Book 2, Chapter 4
Original Latin
Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali quodam ductus exordio:
10 Dici non potest, quam sim hesterna disputatione tua delectatus vel potius adiutus. etsi enim mihi sum conscius numquam me nimis vitae cupidum fuisse, tamen interdum obiciebatur animo metus quidam et dolor cogitanti fore aliquando finem huius lucis et amissionem omnium vitae commodorum. hoc genere molestiae sic, mihi crede, sum liberatus, ut nihil minus curandum putem.
Minime mirum id quidem;
11 nam efficit hoc philosophia: medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores. sed haec eius vis non idem potest apud omnis: tum valet multum, cum est idoneam complexa naturam. fortis enim non modo fortuna adiuvat, ut est in vetere proverbio, sed multo magis ratio, quae quibusdam quasi praeceptis confirmat vim fortitudinis. te natura excelsum quendam videlicet et altum et humana despicientem genuit; itaque facile in animo forti contra mortem habita insedit oratio. sed haec eadem num censes apud eos ipsos valere nisi admodum paucos, a quibus inventa disputata conscripta sunt? quotus enim quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem scientiae, sed legem vitae putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi et decretis suis pareat?
12 videre licet alios tanta levitate et iactatione, ut iis fuerit non didicisse melius, alios pecuniae cupidos, gloriae non nullos, multos libidinum servos, ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio. quod quidem mihi videtur esse turpissimum. ut enim si grammaticum se professus quispiam barbare loquatur, aut si absurde canat is qui se haberi velit musicum, hoc turpior sit, quod in eo ipso peccet, cuius profitetur scientiam, sic philosophus in vitae ratione peccans hoc turpior est, quod in officio, cuius magister esse vult, labitur artemque vitae professus delinquit in vita.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
As we walked, then, our conversation began something like this:
10 “I cannot tell you how much I enjoyed yesterday’s discussion—or rather, how much it helped me. Although I know that I have never clung too desperately to life, sometimes a certain fear and pain would intrude on my mind when I thought that one day this daylight must end for me and all life’s advantages be lost. Believe me, I have been so completely freed of that kind of trouble that I think nothing deserves less concern.”
“That is not at all surprising.
11 “This is what philosophy accomplishes: she heals minds, removes empty anxieties, frees us from desires, drives out fears. But her power does not have the same effect on everyone. It is strongest when it takes hold of a suitable nature. The brave are helped not only by fortune, as the old proverb says, but far more by reason, which strengthens the force of courage through what we may call its precepts. Nature clearly gave you a lofty, aspiring spirit, one that looks down on human affairs. So a discourse against death readily took root in a brave mind. But do you suppose these same arguments have any power over more than a very few even of those who discovered, discussed, and wrote them down? How rarely do we find a philosopher whose character, outlook, and way of life conform to the demands of reason! Who regards his teaching not as a display of knowledge but as a law for living? Who obeys himself and submits to his own decrees?
12 “Some are so frivolous and boastful that they would have been better off without learning; others are greedy for money, some for fame, and many are slaves to lust. Their conduct is astonishingly at odds with their discourse. I think this is utterly disgraceful. If someone professing to be a grammarian speaks bad Latin, or someone who wants to be considered a musician sings out of tune, he is all the more disgraced because he fails in the very thing he claims to know. So too a philosopher who goes wrong in his conduct is all the more disgraced because he stumbles in the duty he wishes to teach: professing the art of living, he fails at life.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
So, as we walked, our conversation began in something like this way:
10 “Yesterday’s argument gave me more pleasure than I can describe. No, ‘help’ is a better word than ‘pleasure.’ I’ve never thought of myself as excessively attached to living. Yet I would sometimes feel frightened and upset at the thought of daylight one day ending for me, along with every advantage life offers. Believe me, you’ve taken that worry away so thoroughly that nothing now seems less worth troubling about.”
“That’s not at all surprising.
11 “That’s what philosophy does. It treats our minds, takes away pointless worries, frees us from desires, and drives out fears. But its power doesn’t have the same effect on everyone. It’s very effective when it takes hold of a suitable character. The old saying tells us that fortune helps the brave. Reason helps them much more. It strengthens the force of courage with what you might call rules. Nature has clearly given you a great, high-minded spirit that looks down on human concerns. So the argument against fearing death easily took root in your brave mind. But do you think these same ideas influence more than a very few even of the people who discovered, discussed, and wrote them down? How often do you find a philosopher whose character, attitude, and life match what reason calls for? Who treats his teaching as a rule for living, not a display of knowledge? Who obeys himself and follows his own principles?
12 “Look at the frivolous, showy behavior of some of them: they’d have done better not to study at all. Then there are the ones who crave money, others who crave fame, and many who are enslaved to their desires. What they say and how they live clash astonishingly. To me, that’s the height of disgrace. Think of a self-described expert in grammar using bad grammar, or a man wanting credit as a musician singing badly. His failure is the more disgraceful because it concerns precisely the skill he claims to possess. The philosopher who goes wrong in his way of life is in the same position, and all the more disgraced: he slips up over the duty he wants to teach. His claim is to teach the art of living, but living is where he fails.”
About this section
Book 2, Chapter 4 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 53 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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