Book 2, Chapter 3

8 After my brother Quintus had delivered the argument on divination recorded in the preceding book, and we thought we had walked enough, we sat down in the library in the Lyceum. Then I said: “Quintus, you have defended the Stoic position with precision and in true Stoic style. And what especially delights me is your use of so many examples from our own history, striking and distinguished examples too. I must therefore answer what you have said, but in such a way that I assert nothing and question everything, generally doubting and mistrusting even myself. If I had anything certain to pronounce, I should myself be practicing divination—I who deny that divination exists.

9 “For I am troubled by the question Carneades was particularly fond of asking: what is divination about? Is it about things we perceive through our senses? But those are things we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there anything in them that foreknowledge or some agitation of the mind enables us to perceive better than our natural faculties do? Could your supposed diviner, if he were blind as Tiresias was, tell what is white and what is black? Or, if deaf, recognize differences of voices or musical modes? Divination, then, has no application to anything apprehended by the senses. Nor is it needed in matters governed by skill. When people are ill, we generally bring them doctors, not prophets or soothsayers; and those who wish to play the lyre or pipes learn to handle them from musicians, not from haruspices.

8 My brother Quintus had finished the discussion of divination recorded in the previous book. After what seemed a sufficient walk, we took seats in the Lyceum’s library. I then said, “Quintus, you have defended the Stoic position carefully, and in true Stoic style. What pleases me most is that you have used so many examples from our own history, and famous, striking examples at that. Now I must answer what you have said. But I will assert nothing and question everything, often uncertain and doubtful of my own judgment. If I had anything certain to say, I would be practicing divination myself, though I deny that divination exists.

9 “What troubles me is a question Carneades used to press above all: what things does divination deal with? Things we perceive through our senses? Yet sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch already tell us about those things. Is there anything in this field that we perceive through foresight or mental excitement rather than through our natural senses? Could some supposed diviner, if he were blind like Tiresias, tell us what was white and what was black? Or, if he were deaf, could he recognize different voices or musical tunes? So divination has no use in anything we learn through our senses. Nor do we need it in things dealt with by trained skills. We normally bring doctors to the sick, not prophets or fortune-tellers. A musician, not a haruspex, teaches anyone wishing to play the pipes or a stringed instrument how to use it.