Book 3, Chapter 20

“Someone will say, ‘What then? Do you think Epicurus intended these things, or that his views were licentious?’ Certainly not. I see that he says many austere things, many splendid things. Accordingly, as I have often said, the question concerns his intellectual acuteness, not his character. However much he scorns the pleasures he has just praised, I shall still remember what he considers the highest good. He did not merely use the word ‘pleasure,’ but explained what he meant: ‘taste,’ he says, ‘and bodily embraces and games and songs and forms that move the eyes pleasantly.’ Am I inventing this? Am I lying? I want to be refuted. For what am I working toward except that truth should be unfolded in every inquiry?

47 “‘But he also says that pleasure does not increase once pain has been removed, and that the greatest pleasure is to feel no pain.’ Three great errors in a few words! First, he contradicts himself. Just now he could not even conceive of any good unless the senses were, so to speak, tickled by pleasure; now the greatest pleasure is freedom from pain. Could he contradict himself more? The second error is this: although there are three natural conditions—enjoyment, pain, and neither enjoyment nor pain—he thinks the first and third identical, and does not distinguish pleasure from the absence of pain. The third error he shares with certain others: although virtue is most earnestly sought, and philosophy was sought out as a means to attain it, he has separated the highest good from virtue.

48 “‘But he often praises virtue.’ So did Gaius Gracchus defend the treasury in words, though he had made the greatest handouts and emptied it. Why should I listen to words when I can see deeds? That Lucius Piso Frugi had always spoken against the grain law. Once it passed, this former consul came to receive grain. Gracchus noticed Piso standing in the assembly, and asked, in the hearing of the Roman people, how he could be consistent when he sought grain under a law he had opposed. ‘I would rather, Gracchus,’ he said, ‘that you did not take pleasure in dividing my property among everyone; but if you do, I shall claim my share.’ Did this serious and wise man fail to make clear that the Sempronian law was squandering the public inheritance? Read Gracchus’ speeches, and you will call him the treasury’s champion.

49 “Epicurus denies that one can live pleasantly without living virtuously. He denies that fortune has any power over the wise, prefers a simple diet to a lavish one, and denies that there is any time when the wise person is not happy. All this is worthy of a philosopher, but incompatible with pleasure. ‘He does not mean that pleasure.’ Let him mean whatever pleasure he chooses; it is certainly a pleasure in which virtue has no share. Come, if we do not understand pleasure, do we not understand pain either? I deny, then, that someone who measures the highest evil by pain has any business mentioning virtue.”

“Here someone may object: ‘Do you really think that’s what Epicurus intended? Were his principles really so lustful?’ Certainly not, as far as I’m concerned. Much of what he says is strict, much admirable. I keep saying that it’s his sharpness of thought under examination, not his behavior. He may scorn the very pleasures he was praising all he wants; I won’t forget what he identifies as the greatest good. He didn’t merely label it ‘pleasure.’ He spelled it out: ‘flavor, bodily embraces, games, singing, and shapes that please the eyes.’ Have I made something up? Told a lie? Please prove me wrong. What else am I trying to do in any inquiry but make the truth clear?

47 “‘But he also says pleasure doesn’t increase once pain has been removed, and the greatest pleasure is not feeling any pain.’ Three big mistakes in a few words. First, he contradicts himself. A moment ago he couldn’t even imagine anything good unless the senses were, so to speak, tickled with pleasure. Now the greatest pleasure is being free of pain. Could he contradict himself more? His second mistake is this: there are three natural states—feeling pleasure, feeling pain, and feeling neither pleasure nor pain. He thinks the first and third are the same, and doesn’t distinguish pleasure from not feeling pain. His third mistake is one he shares with some others. Virtue is what we seek above all, and philosophy was developed to acquire it. Yet he has separated the greatest good from virtue.

48 “‘He does often praise virtue, though.’ So did Gaius Gracchus defend the treasury in words, after enormous giveaways had drained it. With the deeds before me, why pay attention to speeches? Consider Lucius Piso Frugi. He’d opposed the grain law whenever he spoke of it. Once it became law, this former consul turned up for his allocation of grain. At a public meeting Gracchus spotted him standing there and challenged him before the Roman people: how was applying for grain consistent with having argued against the law? Piso replied, ‘Gracchus, I’d prefer you not to take it into your head to hand my property out person by person. If you do, however, I shall ask for my portion.’ Surely that sensible, thoughtful man made his point plainly: the Sempronian law was scattering the people’s inheritance. Yet read Gracchus’ speeches and you’d call him a defender of the treasury.

49 “Epicurus says you can’t live pleasantly without living virtuously. He says fortune has no power over a wise person. He prefers a simple diet to a lavish one, and says there’s no time when a wise person isn’t happy. All these claims suit a philosopher, but they clash with pleasure. ‘That isn’t the pleasure he means.’ Let him mean any pleasure he likes. Whatever he means, it contains no part of virtue. Come on: if we don’t understand pleasure, don’t we even understand pain? So I say that someone who measures the greatest evil by pain has no business mentioning virtue.”