Book 5, Chapter 10

“Yet the ignorant are captivated by these sayings, and sayings of this kind account for these men’s many followers.

28 “But the acute reasoner must consider not what each man says, but what his principles require him to say. Take the very proposition we have undertaken to defend in this discussion: we maintain that all good people are always happy. Who I mean by good people is clear. Those equipped and adorned with all the virtues we call both wise and good. Let us see who should be called happy.

29 “I consider them to be those who possess good things with no admixture of evil. When we say ‘happy,’ the only conception underlying that word is the full possession of good things with all evils excluded. Virtue cannot attain this if anything besides itself is good. For a whole crowd of evils will be present, if we regard these as evils: poverty, obscurity, low rank, loneliness, the loss of loved ones, severe bodily pains, ruined health, disability, blindness, the destruction of one’s country, exile, and finally slavery. Amid so many and such great troubles—and still more can occur—the wise person may find himself; for chance brings them, and chance can strike the wise. But if these are evils, who can guarantee that the wise person will always be happy, when he may suffer all of them at once?

30 “I therefore do not readily allow my friend Brutus, or our common teachers, or those great men of old—Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo—to count what I have listed above among evils, yet at the same time declare that the wise person is always happy. If they delight in this splendid and beautiful distinction, so worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, let them bring themselves to scorn those things whose glitter captivates them—strength, health, beauty, wealth, honors, and power—and count their opposites as nothing. Then they will be able to proclaim in the clearest voice that neither fortune’s assault, nor the crowd’s opinion, nor pain, nor poverty terrifies them; that everything they need lies within themselves; and that they count nothing beyond their own control among good things.

31 “But to speak in this way, as some great and lofty spirit might, while counting the same things as good and evil that the crowd does—this cannot possibly be allowed. Stirred by the glory of this doctrine, Epicurus rises up; he too, heaven help us, thinks the wise person always happy. The dignity of the claim captivates him, but he would never make it if he listened to himself. What could be less consistent than for someone to declare pain either the greatest or the only evil, and also hold that the wise person will say, ‘How delightful this is!’ while being tortured by pain? Philosophers must therefore be judged not by isolated remarks but by the continuity and consistency of their thought.”

“Yet the untrained are taken in by this. Sayings like these draw crowds to those men.

28 “A sharp thinker, though, looks not at what each person says but at what his position requires him to say. Take the very claim we’ve taken on in this discussion: we want all good people to be happy at all times. It’s clear whom I mean by good people. We use both ‘wise’ and ‘good’ for people fully equipped and furnished with every virtue. Let’s see who should be called happy.

29 “I think they are people who have good things with nothing bad mixed in. When we say someone is happy, the word means nothing else than a full collection of good things with everything bad kept out. Virtue can’t achieve that if anything besides itself is good. A whole crowd of bad things will be there, if we count these as bad: poverty, an obscure background, low standing, isolation, the loss of loved ones, severe bodily pain, ruined health, disability, blindness, the fall of one’s country, exile, and finally slavery. A wise person can face all these many, serious troubles—and still more can happen. Chance brings them, and it can strike a wise person. But if they’re bad, who can guarantee that a wise person will always be happy, when he might be in the middle of them all at once?

30 “So I can’t readily accept this from Brutus, dear as he is to me, or from our shared teachers. Nor can I accept it from those earlier thinkers, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo. They classify the things I listed as bad, but still claim uninterrupted happiness for the wise person. Perhaps they’re attracted by that splendid, beautiful declaration, one so worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. Then they must resolve to despise what now dazzles them: strength and health, beauty and wealth, honors and influence. They must also regard the opposite conditions as nothing. Only then can they announce as loudly as they please: fortune can attack, public opinion can turn against us, pain and poverty can come, but none frightens us. We have everything in ourselves; we acknowledge no good that lies outside our control.

31 “But there’s no accepting both positions at once: speaking with such greatness and strength of character, while counting the same things good and bad as the crowd does. Attracted by the glory of the declaration, Epicurus now comes forward. Even he—would you believe it!—claims lasting happiness for the wise. The claim impresses him with its dignity. If he actually heard himself, though, he’d never make it. Could anything be less consistent? The very man who calls pain the greatest evil, or even the only evil, expects the wise person to cry out under torture, ‘This feels so good!’ Don’t assess philosophers by a remark here and there, then. Look at whether their thinking stays coherent and consistent throughout.”