Book 1, Chapter 3

5 Our ancestors, I believe, accepted these practices less from the instruction of reason than from the lessons of events. Philosophers, however, have assembled some subtle arguments to show that divination is true. Among the most ancient—to begin with them—Xenophanes of Colophon alone rejected divination altogether, though he acknowledged the existence of gods. All the others approved it, except Epicurus with his stammering account of the gods’ nature, though they did not approve it in the same way. Socrates and all the Socratics, Zeno and his followers, held to the ancient philosophers’ position, with the agreement of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics. Pythagoras had already given the practice great authority, wishing to be an augur himself; and Democritus, an influential thinker, affirmed foreknowledge of the future in many passages. But the Peripatetic Dicaearchus rejected the other forms of divination, retaining dreams and frenzy. Our friend Cratippus, whom I rank with the greatest Peripatetics, likewise put his trust in these and rejected all the rest.

6 The Stoics defended nearly all those forms. Zeno had scattered what might be called their seeds in his writings, and Cleanthes had developed them somewhat further; then came Chrysippus, a man of penetrating intellect, who set out the entire theory of divination in two books, adding one on oracles and another on dreams. His pupil Diogenes of Babylon followed him with one book, Antipater with two, and our friend Posidonius with five. Yet Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius and pupil of Antipater, departed from the Stoics, though he was himself a leading member of their school. Even he did not venture to deny the power of divination: he said he was in doubt. If a Stoic was allowed, much against the Stoics’ wishes, to do this on one question, will they not allow us to do so on the others? Especially when what remains uncertain to Panaetius seems clearer than sunlight to the rest of his school!

5 In my view, people in the past accepted these things more because events had taught them than because reasoning had persuaded them. Philosophers, however, have gathered some carefully worked-out arguments for the truth of divination. To speak of the earliest, Xenophanes of Colophon was the only one who accepted the existence of gods but rejected divination altogether. All the others accepted it, except Epicurus, who stammers out his account of the gods' nature. But they did not all accept it in the same way. Socrates, all his followers, Zeno, and Zeno's followers held to the view of the ancient philosophers. This was also the position taken by the Old Academy and the Peripatetics. Even earlier, Pythagoras had given divination great authority and wished to be an augur himself. Democritus, an important authority, also supported foreknowledge of the future in many passages. But Dicaearchus the Peripatetic rejected every form of divination except dreams and madness. The same two forms are accepted by our friend Cratippus; I consider him a match for the best Peripatetic thinkers. He rejects all the others.

6 The Stoics stood up for nearly every one of these forms. Zeno's writings had, so to speak, sown the seeds, and Cleanthes had made them grow a little more. Then came Chrysippus, a man of very sharp intelligence. He devoted two books to explaining the entire theory of divination, plus a separate book to oracles and one to dreams. After him came a single book by his student Diogenes of Babylon; Antipater wrote two, and our friend Posidonius five. But Panaetius broke with the Stoics on this point, though he was perhaps the leading member of that school, the teacher of Posidonius and the pupil of Antipater. Even he did not dare deny the power of divination. He said he was uncertain about it. If a Stoic was allowed to do that on one subject, however unwilling the other Stoics were, will they not allow us to do it on other subjects too? Especially when the very thing Panaetius finds unclear seems clearer than sunlight to the rest of his school?