Book 1, Chapter 55
Original Latin
124 Illud tamen eius philosophi magnificum ac paene divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, aequissimo animo se dixit mori; neque enim domo egredienti neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, ascendenti signum sibi ullum, quod consuesset, a deo quasi mali alicuius inpendentis datum.
Equidem sic arbitror, etiamsi multa fallant eos, qui aut arte aut coniectura divinare videantur, esse tamen divinationem; homines autem, ut in ceteris artibus, sic in hac posse falli. Potest accidere, ut aliquod signum dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum, potest aliquod latuisse aut ipsum, aut quod esset illi contrarium. Mihi autem ad hoc, de quo disputo, probandum satis est non modo plura, sed etiam pauciora divine praesensa et praedicta reperiri.
125 Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum.
Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat.
126 Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Latin in separate source-only tasks and reviewed throughout against it. Both books, all 130 chapters and 282 numbered sections; no historical English translation used. Latin transcription credited to the Perseus Project under CC BY-SA 4.0, Müller’s 1915 Teubner edition.
124 “Yet there is something magnificent, almost divine, in that philosopher's declaration, after his condemnation by impious votes, that he faced death with complete serenity. Neither when leaving home nor when mounting the platform where he had pleaded his case had he received from the god any of his customary signs warning of impending evil.
“For my part, I believe that even if those who seem to divine through art or interpretation are often mistaken, divination still exists; human beings can make mistakes in this art as in all others. A sign given ambiguously may have been taken as certain; a sign itself may have gone unnoticed, or one that contradicted it. To establish my argument, it is enough for me to find instances of things divinely foreknown and predicted—not necessarily many, but even a few.
125 “Indeed, I would go further and say without hesitation: if even one thing has been predicted and foreknown in such a way that, when it occurs, it happens as predicted, and nothing in it appears to have come about by accident or chance, then divination certainly exists, and everyone must acknowledge it.
“Accordingly, I think, as Posidonius does, that the whole power and principle of divination must be traced first to god, of whom enough has been said, then to fate, and then to nature. Reason compels us to admit, then, that everything happens by fate. By fate I mean what the Greeks call εἱμαρμένην: the order and sequence of causes, in which one cause, linked to another, brings an event into being. This is the everlasting truth flowing from all eternity. Since this is so, nothing has happened that was not going to happen, and likewise nothing will happen whose effective causes are not already contained in nature.
126 “From this we understand that fate is not what superstition calls it, but what natural philosophy describes: the eternal cause of things, explaining why past events happened, present events happen, and future events will happen. Thus observation can record which event usually follows each cause, even if not always—for that would indeed be difficult to maintain. It is also likely that these same causes of future events are perceived by those who see them either in frenzy or in sleep.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the Latin, never from the Musean edition. Both books and every numbered section; a separate Latin-source model review covered the entire text. No human specialist review is claimed.
124 “But there is one splendid and almost divine statement by that philosopher. After the wicked votes that condemned him, he said he faced death with complete peace of mind. Neither when he left home nor when he mounted the platform on which he had defended himself had the god given him any of his usual signs to warn of some approaching evil.
“For my part, I think divination exists even if people who seem to practice it by learned skill or interpretation are often mistaken. People can make mistakes in this field just as in other arts. An ambiguous sign may have been taken as certain. A sign, or another sign contradicting it, may have gone unnoticed. But to prove my argument I only need to find some things foreseen and predicted by divination, whether there are many or only a few.
125 “I would go further without any doubt: suppose even a single event has been foreseen and predicted, then happens just as predicted, with nothing apparently due to chance or accident. That is enough to establish divination, and everybody has to acknowledge it.
“So I think we should follow Posidonius and trace the whole power and explanation of divination first to god, about whom enough has been said; next to fate; and then to nature. Reason leaves us no choice: fate governs every event. What I call fate—the Greeks' εἱμαρμένην—is a chain of causes in a fixed order, with one cause joined to another and giving rise to an effect. Here is an eternal truth, running on from an infinite past. It follows that every past event was already going to happen. In the same way, nothing will happen unless nature contains the causes that will bring that very thing about.
126 “So fate, as understood not by superstition but by natural philosophy, is the everlasting cause of events: why past events happened, present events are happening, and future events will happen. This makes it possible to observe and record what effect generally follows each cause, even if it does not always do so—it is hard to claim that much. And it is likely that these same causes of future events are seen by people who see them either in frenzy or in sleep.
About this section
Book 1, Chapter 55 is part of On Divination by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 55 of 130 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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