Book 5, Chapter 15
Original Latin
43 Atque cum perturbationes animi miseriam, sedationes autem vitam efficiant beatam, duplexque ratio perturbationis sit, quod aegritudo et metus in malis opinatis, in bonorum autem errore laetitia gestiens libidoque versetur, quae omnia cum consilio et ratione pugnent, his tu tam gravibus concitationibus tamque ipsis inter se dissentientibus atque distractis quem vacuum solutum liberum videris, hunc dubitabis beatum dicere? atqui sapiens semper ita adfectus est; semper igitur sapiens beatus est.
Atque etiam omne bonum laetabile est; quod autem laetabile, id praedicandum et prae se ferendum; quod tale autem, id etiam gloriosum; si vero gloriosum, certe laudabile; quod laudabile autem, profecto etiam honestum;
44 quod bonum igitur, id honestum. at quae isti bona numerant, ne ipsi quidem honesta dicunt; solum igitur bonum, quod honestum; ex quo efficitur honestate una vitam contineri beatam. Non sunt igitur ea bona dicenda nec habenda, quibus abundantem licet esse miserrimum.
45 an dubitas quin praestans valetudine, viribus, forma, acerrumis integerrumisque sensibus, adde etiam, si lubet, pernicitatem et velocitatem, da divitias, honores, imperia, opes, gloriam—si fuerit is, qui haec habet, iniustus, intemperans, timidus, hebeti ingenio atque nullo, dubitabisne eum miserum dicere? qualia igitur ista bona sunt, quae qui habeat miserrimus esse possit? Videamus ne, ut acervus ex sui generis granis, sic beata vita ex sui similibus partibus effici debeat. quod si ita est, ex bonis, quae sola honesta sunt, efficiendum est beatum; ea mixta ex dissimilibus si erunt, honestum ex is effici nihil poterit; quo detracto quid poterit beatum intellegi? Etenim, quicquid est, quod bonum sit, id expetendum est; quod autem expetendum, id certe adprobandum; quod vero adprobaris, id gratum acceptumque habendum; ergo etiam dignitas ei tribuenda est. quod si ita est, laudabile sit necesse est; bonum igitur omne laudabile. ex quo efficitur, ut, quod sit honestum, id sit solum bonum.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
43 “Disturbances of the mind produce misery, while their quieting produces a happy life. These disturbances have a twofold basis: distress and fear concern supposed evils, while exultant joy and desire rest on mistaken beliefs about goods. All are at war with judgment and reason. When you see someone free, released, and liberated from these violent agitations, which are themselves so divided and at odds with one another, will you hesitate to call him happy? Yet the wise person is always in this condition; therefore the wise person is always happy.
“Moreover, every good is a cause for joy; what is a cause for joy should be proclaimed and openly displayed; what deserves that is also glorious; if glorious, certainly praiseworthy; and if praiseworthy, assuredly honorable as well.
44 “Whatever is good, therefore, is honorable. But even those thinkers do not call the things they count as goods honorable. Only what is honorable, then, is good; and from this it follows that a happy life consists in moral goodness alone. We must therefore neither call nor consider things good if someone can possess them in abundance and still be utterly unhappy.
45 “Can you doubt it? Suppose someone is outstanding in health, strength, and beauty, with the keenest and most unimpaired senses. Add, if you like, nimbleness and speed; give him wealth, honors, commands, power, and glory. If the man who possesses all this is unjust, unrestrained, cowardly, and dull-witted to the point of having no intelligence at all, will you hesitate to call him unhappy? What sort of goods are these, then, if someone who possesses them can be utterly unhappy? Consider whether a happy life must not, like a heap made from grains of its own kind, be composed of parts like itself. If so, happiness must be made from goods, and the only goods are honorable. If these ingredients are a mixture of unlike things, nothing honorable can be made from them. And once that is taken away, what could we understand by happiness? For whatever is good is to be sought; whatever is to be sought must certainly be approved; whatever you approve must be regarded as welcome and acceptable, and must therefore also be accorded worth. If that is so, it must be praiseworthy. Every good, therefore, is praiseworthy; and from this it follows that only what is honorable is good.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
43 “Disturbances in the mind make us unhappy; a settled mind makes our life happy. Disturbance has two kinds of cause. Grief and fear concern things we think are bad, while bursts of joy and desire concern things we mistakenly think are good. All these states clash with judgment and reason. If you see someone free, released, and clear of such powerful agitations, which also conflict with one another and pull in opposite directions, will you hesitate to call him happy? But a wise person is always in that condition. So a wise person is always happy.
“Also, everything good is a reason for joy. A reason for joy should be talked up and openly displayed. Something like that is also a source of pride. If it’s a source of pride, it certainly deserves praise. And if it deserves praise, it’s surely morally right.
44 “So anything good is morally right. But even these thinkers don’t call the things they count as good morally right. So only what is morally right is good. It follows that a happy life rests on moral rightness alone. We mustn’t call or consider things good when someone can have plenty of them and still be utterly unhappy.
45 “Do you doubt it? Take a person with outstanding health, strength, and looks, and very sharp, fully functioning senses. Add agility and speed too, if you like. Give him riches, honors, commands, power, and fame. But suppose the person who has all this is unjust, uncontrolled, cowardly, and dull-witted, with no intelligence at all. Would you hesitate to call him unhappy? Then what kind of good things are these, if the person who has them can be utterly unhappy? Perhaps a happy life has to be made out of parts like itself, just as a heap of grain must be made out of grains of its own kind. If that’s so, happiness must be made out of good things, and only morally right things are good. If the parts are a mixture of unlike things, nothing morally right can be made from them. Once you take moral rightness away, what could you understand happiness to be? Besides, whatever is good should be sought. Whatever should be sought should certainly be approved. Whatever you approve should be welcomed and accepted. So it should also be given worth. If so, it must deserve praise. Everything good, then, deserves praise. It follows that only what is morally right is good.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 15 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 163 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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