Book 5, Chapter 16
Original Latin
46 Quod ni ita tenebimus, multa erunt, quae nobis bona dicenda sint; omitto divitias—quas cum quivis quamvis indignus habere possit, in bonis non numero; quod enim est bonum, id non quivis habere potest—, omitto nobilitatem famamque popularem stultorum inproborumque consensu excitatam: haec, quae sunt minima, tamen bona dicantur necesse est, candiduli dentes, venusti oculi, color suavis et ea quae Anticlea laudat Ulixi pedes abluens: Lénitudo orátionis, móllitudo córporis. ea si bona ducemus, quid erit in philosophi gravitate quam in volgi opinione stultorumque turba quod dicatur aut gravius aut grandius?
47 At enim eadem Stoici ‘praecipua’ vel ‘producta’ dicunt, quae ‘bona’ isti. dicunt illi quidem, sed is vitam beatam compleri negant; hi autem sine is esse nullam putant aut, si sit beata, beatissimam certe negant. nos autem volumus beatissimam, idque nobis Socratica illa conclusione confirmatur. sic enim princeps ille philosophiae disserebat: qualis cuiusque animi adfectus esset, talem esse hominem; qualis autem homo ipse esset, talem eius esse orationem; orationi autem facta similia, factis vitam. adfectus autem animi in bono viro laudabilis; et vita igitur laudabilis boni viri; et honesta ergo, quoniam laudabilis. ex quibus bonorum beatam vitam esse concluditur.
48 Etenim, pro deorum atque hominum fidem! parumne cognitum est superioribus nostris disputationibus, an delectationis et otii consumendi causa locuti sumus, sapientem ab omni concitatione animi, quam perturbationem voco, semper vacare, semper in animo eius esse placidissimam pacem? vir igitur temperatus, constans, sine metu, sine aegritudine, sine alacritate futtili, sine libidine nonne beatus? at semper sapiens talis; semper igitur beatus. Iam vero qui potest vir bonus non ad id, quod laudabile sit, omnia referre, quae agit quaeque sentit? refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum; beata igitur vita laudabilis; nec quicquam sine virtute laudabile: beata igitur vita virtute conficitur.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
46 “Unless we hold to that, we shall have to call many things good. I leave aside wealth: since anyone, however unworthy, can possess it, I do not count it among goods, for not just anyone can possess what is good. I leave aside noble birth and popular fame, raised up by the approval of fools and scoundrels. Yet we shall have to call even these trifles good: gleaming teeth, attractive eyes, a pleasing complexion, and the qualities Anticlea praises while washing Ulysses’ feet:
“‘Gentleness of speech, softness of body.’
“If we regard these as goods, what can be said with greater weight or grandeur by a philosopher in all his seriousness than by popular opinion and the crowd of fools?
47 “‘But the Stoics call “preferred” or “promoted” the very things these others call “goods.”’ They do indeed, but they deny that these things make a happy life complete. The others, however, think there is no happy life without them, or, if there is a happy life, they certainly deny that it is the happiest. We, on the other hand, insist on the happiest life, and that conclusion of Socrates confirms our position. For that foremost philosopher reasoned as follows: as a person’s disposition of mind is, so is the person; as the person is, so is his speech; his deeds resemble his speech, and his life resembles his deeds. But the disposition of mind in a good man is praiseworthy; therefore the good man’s life is praiseworthy, and therefore honorable, since it is praiseworthy. From this we conclude that the life of the good is happy.
48 “For, in the name of gods and human beings, did our earlier discussions not establish clearly enough—or were we talking merely for amusement and to pass the time?—that the wise person is always free from every agitation of mind that I call a disturbance, and that the calmest peace always dwells in his mind? Is a man who is self-controlled and steadfast, without fear, without distress, without foolish excitement, without desire, not happy? But the wise person is always like this; therefore he is always happy. Again, how can a good man fail to make what is praiseworthy the standard for everything he does and thinks? Yet he makes a happy life the standard for everything. A happy life is therefore praiseworthy; nothing without virtue is praiseworthy; therefore virtue produces a happy life.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
46 “If we don’t hold to this, we’ll have to call a great many things good. I’ll leave out wealth. Any person, however unworthy, can have that, so I don’t count it as good: not just anyone can possess what is good. I’ll leave out noble birth and popular fame built up by the agreement of fools and bad people. But we’ll still have to call even these tiny things good: bright little teeth, attractive eyes, a pleasing complexion, and the things Anticlea praises while washing Odysseus’ feet: “‘Gentleness of speech, softness of body.’ “If we count these as good, what could a serious philosopher say that carries more weight or grandeur than popular opinion and a crowd of fools?
47 “But, you may say, the Stoics call the very same things ‘preferred’ or ‘promoted’ that these people call ‘good.’ They certainly do. But the Stoics deny that these things make life fully happy. The others think there’s no happy life without them, or, if there is, they certainly deny it’s the happiest possible life. We, however, want the happiest possible life. That conclusion of Socrates confirms our position. That leading figure in philosophy argued like this: a person’s character matches the state of his mind. His speech matches the person himself. His actions match his speech, and his life matches his actions. Now a good person’s state of mind deserves praise. So a good person’s life also deserves praise. And since it deserves praise, it’s morally right too. From this we conclude that good people’s lives are happy.
48 “In the name of gods and men! Didn’t we establish clearly enough in our earlier discussions that a wise person is always free of every stirring of the mind that I call a disturbance, and that the deepest peace is always in his mind? Or were we just talking for amusement and to fill our free time? Isn’t a person happy if he’s self-controlled and steady, without fear, grief, pointless excitement, or desire? Yet a wise person is always like that. So he’s always happy. And how could a good person fail to direct everything he does and thinks toward what deserves praise? But he directs everything toward living happily. A happy life therefore deserves praise. Nothing deserves praise without virtue. So virtue produces a happy life.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 16 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 164 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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