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Book 3, Chapter 11

87 of 189 chapters in Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero

Original Latin

24 Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspernans vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens , id est praeter modum elata laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas , quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans,

25 —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut duo reliqua, metus et aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus opinio magni mali inpendentis et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in vitam hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat, omnibus viribus atque opibus repugnandum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere.

Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda.

Musean translation

Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

24 “The entire cause, then, lies in opinion—not only of distress, but of all the other disturbances as well. There are four kinds of these, with numerous subdivisions. For every disturbance is a movement of the soul either devoid of reason, or scorning reason, or disobedient to reason. And since such a movement is aroused in either of two ways by an opinion concerning good or evil, the four disturbances fall into equal divisions. Two arise from an opinion concerning good. One, “‘exultant pleasure,’ “is joy carried beyond measure, produced by the opinion that some great good is present. The other, “‘desire,’ “which may properly also be called craving, is an immoderate appetite for a supposed great good, disobedient to reason.

25 “These two kinds, then, exultant pleasure and craving, are agitated by opinions about good things, as the other two, fear and distress, are by opinions about evils. Fear is the opinion that a great evil is impending, and “‘distress’ “is the opinion that a great evil is present—and indeed a fresh opinion of an evil of such a kind that anguish over it seems right: in other words, the person in pain thinks he ought to be in pain. We must resist with all our strength and resources these disturbances, which folly unleashes and drives like so many Furies into human life, if we wish to pass in peace and quiet through the span of life we have been given.

“But we shall deal with the others another time. For now, let us drive away distress, if we can. Let that be our aim, since you said that you think it can befall the wise person, which I utterly deny. For it is something hideous, miserable, and detestable, to be fled with every effort—with sail and oar, so to speak.”

Plain English translation

Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

24 “The whole cause, then, is in belief. That goes not just for distress, but for every other emotional disturbance too. There are four kinds, with more subdivisions. Every disturbance is a movement of the mind that either lacks reason, rejects reason, or disobeys reason. Such a movement is prompted by a belief about something good or bad, in two ways for each. That divides the four disturbances equally. Two come from a belief about something good. One is “excited pleasure, “meaning delight that rises beyond proper limits, based on the belief that some great good is present. The other is “desire, “which can also properly be called lust: an excessive reaching for some supposed great good, which doesn’t obey reason.

25 “So these two kinds, excited pleasure and uncontrolled desire, are stirred up by beliefs about good things. The other two, fear and distress, are stirred up by beliefs about bad things. Fear is the belief that something very bad is approaching, while “distress “is the belief that something very bad is present. More precisely, it’s a fresh belief about a bad thing of such a kind that being upset about it seems right. That means the person in pain believes they ought to feel pain. Foolishness lets these disturbances loose in human life and spurs them on like Furies. We must resist them with every ounce of strength and every resource if we want to get through the life we’ve been given calmly and peacefully.

“But the others can wait. Let’s drive out distress now, if we can. That’s our goal, since you said you thought a wise person could experience it. I don’t think so at all. It’s a dreadful, miserable, hateful thing. We must make every effort to escape it—by sail and oar, so to speak.”

About this section

Book 3, Chapter 11 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 87 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.

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