Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book IV, Chapter 3
Book IV, Chapter 3 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Des Elections.
A l’egard des élections du Prince & des Magistrats, qui sont, comme je l’ai dit, des actes complexes, il y a deux voyes pour y proceder; savoir, le choix & le sort. L’une & l’autre ont été employées en diverses Republiques, & l’on voit encore actuellement un melange très compliqué des deux dans l’election du Doge de Venise.
Le suffrage par le sort, dit Montesquieu, est de la nature de la Démocratie. J’en conviens, mais comment cela? Le sort, continue-t-il, est une façon d’élire qui n’afflige personne; il laisse à chaque Citoyen une espérance raisonnable de servir la patrie. Ce ne sont pas-là des raisons.
Si l’on fait attention que l’élection des chefs est une fonction du Gouvernement & non de la Souveraineté, on verra pourquoi la voye du sort est plus dans la nature de la Démocratie, où l’administration est d’autant meilleure que les actes en sont moins multipliés.
Dans toute véritable Démocratie la magistrature n’est pas un avantage mais une charge onéreuse, qu’on ne peut justement imposer à un particulier plutôt qu’à un autre. La loi seule peut imposer cette charge à celui sur qui le sort tombera. Car alors la condition étant égale pour tous, & le choix ne dépendant d’aucune volonté humaine, il n’y a point d’application particuliere qui altere l’universalité de la loi.
Dans l’Aristocratie le Prince choisit le Prince, le Gouvernement se conserve par lui-même, & c’est là que les suffrages sont bien placés.
L’exemple de l’élection du Doge de Venise confirme cette distinction loin de la détruire: Cette forme mêlée convient dans un Gouvernement mixte. Car c’est une erreur de prendre le Gouvernement de Venise pour une véritable Aristocratie. Si le Peuple n’y a nulle part au Gouvernement, la noblesse y est peuple elle-même. Une multitude de pauvres Barnabotes n’approcha jamais d’aucune magistrature, & n’a de sa noblesse que le vain titre d’Excellence & le droit d’assister au grand Conseil. Ce grand Conseil étant aussi nombreux que notre Conseil général à Genève, ses illustres membres n’ont pas plus de privileges que nos simples Citoyens. Il est certain qu’ôtant l’extrême disparité des deux Républiques, la bourgeoisie de Genève représente exactement le Patriciat Vénitien, nos natifs & habitans représentent les Citadins & le peuple de Venise, nos paysans représentent les sujets de terre-ferme: enfin de quelque maniere que l’on considère cette République, abstraction faite de sa grandeur, son Gouvernement n’est pas plus aristocratique que le notre. Toute la différence est que n’ayant aucun chef à vie, nous n’avons pas le même besoin du sort.
Les élections par le sort auroient peu d’inconvénient dans une véritable Démocratie où tout étant égal, aussi bien par les mœurs & par les talens que par les maximes & par la fortune, le choix deviendroit presque indifférent. Mais j’ai déjà dit qu’il n’y avoit point de véritable Démocratie.
Quand le choix & le sort se trouvent mêlés, le premier doit remplir les places qui demandent des talens propres, telles que les emplois militaires; l’autre convient à celles où suffisent le bon-sens, la justice, l’intégrité, telles que les charges de judicature; parce que dans un état bien constitué ces qualités sont communes à tous les Citoyens.
Le sort ni les suffrages n’ont aucun lieu dans le Gouvernement monarchique. Le Monarque étant de droit seul Prince & Magistrat unique, le choix de ses lieutenans n’appartient qu’à lui. Quand l’Abbé de St. Pierre proposoit de multiplier les Conseils du Roi de France & d’en élire les membres par Scrutin, il ne voyoit pas qu’il proposoit de changer la forme du Gouvernement.
Il me resteroit à parler de la maniere de donner & de recueillir les voix dans l’assemblée du peuple; mais peut-être l’historique de la police Romaine à cet égard expliquera-t-il plus sensiblement toutes les maximes que je pourrois établir. Il n’est pas indigne d’un lecteur judicieux de voir un peu en détail comment se traittoient les affaires publiques & particulieres dans un Conseil de deux-cent mille hommes.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On Elections.
As for the election of the prince and magistrates, which are, as I have said, complex acts, there are two ways to proceed: choice and lot. Both have been used in various republics, and even now a very complicated mixture of the two can be seen in the election of the Doge of Venice.
Voting by lot, says Montesquieu, is in the nature of democracy. I agree; but why is that? Lot, he continues, is a way of electing that offends no one; it leaves every citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country. These are not reasons.
If we bear in mind that the election of chiefs is a function of government and not of sovereignty, we shall see why the use of lot is more in the nature of democracy, where administration is better the fewer its acts become.
In every true democracy magistracy is not an advantage but a burdensome duty, which cannot justly be imposed on one individual rather than another. Only the law can impose that duty on the person on whom the lot falls. For then, the condition being equal for all, and the choice depending on no human will, no particular application alters the universality of the law.
In an aristocracy the prince chooses the prince, the government perpetuates itself, and it is there that voting has its proper place.
The example of the election of the Doge of Venice confirms this distinction rather than overturning it: this mixed procedure suits a mixed government. For it is a mistake to take the government of Venice for a true aristocracy. If the people have no part in its government, the nobility there are themselves the people. A multitude of poor Barnabotes never came near any magistracy, and their nobility gives them nothing but the empty title of Excellence and the right to attend the Grand Council. This Grand Council being as numerous as our General Council in Geneva, its illustrious members have no more privileges than our ordinary citizens. Certainly, setting aside the extreme difference between the two republics, the citizenry of Geneva corresponds exactly to the Venetian patriciate, our natives and residents correspond to the townspeople and people of Venice, and our peasants correspond to its mainland subjects. In short, however one considers this republic, apart from its size, its government is no more aristocratic than ours. The whole difference is that, since we have no chief holding office for life, we have no comparable need for the lot.
Elections by lot would have few disadvantages in a true democracy where, everything being equal in morals and talents as well as in principles and fortune, the choice would become almost a matter of indifference. But I have already said that no true democracy exists.
When choice and lot are combined, the first should fill positions calling for special talents, such as military posts; the second suits those for which good sense, justice, and integrity suffice, such as judicial offices, because in a well-constituted state these qualities are common to all citizens.
Neither lot nor voting has any place in monarchical government. Since the monarch is by right sole prince and sole magistrate, the choice of his deputies belongs to him alone. When the Abbé de St. Pierre proposed multiplying the councils of the King of France and electing their members by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government.
It remains for me to speak of the way votes are cast and collected in the people's assembly; but perhaps the history of Roman practice in this matter will explain more vividly all the principles I could lay down. It is not unworthy of a discerning reader to see in some detail how public and private business was conducted in an assembly of two hundred thousand men.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
Elections.
As for electing the prince and the magistrates, these elections are, as I have said, complex acts. There are two ways to carry them out: by choice and by lot. Both methods have been used in different republics. Even today the election of the Doge of Venice uses a very complicated mixture of the two.
Montesquieu says, "Selection by lot is in the nature of democracy." I agree, but why? He continues, "Drawing lots is a way of electing that offends no one; it leaves every citizen a reasonable hope of serving the country." Those are not the reasons.
If we remember that choosing leaders is a function of government, not of sovereignty, we will see why drawing lots fits democracy better. In a democracy, administration works better the fewer separate acts it requires.
In every genuine democracy, holding office is not a benefit but a heavy duty. It cannot fairly be imposed on one individual rather than another. Only the law can impose this duty on the person selected by lot. Then the conditions are equal for all, and the selection depends on no human decision. No particular application of the rule changes the law's universal character.
In an aristocracy, the prince chooses the prince. The government maintains itself, and there voting is properly used.
The example of the Doge's election in Venice confirms this distinction rather than disproving it. This mixed method suits a mixed government. It is a mistake to regard Venice's government as a genuine aristocracy. Even though the people have no role in the government, the nobility there are themselves a people. Large numbers of poor Barnabotes never come near any public office. All they get from their noble status is the empty title of Excellency and the right to attend the Great Council. That council has as many members as our General Council in Geneva. Its distinguished members have no more privileges than our ordinary citizens. If we set aside the extreme differences between the two republics, Geneva's citizens correspond exactly to Venice's patricians; our natives and residents correspond to Venice's city dwellers and common people; our peasants correspond to its subjects on the mainland. In short, however we look at that republic, leaving aside its size, its government is no more aristocratic than ours. The whole difference is that we have no leader who holds office for life, so we have less need to draw lots.
Elections by lot would have few drawbacks in a genuine democracy. There, everyone would be equal in customs, talents, principles, and wealth, so the choice would matter very little. But I have already said that there is no genuine democracy.
When choice and chance are combined, choice should fill posts that require particular talents, such as military positions. Drawing lots is suitable for posts requiring only common sense, fairness, and honesty, such as judicial offices. In a well-organized state, all citizens share these qualities.
Neither drawing lots nor voting has any place in a monarchy. The monarch is by right the sole prince and the only magistrate, so only the monarch can choose deputies. When the Abbé de St. Pierre proposed increasing the number of councils of the King of France and electing their members by ballot, he did not realize that he was proposing to change the form of government.
I still have to discuss how votes are cast and collected in the people's assembly. But perhaps the history of Roman procedures in this area will explain all the rules I could lay down more clearly. A thoughtful reader will not find it beneath them to see in some detail how public and private business was conducted in a council of two hundred thousand people.