Book 4, Chapter 21
Original Latin
Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante:
47 videsne, quanta fuerit apud Academicos verecundia? plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat: Peripateticis respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse nisi, ubi sit illud, quod veri simillimum videatur, anquirere. quid est igitur quod occurrat in hac quaestione, e quo possit attingi aliquid veri simile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum puto. ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa <a> ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit adpetitus vehementior, vehementior autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia.
48 quid ad has definitiones possim dicere? atque haec pleraque sunt prudenter acuteque disserentium, illa quidem ex rhetorum pompa: ‘ardores animorum cotesque virtutum.’ an vero vir fortis, nisi stomachari coepit, non potest fortis esse? gladiatorium id quidem. quamquam in eis ipsis videmus saepe constantiam: ‘conlocuntur, congrediuntur, quaerunt aliquid, postulant,’ ut magis placati quam irati esse videantur, sed in illo genere sit sane Pacideianus aliquis hoc animo, ut narrat Lucilius: ‘Occidam illum equidem et vincam, si id quaeritis’ inquit, ‘Verum illud credo fore: in os prius accipiam ipse Quam gladium in stomacho furi ac pulmonibus sisto. Odi hominem, iratus pugno, nec longius quicquam Nobis, quam dextrae gladium dum accommodet alter; Usque adeo studio atque odio illius ecferor ira;’
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Perhaps I shall find one. But first this:
47 “Do you see how restrained the Academics have been? They speak plainly, and to the point: ‘The Stoics have answered the Peripatetics.’ Let them fight it out, as far as I am concerned. My only obligation is to seek out where the greatest semblance of truth may lie. What presents itself in this question, then, from which we might grasp something probable, beyond which the human mind cannot advance? The definition of disturbance, which I think Zeno rightly employed. He defines a disturbance as a movement of the soul turned away <from> reason and contrary to nature, or, more briefly, an excessively strong impulse, ‘excessively strong’ being understood as far removed from nature’s steadiness.
48 “What can I say against these definitions? Most of this belongs to people arguing wisely and acutely; those other expressions belong to rhetorical display: ‘the soul’s ardors,’ ‘the whetstones of virtue.’ Is a courageous man really incapable of courage unless he begins to rage? That is the spirit of a gladiator. Yet even among gladiators we often see composure: ‘They talk, they meet, they put a question, they make a demand,’ so that they seem peaceful rather than angry. Still, let us grant that in that profession there may be a Pacideianus of the spirit Lucilius describes:
“‘I shall kill him and win, if that is what you ask,’ he says,“‘But I believe this is how it will be: I shall take a blow in the face“‘Before I plant my sword in the thief’s belly and lungs.“‘I hate the man, I fight in anger; no time seems longer“‘Than while the other fits his sword to his right hand;“‘So carried away am I by eagerness, by hatred of him, by rage.’”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Perhaps I’ll find one. But first, this:
47 “Notice the Academics’ caution here. They put the relevant point quite openly: it’s the Stoics who are opposing the Peripatetics. I’m content to leave the sword fight to them. All I have to do is search out whichever position looks most like the truth. What starting point in this question, then, offers us a grasp of probability, the furthest limit of human thought? The definition Zeno gave of disturbance seems right to me. It means a movement in the mind contrary to nature, turned aside from reason. His briefer formulation is ‘an excessive impulse’: excessive means far beyond the steadiness nature gives.
48 “What could I say against these definitions? Most of this is the work of sensible, sharp thinkers. Those ‘fires of the mind’ and ‘whetstones of the virtues,’ on the other hand, come from the showy display of rhetoricians. Really, can’t a brave man be brave unless he first loses his temper? That’s a gladiator’s notion. Yet even gladiators often show steadiness: ‘They talk, they meet, they ask for something, they make a demand.’ They seem calm rather than angry. Still, let there be a Pacideianus among them with the attitude Lucilius describes: “‘I’ll kill him and beat him, if that’s what you’re asking,’ he says. “‘But I think this will happen: I’ll take a blow to the face myself “‘Before I drive my sword into the thief’s stomach and lungs. “‘I hate the man. I’m angry as I fight. Nothing seems longer “‘Than the time till the other man fits the sword to his right hand. “‘That’s how carried away I am with eagerness, hatred, and anger at him.’”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 21 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 131 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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