Book 2, Chapter 17

38 “And when sacrifices are made to several gods, how does it happen that some accept them and others do not? What fickleness is this in the gods, threatening through the first entrails and promising well through the second? Or what great discord is there among them, often even among the closest relatives, that Apollo's entrails are favorable and Diana's unfavorable? What could be clearer than that, since victims are brought forward at random, each man's entrails will match whatever victim he happens to receive? ‘But,’ you say, ‘there is something divine in the very choice of the victim that falls to each man, just as in the lot each man draws.’ More about lots shortly. You do not strengthen the case for victims by comparing them to lots; you weaken the case for lots by comparing them to victims.

39 “When we send someone to the Aequimaelium to bring a lamb for sacrifice, is the lamb brought to me one whose entrails fit my circumstances? Is the slave led to that lamb not by chance but by a god? If you say that chance here too is a kind of lot joined to the gods' will, I am sorry that our Stoic friends have given the Epicureans so much opportunity to laugh at them. You know very well how they ridicule these notions.

40 “And they can do so all the more easily. Epicurus introduced his very gods as a joke: transparent, open to every breeze, dwelling between two worlds as though between two groves, for fear of falling ruins. He thinks they have the same limbs as we do but make no use of them. Thus, abolishing the gods by this roundabout route, he quite consistently has no hesitation about abolishing divination. But the Stoics do not share his consistency. His god, having no business either of his own or anyone else's, cannot bestow divination on human beings. Your god, however, can withhold it and still govern the universe and care for humanity no less.

41 “Why, then, do you entangle yourselves in snares you can never undo? When in a particular hurry, they habitually conclude like this: ‘If there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods; therefore there is divination.’ Much more plausible is: ‘But there is no divination; therefore there are no gods.’ See how rashly they risk the consequence that, if divination does not exist, neither do the gods. Divination is plainly refuted; the existence of the gods must be upheld.

38 “And when sacrifices are offered to several gods, how does it happen that the signs are favorable for some and not for others? How can the gods be so inconsistent that they threaten us through the first organs and promise good things through the second? Or how can there be such disagreement among them, often even among close relatives, that the organs offered to Apollo are good and those offered to Diana are not? What could be clearer? The victims are brought up by chance, and the organs each person gets depend on the animal that happens to fall to him. ‘But there is something divine in which victim falls to each person, just as in which lot each person draws.’ We will discuss lots shortly. Though in fact, comparing victims to lots does not strengthen your case for victims. Comparing lots to victims weakens your case for lots.

39 “Suppose we send to the Aequimaelium for a lamb to sacrifice. Are we really brought an animal with organs suited to my circumstances? Does a god guide the slave to that particular lamb, rather than chance taking him there? If you say that chance in this case too is like a drawing of lots connected with the gods’ will, I am sorry our Stoic friends have given the Epicureans such a good opportunity to laugh at them. You know how they ridicule these things.

40 “And they can do it more easily. Epicurus introduced the gods themselves as a joke: transparent, with the wind blowing through them, living between two worlds as if between two groves, for fear the worlds might collapse. He thinks they have the same limbs as we do, but no use for those limbs. So this man, who does away with the gods in a roundabout way, is right not to hesitate about doing away with divination. But the Stoics are not as consistent as he is. His god, who has no business of his own or anyone else’s, cannot give people divination. Your god, however, could go on running the universe and looking after people even without giving them divination.

41 “Why, then, do you trap yourselves in arguments you can never escape? When they are in more of a hurry, they usually reason like this: ‘If gods exist, divination exists. But gods exist. Therefore divination exists.’ Much more plausible is: ‘But divination does not exist. Therefore gods do not exist.’ See how recklessly they risk this result: if there is no divination, there are no gods. For divination can clearly be disproved, while belief in the gods’ existence must be kept.