Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 7
Book III, Chapter 7 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Des Gouvernemens mixtes.
A proprement parler il n’y a point de Gouvernement simple. Il faut qu’un Chef unique ait des magistrats subalternes; il faut qu’un Gouvernement populaire ait un Chef. Ainsi dans le partage de la puissance exécutive il y a toujours gradation du grand nombre au moindre, avec cette différence que tantôt le grand nombre dépend du petit, & tantôt le petit du grand.
Quelquefois il y a partage égal; soit quand les parties constitutives sont dans une dépendance mutuelle, comme dans le Gouvernement d’Angleterre; soit quand l’autorité de chaque partie est indépendante mais imparfaite, comme en Pologne. Cette derniere forme est mauvaise, parce qu’il n’y a point d’unité dans le Gouvernement, & que l’Etat manque de liaison.
Lequel vaut le mieux, d’un Gouvernement simple ou d’un Gouvernement mixte? Question fort agitée chez les politiques, & à laquelle il faut faire la même réponse que j’ai faite ci-devant sur toute forme de Gouvernement.
Le Gouvernement simple est le meilleur en soi, par cela seul qu’il est simple. Mais quand la Puissance exécutive ne dépend pas assez de la législative, c’est-à-dire, quand il y a plus de rapport du Prince au Souverain que du Peuple au Prince, il faut remédier à ce défaut de proportion en divisant le Gouvernement; car alors toutes ses parties n’ont pas moins d’autorité sur les sujets, & leur division les rend toutes ensemble moins fortes contre le Souverain.
On previent encore le même inconvénient en établissant des magistrats intermédiaires, qui, laissant le Gouvernement en son entier, servent seulement à balancer les deux Puissances & à maintenir leurs droits respectifs. Alors le Gouvernement n’est pas mixte, il est tempéré.
On peut remédier par des moyens semblables à l’inconvénient opposé, & quand le Gouvernement est trop lâche, ériger des Tribunaux pour le concentrer. Cela se pratique dans toutes les Démocraties. Dans le premier cas on divise le Gouvernement pour l’affoiblir, & dans le second pour le renforcer; car les maximum de force & de foiblesse se trouvent également dans les Gouvernemens simples, au lieu que les formes mixtes donnent une force moyenne.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On Mixed Governments
Strictly speaking, there is no simple government. A single chief must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government must have a chief. Thus, in the distribution of executive power, there is always a progression from the greater number to the smaller, with this difference: at times the greater number depends on the smaller, and at times the smaller on the greater.
Sometimes the division is equal: either the constituent parts are mutually dependent, as in the government of England, or the authority of each part is independent but incomplete, as in Poland. The latter form is bad because the government lacks unity and the state lacks cohesion.
Which is better, a simple government or a mixed one? This question is much debated among political thinkers, and it calls for the same answer I gave earlier concerning every form of government.
Simple government is best in itself, for the very reason that it is simple. But when executive power is not sufficiently dependent on legislative power—that is, when the ratio of prince to sovereign is greater than that of people to prince—this disproportion must be remedied by dividing the government. For then all its parts retain undiminished authority over the subjects, while their division makes them, taken together, less strong against the sovereign.
The same disadvantage may also be forestalled by establishing intermediate magistrates who, while leaving the government whole, serve only to balance the two powers and preserve their respective rights. In that case the government is not mixed but moderated.
Similar means can remedy the opposite disadvantage; when the government is too lax, tribunals can be established to concentrate it. This is done in every democracy. In the first case government is divided to weaken it, and in the second to strengthen it; for the greatest strength and the greatest weakness are both found in simple governments, while mixed forms provide a middle degree of strength.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On mixed governments.
Strictly speaking, there is no simple government. A single leader must have magistrates under him. A popular government must have a leader. So executive power is always divided in degrees, from the many to the few. The difference is that sometimes the many depend on the few, and sometimes the few depend on the many.
Sometimes power is divided equally. The parts may depend on each other, as they do in the government of England. Or each part's authority may be independent but incomplete, as in Poland. This second form is bad, because the government has no unity and the state lacks a link between its parts.
Which is better, a simple government or a mixed government? Political writers have debated this question intensely. The answer is the same one I gave earlier about every form of government.
Simple government is best in itself, simply because it is simple. But when executive power does not depend enough on legislative power—that is, when the relationship of the prince to the sovereign is greater than that of the people to the prince—we must correct this imbalance by dividing the government. All its parts still have just as much authority over the subjects. But together they are weaker against the sovereign because they have been divided.
The same problem can also be prevented by setting up intermediate magistrates. These leave the government intact but help balance the two powers and protect the rights of each. The government is then not mixed but moderated.
Similar means can correct the opposite problem. When the government is too weak, we can establish councils to concentrate its power. This is done in every democracy. In the first case we divide the government to weaken it, and in the second we concentrate it to strengthen it. Simple governments have both the greatest potential strength and the greatest potential weakness. Mixed forms, by contrast, have strength somewhere between the two.