of work that could be carried out without any danger and without arousing the enemy’s suspicion.

SECTION 8.41.5A mound was raised to a height of sixty feet, and on it was placed a tower ten stories high—not indeed one that could equal the town walls, for no works could accomplish that, but one that could rise above the summit of the spring.

SECTION 8.41.6When missiles were hurled from it by artillery upon the approach to the spring, the townspeople could no longer draw water without danger, and not only their cattle and pack animals but also a great multitude of the enemy were wasting away from thirst.

CHAPTER 8.42

SECTION 8.42.1Terrified by this disaster, the townspeople filled barrels with tallow, pitch, and wooden shingles, set them on fire, and rolled them down upon the siegeworks; at the same time they fought with the utmost fury, hoping by the danger of combat to deter the Romans from extinguishing the blaze.

SECTION 8.42.2Suddenly a great sheet of flame sprang up amid the siegeworks themselves. For everything hurled down the steep slope was caught beneath the sheds and the rampart and set fire to the very structures that had arrested its descent.

SECTION 8.42.3Our soldiers, on the other hand, though hard pressed by the perilous nature of the fighting and the disadvantage of their position, nevertheless endured everything with the utmost courage.

SECTION 8.42.4For the action was taking place both on high ground and in full view of our army, and a great shouting arose on either side.

SECTION 8.42.5Thus each man, making himself as conspicuous as he could so that his valor might be the more widely known and clearly attested, exposed himself to the enemy’s missiles and the flames.

CHAPTER 8.43

SECTION 8.43.1When Caesar saw that many of his men were being wounded, he ordered cohorts to climb the hill from every side of the town and, by pretending that they were about to seize the walls, to raise a shout from every quarter.

SECTION 8.43.2At this the terrified townspeople, uncertain what was happening elsewhere, recalled their armed men from the attack on the siegeworks and stationed them along the walls.

SECTION 8.43.3Thus, when the fighting had ceased, our men quickly extinguished some portions of the works that the fire had seized and cut away others.

SECTION 8.43.4Although the townspeople continued their obstinate resistance and, even after losing a great part of their number to thirst, persisted in their resolve, at last the veins feeding the spring were severed by tunnels and diverted.

SECTION 8.43.5Thereupon the never-failing spring suddenly dried up, and this plunged the townspeople into such despair of deliverance that they believed it had been brought about not by human design but by the will of the gods. Accordingly, compelled by necessity, they surrendered.

CHAPTER 8.44

SECTION 8.44.1Caesar knew that his clemency was familiar to everyone and had no fear that some act of exceptional severity might be attributed to cruelty in his nature; but since he could see no end to such designs if larger numbers adopted similar plans in different places, he judged that the rest must be deterred by an exemplary punishment.

SECTION 8.44.2Accordingly, he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms but spared their lives, so that the punishment of the wicked might be the more clearly attested.

SECTION 8.44.3Drappes, whose capture by Caninius I have related, abstained from food for several days—whether from indignation and anguish at his imprisonment or from fear of a more grievous punishment—and so died.

SECTION 8.44.4At the same time Lucterius, who, as I have written, had escaped from the battle, fell into the power of Epasnactus the Arvernian.

SECTION 8.44.5For by constantly changing his abode he entrusted himself to the good faith of many men, since he believed that he could nowhere remain for long without danger, conscious as he was how bitter an enemy he must have in Caesar.

SECTION 8.44.6Epasnactus the Arvernian, a devoted friend of the Roman people, without any hesitation put him in chains and brought him to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.45

SECTION 8.45.1Meanwhile Labienus fought a successful cavalry action in the country of the Treveri. After killing many Treveri and Germans, who denied assistance to no one against the Romans, he took their leaders alive into his power.

SECTION 8.45.2Among them was Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction both for valor and for birth, and the only one of the Aedui who up to that time had remained under arms.

CHAPTER 8.46

SECTION 8.46.1When Caesar learned of this, seeing that operations were proceeding well in every part of Gaul and judging that Gaul had been conquered and subdued in the campaigns of the preceding summers, he set out with two legions for Aquitania, which he had never visited but had partly conquered through Publius Crassus, intending to spend the remainder of the campaigning season in that part of Gaul.

SECTION 8.46.2This undertaking, like all the rest, he completed swiftly and successfully. For every state in Aquitania sent envoys to Caesar and gave him hostages.

SECTION 8.46.3After these operations, he himself set out for Narbo with an escort of cavalry, while he sent the army into winter quarters under his lieutenants.

SECTION 8.46.4He stationed four legions in Belgium under his lieutenants Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius; he sent two legions among the Aedui, whose authority he knew to be supreme throughout Gaul; he placed two among the Turones, on the borders of the Carnutes, to hold in check that entire region adjoining the Ocean; and the remaining two he stationed in the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul might be left without an army.

SECTION 8.46.5He himself remained only a few days in the province, swiftly making the rounds of all the assize districts, hearing public disputes,

SECTION 8.46.6and bestowing rewards upon those who had deserved well—for he had had the fullest opportunity to learn what spirit each man had shown during the revolt of all Gaul, which he had withstood through the loyalty and assistance of that province. When these matters were completed, he returned to the legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.

CHAPTER 8.47

SECTION 8.47.1There he learned that Commius the Atrebatian had fought an engagement against the Romans with his cavalry.

SECTION 8.47.2For when Antonius had reached his winter quarters and the state of the Atrebates remained obedient, Commius—who ever since the wounding mentioned above had made it his practice to keep himself ready for every uprising among his countrymen, so that those seeking to renew the war might not lack an instigator and leader in arms—

SECTION 8.47.3while his state obeyed the Romans, supported himself and his men by brigandage with his cavalry and, by making the roads unsafe, intercepted many convoys carrying supplies to the Roman winter quarters.

CHAPTER 8.48

SECTION 8.48.1Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, a prefect of cavalry, had been assigned to Antonius and was wintering with him. Antonius sent him to pursue the enemy cavalry.

SECTION 8.48.2Besides the remarkable courage native to him, Volusenus harbored a deep hatred of Commius, which made him the more willing to carry out his orders. Accordingly, by laying ambushes, he repeatedly attacked Commius’s horsemen and fought successful engagements.

SECTION 8.48.3At last, when the struggle became more violent and Volusenus, in his eagerness to capture Commius himself, pursued him too obstinately with only a few men, while Commius by headlong flight had drawn Volusenus far away, Commius, in his hatred of the man, appealed to the honor and assistance of his followers, begging them not to allow the wounds treacherously inflicted upon him under a pledge of good faith to go unavenged; then, wheeling his horse, he recklessly charged ahead of the rest against the prefect.

SECTION 8.48.4All his horsemen did the same, turned our small force, and pursued it.

SECTION 8.48.5Driving his horse on with the spurs, Commius brought it alongside the horse of Quadratus and, with his lance leveled, pierced Volusenus through the middle of the thigh with tremendous force.

SECTION 8.48.6When their prefect was wounded, our men did not hesitate to make a stand; wheeling their horses, they drove back the enemy.

SECTION 8.48.7When this happened, many of the enemy, overwhelmed by the violent onset of our men, were wounded; some were trampled down in flight, others were captured. Their leader escaped this disaster through the speed of his horse. The prefect, so gravely wounded that his life appeared to be in danger, was carried back to camp.

SECTION 8.48.8Commius, however, whether because his thirst for vengeance had been satisfied or because he had lost a great part of his men, sent envoys to Antonius and guaranteed with hostages that he would remain wherever Antonius prescribed and would do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 8.48.9He asked only one concession to his fear: that he should not be required to come into the presence of any Roman. Antonius judged that this request arose from a well-founded fear, granted his petition, and accepted the hostages.

SECTION 8.48.10I know that Caesar composed a separate commentary for each individual year. I did not think that I should do the same, because the following year, in the consulship of Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus, contains no events of great importance in Gaul.

SECTION 8.48.11Nevertheless, to prevent anyone from remaining ignorant of the places where Caesar and his army were at that time, I have determined to write a brief account and append it to this commentary.

CHAPTER 8.49

SECTION 8.49.1While Caesar was wintering in Belgium, he had one purpose alone: to preserve the allegiance of the states and give no one either hope or cause for taking up arms.

SECTION 8.49.2For nothing was less desirable to him than to have the necessity of waging war imposed upon him just as he was preparing to depart, lest, when he was about to withdraw his army, some war should be left behind that all Gaul would gladly undertake when there was no immediate danger.

SECTION 8.49.3Accordingly, by addressing the states with honor, conferring the greatest rewards upon their leading men, and imposing no burdens, he easily kept Gaul—wearied by so many disastrous battles—at peace under more favorable terms of submission.

CHAPTER 8.50

SECTION 8.50.1When the winter was over, Caesar, contrary to his custom, set out for Italy by the longest possible marches, so that he might personally appeal to the municipal towns and colonies to which he had commended the candidacy of his quaestor Marcus Antonius for a priesthood.

SECTION 8.50.2He exerted his influence willingly on behalf of a man very closely connected with him, whom he had sent ahead a short time before to stand for election, but he also contended vigorously against the faction and power of the few who hoped, by defeating Marcus Antonius, to undermine Caesar’s influence as his command drew to its close.

SECTION 8.50.3Although he had heard on his journey, before he reached Italy, that Antonius had already been elected augur, he nevertheless considered that he had no less valid a reason for visiting the municipal towns and colonies, in order to thank them for the numbers and devotion they had furnished in support of Antonius,

SECTION 8.50.4and at the same time to commend himself and the office he sought for the following year. For his opponents were insolently boasting that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to strip Caesar of every honor and dignity, and that Servius Galba had been denied the consulship, though he had possessed far greater influence and support among the voters, because he was connected with Caesar both by personal intimacy and by service as his lieutenant.

CHAPTER 8.51

SECTION 8.51.1Caesar’s arrival was welcomed by every municipal town and colony with incredible honor and affection.

SECTION 8.51.2For this was the first time he had returned since the great war of all Gaul. Nothing that ingenuity could devise was omitted from the adornment of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass.

SECTION 8.51.3The entire population came out to meet him with their children; sacrificial victims were slaughtered everywhere; the forums and temples were filled with couches spread for banquets, so that the rejoicing of even the most eagerly awaited triumph seemed to be anticipated. Such was the magnificence displayed by the wealthier citizens and the eagerness shown by those of humbler means.

CHAPTER 8.52

SECTION 8.52.1After traversing every region of Cisalpine Gaul, Caesar returned with the utmost speed to the army at Nemetocenna. Summoning the legions from all their winter quarters to the borders of the Treveri, he went there and held a ceremonial review and purification of the army.

SECTION 8.52.2He placed Titus Labienus in command of Cisalpine Gaul so that the region might be won over through his stronger influence in support of Caesar’s candidacy for the consulship. Caesar himself made only as many marches as he judged sufficient to change the army’s quarters for reasons of health.

SECTION 8.52.3There, although he often heard that Labienus was being approached by his enemies and was informed that a few men were plotting to use the authority of the Senate to deprive him of some part of his army, he neither believed anything against Labienus nor could be induced to act in opposition to the Senate’s authority. For he judged that, if the senators were free to express their opinions, his cause would easily prevail.

SECTION 8.52.4For Gaius Curio, tribune of the plebs, having undertaken the defense of Caesar’s cause and dignity, had often promised the Senate that, if anyone was disturbed by fear of Caesar’s armed forces, and since Pompey’s domination and military power were causing no small terror in the Forum, both men should lay down their arms and dismiss their armies; if this were done, the state would be free and master of itself.

SECTION 8.52.5He not only made this promise but even began on his own authority to call for a division of the Senate. The consuls and Pompey’s friends ordered that no division be taken and, by delaying the matter in this way, brought the proceedings to nothing.

CHAPTER 8.53

SECTION 8.53.1This was powerful evidence of the sentiment of the Senate as a whole and accorded with its earlier action. For in the preceding year Marcellus, while attacking Caesar’s dignity, had in violation of the law of Pompey and Crassus brought Caesar’s provinces before the Senate prior to the appointed time. After the speeches had been delivered, Marcellus—who sought all his own distinction by arousing hatred against Caesar—called for a division, but a full Senate rejected his proposal.

SECTION 8.53.2This did not break the spirit of Caesar’s enemies; instead, it warned them to devise stronger means of compulsion by which the Senate might be forced to approve what they themselves had determined.

CHAPTER 8.54

SECTION 8.54.1A decree of the Senate was next passed that one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompey and another by Gaius Caesar for the war against the Parthians; yet it was perfectly clear that both legions were being taken from one man.

SECTION 8.54.2For Gnaeus Pompey offered as though it belonged to his own establishment the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar, though it had been raised by a levy in Caesar’s province.

SECTION 8.54.3Nevertheless, although there could be no doubt about the intentions of his opponents, Caesar returned the legion to Pompey and ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Cisalpine Gaul, to be handed over in his own name in accordance with the Senate’s decree. In its place he sent the Thirteenth Legion into Italy to guard the posts from which the Fifteenth was being withdrawn.

SECTION 8.54.4He then assigned winter quarters to his army: he stationed Gaius Trebonius with four legions in Belgium and sent Gaius Fabius with the same number among the Aedui.

SECTION 8.54.5For he believed that Gaul would be most secure if the Belgae, whose valor was greatest, and the Aedui, whose authority was supreme, were held in check by armies. He himself set out for Italy.

CHAPTER 8.55

SECTION 8.55.1When he arrived there, he learned that the two legions he had sent back, which according to the Senate’s decree should have been dispatched to the Parthian war, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompey by the consul Gaius Marcellus and retained in Italy.

SECTION 8.55.2Although this action left no one in doubt about what was being prepared against Caesar, he nevertheless resolved to endure everything so long as any hope remained to him of settling the dispute by law rather than by waging war. He strove.

CHAPTER 8.0

SECTION 8.0.1Compelled by your persistent urging, Balbus, and because my daily refusal seemed to offer a plea not of difficulty but of laziness, I have undertaken a most difficult task.

SECTION 8.0.2I have connected the earlier and later writings of our Caesar’s account of his campaigns in Gaul, and I have completed his final, unfinished work, continuing from the events at Alexandria to the end—not, indeed, of the civil conflict, whose end we cannot see, but of Caesar’s life.

SECTION 8.0.3I only wish that those who read these works could know how reluctantly I undertook to write them, so that I might more easily escape the charge of stupidity and arrogance for having inserted myself among Caesar’s writings.

SECTION 8.0.4For everyone agrees that nothing has ever been completed by others with such labor that it is not surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries.

SECTION 8.0.5They were published so that writers would not lack knowledge of such great events, and in everyone’s judgment they are so highly praised that they seem to have taken away rather than provided writers with the opportunity to write about them.

SECTION 8.0.6Yet our admiration for this achievement is greater than everyone else’s. Others know how well and flawlessly he wrote them; we also know how easily and quickly he completed them.

SECTION 8.0.7Caesar possessed not only the greatest skill and elegance in writing, but also the most accurate knowledge for explaining his own plans.

SECTION 8.0.8I did not even have the advantage of taking part in the Alexandrian and African wars. Although these wars are partly known to me from Caesar’s own conversation, we listen in one way to things that captivate us by their novelty or wonder, and in another to things that we intend to report as testimony.

SECTION 8.0.9But of course, while gathering every possible excuse not to be compared with Caesar, I incur the very charge of arrogance by imagining that in anyone’s judgment I could be compared with Caesar. Farewell.

CHAPTER 8.1

SECTION 8.1.1After all Gaul had been conquered, Caesar, who had allowed no break in military operations since the previous summer, wanted his soldiers to recover from such great exertions by resting in winter quarters. Yet reports came that several states were simultaneously reviving plans for war and forming conspiracies.

SECTION 8.1.2A plausible reason for this was given: all the Gauls had learned that no force, however large, could resist the Romans when concentrated in one place; but if several states began separate wars at the same time, the army of the Roman people would not have enough assistance, time, or troops to deal with them all. No state should refuse to accept its share of hardship if, through such a delay, the rest could recover their freedom.

CHAPTER 8.2

SECTION 8.2.1To prevent this belief from becoming firmly established among the Gauls, Caesar puts the quaestor Marcus Antonius in command of his winter quarters. On December 31, he himself sets out from the town of Bibracte with a cavalry escort for the Thirteenth Legion, which he had stationed in the territory of the Bituriges not far from the borders of the Aedui, and joins to it the Eleventh Legion, which was quartered nearest.

SECTION 8.2.2Leaving two cohorts from each legion to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the Bituriges’ territory. Because they had extensive lands and several towns, they could not be kept under control by the winter quarters of a single legion or prevented from preparing for war and forming conspiracies.

CHAPTER 8.3

SECTION 8.3.1Caesar’s sudden arrival produced the result that was inevitable among people who were unprepared and scattered: while they were cultivating the countryside without any fear, they were overwhelmed by the cavalry before they could take refuge in the towns.

SECTION 8.3.2Even the usual sign of an enemy raid, ordinarily revealed by the burning of buildings, had been eliminated by Caesar’s prohibition, so that he would not run short of fodder and grain if he wished to advance farther, and so that the enemy would not be warned by the fires.

SECTION 8.3.3After many thousands of people had been captured, the terrified Bituriges who had managed to escape the Romans’ first arrival fled into neighboring states, relying either on private ties of hospitality or on a shared commitment to their plans.

SECTION 8.3.4They fled in vain. By forced marches Caesar reached every place before them and gave no state time to think about the safety of others rather than its own. By this speed he both kept his loyal friends faithful and frightened the wavering into accepting terms of peace.

SECTION 8.3.5With such terms offered, the Bituriges saw that Caesar’s clemency left open a return to his friendship, and that neighboring states had surrendered hostages without suffering any punishment and had been accepted under his protection. They therefore did the same.

CHAPTER 8.4

SECTION 8.4.1In recognition of such great exertion and endurance, since the soldiers had worked with exceptional devotion during the days of midwinter, on extremely difficult marches and in intolerable cold, Caesar promises to award each soldier two hundred sesterces and each centurion two thousand as prize money. After sending the legions back to winter quarters, he himself returns to Bibracte on the fortieth day.

SECTION 8.4.2While he is administering justice there, the Bituriges send envoys to ask him for help against the Carnutes, whom they accuse of making war on them.

SECTION 8.4.3On learning this, although he had remained in winter quarters no more than eighteen days, he leads the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions out of their winter quarters by the Arar, where, as explained in the preceding commentary, they had been stationed to facilitate the grain supply. He then sets out with two legions to pursue the Carnutes.

CHAPTER 8.5

SECTION 8.5.1When news of the army’s approach reaches the enemy, the Carnutes, warned by the disaster suffered by the others, abandon the villages and towns where they had been living in hastily constructed, makeshift buildings erected to endure the winter—for, having recently been defeated, they had abandoned several towns—and flee in all directions.

SECTION 8.5.2Because Caesar does not want his soldiers exposed to the extremely violent storms that broke out at that very time, he establishes camp in Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes. He crowds the soldiers partly into the houses of the Gauls and partly into shelters quickly built by piling thatch over the tents to cover them.

SECTION 8.5.3Nevertheless, he sends the cavalry and auxiliary infantry in every direction in which the enemy are said to have gone, and not without success.

SECTION 8.5.4Our men generally return with a great deal of plunder. Overwhelmed by the hardships of winter and by fear of danger, driven from shelter and not daring to remain long in any one place, and unable to protect themselves from the extremely severe weather by taking refuge in the forests, the Carnutes disperse into neighboring states after losing a large part of their people.

CHAPTER 8.6

SECTION 8.6.1At the most difficult season of the year, Caesar considered it enough to scatter the forces that were assembling so that no fresh war could begin, and he knew that, so far as could reasonably be calculated, no major war could be organized before the beginning of the summer campaign. He therefore stations Gaius Trebonius with the two legions he had with him in winter quarters at Cenabum.

SECTION 8.6.2Meanwhile, repeated embassies from the Remi informed him that the Bellovaci, who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in military reputation, and their neighboring states, under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacan and Commius the Atrebatian, were raising armies and concentrating them in one place, intending to invade with their entire force the territory of the Suessiones, who had been placed under the protection of the Remi. Caesar judged that it concerned not only his honor but also his security that allies who had rendered the Roman people outstanding service should suffer no disaster,

SECTION 8.6.3so he again summons the Eleventh Legion from winter quarters. He sends orders to Gaius Fabius to bring the two legions under his command into the territory of the Suessiones, and sends for one of the two legions under Labienus.

SECTION 8.6.4Thus, as the locations of the winter quarters and the requirements of the war demanded, through his own unremitting exertions he assigned the burden of active campaigning to the legions in turn.

CHAPTER 8.7

SECTION 8.7.1After assembling these forces, he sets out against the Bellovaci. He establishes camp in their territory and sends squadrons of cavalry in every direction to intercept people from whom he might learn the enemy’s plans.

SECTION 8.7.2After carrying out their assignment, the cavalry reports that only a few people have been found in the houses, and that these had remained not to cultivate the fields—for everyone had carefully moved away from all parts of the area—but had been sent back to spy.

SECTION 8.7.3When Caesar asked them where the main force of the Bellovaci was and what their plan was, he learned that all the Bellovaci capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place,

SECTION 8.7.4along with the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti, Veliocasses, and Atrebates. They had chosen for their camp an elevated position in a forest surrounded by marshland, and had moved all their baggage into the more distant forests.

SECTION 8.7.5Several chiefs were responsible for starting the war, but the main body obeyed Correus above all because they knew that he felt the deepest hatred for the name of the Roman people.

SECTION 8.7.6A few days earlier, Commius the Atrebatian had left this camp to bring in German reinforcements, since the Germans were close neighbors and their numbers were limitless.

SECTION 8.7.7With the agreement of all their chiefs and the strongest enthusiasm of the common people, the Bellovaci had decided that if Caesar came with three legions, as was reported, they would offer battle, so that they would not later be forced to fight his entire army under more miserable and difficult conditions.

SECTION 8.7.8If he brought larger forces, they would remain in the position they had chosen and use ambushes to prevent the Romans from gathering fodder—which, because of the season, was both scarce and widely scattered—collecting grain, and obtaining all other supplies.

CHAPTER 8.8

SECTION 8.8.1When Caesar learned these facts from several people whose reports agreed, and judged that the plans described to him were full of prudence and far removed from the usual recklessness of barbarians, he decided to adapt everything to the goal of making the enemy despise the small size of his force and come out to offer battle as quickly as possible.

SECTION 8.8.2He had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions, veteran units of exceptional courage, and the Eleventh, composed of carefully selected young men of the highest promise. Although it was already in its eighth year of service, in comparison with the other legions it had not yet acquired the same reputation for experience and courage.

SECTION 8.8.3He therefore calls a council, explains everything that has been reported to him, and strengthens the resolve of the whole army.

SECTION 8.8.4In the hope that he might lure the enemy into battle by appearing to have only three legions, he arranges the order of march so that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions go ahead of all the baggage. The Eleventh then brings up the rear behind the entire baggage train, which was not very large, as is usual on an active campaign, so that the enemy would see no appearance of a larger force than the one they themselves had demanded.

SECTION 8.8.5With the column arranged in this way, in an almost square formation, he brings the army into the enemy’s sight sooner than they had expected.

CHAPTER 8.9

SECTION 8.9.1When the Gauls, whose confidently conceived plans had been reported to Caesar, suddenly see the legions approaching at a steady pace and drawn up as if in battle line, they deploy their forces in front of their camp and do not leave the higher ground—whether because of the danger of battle, the suddenness of his arrival, or uncertainty about our plan.

SECTION 8.9.2Although Caesar had wanted to fight, he is nevertheless astonished by the enemy’s great numbers and establishes his camp opposite theirs, with a valley between them that was more deeply sunken than broad.

SECTION 8.9.3He orders this camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with a breastwork built on top in proportion to its height; a double ditch, each fifteen feet wide, to be sunk with straight sides; and numerous towers, three stories high, to be raised and connected by bridges laid between them and covered with flooring, their fronts protected by wicker breastworks. In this way the camp would be defended against the enemy by a double ditch and two lines of defenders,

SECTION 8.9.4one of which, from the bridges, could throw missiles more boldly and to a greater distance because it was safer due to its height, while the other, stationed on the rampart itself and nearer the enemy, would be protected by the bridge from falling missiles. He fitted the gates with doors and taller towers.

CHAPTER 8.10

SECTION 8.10.1This fortification had a double purpose. Caesar hoped that the massive scale of the works and the appearance of his own fear would give the barbarians confidence; and because the army had to travel farther to gather fodder and grain, he saw that the fortifications themselves would allow the camp to be defended by a small force.

SECTION 8.10.2Meanwhile, small groups frequently ran forward from both sides and fought between the two camps, with the marsh lying between them. Sometimes, however, our Gallic and German auxiliaries crossed the marsh and pursued the enemy more aggressively; at other times, the enemy crossed it in turn and drove our men back a considerable distance.

SECTION 8.10.3Moreover, during the daily foraging, as was bound to happen when forage had to be gathered from isolated buildings scattered far apart, foragers who had dispersed through difficult terrain were being surrounded;

SECTION 8.10.4although this caused our men only moderate losses of pack animals and servants, it encouraged the barbarians in their foolish hopes, all the more because Commius, whom I have said had gone to summon assistance from the Germans, had arrived with cavalry. Though they numbered no more than five hundred, the barbarians nevertheless took confidence from the arrival of the Germans.

CHAPTER 8.11

SECTION 8.11.1When Caesar observed that the enemy had remained for several days in a camp protected by a marsh and the natural terrain, that their camp could not be attacked without a costly battle, and that the position could not be enclosed with fortifications except by a larger army, he sent a letter to Trebonius ordering him to summon as quickly as possible the Thirteenth Legion, which was wintering among the Bituriges with the lieutenant Titus Sextius, and then to come to him by forced marches with three legions.

SECTION 8.11.2Meanwhile, he sent the cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the other states, a large number of whom he had called out, to guard the foraging parties in rotation and withstand sudden enemy attacks.

CHAPTER 8.12

SECTION 8.12.1As this happened every day, carefulness was already declining through familiarity, as usually occurs when something continues for a long time. The Bellovaci, after learning the regular positions occupied each day by our cavalry,

SECTION 8.12.2placed a picked force of infantry in ambush in wooded areas and sent cavalry there the next day, first to draw our men out and then to attack them after they had been surrounded.

SECTION 8.12.3This misfortune fell to the Remi, whose turn it was to perform that duty on that day. When they suddenly noticed the enemy cavalry, they were superior in number and therefore despised the enemy’s small force; but after pursuing too eagerly, they were surrounded on every side by infantry.

SECTION 8.12.4Thrown into confusion by this, they withdrew more quickly than is usual in a cavalry battle, after losing Vertiscus, the leading man of their state and commander of their cavalry.

SECTION 8.12.5Although his age made him scarcely able to ride a horse, in accordance with Gallic custom he had neither used his age as an excuse for declining the command nor been willing for the battle to be fought without him.

SECTION 8.12.6The enemy’s spirits were raised and encouraged by their success in the battle and by the death of the chief and cavalry commander of the Remi,

SECTION 8.12.7while our men were warned by the loss to reconnoiter positions more carefully before posting guards and to show more restraint when pursuing an enemy who was retreating.

CHAPTER 8.13

SECTION 8.13.1Meanwhile, the daily fighting within sight of both camps continued without interruption at the fords and crossing places of the marsh.

SECTION 8.13.2During this struggle, the Germans, whom Caesar had brought across the Rhine for the specific purpose of fighting interspersed among the cavalry, crossed the marsh together with greater determination, killed the few who resisted, and pursued the rest of the force too persistently. Not only those who were being overwhelmed at close quarters or wounded from a distance, but even those who had normally remained farther back as a reserve, were terrified and disgracefully fled.

SECTION 8.13.3Repeatedly abandoning higher ground, they did not stop fleeing until they had either taken refuge in their own camp or, in some cases, had been driven by shame to flee still farther.

SECTION 8.13.4The danger they faced threw all their forces into such confusion that it was hard to judge whether they were more arrogant after even the smallest success or more timid after a moderate setback.

CHAPTER 8.14

SECTION 8.14.1After spending several days in the same camp, the commanders of the Bellovaci learned that the legions and the lieutenant Gaius Trebonius had drawn nearer. Fearing a siege like the one at Alesia, they sent away by night everyone they considered inferior in age or strength or who was unarmed, together with the rest of their baggage.

SECTION 8.14.2While they were sorting out this disordered and confused column—for a great mass of wagons normally accompanies even Gallic forces traveling without baggage—they were overtaken by daylight and drew up their armed forces in front of their camp, so that the Romans would not begin pursuing them before their long baggage column had advanced farther.

SECTION 8.14.3Caesar judged that the enemy should not be attacked while resisting at the top of so steep a hill, but also that the legions should be brought close enough to prevent the barbarians from leaving the position without danger while his soldiers pressed them.

SECTION 8.14.4He saw that the two camps were separated by a difficult marsh whose hard crossing could slow the speed of pursuit. He also noticed that a ridge extending across the marsh almost to the enemy camp was separated from their position by a shallow valley. He therefore laid bridges over the marsh, led the legions across, and quickly reached the flat summit of the ridge, which was protected on both sides by downward slopes.

SECTION 8.14.5After drawing up the legions there, he reached the farthest end of the ridge and stationed his battle line at a point from which missiles launched by artillery could be hurled into the enemy’s packed formations.

CHAPTER 8.15

SECTION 8.15.1The barbarians trusted in the natural strength of their position and would not have refused battle if the Romans happened to attempt the ascent of the hill. Since they could not gradually dismiss their divided forces for fear that they would be thrown into confusion once dispersed, they remained in battle formation.

SECTION 8.15.2When Caesar recognized their determination, he drew up twenty cohorts, marked out a camp in that position, and ordered it to be fortified.

SECTION 8.15.3When the works were completed, he stationed the legions in formation before the rampart and posted the cavalry on guard with their horses bridled.

SECTION 8.15.4When the Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready to pursue and realized that they could neither spend the night nor remain longer in the same position without danger, they adopted the following plan for retreating.

SECTION 8.15.5At the places where they had been sitting—for Caesar’s earlier commentaries have explained that the Gauls customarily sit while in battle formation—they placed bundles of straw and brushwood, of which there was a vast quantity in the camp, in front of their line after passing them from hand to hand among themselves. At the very end of the day, when the signal was given, they set them all on fire at once.

SECTION 8.15.6The continuous sheet of flame suddenly concealed all their forces from the Romans’ sight. As soon as this happened, the barbarians fled at full speed.

CHAPTER 8.16

SECTION 8.16.1Although Caesar could not observe the enemy’s departure because the fires blocked his view, he suspected that the plan had been devised to cover a retreat. He advanced the legions and sent cavalry squadrons in pursuit; but because he feared an ambush, in case the enemy might have halted in the same area and be trying to draw our men onto unfavorable ground, he himself advanced more slowly.

SECTION 8.16.2The cavalry were afraid to enter the extremely dense smoke and flames, and any who entered too eagerly could scarcely see even the front parts of their own horses. Fearing an ambush, they therefore gave the Bellovaci a free opportunity to withdraw.

SECTION 8.16.3Thus, by a retreat full of both fear and cunning, the enemy advanced no more than ten miles without any loss and pitched camp in an exceptionally well-fortified position.

SECTION 8.16.4From there they frequently placed cavalry and infantry in ambush and inflicted heavy losses on the Romans during foraging operations.

CHAPTER 8.17

SECTION 8.17.1After this happened repeatedly, Caesar learned from a prisoner that Correus, commander of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of the bravest infantry and one thousand cavalry from their entire force to place in ambush at a location where he suspected the Romans would send men because of the abundance of grain and forage.

SECTION 8.17.2When Caesar learned of this plan, he led out more legions than usual and sent ahead the cavalry he customarily assigned to protect the foragers. He interspersed lightly armed auxiliary infantry among them and himself approached as closely as possible with the legions.

CHAPTER 8.18

SECTION 8.18.1The enemy lying in ambush had chosen for the operation a plain extending no more than a thousand paces in any direction and protected on every side by woods or by an extremely difficult river. They surrounded it with their ambush as though with a hunting enclosure.

SECTION 8.18.2Our men had discovered the enemy’s plan and were prepared in spirit and arms for battle. Since the legions were following behind, they refused no engagement and entered the area squadron by squadron.

SECTION 8.18.3At their arrival, Correus thought that an opportunity for action had been offered to him. He first showed himself with a few men and charged the nearest squadrons.

SECTION 8.18.4Our men firmly withstood the ambushers’ charge and did not mass too many men in one place. When that usually happens in cavalry battles because of fear, the troops suffer losses from their very numbers.

CHAPTER 8.19

SECTION 8.19.1While the squadrons, arranged in position, fought in small groups by turns and did not allow their men to be surrounded on the flanks, the rest burst out of the woods as Correus continued fighting.

SECTION 8.19.2A fierce battle developed between the opposing forces. After it had continued for a considerable time with evenly balanced success, the massed infantry gradually advanced from the woods and forced our cavalry to give ground. The lightly armed infantry, whom I have said had been sent ahead of the legions, quickly came to their aid and, interspersed among our squadrons, fought resolutely.

SECTION 8.19.3For some time the fighting continued with equal intensity. Then, as the nature of the battle dictated, those who had withstood the ambush’s first attacks gained the advantage for the very reason that they had suffered no unexpected loss at the hands of the ambushers.

SECTION 8.19.4Meanwhile, the legions drew nearer, and frequent reports reached both our men and the enemy at the same time that the commander was approaching with his forces drawn up for battle.

SECTION 8.19.5When our men learned this, they trusted in the support of the cohorts and fought with the greatest vigor, fearing that if they acted too slowly they would appear to have shared the glory of victory with the legions.

SECTION 8.19.6The enemy lost heart and sought escape by different routes. It was useless, for they themselves were trapped by the same obstacles in the terrain with which they had intended to confine the Romans.

SECTION 8.19.7Nevertheless, defeated and shattered after losing the greater part of their force, they fled in panic, some seeking the woods and others the river. Yet during their flight they were cut down by our men, who pursued them fiercely.

SECTION 8.19.8Meanwhile, Correus, unconquered by any disaster, could not be induced to leave the battle and seek the woods or to surrender when our men invited him to do so. Instead, by fighting with the greatest bravery and wounding many men, he forced the victorious Romans, now inflamed with anger, to shower him with missiles.

CHAPTER 8.20

SECTION 8.20.1After the action had ended in this way, Caesar followed over the fresh traces of the battle. He believed that after suffering so great a disaster the defeated enemy would abandon their camp upon receiving the news; it was said to be no more than about eight miles from the scene of the slaughter. Although he saw that the river obstructed his crossing, he led his army across and advanced.

SECTION 8.20.2The Bellovaci and the other states received from the flight only a few survivors, and those wounded, who had escaped disaster under cover of the woods. With everything against them, once they learned of the calamity, the death of Correus, and the loss of their cavalry and bravest infantry, they believed that the Romans were approaching. They immediately summoned a council by trumpet call and unanimously demanded that envoys and hostages be sent to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.21

SECTION 8.21.1When everyone approved this plan, Commius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliary forces for that war.

SECTION 8.21.2The others immediately sent envoys to Caesar and asked him to be satisfied with the punishment the enemy had already suffered—a punishment that, if he had been able to inflict it without battle while their strength was still intact, he certainly would never have imposed, given his customary mercy and humanity.

SECTION 8.21.3They said that the resources of the Bellovaci had been shattered in the cavalry battle, that many thousands of picked infantrymen had perished, and that the messengers who reported the slaughter had barely escaped.

SECTION 8.21.4Nevertheless, amid so great a disaster the Bellovaci had gained one great advantage from the battle: Correus, the instigator of the war and agitator of the populace, had been killed. For while he was alive, the senate had never possessed as much influence in the state as the ignorant common people.

CHAPTER 8.22

SECTION 8.22.1In response to the envoys’ pleas, Caesar reminded them that the Bellovaci and the other states of Gaul had undertaken war at the same time the previous year; that of all of them, the Bellovaci had persisted most stubbornly in their decision; and that they had not been brought back to their senses by the surrender of the others.

SECTION 8.22.2He knew and understood, he said, that responsibility for wrongdoing was very easily shifted onto the dead. Yet no one could truly possess so much power that, against the will of the leading men, in the face of the senate’s resistance, and despite the opposition of all respectable citizens, he could incite and wage war with only the weak support of the common people. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment they had brought upon themselves.

CHAPTER 8.23

SECTION 8.23.1The following night the envoys carried his reply back to their people and assembled the hostages. Envoys from the remaining states, which had been watching to see what happened to the Bellovaci, gathered there.

SECTION 8.23.2They gave hostages and carried out his commands, with the exception of Commius, whose fear prevented him from entrusting his safety to anyone’s word.

SECTION 8.23.3The previous year, while Caesar was administering justice in Cisalpine Gaul, Titus Labienus had discovered that Commius was stirring up the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar. Labienus judged that his disloyalty could be suppressed without any breach of faith.

SECTION 8.23.4Because he did not think Commius would come to the camp if summoned, and did not wish to make him more cautious by attempting it, he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to arrange to kill him under the pretense of a conference. For this purpose he assigned Volusenus centurions specially selected as suitable for the task.

SECTION 8.23.5When they came to the conference and Volusenus, as arranged, seized Commius by the hand, the centurion—either unsettled by the unfamiliar assignment or quickly prevented by Commius’s companions—was unable to kill him. He nevertheless struck him a severe first blow on the head with his sword.

SECTION 8.23.6Both sides drew their swords, but each was thinking more of scattering than of fighting: our men because they believed Commius had received a fatal wound, and the Gauls because, once they discovered the ambush, they feared more dangers than they could see. After this, Commius was said to have resolved never again to come into the presence of any Roman.

CHAPTER 8.24

SECTION 8.24.1After defeating the most warlike peoples, Caesar saw that no state was now preparing a war with which to resist him, although some people were leaving the towns and scattering from the countryside to avoid submitting to his authority for the present. He therefore decided to send his army in several directions.

SECTION 8.24.2He brought the quaestor Mark Antony with the Twelfth Legion to join him. He sent the lieutenant Gaius Fabius with twenty-five cohorts to the most distant part of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were under arms and believed that the lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who was in those regions, did not have sufficient strength in his two legions.

SECTION 8.24.3He summoned Titus Labienus to join him, but sent the Fifteenth Legion, which had been wintering with Labienus, into Gallia Togata to protect the colonies of Roman citizens, so that they would not suffer a disaster from a barbarian raid like the one that had befallen the people of Tergeste the previous summer, when they had been overwhelmed by the barbarians’ sudden incursion and attack.

SECTION 8.24.4Caesar himself set out to ravage and lay waste the territory of Ambiorix. Since he had given up hope of bringing the terrified fugitive under his control, he considered it the course most consistent with his honor to devastate Ambiorix’s territory so completely—its inhabitants, buildings, and livestock—that Ambiorix would incur the hatred of his own people and, if fortune left any of them alive, would have no way to return to his state after such terrible disasters.

CHAPTER 8.25

SECTION 8.25.1After dispatching either legions or auxiliary troops into every part of Ambiorix’s territory and devastating everything with slaughter, fire, and plunder, killing or capturing a great number of people, Caesar sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri,

SECTION 8.25.2whose state, hardened by daily wars because of its proximity to Germany, differed little from the Germans in its way of life and savagery and never obeyed orders unless compelled by an army.

CHAPTER 8.26

SECTION 8.26.1Meanwhile, when Gaius Caninius, Caesar’s lieutenant, learned from letters and messengers sent by Duratius that a large force of the enemy had assembled in the territory of the Pictones, he hurried to the town of Lemonum. Duratius had remained steadfastly loyal to the Romans even though a certain faction of his state had revolted.

SECTION 8.26.2As he approached and learned more definitely from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and being besieged by many thousands of men under Dumnacus, leader of the Andes, he did not dare expose his understrength legions to the enemy and pitched camp in a fortified position.

SECTION 8.26.3When Dumnacus learned that Caninius was approaching, he turned all his forces against the legions and began attacking the Roman camp.

SECTION 8.26.4After spending several days on the assault and suffering heavy losses among his own men without being able to tear down any part of the fortifications, he returned to the siege of Lemonum.

CHAPTER 8.27

SECTION 8.27.1At the same time, Gaius Fabius, Caesar’s lieutenant, received several states into Roman protection, secured their loyalty with hostages, and was informed by a letter from Gaius Caninius Rebilus of what was happening among the Pictones.

SECTION 8.27.2On learning this, he set out to bring aid to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learned of Fabius’s approach, he despaired of escaping if he were forced at the same time both to withstand the external enemy, the Romans, and to watch and fear the townspeople. He therefore suddenly withdrew his forces from that place and did not think he would be sufficiently safe until he had led them across the Loire, which because of its size had to be crossed by a bridge.

SECTION 8.27.3Although Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy or joined Caninius, he had learned the nature of the country from those who knew it and thought it most likely that the frightened enemy would make for the place they were seeking to reach.

SECTION 8.27.4He therefore hurried with his forces toward the same bridge and ordered the cavalry to advance only so far ahead of the legionary column that they could return to the same camp without exhausting their horses.

SECTION 8.27.5Our cavalry caught up with them as ordered and attacked Dumnacus’s column. They fell upon the fleeing and terrified men while they were burdened with their packs on the march, killed many, and took a large amount of plunder. After this success they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 8.28

SECTION 8.28.1The following night Fabius sent the cavalry ahead, prepared to engage the enemy and delay the entire column until he himself caught up.

SECTION 8.28.2To ensure that his instructions were carried out, Quintus Atius Varus, the cavalry commander, a man of exceptional courage and judgment, encouraged his men and, after catching up with the enemy column, stationed some squadrons in suitable positions and began the battle with the rest of the cavalry.

SECTION 8.28.3The enemy cavalry fought more boldly because their infantry came to their support. The infantry halted along the entire column and went to the aid of their horsemen against ours. A fiercely contested battle followed.

SECTION 8.28.4Our men had learned to despise the enemy whom they had defeated the day before, and, remembering that the legions were following, they fought with the greatest courage against the infantry, both because they were ashamed to give way and because they desired to finish the battle by themselves,

SECTION 8.28.5while the enemy, believing from what they had seen the day before that no additional Roman forces would arrive, thought that they had found an opportunity to destroy our cavalry.

CHAPTER 8.29

SECTION 8.29.1After the fighting had continued for some time with the greatest intensity, Dumnacus drew up a battle line to support his cavalry in turn, when suddenly the legions appeared in close formation within sight of the enemy.

SECTION 8.29.2At the sight of them, the barbarian cavalry squadrons were stunned and the enemy battle line thrown into panic. Their baggage column fell into confusion, and with loud shouting they scattered in every direction and fled.

SECTION 8.29.3But our cavalry, who shortly before had fought with the greatest courage against an enemy that stood its ground, were now carried away by the joy of victory. Raising a loud shout on every side, they surrounded the retreating enemy and killed as many in that battle as their horses had strength to pursue and their right arms to cut down.

SECTION 8.29.4More than twelve thousand men were therefore killed, either while armed or after throwing away their weapons in terror, and the entire baggage train was captured.

CHAPTER 8.30

SECTION 8.30.1It was established from reports of the rout that Drappes the Senonian had gathered no more than two thousand men from the fugitives and was heading for the Province. As soon as Gaul had revolted, Drappes had collected desperate men from every quarter, summoned slaves to freedom, recruited exiles from every state, taken in bandits, and intercepted Roman baggage and supplies. Lucterius the Cadurcan had joined him in this plan—the man who, as related in the preceding book, had attempted to attack the Province at the beginning of Gaul’s first revolt.

SECTION 8.30.2Caninius hurried after them with two legions, so that the disgrace caused by the banditry of these desperate men would not become great through damage to the Province or fear for its safety.

CHAPTER 8.31

SECTION 8.31.1Gaius Fabius set out with the rest of the army for the territory of the Carnutes and the other states whose forces he knew had been cut down in the battle he had fought against Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.2He had no doubt that their recent disaster would make them more submissive, but that, if they were given time and opportunity, they might be stirred up again at the instigation of the same Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.3In this operation Fabius enjoyed the greatest good fortune and speed in bringing the states back into submission.

SECTION 8.31.4The Carnutes, who despite frequent punishment had never mentioned peace, gave hostages and surrendered. The other states situated at the farthest limits of Gaul along the Ocean, which are called the Armorican states, were influenced by the authority of the Carnutes and obeyed Fabius’s orders without delay when he and the legions arrived.

SECTION 8.31.5Driven from his own territory, Dumnacus was forced to wander and hide alone and make for the most remote regions of Gaul.

CHAPTER 8.32

SECTION 8.32.1But when Drappes and Lucterius learned that Caninius and the legions were near, they realized that they could not enter the borders of the Province without certain destruction while an army was pursuing them, and that they no longer had the freedom to roam and conduct raids. They therefore halted in the territory of the Cadurci.

SECTION 8.32.2There Lucterius, who had once possessed great influence among his fellow citizens when his fortunes were still intact and who, as a constant advocate of revolutionary plans, still had great authority among the barbarians, occupied the town of Uxellodunum with his own and Drappes’s forces and brought its inhabitants over to his side. The town had formerly been under his patronage and was exceptionally well fortified by the nature of its position.

CHAPTER 8.33

SECTION 8.33.1Gaius Caninius immediately came there and observed that every side of the town was protected by extremely steep cliffs, which would have been difficult for armed men to climb even if no one were defending them. He also saw that the townspeople had a large baggage train which, if they tried to remove it in a secret flight, could not escape either the cavalry or even the legions. He therefore divided his cohorts into three groups and established three camps on very high ground;

SECTION 8.33.2from these camps he began gradually, as far as the number of his troops permitted, to extend a line of fortification around the town.

CHAPTER 8.34

SECTION 8.34.1When the townspeople noticed this, they became anxious at the dreadful memory of Alesia and feared a similar fate under siege. Lucterius most of all, since he had experienced the danger of that disaster, warned them that they must take thought for their grain supply. They therefore unanimously decided to leave part of their forces there while they themselves set out with lightly equipped troops to bring in grain.

SECTION 8.34.2After this plan was approved, Drappes and Lucterius left two thousand armed men behind and led the rest out of the town the following night.

SECTION 8.34.3After spending a few days in the territory of the Cadurci, some of whom wanted to help them with grain while others were unable to prevent them from taking it, they obtained a large quantity of grain. From time to time they also attacked our forts in nighttime raids.

SECTION 8.34.4For this reason Gaius Caninius delayed surrounding the entire town with fortifications, fearing that he might either be unable to defend the completed works or have to station weak garrisons in a great many places.

CHAPTER 8.35

SECTION 8.35.1After obtaining a large supply of grain, Drappes and Lucterius took up a position no more than ten miles from the town, from which they could gradually transport the grain into it.

SECTION 8.35.2They divided their responsibilities between them: Drappes remained with part of the force to guard the camp, while Lucterius led the train of pack animals toward the town.

SECTION 8.35.3After stationing guards along the route, at about the tenth hour of the night he began transporting the grain into the town along narrow, wooded paths.

SECTION 8.35.4When the camp sentries heard their noise and scouts who had been sent out reported what was happening, Caninius quickly took armed cohorts from the nearest forts and attacked the men transporting the grain just before dawn.

SECTION 8.35.5Terrified by this sudden disaster, they scattered and fled toward their armed guards. When our men saw these, they were roused to attack the armed men more fiercely and allowed no one in that body to be taken alive. Lucterius escaped from there with a few men and did not return to the camp.

CHAPTER 8.36

SECTION 8.36.1After this successful action, Caninius learned from the prisoners that part of the forces was with Drappes in a camp no more than twelve miles away.

SECTION 8.36.2When several prisoners confirmed this information, he understood that, with one leader driven off, the rest were terrified and could easily be overwhelmed. He considered it extremely fortunate that no one had escaped the slaughter and returned to the camp to bring Drappes news of the disaster they had suffered.

SECTION 8.36.3Since he saw no danger in making the attempt, he sent all the cavalry and the German infantry, men of the greatest speed, ahead to the enemy camp. He distributed one legion among the three camps and led the other with him without its baggage.

SECTION 8.36.4When he had come closer to the enemy, he learned from the scouts he had sent ahead that their camp, as is generally the custom among barbarians, had been brought down from the higher ground and placed on the banks of a river, and that the Germans and cavalry had suddenly rushed upon them while they were all unprepared and had begun the battle.

SECTION 8.36.5On learning this, he brought up the legion armed and drawn up for battle. Then, at a signal suddenly given on every side, the higher ground was seized.

SECTION 8.36.6When this happened, the Germans and cavalry, on seeing the legion’s standards, fought with the greatest intensity. The cohorts immediately attacked from every direction, killed or captured everyone, and took a large amount of plunder. Drappes himself was captured in that battle.

CHAPTER 8.37

SECTION 8.37.1After achieving this success with scarcely a single soldier wounded, Caninius returned to besiege the townspeople

SECTION 8.37.2and, now that the external enemy had been destroyed—the enemy whose threat had previously prevented him from dividing his garrisons and surrounding the townspeople with fortifications—he ordered the work to be carried on from every side. Gaius Fabius arrived there with his forces the following day and undertook the siege of one part of the town.

CHAPTER 8.38

SECTION 8.38.1Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, to prevent the Belgae from again being given any opportunity to adopt revolutionary plans.

SECTION 8.38.2He himself visited the remaining states, demanded a greater number of hostages, and reassured everyone’s frightened minds with words of consolation.

SECTION 8.38.3When he came among the Carnutes, in whose state Caesar explained in the preceding book that the war had begun, he saw that consciousness of their deed made them especially afraid. To free the state from fear more quickly, he demanded that Gutruatus, the chief author of that crime and instigator of the war, be delivered for punishment.

SECTION 8.38.4Although Gutruatus did not entrust himself even to his own fellow citizens, he was quickly sought out through everyone’s efforts and brought to the camp.

SECTION 8.38.5Contrary to his own nature, Caesar was compelled to execute him by the great crowd of soldiers who gathered and blamed him for all the dangers and losses they had suffered in the war. His body was beaten until he was dead and then struck with the executioner’s ax.

CHAPTER 8.39

SECTION 8.39.1There Caesar was informed by frequent letters from Caninius of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterius and of the plan in which the townspeople persisted.

SECTION 8.39.2Although he regarded their small numbers with contempt, he nevertheless judged that their stubbornness must be punished severely, so that all Gaul would not think that it had lacked not the strength to resist the Romans but the determination, and so that the other states, following this example and relying on the advantages of their positions, would not assert their freedom,

SECTION 8.39.3since he knew that all the Gauls were aware that only one summer remained in his provincial command and believed that, if they could hold out through it, they would have no further danger to fear.

SECTION 8.39.4He therefore left Quintus Calenus, his lieutenant, with the legions to follow at regular marching pace, while he himself hurried with all the cavalry to Caninius as quickly as he could.

CHAPTER 8.40

SECTION 8.40.1When Caesar arrived at Uxellodunum contrary to everyone’s expectations, he saw that the town had been enclosed by siege works and that the siege could not be abandoned under any circumstances. After learning from deserters that the townspeople had an abundant supply of grain, he began trying to cut the enemy off from water.

SECTION 8.40.2A river divided the valley at the foot of the heights, which almost completely encircled the mountain on which Uxellodunum stood, a town with precipitous approaches on every side.

SECTION 8.40.3The nature of the ground made it impossible to divert this river, for it flowed so close to the very base of the mountain that it could not be channeled away in any direction by digging trenches below it.

SECTION 8.40.4But the descent to the river was difficult and steep for the townspeople, so that, if our men tried to stop them, they could neither reach the river nor make their way back up the steep ascent without wounds and danger to their lives.

SECTION 8.40.5When Caesar learned of their difficulty, he stationed archers and slingers and also placed artillery at certain points opposite the easiest descents, thereby preventing the townspeople from drawing water from the river.

CHAPTER 8.41

SECTION 8.41.1After that, everyone from the town who went to fetch water gathered at a single place directly beneath the town wall, where a large spring gushed out on the side that the river’s circuit left open for a distance of about three hundred feet.

SECTION 8.41.2Although all the others wished that the townspeople could be cut off from this spring, Caesar alone saw how it could be done. Directly opposite it, he began advancing covered galleries up the slope and constructing a mound, with great labor and continuous fighting.

SECTION 8.41.3The townspeople ran down from their higher position and fought from a distance without danger to themselves, wounding many of our men as they stubbornly advanced. Nevertheless, our soldiers were not deterred from pushing the covered galleries forward and overcoming the difficulties of the terrain by their labor and siege works.

SECTION 8.41.4At the same time, they drove covered tunnels from the galleries toward the source of the spring, a type of work that could be done without any danger and without arousing the enemy’s suspicion.

SECTION 8.41.5A mound was built to a height of sixty feet, and on it was placed a ten-story tower—not high enough to equal the town walls, since no siege works could accomplish that, but high enough to overlook the source of the spring.

SECTION 8.41.6When artillery began hurling missiles from the tower toward the approach to the spring, the townspeople could no longer draw water without danger, and not only their cattle and pack animals but also a great many of the enemy were wasting away from thirst.

CHAPTER 8.42

SECTION 8.42.1Terrified by this disaster, the townspeople filled barrels with tallow, pitch, and wooden shingles, set them on fire, and rolled them down onto the siegeworks. At the same time they fought with the utmost ferocity, to deter the Romans from extinguishing the fire by the danger of battle.

SECTION 8.42.2A great blaze suddenly broke out within the siegeworks themselves. Everything sent down the steep slope was caught and held by the covered galleries and the siege ramp, and set fire to the very structures that stopped it.

SECTION 8.42.3Our soldiers, on the other hand, although hard-pressed by the dangerous kind of fighting and the unfavorable ground, nevertheless endured everything with the greatest courage.

SECTION 8.42.4For the action was taking place both on high ground and in full view of our army, and a great shout arose from both sides.

SECTION 8.42.5Accordingly, each man made himself as conspicuous as he could and exposed himself to the enemy’s missiles and the flames, so that his courage might be more widely known and clearly attested.

CHAPTER 8.43

SECTION 8.43.1When Caesar saw that many of his men were being wounded, he ordered cohorts to climb the hill from every side of the town and raise a shout everywhere, pretending that they were about to seize the walls.

SECTION 8.43.2This action terrified the townspeople, and, uncertain about what was happening elsewhere, they recalled the armed men from their attack on the siegeworks and stationed them along the walls.

SECTION 8.43.3Thus, when the fighting had ended, our men quickly extinguished some of the siegeworks that had caught fire and cut away other parts.

SECTION 8.43.4Although the townspeople continued to resist stubbornly and, even after losing a large number of their men to thirst, persisted in their resolve, in the end the channels feeding the spring were cut by tunnels and diverted.

SECTION 8.43.5When this was done, the spring, though previously unfailing, suddenly dried up. This brought the townspeople such despair of being saved that they believed it had happened not through human planning but by the will of the gods. And so, compelled by necessity, they surrendered.

CHAPTER 8.44

SECTION 8.44.1Caesar knew that his clemency was known to everyone and did not fear that an unusually harsh action would be attributed to cruelty in his nature. But since he could see no end to his measures if several men in different places undertook plans of this kind, he concluded that the others must be deterred by an exemplary punishment.

SECTION 8.44.2He therefore cut off the hands of everyone who had borne arms but spared their lives, so that the punishment of criminals might be all the more clearly demonstrated.

SECTION 8.44.3Drappes, whose capture by Caninius I have reported, abstained from food for several days, whether because of the humiliation and pain of his chains or from fear of a more severe punishment, and so died.

SECTION 8.44.4At the same time Lucterius, who, as I wrote, had escaped from the battle, fell into the hands of Epasnactus the Arvernian.

SECTION 8.44.5For by frequently changing locations he entrusted himself to the protection of many men, because he believed he could not remain anywhere for long without danger, conscious as he was of how bitter an enemy Caesar was bound to be to him.

SECTION 8.44.6Epasnactus the Arvernian, a very close friend of the Roman people, without any hesitation put him in chains and brought him to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.45

SECTION 8.45.1Meanwhile Labienus fought and won a cavalry battle in the territory of the Treveri. After killing many Treveri and Germans, who never refused assistance against the Romans, he took their leaders alive into his power.

SECTION 8.45.2Among them was Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction in both courage and birth and the only one of the Aedui who had remained under arms up to that time.

CHAPTER 8.46

SECTION 8.46.1When Caesar learned of this, he saw that operations were going well in every part of Gaul and judged that Gaul had been defeated and subdued in the previous summer’s campaign. Since he had never visited Aquitania, though he had partially conquered it through Publius Crassus, he set out for that part of Gaul with two legions, intending to spend the final portion of the campaigning season there.

SECTION 8.46.2He completed this task, like the others, quickly and successfully. For all the states of Aquitania sent envoys to Caesar and gave him hostages.

SECTION 8.46.3After accomplishing these things, he himself set out for Narbo with a cavalry escort and had his army led into winter quarters by his legates.

SECTION 8.46.4He stationed four legions in Belgium under the legates Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius. He led two legions into the territory of the Aedui, whose influence he knew to be supreme throughout Gaul. He placed two among the Turoni, near the borders of the Carnutes, to hold in check that entire region adjoining the Ocean, and the remaining two in the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul would be left without troops.

SECTION 8.46.5Caesar himself remained only a few days in the province. He quickly made the rounds of all the judicial districts, heard public disputes,

SECTION 8.46.6and gave rewards to those who had served him well. For he had had the fullest opportunity to learn what attitude each man had taken during the revolt of all Gaul, which he had withstood through the loyalty and assistance of that province. When he had completed these matters, he returned to the legions in Belgium and spent the winter at Nemetocenna.

CHAPTER 8.47

SECTION 8.47.1There he learned that Commius the Atrebatian had fought a battle with his cavalry.

SECTION 8.47.2For when Antonius had arrived in winter quarters and the state of the Atrebates was remaining obedient, Commius—who, after the wounding I described above, had always been accustomed to keep himself ready to support any uprising among his people, so that those seeking plans for war would not lack an advocate and leader of armed resistance—

SECTION 8.47.3supported himself and his men by raiding while his state obeyed the Romans, and, by making the roads unsafe, intercepted many supplies being carried to the Romans’ winter quarters.

CHAPTER 8.48

SECTION 8.48.1Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, a cavalry commander, had been assigned to Antonius to spend the winter with him. Antonius sent him to pursue the enemy cavalry.

SECTION 8.48.2In addition to his exceptional courage, Volusenus felt a deep hatred for Commius, and so he carried out his orders all the more willingly. He therefore arranged ambushes, repeatedly attacked Commius’s cavalrymen, and fought successful engagements.

SECTION 8.48.3Finally, when the struggle became more intense and Volusenus, in his desire to capture Commius himself, pursued him too persistently with only a few men, Commius drew Volusenus a considerable distance away by fleeing at full speed. Then, because of his personal hatred for the man, he called on the loyalty and assistance of his followers, begging them not to allow the wounds treacherously inflicted on him to go unpunished, and, wheeling his horse around, recklessly broke away from the others and charged the commander.

SECTION 8.48.4All his cavalrymen did the same, forced our few men to turn, and pursued them.

SECTION 8.48.5Commius drove his horse forward with his spurs, brought it alongside Quadratus’s horse, and with his lance leveled struck Volusenus with great force through the middle of the thigh.

SECTION 8.48.6When their commander was wounded, our men did not hesitate to make a stand; they turned their horses and drove the enemy back.

SECTION 8.48.7When this happened, many of the enemy, thrown into confusion by the powerful charge of our men, were wounded; some were trampled down in flight, while others were captured. Their leader escaped this fate through the speed of his horse. The commander, so severely wounded that his life appeared to be in danger, was carried back to camp.

SECTION 8.48.8Commius, however, whether because his desire for vengeance had been satisfied or because he had lost a large part of his men, sent envoys to Antonius and guaranteed with hostages that he would remain wherever Antonius directed and would do whatever he ordered.

SECTION 8.48.9He asked only one thing: that allowance be made for his fear and that he not be required to come into the presence of any Roman. Antonius judged that this request arose from a well-founded fear, granted his petition, and accepted the hostages.

SECTION 8.48.10I know that Caesar composed a separate commentary for each individual year. I did not think I should do the same, because the following year, when Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus were consuls, contains no particularly important operations in Gaul.

SECTION 8.48.11Nevertheless, so that no one would remain ignorant of the places where Caesar and his army were at that time, I decided that I should write a brief account and attach it to this commentary.

CHAPTER 8.49

SECTION 8.49.1While Caesar was wintering in Belgium, he had one objective: to keep the states on friendly terms and to give no one either hope or cause for taking up arms.

SECTION 8.49.2For nothing was less desirable to him than to have some necessity for waging war forced on him as his departure approached, so that, when he was about to withdraw his army, no war would be left behind that all Gaul would gladly undertake when there was no immediate danger.

SECTION 8.49.3And so, by addressing the states with honor, rewarding their leading men most generously, and imposing no burdens, he easily kept Gaul—exhausted by so many unsuccessful battles—at peace under more favorable terms of submission.

CHAPTER 8.50

SECTION 8.50.1When the winter was over, Caesar himself, contrary to his usual practice, set out for Italy by the longest possible daily marches, so that he could address the towns and colonies to which he had recommended the candidacy of his quaestor Marcus Antonius for the priesthood.

SECTION 8.50.2He exerted his influence both willingly on behalf of a man very closely connected to him, whom he had sent ahead shortly before to conduct his campaign, and vigorously against the faction and power of the few who hoped, by defeating Marcus Antonius, to undermine Caesar’s influence as he left his command.

SECTION 8.50.3Although he had learned on the journey, before he reached Italy, that Antonius had already been elected augur, he nevertheless considered that he still had good reason to visit the towns and colonies, so that he could thank them for turning out in large numbers and fulfilling their obligations to Antonius on his behalf,

SECTION 8.50.4and at the same time recommend to them himself and his claim to office for the following year. For his opponents were boasting arrogantly that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to strip Caesar of every office and distinction, and that Servius Galba had been deprived of the consulship, although he had enjoyed far greater influence and electoral support, because he was connected with Caesar both by personal friendship and by long association as his legate.

CHAPTER 8.51

SECTION 8.51.1Caesar’s arrival was greeted by every town and colony with incredible honor and affection.

SECTION 8.51.2For this was the first time he had returned since the war involving all Gaul. Nothing that could be devised to decorate the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass was left undone.

SECTION 8.51.3The entire population came out to meet him with their children. Sacrificial victims were slaughtered everywhere, and dining couches were spread out in the forums and temples, so that the rejoicing of a triumph, even one most eagerly awaited, seemed to be enjoyed in advance. Such was the magnificence displayed by the wealthier people and the enthusiasm shown by those of humbler means.

CHAPTER 8.52

SECTION 8.52.1After Caesar had rapidly passed through every region of Roman Gaul, he returned with the utmost speed to the army at Nemetocenna. He summoned the legions from all their winter quarters to the borders of the Treveri, proceeded there, and reviewed and purified the army.

SECTION 8.52.2He placed Titus Labienus in command of Roman Gaul, so that this greater distinction might help him win support in his campaign for the consulship. Caesar himself made only as many marches as he considered sufficient to change locations for reasons of health.

SECTION 8.52.3Although Caesar frequently heard there that Labienus was being approached by his enemies and was informed that a few men were planning to use the Senate’s authority to deprive him of some part of his army, he neither believed anything against Labienus nor could be induced to do anything contrary to the Senate’s authority. For he judged that his case would easily prevail if the senators were free to express their opinions.

SECTION 8.52.4For Gaius Curio, a tribune of the plebs, after undertaking the defense of Caesar’s cause and rank, had often promised the Senate that, if anyone was troubled by fear of Caesar’s armed forces—and since Pompey’s domination and armed forces were also bringing no small terror to the Forum—both men should give up their arms and disband their armies. If that were done, he said, the state would be free and independent.

SECTION 8.52.5He not only made this promise but also began on his own initiative to call for a division of the Senate. To prevent it, the consuls and Pompey’s friends ordered him to stop, and by delaying the matter in this way they caused the proposal to fail.

CHAPTER 8.53

SECTION 8.53.1This was powerful evidence of the position of the Senate as a whole, and it agreed with its previous action. For in the preceding year Marcellus, while attacking Caesar’s rank, had, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, brought Caesar’s provinces before the Senate prior to the appointed time. After the senators had expressed their opinions and Marcellus called for a division—he was seeking all his own distinction by exploiting hostility toward Caesar—a full Senate voted unanimously against his proposal.

SECTION 8.53.2These actions did not break the spirit of Caesar’s enemies, but warned them to prepare more powerful pressures by which the Senate could be compelled to approve what they themselves had decided.

CHAPTER 8.54

SECTION 8.54.1The Senate then passed a decree that one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompey and another by Gaius Caesar for the war against the Parthians. Yet it was perfectly clear that both legions were being taken away from one man.

SECTION 8.54.2For Gnaeus Pompey offered as if it were one of his own the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar but which had been formed by a levy in Caesar’s province.

SECTION 8.54.3Nevertheless, although there could be no doubt at all about his opponents’ intentions, Caesar returned the legion to Pompey and, in accordance with the Senate’s decree, ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Cisalpine Gaul, to be handed over in his own name. In its place he sent the Thirteenth Legion into Italy to protect the garrisons from which the Fifteenth was being withdrawn.

SECTION 8.54.4He then assigned winter quarters to the army. He stationed Gaius Trebonius with four legions in Belgium and sent Gaius Fabius with the same number into the territory of the Aedui.

SECTION 8.54.5For he believed that Gaul would be safest if the Belgae, whose courage was greatest, and the Aedui, whose influence was supreme, were held in check by armies. He himself set out for Italy.

CHAPTER 8.55

SECTION 8.55.1When he arrived there, he learned that the two legions he had returned, which according to the Senate’s decree were supposed to be sent to the war against the Parthians, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompey by the consul Gaius Marcellus and retained in Italy.

SECTION 8.55.2Although after this action no one could doubt what was being prepared against Caesar, Caesar nevertheless decided that he must endure everything as long as any hope remained to him of resolving the dispute by law rather than waging war. He pressed on.