Book 3, Chapter 10

“the same person, then, is liable both to pity and to envy. For whoever grieves at someone’s adversity also grieves at someone’s prosperity. Thus Theophrastus, lamenting the death of his companion Callisthenes, is tormented by Alexander’s successes, and says that Callisthenes fell into the hands of a man of supreme power and supreme good fortune, who did not know how prosperity should be used. But just as pity is distress at another’s adversity, so envy is distress at another’s prosperity. Whoever is liable to pity, then, is also liable to envy. But the wise person is not liable to envy, and therefore not to pity either. If the wise person were accustomed to feeling distress, he would also be accustomed to pity. Distress, therefore, is absent from the wise.

22 “These are the Stoics’ formulations, and their conclusions are rather tightly twisted. But at some point we must speak more expansively and fully; even so, we should chiefly use the views of those whose reasoning and judgment are most courageous and, so to speak, manly. For our friends the Peripatetics—unsurpassed in richness, learning, and weight—do not really convince me when they speak of moderate disturbances or diseases of the soul. Every evil, even a moderate one, is evil; but our aim is that there should be absolutely none in the wise person. Just as a body is not healthy even if it is only moderately sick, so this moderation in the soul falls short of health. Our people, then, were splendidly right, as in so many other things, to name trouble, anxiety, and anguish ‘distress,’ using a word for sickness because of their likeness to sick bodies.

23 “The Greeks use almost this very word for every disturbance of the soul: they call any turbulent movement in it an ‘affection,’ that is, a disease. We do better. For distress of soul most closely resembles bodily sickness, whereas desire does not resemble sickness, nor does immoderate joy, that exalted and exultant pleasure of the soul. Even fear, although close to distress, does not much resemble disease. But distress in the soul, like sickness in the body, has a name properly and inseparably associated with pain. We must therefore explain the origin of this pain, that is, the cause that produces distress in the soul as it produces sickness in the body. For just as physicians think that discovering the cause of a disease means discovering its cure, so, once we have found the cause of distress, we shall find the means of healing it.”

“So the same person is capable of both pity and envy. Anyone who feels pain at someone’s misfortunes also feels pain at someone’s successes. For example, Theophrastus mourns the death of his friend Callisthenes and is troubled by Alexander’s success. He says that Callisthenes encountered a man with the greatest power and good fortune, but no understanding of how to use success properly. Now pity is distress at someone else’s misfortunes, just as envy is distress at someone else’s good fortune. So anyone capable of pity is also capable of envy. But a wise person isn’t capable of envy, and therefore isn’t capable of pity either. If a wise person regularly felt distress, they would regularly feel pity too. So a wise person is free from distress.

22 “That’s how the Stoics state their arguments and draw their conclusions, in a rather cramped form. But at some point we need to speak more broadly and fully. Still, we should rely chiefly on the views of those whose reasoning and outlook are the bravest and, so to speak, most manly. Our friends the Peripatetics are unsurpassed in richness of expression, learning, and seriousness. But I don’t really approve of their moderate amounts of emotional disturbance or mental illness. Every bad thing, even a moderate one, is bad. Our aim is that a wise person should have none of it at all. A body isn’t healthy even if it’s only moderately sick. In the same way, this moderation in the mind isn’t health. Our countrymen got it exactly right, as they did with so much else, when they named trouble, anxiety, and anguish aegritudo, ‘sickness,’ because of their likeness to sick bodies.

23 “The Greeks use much the same word for every disturbance of the mind. Any confused mental movement they call pathos, meaning ‘illness.’ Our usage is better. Mental distress is very like a sick body. Uncontrolled desire isn’t like sickness, nor is excessive delight, that excited, jumping pleasure in the mind. Even fear isn’t very like an illness, though it’s closely related to distress. But distress, in the mind, has a name specifically connected with pain, just as sickness does in the body. So we need to explain the origin of this pain: the cause that produces distress in the mind, as a cause produces sickness in the body. Doctors believe that once they’ve found an illness’s cause, they’ve found its treatment. In the same way, once we find the cause of distress, we’ll find a way to treat it.”