Book 2, Chapter 53
Original Latin
108 ‘Si’, inquit, ‘aliquando oculi peccent, tamen, quia recte aliquando viderunt, inest in iis vis videndi; item, si quis semel aliquid in divinatione dispexerit, is, etiam cum peccet, tamen existumandus sit habere vim divinandi.’ Vide, quaeso, Cratippe noster, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur. Oculi enim vera cernentes utuntur natura atque sensu, animi, si quando vel vaticinando vel somniando vera viderunt, usi sunt fortuna atque casu; nisi forte concessuros tibi existumas eos, qui somnia pro somniis habent, si quando aliquod somnium verum evaserit, non id fortuito accidisse. Sed demus tibi istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos Latine loqui malumus), adsumptio tamen (quam πρόσληψιν iidem vocant) non dabitur.
109 Adsumit autem Cratippus hoc modo: ‘Sunt autem innumerabiles praesensiones non fortuitae.’ At ego dico nullam (vide, quanta sit controversia); iam adsumptione non concessa nulla conclusio est. At impudentes sumus, qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus. Quid est perspicuum? ‘Multa vera’, inquit ‘evadere.’ Quid, quod multo plura falsa? Nonne ipsa varietas, quae est propria fortunae, fortunam esse causam, non naturam esse docet? Deinde, si tua ista conclusio, Cratippe, vera est (tecum enim mihi res est), non intellegis eadem uti posse et haruspices et fulguratores et interpretes ostentorum et augures et sortilegos et Chaldaeos? quorum generum nullum est, ex quo non aliquid, sicut praedictum sit, evaserit. Ergo aut ea quoque genera divinandi sunt, quae tu rectissume inprobas, aut, si ea non sunt, non intellego, cur haec duo sint, quae relinquis. Qua ergo ratione haec inducis, eadem illa possunt esse, quae tollis.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Latin in separate source-only tasks and reviewed throughout against it. Both books, all 130 chapters and 282 numbered sections; no historical English translation used. Latin transcription credited to the Perseus Project under CC BY-SA 4.0, Müller’s 1915 Teubner edition.
108 “‘If,’ he says, ‘the eyes sometimes err, they still possess the power of sight, because at other times they have seen correctly. Similarly, if someone has even once perceived something through divination, we must believe that he possesses the power of divination, even when he errs.’ Consider, my dear Cratippus, how close this likeness is: to me it seems no likeness at all. Eyes that see truly employ nature and sensation; minds that have at any time seen truly through inspired prophecy or dreams have employed fortune and chance. Unless perhaps you think those who regard dreams as dreams will grant you that, whenever a dream comes true, it has not happened by chance! But let us grant your two premises—what dialecticians call λήμματα, though I prefer our Latin terms. The additional premise, which they call πρόσληψις, will still not be granted.
109 “Cratippus adds it in this form: ‘But there are countless forebodings that are not due to chance.’ I say there is not one: see how great our disagreement is! Once that additional premise is refused, there is no conclusion. ‘But it is shameless of us not to concede something so obvious.’ What is obvious? ‘That many predictions come true,’ he says. What about the far greater number that prove false? Does not the very variation, which is characteristic of chance, teach us that chance, not nature, is the cause? Besides, Cratippus—for it is with you that I am arguing—if this argument of yours is valid, do you not see that haruspices, interpreters of lightning and portents, augurs, diviners by lots, and Chaldeans can all use it too? There is no one of these kinds in which something has not happened as predicted. So either those kinds of divination that you quite rightly reject also exist, or, if they do not, I cannot see why these two you retain should exist. The very reasoning by which you establish these can establish those you abolish.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the Latin, never from the Musean edition. Both books and every numbered section; a separate Latin-source model review covered the entire text. No human specialist review is claimed.
108 “‘Even if the eyes sometimes make mistakes,’ he says, ‘they still have the power of sight, because they have sometimes seen correctly. Likewise, if someone has once seen something clearly through divination, we should think he has the power of divination even when he makes mistakes.’ Please consider, dear Cratippus, how similar these cases are. They do not look similar to me. When eyes see truly, they use nature and a sense. If minds have ever seen truly in inspired prophecy or dreams, they have used luck and chance. Unless perhaps you expect people who regard dreams as just dreams to grant you that, when a dream comes true, it did not happen by chance. But let us grant your two premises—what logicians call λήμματα, though we prefer to speak Latin. Still, we will not grant your additional premise, which the same men call πρόσληψιν.
109 “Cratippus adds this premise: ‘There are countless predictions that are not due to chance.’ But I say there is not one. See how great our disagreement is! Reject the extra premise, and the argument proves nothing. Yet apparently we are shameless for not agreeing when the matter is so clear. What is clear? He answers, ‘Many predictions turn out right.’ But aren't far more of them wrong? Doesn't this very unevenness, which is typical of chance, show that chance is the cause, not nature? Besides, Cratippus, if your argument is sound—and it is with you that I am arguing—don't you see that the same argument could be used by haruspices, lightning diviners, interpreters of portents, augurs, people who draw lots, and Chaldeans? In every one of those groups, something has turned out as predicted. So the practices you rightly dismiss must count as divination too; otherwise I see no reason to accept the two you retain. The same reasoning you use to bring these in can establish the ones you rule out.
About this section
Book 2, Chapter 53 is part of On Divination by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 111 of 130 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the Roman tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.