Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book II, Chapter 10
Book II, Chapter 10 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Suite.
On peut mésurer un corps politique de deux manieres; savoir, par l’étendue du territoire, & par le nombre du peuple, & il y a, entre l’une & l’autre de ces mésures, un rapport convenable pour donner à l’Etat sa véritable grandeur: Ce sont les hommes qui font l’Etat, & c’est le terrain qui nourrit les hommes; ce rapport est donc que la terre suffise à l’entretien de ses habitans, & qu’il y ait autant d’habitans que la terre en peut nourrir. C’est dans cette proportion que se trouve le maximum de force d’un nombre donné de peuple; car s’il y a du terrein de trop, la garde en est onéreuse, la culture insuffisante, le produit superflu; c’est la cause prochaine des guerres deffensives; s’il n’y en a pas assés, l’Etat se trouve pour le supplément à la discretion de ses voisins; c’est la cause prochaine des guerres offensives. Tout peuple qui n’a par sa position que l’alternative entre le commerce ou la guerre, est foible en lui-même; il dépend de ses voisins, il dépend des événemens; il n’a jamais qu’une existence incertaine & courte. Il subjugue & change de situation, ou il est subjugué & n’est rien. Il ne peut se conserver libre qu’à force de petitesse ou de grandeur.
On ne peut donner en calcul un rapport fixe entre l’étendue de terre & le nombre d’hommes qui se suffisent l’un à l’autre; tant à cause des différences qui se trouvent dans les qualités du terrein, dans ses dégrés de fertilité, dans la nature de ses productions, dans l’influence des climats, que de celles qu’on remarque dans les tempéramens des hommes qui les habitent, dont les uns consomment peu dans un pays fertile, les autres beaucoup sur un sol ingrat. Il faut encore avoir égard à la plus grande ou moindre fécondité des femmes, à ce que le pays peut avoir de plus ou moins favorable à la population, à la quantité dont le législateur peut espérer d’y concourir par ses établissemens; de sorte qu’il ne doit pas fonder son jugement sur ce qu’il voit mais sur ce qu’il prévoit, ni s’arrêter autant à l’état actuel de la population qu’à celui où elle doit naturellement parvenir. Enfin il y a mille occasions où les accidens particuliers du lieu exigent ou permettent qu’on embrasse plus de terrein qu’il ne paroit nécessaire. Ainsi l’on s’étendra beaucoup dans un pays de montagnes, où les productions naturelles, savoir les bois, les paturages, demandent moins de travail, où l’expérience apprend que les femmes sont plus fécondes que dans les plaines, & où un grand sol incliné ne donne qu’une petite base horisontale, la seule qu’il faut compter pour la végétation. Au contraire, on peut se resserrer au bord de la mer, même dans des rochers & des sables presque stériles; parce que la pêche y peut suppléer en grande partie aux productions de la terre, que les hommes doivent être plus rassemblés pour répousser les pyrates, & qu’on a d’ailleurs plus de facilité pour délivrer le pays par les colonies, des habitans dont il est surchargé.
A ces conditions pour instituer un peuple, il en faut ajouter une qui ne peut suppléer à nulle autre, mais sans laquelle elles sont toutes inutiles; c’est qu’on jouisse de l’abondance & de la paix; car le tems où s’ordonne un État est, comme celui où se forme un bataillon, l’instant où le corps est le moins capable de résistance & le plus facile à détruire. On résisteroit mieux dans un désordre absolu que dans un moment de fermentation, où chacun s’occupe de son rang & non du péril. Qu’une guerre une famine une sédition survienne en ce tems de crise, l’État est infailliblement renversé.
Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y ait beaucoup de gouvernemens établis durant ces orages; mais alors ce sont ces gouvernemens-mêmes qui détruisent l’État. Les usurpateurs amenent ou choisissent toujours ces tems de trouble pour faire passer, à la faveur de l’effroi public, des loix destructives que le peuple n’adopteroit jamais de sang-froid. Le choix du moment de l’institution est un des caracteres les plus surs par lesquels on peut distinguer l’œuvre du Législateur d’avec celle du Tiran.
Quel peuple est donc propre à la législation? Celui qui, se trouvant déjà lié par quelque union d’origine d’intérêt ou de convention, n’a point encore porté le vrai joug des loix; celui qui n’a ni coutumes ni superstitions bien enracinées; celui qui ne craint pas d’être accablé par une invasion subite, qui, sans entrer dans les querelles de ses voisins, peut résister seul à chacun d’eux, ou s’aider de l’un pour repousser l’autre; celui dont chaque membre peut être connu de tous, & où l’on n’est point forcé de charger un homme d’un plus grand fardeau qu’un homme ne peut porter; celui qui peut se passer des autres peuples & dont tout autre peuple peut se passer; Celui qui n’est ni riche ni pauvre & peut se suffire à lui-même; enfin celui qui réunit la consistance d’un ancien peuple avec la docilité d’un peuple nouveau. Ce qui rend pénible l’ouvrage de la législation, est moins ce qu’il faut établir que ce qu’il faut détruire; & ce qui rend le succès si rare, c’est l’impossibilité de trouver la simplicité de la nature jointe aux besoins de la société. Toutes ces conditions, il est vrai, se trouvent difficilement rassemblées. Aussi voit-on peu d’États bien constitués.
Il est encore en Europe un pays capable de législation; c’est l’Isle de Corse. La valeur & la constance avec laquelle ce brave peuple a su recouvrer & défendre sa liberté, mériteroit bien que quelque homme sage lui apprit à la conserver. J’ai quelque pressentiment qu’un jour cette petite Isle étonnera l’Europe.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Continued.
A body politic can be measured in two ways: by the extent of its territory and by the number of its people; between these two measures there is a fitting relation that gives the State its true size. It is men who make the State, and land that feeds men. This relation therefore requires that the land be enough to maintain its inhabitants, and that there be as many inhabitants as the land can feed. In this proportion lies the maximum strength of a given population. For if there is too much land, defending it is burdensome, its cultivation inadequate, its produce superfluous; this is the immediate cause of defensive wars. If there is not enough, the State depends upon its neighbors for what it lacks; this is the immediate cause of offensive wars. Any people whose situation leaves it only the choice between trade and war is weak in itself; it depends on its neighbors, it depends on events, and its existence is always uncertain and brief. It conquers and changes its situation, or it is conquered and becomes nothing. It can preserve its freedom only by being exceedingly small or exceedingly great.
No fixed ratio can be calculated between the extent of the land and the number of men able to live from it, given the differences in the qualities of the soil, its degrees of fertility, the nature of its produce, and the influence of climates, as well as the differences observed in the constitutions of the men who inhabit them: some consume little in a fertile country, others much on poor soil. Consideration must also be given to women's greater or lesser fertility, to how favorable the country may be to population growth, and to how much the legislator may hope to contribute to that growth through his institutions. Thus he must base his judgment not on what he sees but on what he foresees, and attend not so much to the present state of the population as to the size it should naturally reach. Finally, there are a thousand cases in which the particular circumstances of a place require or permit the inclusion of more land than seems necessary. Thus one will extend a great way into mountainous country, where natural products, namely woods and pastures, require less labor, where experience teaches that women are more fertile than on the plains, and where a great stretch of sloping ground offers only a small horizontal area, the only one that counts for vegetation. By contrast, one can occupy a smaller area along the seashore, even among almost barren rocks and sands, because fishing can make up for a great part of what the land does not produce, men must gather more closely to repel pirates, and, moreover, colonies make it easier to relieve the country of its surplus inhabitants.
To these conditions for instituting a people one more must be added, one that cannot replace any other, yet without which they are all useless: the enjoyment of abundance and peace. For the time when a State is put in order is, like the time when a battalion is formed, the moment when the body is least capable of resistance and easiest to destroy. It would resist better in utter disorder than in a moment of ferment, when each is occupied with his place rather than with the danger. Let war, famine, or sedition arise at this critical time, and the State is inevitably overthrown.
Not that many governments have not been established amid such storms; but then these governments themselves destroy the State. Usurpers always bring about or choose such times of trouble to pass, under cover of public fear, destructive laws that the people would never adopt in a calm frame of mind. The choice of the moment for instituting a people is one of the surest marks by which the work of the legislator can be distinguished from that of the tyrant.
What people, then, is suited to legislation? One already bound by some union of origin, interest, or convention, but not yet subjected to the true yoke of laws; one without deeply rooted customs or superstitions; one that need not fear being overwhelmed by a sudden invasion and that, without entering into its neighbors' quarrels, can resist each of them alone or enlist one to repel another; one in which each member can be known to all and no man must be made to carry a burden greater than any man can bear; one that can do without other peoples and that every other people can do without; one that is neither rich nor poor and can provide for itself; finally, one that combines the stability of an old people with the pliancy of a new one. What makes the work of legislation difficult is less what must be established than what must be destroyed; and what makes success so rare is the impossibility of finding the simplicity of nature joined to the needs of society. All these conditions, it is true, are seldom found together. Hence one sees few well-constituted States.
There is still one country in Europe capable of receiving legislation: the island of Corsica. The courage and steadfastness with which this brave people has regained and defended its freedom richly deserve a wise man to teach it how to preserve that freedom. I have some presentiment that this little island will one day astonish Europe.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
Continued.
There are two ways to measure a body politic: by the size of its territory and by the number of its people. To give a state its proper size, these two measurements must stand in a suitable relationship. People make the state, and land feeds the people. The land must therefore provide enough to feed its inhabitants, and there must be as many inhabitants as the land can feed. At that proportion a given population has its greatest strength. If there is too much land, defending it is costly, too little of it is cultivated, and it produces more than is needed. This is the immediate cause of defensive wars. If there is not enough land, the state must rely on its neighbors for what it lacks. This is the immediate cause of offensive wars. Any people whose location leaves it only the choice between trade and war is weak in itself. It depends on its neighbors and on events; its existence is always uncertain and short. It conquers others and changes its position, or is conquered and becomes nothing. It can stay free only by being very small or very large.
No calculation can establish a fixed ratio between the area of land and the number of people it can support. Land differs in quality, fertility, crops, and climate. The people who live on it also differ in their needs: some consume little on fertile land, while others consume much on poor soil. We must also consider differences in women's fertility, whether conditions in the country favor population growth, and how much the legislator can hope to increase it through institutions. The legislator must therefore base judgment not on what can be seen now but on what can be foreseen. They must consider not only the current population but also the size it will naturally reach. Finally, particular local conditions often require or allow more land to be taken in than seems necessary. A mountainous country, for example, calls for a wide area. Its natural products, namely woods and pasture, require less labor; experience shows that women there are more fertile than on the plains; and a large area of sloping ground offers only a small area of level ground, the only area that counts for growing plants. By contrast, a country can occupy a smaller area by the sea, even among nearly barren rocks and sands. Fishing can largely make up for what the land does not produce. People need to live closer together to repel pirates. Colonies also make it easier to relieve the country of its excess population.
One more condition must be added to those for establishing a people. Nothing else can replace it, and without it all the others are useless: there must be prosperity and peace. The time when a state is being organized is like the time when a battalion is being formed. At that moment the body is least able to resist and easiest to destroy. People would resist better in complete disorder than during a period of upheaval when everyone is thinking of their place in the ranks instead of the danger. If war, famine, or rebellion breaks out at this critical time, the state will certainly be overthrown.
This does not mean that many governments have not been established amid such storms. But then those governments themselves destroy the state. Usurpers always bring about or choose troubled times to pass destructive laws under cover of public fear, laws the people would never adopt with a clear head. The choice of when to establish institutions is one of the surest ways to distinguish the work of a legislator from that of a tyrant.
What people, then, are suited to legislation? A people already bound by some shared origin, interest, or agreement but not yet subjected to the full yoke of laws. A people without deeply rooted customs or superstitions. A people unafraid of being overwhelmed by a sudden invasion, able without joining its neighbors' quarrels either to resist each one alone or to enlist one against another. A people whose every member can be known to all, and where no one has to carry a burden greater than a person can bear. A people who can do without other peoples, and whom every other people can do without. A people neither rich nor poor, able to provide for itself. Finally, a people with the stability of an old nation and the readiness to learn of a new one. What makes the legislator's work hard is not so much what must be built as what must be destroyed. Success is so rare because it is impossible to find natural simplicity together with the needs of society. It is true that all these conditions are rarely found together. That is why we see few well-constituted states.
There is still one country in Europe fit for legislation: the island of Corsica. The courage and persistence with which its brave people have won back and defended their freedom deserve a wise person to teach them how to keep it. I have a feeling that one day this small island will amaze Europe.