Book 2, Chapter 51
Original Latin
105 Sequitur porro, nihil deos ignorare, quod omnia sint ab iis constituta. Hic vero quanta pugna est doctissumorum hominum negantium esse haec a dis inmortalibus constituta! At nostra interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt. Magnus Dicaearchi liber est nescire ea melius esse quam scire. Negant id esse alienum maiestate deorum. Scilicet casas omnium introspicere, ut videant, quid cuique conducat.
106 ‘Neque non possunt futura praenoscere.’ Negant posse ii, quibus non placet esse certum, quid futurum sit. Videsne igitur, quae dubia sint, ea sumi pro certis atque concessis? Deinde contorquent et ita concludunt: ‘Non igitur et sunt di nec significant futura’; id enim iam perfectum arbitrantur. Deinde adsumunt: ‘Sunt autem di’, quod ipsum non ab omnibus conceditur. ‘Significant ergo.’ Ne id quidem sequitur; possunt enim non significare et tamen esse di. ‘Nec, si significant, non dant vias aliquas ad scientiam significationis.’ At id quoque potest, ut non dent homini, ipsi habeant; cur enim Tuscis potius quam Romanis darent? ‘Nec, si dant vias, nulla est divinatio.’ Fac dare deos, quod absurdum est; quid refert, si accipere non possumus? Extremum <est>: ‘Est igitur divinatio.’ Sit extremum, effectum tamen non est; ex falsis enim, ut ab ipsis didicimus, verum effici non potest. Iacet igitur tota conclusio.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Latin in separate source-only tasks and reviewed throughout against it. Both books, all 130 chapters and 282 numbered sections; no historical English translation used. Latin transcription credited to the Perseus Project under CC BY-SA 4.0, Müller’s 1915 Teubner edition.
105 “Next comes the assertion that the gods are ignorant of nothing, since they have ordained everything. Yet how fiercely the most learned men dispute this, denying that these things were ordained by the immortal gods! ‘But it is in our interest to know what will happen.’ Dicaearchus wrote a substantial book arguing that it is better not to know than to know. They deny that giving signs is beneath the gods’ majesty. No doubt it is majestic to peer into everyone’s cottage to see what would be to each person’s advantage!
106 “‘Nor are they unable to know the future in advance.’ Those who do not believe the future is fixed deny that they can. Do you see, then, how doubtful claims are taken as certain and conceded? Then they twist the argument into this conclusion: ‘It is therefore not the case both that gods exist and that they do not signify the future.’ They think they have now proved that. Next they add, ‘But gods exist’—which itself is not granted by everyone. ‘Therefore they give signs.’ Even that does not follow: they may give no signs and still be gods. ‘Nor, if they give signs, do they fail to give some means of understanding their meaning.’ But that too is possible: they might keep the knowledge themselves and not give it to human beings. Why give it to Etruscans rather than Romans? ‘Nor, if they give us means, can divination be nonexistent.’ Suppose the gods give them, absurd though that is: what does it matter if we cannot receive them? The final step is, ‘Therefore divination exists.’ Final it may be, but it is not proved: from false premises, as we have learned from these very men, truth cannot be established. So the entire argument collapses.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the Latin, never from the Musean edition. Both books and every numbered section; a separate Latin-source model review covered the entire text. No human specialist review is claimed.
105 “Next comes the claim that the gods know everything because they arranged everything. Here there is a huge battle, with highly learned men denying that these things were arranged by the immortal gods! ‘But knowing what will happen is in our interest.’ Dicaearchus devotes a long book to showing we are better off not knowing the future. They also claim that giving signs does not diminish the gods' dignity. Of course: peering into everyone's little house to see what is good for each person!
106 “‘And they can know the future in advance.’ Those who reject a fixed future deny that they can. Do you see, then, that doubtful claims are taken as certain and accepted? Next they twist things around and conclude: ‘So it cannot be the case that gods exist but do not give signs of the future.’ They think they have proved that by now. Then they add: ‘But gods exist.’ There is no universal agreement even on that. ‘So they signal the future.’ But this conclusion still does not follow. They could give no signs and still be gods. ‘And if they give signs, they also give some way to understand those signs.’ But they could keep that knowledge themselves and not give it to humans. Why, after all, would they give it to Etruscans rather than Romans? ‘And if they give ways to understand, divination must exist.’ Suppose the gods give them, absurd as that is. What difference does it make if we cannot receive them? Their last point is: ‘Therefore divination exists.’ It may be their last point, but it is not proved. As we have learned from these men themselves, you cannot get a true conclusion from false premises. So their entire argument collapses.
About this section
Book 2, Chapter 51 is part of On Divination by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 109 of 130 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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