Book 1, Chapter 5

8 We have often discussed these questions, and recently, when I was at my Tusculan villa with my brother Quintus, we examined them somewhat more closely. We had gone for a walk in the Lyceum—the name of the upper gymnasium—when he said, “I finished your third book on the nature of the gods a little while ago. Cotta’s argument there has shaken my position, but has not altogether overthrown it.” “Excellent,” I said. “After all, Cotta himself argues in a way that refutes the Stoics’ reasoning rather than destroys people’s religion.” Then Quintus said, “Cotta does say that, and says it often, I believe, so as not to seem to overstep the bounds generally accepted. But in his eagerness to argue against the Stoics, he seems to me to abolish the gods altogether.

9 “I am at no great loss for an answer to his reasoning. Religion was defended well enough in the second book by Lucilius, whose argument, as you yourself write at the end of the third, seemed to you closer to the truth. But there is something those books passed over—I suppose because you judged it more convenient to examine and discuss it separately. I mean divination: the prediction and foreknowledge of events considered matters of chance. If you agree, let us examine the extent and nature of its power. My own view is this: if the forms of divination handed down to us and practiced among us are true, gods exist; and conversely, if gods exist, there are people who divine.”

8 We have often discussed these matters, and did so in more detail recently when I was with my brother Quintus at my Tusculan villa. Our walk had brought us to the Lyceum, as we call the upper exercise ground. He said, “A little while ago I read through the third of your books about the nature of the gods. Cotta's argument shook my belief, but it did not destroy it.” “That's very good,” I said. “Cotta himself argues in a way meant to refute the Stoics' reasoning rather than to wipe out people's religion.” Quintus replied, “Yes, Cotta says that—quite often, in fact. I think he wants to avoid seeming to violate the rules everyone shares. Yet as I see it, his drive to challenge the Stoics ends up removing the gods entirely.

9 “I have no real trouble finding an answer to his reasoning. Lucilius defended religion well enough in the second book. You yourself say at the end of the third that his argument seemed to you closer to the truth. But those books left out divination. I suppose you thought it could be examined and discussed more conveniently on its own. Divination is the prediction and foreknowledge of things regarded as chance events. If you agree, let's look at its power and character. My own view is this: if the kinds of divination we have inherited and practice are true, there are gods. And, conversely, if there are gods, there are people who can divine.”