Book 4, Chapter 6
Original Latin
Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, utperturbatiosit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonislibidinemetlaetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum etaegritudinemnasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine instantia.
12 laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta et inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura enim omnes ea, quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellemus voluntatem , eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur.
13 itemque cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, ut bona natura adpetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio [si] cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus <a> ratione aversa cautio.
14 praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum aegritudo est, eaque adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Here, then, is Zeno’s definition: a disturbance—what he calls πάθος, ‘passion’—is a movement of the soul which turns away from right reason and is contrary to nature. Some put it more briefly: a disturbance is an excessively strong impulse. By ‘excessively strong’ they mean one that has departed too far from nature’s steadiness. They hold that the different disturbances arise from two supposed goods and two supposed evils, making four kinds: from goods, lust and delight—delight concerning present goods, lust future ones; from evils, they believe, fear and distress arise—fear concerning future evils, distress present ones. For the very things we fear when they are approaching distress us when they are upon us.
12 “Delight and lust concern a belief in goods: lust is enticed and fired into pursuit of what seems good, while delight, as though it had already gained something desired, rises in exultation. By nature everyone pursues what seems good and avoids its opposite. Consequently, as soon as the appearance of something seemingly good presents itself, nature herself impels us to obtain it. When this happens steadily and wisely, the Stoics call an impulse of this kind βούλησις, ‘rational wish’; let us call it volition. They hold that it exists only in the wise person, and define it thus: volition is a desire for something in accordance with reason. But an impulse stirred too violently, in opposition to reason, is lust or unbridled desire, which is found in all fools.
13 “Similarly, when we are moved by the sense that we possess some good, this happens in two ways. When the soul’s movement accords with reason and is calm and steady, it is called joy. But when the soul exults vainly and extravagantly, that may be called exuberant or excessive delight, which they define as an irrational elevation of the soul. And since we naturally avoid evils just as we naturally seek goods, let avoidance be called caution when it accords with reason, and let this be understood to exist only in the wise person. But avoidance without reason, accompanied by abject and broken-spirited dismay, should be named fear. Fear, then, is caution turned away <from> reason.
14 “The wise person has no emotional reaction to a present evil; the reaction of fools is distress. They experience it in the face of supposed evils, letting their spirits sink and contract in disobedience to reason. Thus the first definition is that distress is a contraction of the soul against reason. In this way there are four disturbances but three states of steadiness, since no steady state corresponds to distress.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Here, then, is Zeno’s definition: a disturbance—what he calls a pathos—is a movement of the mind that turns away from right reason and goes against nature. Some put it more briefly: a disturbance is an excessive impulse. By ‘excessive’ they mean one that has moved too far from nature’s steadiness. They trace the kinds of disturbance to two supposed goods and two supposed evils, making four in all. From supposed goods come craving and delight: delight concerns good things present, craving good things to come. From supposed evils, they hold, come fear and distress: fear concerns future evils, distress present ones. The very things we fear when they’re approaching distress us when they’re upon us.
12 “Delight and craving, then, involve a belief in something good. Craving is attracted and fired up by what seems good and rushes toward it. Delight gets carried away and jumps for joy as though it has already secured something it wanted. Everyone naturally pursues what seems good and avoids its opposite. So as soon as something appears good to us, nature itself drives us to obtain it. When this happens steadily and sensibly, the Stoics call this kind of impulse boulēsis. Let’s call it ‘willing.’ They think only a wise person has it, and define it this way: willing is desiring something with reason. But when an impulse grows too strong in defiance of reason, it’s craving, or uncontrolled desire. That’s found in everyone who isn’t wise.
13 “Similarly, when we respond to having something good, this can happen in two ways. When the mind moves peacefully and steadily in accordance with reason, it’s called ‘joy.’ But when it jumps about pointlessly and without restraint, we can call that unrestrained or excessive delight. They define it as the mind’s unreasonable swelling. And since we naturally avoid bad things just as we naturally seek good things, let’s call this avoidance ‘caution’ when it’s guided by reason. This too, we should understand, belongs only to a wise person. Avoidance without reason, accompanied by a frightened collapse of spirit, should be called ‘fear.’ Fear, then, is caution that has turned away from reason.
14 “A wise person has no response to a present evil; the unwise respond with distress. They experience it amid supposed evils, letting their spirits sink and shrink instead of obeying reason. So the first definition is this: distress is the mind’s shrinking in defiance of reason. There are thus four disturbances and three steady states, since no steady state corresponds to distress.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 6 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 116 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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