Book 5, Chapter 30

“These, I think, are the positions about the ultimate ends that have been maintained and defended. First, four uncompounded views: nothing is good except moral goodness, as the Stoics hold; nothing except pleasure, as Epicurus holds; nothing except freedom from pain, as Hieronymus holds; nothing except the enjoyment of all, or the greatest, of nature’s primary goods, as Carneades used to argue against the Stoics.

85 “These, then, are the uncompounded views; the following are combinations. The Peripatetics hold that there are three kinds of goods: the greatest are those of the mind, second come those of the body, and third external goods. The Old Academy differs little from them. Dinomachus and Callipho coupled pleasure with moral goodness, while the Peripatetic Diodorus added freedom from pain to moral goodness. These are the positions that have some staying power; those of Aristo, Pyrrho, Herillus, and several others have faded away. Let us see what ground these thinkers can hold, leaving aside the Stoics, whose position I think I have sufficiently defended.

“The case of the Peripatetics has indeed been made clear, except for Theophrastus and any who have followed him in their rather feeble shuddering and shrinking from pain. The rest may do what they generally do: exalt the weight and dignity of virtue. Once they have raised it to the heavens, as eloquent men usually do at length, it is easy to crush and despise everything else by comparison. Those who say that glory must be sought even at the cost of pain cannot deny that those who have attained it are happy. For although they may be suffering certain evils, the word ‘happy’ has a wide and far-reaching scope.”

“As I see it, the positions about the ultimate ends that have survived and found defenders are these. First there are four simple ones: nothing is good except what’s morally right, as the Stoics say; nothing is good except pleasure, as Epicurus says; nothing is good except freedom from pain, as Hieronymus says; and nothing is good except enjoying all, or the most important, of nature’s primary goods, as Carneades argued against the Stoics.

85 “So much for the simple accounts. The combined accounts are these. For the Peripatetics there are three classes of goods: mental goods rank highest, physical ones come next, and external ones come third. The Old Academy takes much the same line. Dinomachus and Callipho put moral worth together with pleasure; Diodorus of the Peripatetic school put it together with absence of pain. Those are the views that have some lasting support. Aristo’s, Pyrrho’s, Erillus’, and a number of others have died out. We should see how the supporters of the surviving views can defend their ground. I think I’ve said enough for the Stoics, so we can set them aside.

“The Peripatetics’ case has already been explained, except for Theophrastus and any followers of his who are weak enough to shudder at pain and shrink from it. The rest can do what they generally do: stress the importance and dignity of virtue. Once they’ve raised it to the sky, as eloquent people regularly do at length, it’s easy to crush everything else by comparison and think nothing of it. People who say we should pursue praise even at the cost of pain can’t deny happiness to those who’ve achieved that praise. They may have some bad things in their lives, but the word ‘happy’ has a very wide reach.”