Book 5, Chapter 11
Original Latin
32 Adducis me, ut tibi adsentiar. sed tua quoque vide ne desideretur constantia.
Quonam modo?
Quia legi tuum nuper quartum de finibus; in eo mihi videbare contra Catonem disserens hoc velle ostendere—quod mihi quidem probatur—inter Zenonem et Peripateticos nihil praeter verborum novitatem interesse. quod si ita est, quid est causae quin, si Zenonis rationi consentaneum sit satis magnam vim in virtute esse ad beate vivendum, liceat idem Peripateticis dicere? rem enim opinor spectari oportere, non verba.
33 Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant: nos in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, itaque soli sumus liberi. verum tamen, quoniam de constantia paulo ante diximus, non ego hoc loco id quaerendum puto, verumne sit, quod Zenoni placuerit quodque eius auditori Aristoni, bonum esse solum, quod honestum esset, sed si ita esset, tum <fueritne consentaneum>, ut totum hoc beate vivere in una virtute poneret.
34 quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
32 “You are bringing me to agree with you. But take care that your own consistency is not found wanting.”
“How so?”
“I recently read the fourth book of your On Ends. In it, while arguing against Cato, you seemed to me to be trying to show—and I approve of this—that there is no difference between Zeno and the Peripatetics except the novelty of his words. If that is so, why, if Zeno’s system consistently allows virtue sufficient power to make life happy, should the Peripatetics not be allowed to say the same? Surely we ought to consider the substance, not the words.”
33 “You are proceeding against me with sealed documents, calling witnesses to what I once said or wrote! Deal in that way with others, who argue under laws they have laid down. We live from day to day: whatever strikes our minds as probable, we say. And so we alone are free. Nevertheless, since we were speaking a little earlier of consistency, I do not think the present question is whether Zeno and his pupil Aristo were right in holding that only what is honorable is good, but whether, if that were so, it would follow consistently that Zeno should place the whole of a happy life in virtue alone.
34 “So let us certainly grant Brutus that the wise person is always happy. Let him see for himself how consistent that is with his principles; surely no man deserves the glory of this doctrine more than he does. Let us, however, maintain that the wise person is also supremely happy.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
32 “You’re bringing me around to your view. But watch out that your own consistency doesn’t come up short.”
“How so?”
“I recently read your fourth book On Ends. There, arguing against Cato, you seemed to want to show that Zeno and the Peripatetics differed only in their new vocabulary. I agree with that. If it’s true, and Zeno can consistently say virtue has enough power for a happy life, why can’t the Peripatetics say the same? Surely we ought to look at the substance, not the words.”
33 “You’re bringing sealed documents against me and calling witnesses to something I once said or wrote. Use that approach with people who argue under rules they’ve laid down. We live from day to day. We say whatever has struck our minds as plausible, and so we’re the only ones who are free. Still, since we were just talking about consistency, I don’t think the question here is whether Zeno and his student Aristo were right to hold that only what is morally right is good. The question is whether, if that were so, it would follow consistently that he placed the whole of happiness in virtue alone.
34 “So let’s certainly grant Brutus that a wise person is always happy. He can look after his own consistency. And who deserves the glory of that claim more than he does? But let’s hold on to this ourselves: the same person is also as happy as anyone can be.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 11 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 159 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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