Book 1, Chapter 39
Original Latin
84 Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. Quid est igitur, cur dubitandum sit, quin sint ea, quae disputavi, verissima, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi philosophi, si poë- tae, si sapientissimi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An, dum bestiae loquantur, exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus?
85 Nec vero quicquam aliud adfertur, cur ea, quae dico, divinandi genera nulla sint, nisi quod difficile dictu videtur, quae cuiusque divinationis ratio, quae causa sit. Quid enim habet haruspex, cur pulmo incisus etiam in bonis extis dirimat tempus et proferat diem? quid augur, cur a dextra corvus, a sinistra cornix faciat ratum? quid astrologus, cur stella Iovis aut Veneris coniuncta cum luna ad ortus puerorum salutaris sit, Saturni Martisve contraria? Cur autem deus dormientes nos moneat, vigilantes neglegat? Quid deinde causae est, cur Cassandra furens futura prospiciat, Priamus sapiens hoc idem facere non queat?
86 Cur fiat quidque, quaeris. Recte omnino; sed non nunc id agitur; fiat necne fiat, id quaeritur. Ut, si magnetem lapidem esse dicam, qui ferrum ad se adliciat et attrahat, rationem, cur id fiat, adferre nequeam, fieri omnino neges. Quod idem facis in divinatione, quam et cernimus ipsi et audimus et legimus et a patribus accepimus. Neque ante philosophiam patefactam, quae nuper inventa est, hac de re communis vita dubitavit, et, posteaquam philosophia processit, nemo aliter philosophus sensit, in quo modo esset auctoritas.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Latin in separate source-only tasks and reviewed throughout against it. Both books, all 130 chapters and 282 numbered sections; no historical English translation used. Latin transcription credited to the Perseus Project under CC BY-SA 4.0, Müller’s 1915 Teubner edition.
84 “This is the argument used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater. What reason, then, is there to doubt the absolute truth of what I have argued, if reason is on my side, if events are, if peoples and nations are, Greeks and foreigners alike, and even our own ancestors; if, in short, this has always been the accepted belief; if the greatest philosophers support it, and poets, and the wisest men who established states and founded cities? Are we waiting for the beasts to speak, dissatisfied with the unanimous authority of humanity?
85 “Indeed, the only objection offered to the existence of the kinds of divination I describe is that it seems difficult to explain the principle and cause of each. What reason can the haruspex give why a cleft in the lung, even when the other entrails are favorable, interrupts proceedings and postpones the day? What reason can the augur give why a raven on the right or a crow on the left confirms an undertaking? What can the astrologer say about why Jupiter or Venus in conjunction with the moon at a child's birth is beneficial, while Saturn or Mars has the opposite effect? Why does a god warn us when we sleep and neglect us when we are awake? And why can Cassandra foresee the future in her frenzy, while Priam in his wisdom cannot do the same?
86 “You ask why each thing happens. Quite right; but that is not the question now. The question is whether it happens or not. It is as if I said there was a magnetic stone that drew and pulled iron toward itself, and, because I could not explain why this happened, you denied that it happened at all. You do just the same with divination, which we ourselves witness, hear about, read of, and have inherited from our fathers. Before the revelation of philosophy, itself a recent discovery, ordinary life had no doubts on this subject; and after philosophy advanced, no philosopher of any standing held a different view.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the Latin, never from the Musean edition. Both books and every numbered section; a separate Latin-source model review covered the entire text. No human specialist review is claimed.
84 “Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater all use this argument. Why, then, should we doubt the absolute truth of what I have argued? Reason supports me, and so do events, peoples, nations, Greeks, non-Greeks, and our own ancestors. This has always been the accepted view. The greatest philosophers support it, as do poets and those very wise men who established governments and founded cities. Or are we waiting for animals to speak? Isn't the united testimony of humanity enough for us?
85 “The only reason offered for denying the kinds of divination I have described is that it seems hard to explain the process and cause behind each of them. How can a haruspex explain why a cleft in a lung stops a proceeding and postpones the day, even when the other entrails are favorable? What grounds does an augur have for treating a raven to the right or a crow to the left as making an omen valid? What explanation can an astrologer give for this: a birth under a conjunction of the moon with Jupiter or Venus is favorable, but with Saturn or Mars it is unfavorable? And why should warnings from a god come to us in sleep, while we get none when awake? And why does Cassandra in her frenzy foresee the future, while sensible Priam cannot do the same?
86 “You ask why each thing happens. A perfectly proper question, but that is not our subject now. The question is whether it happens at all. Suppose I said there is a magnetic stone that draws iron toward itself and attracts it, but could not give the reason why. Would you deny that it happens at all? That is just what you do with divination. Yet we see it ourselves, hear about it, read about it, and have inherited it from our fathers. Before philosophy was made known—a fairly recent discovery—ordinary people had no doubts about it. And after philosophy developed, no philosopher of any standing held a different view.
About this section
Book 1, Chapter 39 is part of On Divination by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 39 of 130 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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