Book 4, Chapter 5
Original Latin
Quia Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa eorum perexigua oratio est, qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur, Peripatetici autem ad placandos animos multa adferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi praetermittunt. quaerebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis statim an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem.
Isto modo vero; erit enim hoc totum, quod quaero, ex utroque perfectius.
Est id quidem rectius;
10 sed post requires, si quid fuerit obscurius.
Faciam equidem; tu tamen, ut soles, dices ista ipsa obscura planius quam dicuntur a Graecis.
Enitar equidem, sed intento opus est animo, ne omnia dilabantur, si unum aliquid effugerit. Quoniam, quae Graeci πάθη vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi.
11 sit igitur hic fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“When Chrysippus and the Stoics discuss disturbances of the soul, they spend much of their time classifying and defining them. Very little of their discourse is devoted to healing souls and keeping them free of turmoil. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, have much to offer for calming souls, and pass over the thorns of classification and definition. I was asking, then, whether I should spread the sails of my discourse at once, or first propel it a little way with the oars of dialectic.”
“The latter, certainly. Everything I am asking for will be more fully accomplished by combining the two.”
“That is indeed the better course;
10 “but afterward you must ask about anything that proves obscure.”
“I shall. Still, as you usually do, you will explain even these obscure matters more clearly than the Greeks explain them.”
“I shall try, certainly, but you must pay close attention, or everything may slip away if you miss a single point. Since we prefer to call what the Greeks term πάθη, ‘passions,’ disturbances rather than diseases, in explaining them I shall follow the ancient division of Pythagoras first and Plato afterward. They divide the soul into two parts, one sharing in reason, the other without it. In the part that shares in reason they place tranquility—that is, a calm and peaceful steadiness—and in the other the turbulent movements of anger and desire, opposed and hostile to reason.
11 “Let that, then, be our starting point. In describing these disturbances, however, let us use the Stoics’ definitions and classifications: they seem to me to handle this question with the greatest precision.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“When Chrysippus and the Stoics discuss emotional disturbances, they spend most of their time classifying and defining them. Very little of what they say actually treats the mind and keeps it from being troubled. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, offer plenty to calm people’s minds, leaving aside the prickly business of classification and definition. So I was asking whether to spread the sails of my talk at once, or first push it forward a little with the logicians’ oars.”
“Yes, do it that way. Both approaches together will give a fuller answer to my whole question.”
“That’s certainly the better way.
10 “But ask afterward if anything isn’t clear.”
“I will. Still, as you usually do, you’ll make even the obscure parts clearer than the Greeks make them.”
“I’ll try. But you’ll need to pay close attention. If one thing slips past you, the whole thing may fall apart. I prefer to call what the Greeks call pathē ‘disturbances’ rather than ‘diseases.’ In explaining them, I’ll follow the old division used first by Pythagoras, then by Plato. They divide the mind into two parts, one that shares in reason and another that doesn’t. In the rational part they place calm—a peaceful, quiet steadiness. In the other they place the turbulent movements of anger and desire, which oppose reason and work against it.
11 “Let’s take that as our starting point. But to describe these disturbances, let’s use the Stoics’ definitions and divisions. They seem to me the sharpest thinkers on this question.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 5 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 115 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the Roman tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.