Book 5, Chapter 29

“I certainly can offer nothing better. But I would gladly ask you a favor, if it is not too much trouble. No bonds tie you to any particular school, and you gather from them all whatever most impresses you with the appearance of truth. A little while ago you seemed to urge the Peripatetics and the Old Academy to venture, freely and without reservation, to declare that the wise are always supremely happy. I should like to hear how you think they can say this consistently with their principles. For much that you have said has argued against that position and drawn its conclusions by the Stoics’ method.”

83 “Let us then exercise the freedom which we alone may enjoy in philosophy: our discourse passes no verdict of its own but ranges over every side, so that others can judge it on its own merits, with no authority added to it. You seem to wish us to show that, whatever the rival philosophers’ opinions about the ultimate ends, virtue still has sufficient resources for a happy life. Carneades, we are told, used to argue this very point, but as an attack on the Stoics, whom he always took the greatest pains to refute, and against whose school his genius blazed. We shall proceed peacefully—for if the Stoics have rightly determined the ultimate good, the matter is settled: the wise man must always be happy.

84 “But let us examine each of the remaining positions, to see whether this splendid declaration, this decree, as it were, concerning the happy life, can be reconciled with the views and teachings of them all.”

“Nothing better occurs to me. Still, if you don’t mind, I’d be grateful if you’d explain something. You aren’t committed to one philosophical school: you sample every school and choose whatever seems closest to the truth. Just now you appeared to be encouraging the Peripatetics and the Old Academy to speak out boldly, with no hesitation, and say that wise people always have the greatest happiness. How, in your view, can they make that claim without contradicting themselves? You’ve argued at length against their view and drawn conclusions in the Stoic manner.”

83 “Let’s exercise our philosophical freedom, then. It belongs to our school alone. We make no final ruling in the discussion itself; we put forward arguments on every side. That lets other people assess the discussion for itself, with no appeal to anyone’s authority. You seem to want to establish that virtue provides enough support for happiness whatever the rival philosophers think the final goal is. Carneades, we hear, regularly took that line. His purpose, however, was to attack the Stoics. He pursued their refutation with particular enthusiasm, and opposition to their school fired his abilities. We’ll handle the question without a fight. If the Stoic account of the ultimate good is right, everything is settled: the wise must always be happy.

84 “But let’s examine each of the other positions, to see whether this splendid resolution about a happy life, as we might call it, can be made to fit everyone’s views and teachings.”