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Adam Smith · Complete work

Book I, Chapter II

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Original 18th-century English

OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION TO THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature, which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given, or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man, or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion, but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison, with his companions; and he finds at last that he can, in this manner, get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came in to the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals, acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a grey-hound, or a grey-hound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd’s dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd’s dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men’s talents he has occasion for.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete English text of all five books for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.

Of the Principle Which Gives Rise to the Division of Labor.

This division of labor, from which so many advantages arise, is not originally the effect of human wisdom foreseeing and intending the general wealth it brings about. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature that has no such broad benefit in view: the propensity to trade, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propensity is an original principle of human nature that admits no further explanation, or, as seems more likely, a necessary consequence of our faculties of reason and speech, is not a question for our present inquiry. It is common to all human beings and found in no other species of animal, which appear to know neither this nor any other kind of contract. Two grayhounds pursuing the same hare sometimes seem to act in concert. Each turns her toward its companion, or tries to intercept her when its companion turns her back. But this is not the result of any contract: their desires simply happen to converge on the same object at that particular moment. No one has ever seen a dog fairly and deliberately exchange one bone for another with another dog. No one has ever seen one animal signify to another, by its gestures and natural cries, “This is mine, that is yours; I will give this for that.” When an animal wants something from a human being or another animal, it has no means of persuasion except to win the favor of the one whose help it needs. A puppy fawns on its mother, and a spaniel tries by a thousand enticements to engage its master’s attention at dinner when it wants to be fed. People sometimes employ the same devices with one another; when they have no other means of inducing others to act as they wish, they try by every servile and fawning attention to gain their goodwill. But no one has time to do this on every occasion. In civilized society a person needs the cooperation and help of great multitudes at all times, while an entire life is scarcely enough to win the friendship of a few. Among almost all other species, each animal, when fully grown, is entirely independent and in its natural state needs no other living creature’s assistance. A human being, however, has almost constant need of others’ help, and it is futile to expect that help from their benevolence alone. He is more likely to succeed if he can enlist their self-interest on his side and show them that doing what he asks is to their own advantage. Anyone offering another person a bargain proposes just this. “Give me what I want, and you shall have what you want”: that is the meaning of every such offer. In this way we obtain from one another by far the greater part of the services we need. We expect our dinner not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, but from their concern for their own interest. We appeal not to their humanity but to their self-interest, and we speak to them not of our own needs but of their advantages. No one except a beggar chooses to rely chiefly on the benevolence of his fellow citizens. Even a beggar does not depend on it entirely. The charity of kindly people does, indeed, supply the whole fund of his subsistence. Yet though this principle ultimately provides all the necessities of life he needs, it neither does nor can provide them as he needs them. Most of his immediate wants are met as other people’s are: by agreement, barter, and purchase. With the money one person gives him, he buys food. Old clothes given by another he exchanges for clothes that suit him better, or for lodging, food, or money with which to buy food, clothes, or lodging as he needs.

Just as it is by agreement, barter, and purchase that we obtain from one another most of the mutual services we need, so this same disposition to trade originally gives rise to the division of labor. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, one person, for example, makes bows and arrows more quickly and skillfully than the others. He often exchanges them with his companions for cattle or venison, and at last discovers that this way he can obtain more cattle and venison than if he went out to catch them himself. With his own interest in mind, then, he makes bow-and-arrow-making his chief business and becomes a kind of armorer. Another excels at making the frames and coverings of their little huts or movable houses. He is accustomed to helping his neighbors in this way, and they reward him with cattle and venison too, until at last he sees that it is in his interest to devote himself wholly to this work and become a kind of house carpenter. In the same way a third person becomes a smith or a brassworker, a fourth a tanner or a dresser of hides and skins, the principal clothing of people in such societies. Thus the certainty of being able to exchange the surplus produce of one’s own labor—whatever exceeds one’s own consumption—for the produce of other people’s labor that one needs encourages everyone to devote himself to a particular occupation and develop to its fullest whatever talent or aptitude he has for that kind of business.

In reality, differences in natural talents among people are much smaller than we suppose. The very different aptitudes that seem to distinguish people in different professions when they reach maturity are often less the cause than the effect of the division of labor. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, a philosopher and an ordinary street porter, for example, seems to arise less from nature than from habit, custom, and education. When they first came into the world, and for their first six or eight years, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither parents nor playmates could detect any remarkable difference. At that age, or soon afterward, they begin to be employed in very different occupations. Differences in talent then become noticeable and gradually widen until at last the philosopher’s vanity can scarcely acknowledge any resemblance. Yet without the disposition to trade, barter, and exchange, everyone would have had to obtain for himself every necessity and convenience of life he wanted. All would have had the same duties to perform and the same work to do, and there could have been no difference of employment such as alone can give rise to any great difference of talents.

Just as this disposition produces the striking differences of talent among people of different professions, it also makes those differences useful. Many breeds of animals, acknowledged to be of one species, have by nature much greater differences of disposition and ability than appear among people before custom and education shape them. A philosopher is by nature not half so different in mind and disposition from a street porter as a mastiff is from a greyhound, a greyhound from a spaniel, or a spaniel from a shepherd’s dog. Yet these different breeds of animals, though all of one species, are of hardly any use to one another. The mastiff’s strength receives not the slightest support from the greyhound’s speed, the spaniel’s keen perception, or the shepherd dog’s obedience. For want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, the fruits of these different abilities and talents cannot be brought into a common stock and do nothing to improve the comfort and well-being of the species. Every animal must still support and defend itself separately and independently, gaining no advantage from the range of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among human beings, on the contrary, the most dissimilar abilities benefit one another. Through the general disposition to trade, barter, and exchange, the different products of their respective talents are brought, as it were, into a common stock from which everyone can purchase whatever share of the produce of others’ talents he needs.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete English text of all five books.

On the Principle That Gives Rise to the Division of Labor.

The division of labor brings many benefits. It did not originally arise because people wisely foresaw and planned the widespread wealth it would bring. Rather, it is the necessary result, reached very slowly and gradually, of a human tendency that is not aimed at any such broad benefit. People tend to trade, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

We need not decide here whether this tendency is an inborn feature of human nature that cannot be explained further, or, as seems more likely, a necessary result of our ability to reason and speak. All people have it, but no other kind of animal seems to understand this or any other kind of agreement. Two grayhounds chasing one hare sometimes appear to work together. Each turns the hare toward the other or tries to catch it as the other turns it back. But they have not made an agreement. They simply happen to want the same thing at that moment. Nobody has ever seen one dog consciously make a fair trade of one bone for another with a second dog. Nobody has ever seen an animal convey to another by gesture or natural cry: this is mine, that is yours; I will give you this for that. If an animal wants something from a person or another animal, its only way of persuading them is to win favor from the one whose help it needs. A puppy fawns on its mother. A spaniel seeking food tries in a thousand ways to catch the attention of its owner at dinner. People sometimes act this way toward other people. If they have no other way to get what they want, they try to gain goodwill by being submissive and flattering. But they cannot do this every time they need something. In civilized society a person constantly needs the cooperation and help of large numbers of people. A whole lifetime is barely enough to become friends with a few. In almost every other animal species, a mature individual is completely independent and naturally needs no help from another living creature. A person, however, almost always needs help from other people. It is no use relying only on their kindness. A person has a better chance if he appeals to their self-interest and shows that helping him would benefit them. Everyone who proposes a deal does this. The meaning of every such offer is: give me what I want and you will get what you want. This is how we obtain by far most of the help we need from each other. We expect dinner from the butcher, the brewer, and the baker not because they are kind but because they care about their own interests. We appeal to their self-interest, not to their concern for others, and speak about what they stand to gain, not what we need. Only a beggar chooses to depend mainly on fellow citizens' kindness. Even a beggar does not depend on it entirely. Gifts from generous people provide all the means by which he lives, but they cannot supply each necessity exactly when it arises. He meets most of his day-to-day needs the same way other people do: by making deals, bartering, and buying things. He buys food with money someone gives him. He exchanges someone else's gift of old clothes for more suitable clothes, or for housing, food, or money. With that money he buys food, clothes, or housing when he needs them.

Deals, barter, and purchases provide most of the help people give each other. The same tendency to trade first gives rise to the division of labor. Suppose someone in a tribe of hunters or shepherds can make bows and arrows faster and more skillfully than anyone else. He often trades them with other members for cattle or venison. Eventually he finds that this brings him more cattle and venison than hunting or tending herds himself would. So it is in his interest to make bows and arrows as his main occupation, and he becomes a kind of armorer. Another person is especially good at making the frames and covers of their small huts or movable homes. His neighbors regularly use his help and pay him with cattle and venison. He eventually sees that it pays to devote himself entirely to this work and becomes a kind of house carpenter. In the same way, a third person becomes a smith or a worker in brass, and a fourth prepares or tans hides and skins, which supply most of the clothing worn by people in such societies. Because each person knows he can exchange everything he makes beyond what he uses for the things other workers make that he needs, he is encouraged to specialize. He develops whatever talent he has for that job as far as he can.

People's natural talents actually differ much less than we think. The very different abilities we see in adults of different occupations are often results of the division of labor rather than its causes. Consider two people who seem very different, a philosopher and an ordinary street porter. Habit, custom, and education seem to account for more of that difference than nature does. At birth and for their first six or eight years, they may have been very much alike. Neither parents nor playmates could notice any striking difference. At about that age, or shortly after, they begin different kinds of work. Their different talents then become visible and gradually grow further apart. At last the philosopher's vanity makes him reluctant to admit that they resemble each other at all. Without the tendency to trade and exchange, though, each person would have to supply all the necessities and comforts he wanted for himself. Everyone would have the same jobs to do. There could be no division of work to create large differences in talent.

The tendency to trade both creates the striking differences in talent among people in different professions and makes those differences useful. Among the groups of animals recognized as belonging to a single species, nature produces much greater differences in abilities than those seen among people before custom and education take effect. A philosopher's natural intelligence and disposition differ less from a street porter's than a mastiff's differ from a greyhound's, or a greyhound's from a spaniel's, or a spaniel's from a shepherd's dog's. Yet these different groups of animals, though members of the same species, can do almost nothing for each other. The mastiff's strength gains nothing from the greyhound's speed, the spaniel's keen senses, or the shepherd's dog's readiness to learn. Because they cannot or will not trade, their different talents cannot be pooled. They do nothing to improve the comfort and living conditions of their species. Each animal must support and protect itself independently and gets no benefit from the different abilities of its fellows. Among people, on the other hand, even the most different talents are useful to one another. The general tendency to trade and exchange brings the various products of people's skills into a common stock. Each person can then buy whatever he needs of the products of other people's talents.

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