"Reason" in Philosophy
Original German
1 Sie fragen mich, was Alles Idiosynkrasie bei den Philosophen ist?… Zum Beispiel ihr Mangel an historischem Sinn, ihr Hass gegen die Vorstellung selbst des Werdens, ihr Ägypticismus. Sie glauben einer Sache eine Ehre anzuthun, wenn sie dieselbe enthistorisiren, sub specie aeterni, - wenn sie aus ihr eine Mumie machen. Alles, was Philosophen seit Jahrtausenden gehandhabt haben, waren Begriffs-Mumien; es kam nichts Wirkliches lebendig aus ihren Händen. Sie tödten, sie stopfen aus, diese Herren Begriffs-Götzendiener, wenn sie anbeten, - sie werden Allem lebensgefährlich, wenn sie anbeten. Der Tod, der Wandel, das Alter ebensogut als Zeugung und Wachsthum sind für sie Einwände, - Widerlegungen sogar. Was ist, wird nicht; was wird ist nicht… Nun glauben sie Alle, mit Verzweiflung sogar, an's Seiende. Da sie aber dessen nicht habhaft werden, suchen sie nach Gründen, weshalb man's ihnen vorenthält. "Es muss ein Schein, eine Betrügerei dabei sein, dass wir das Seiende nicht wahrnehmen: wo steckt der Betrüger?" - "Wir haben ihn, schreien sie glückselig, die Sinnlichkeit ist's! Diese Sinne, die auch sonst so unmoralisch sind, sie betrügen uns über die wahre Welt. Moral: loskommen von dem Sinnentrug, vom Werden, von der Historie, von der Lüge, - Historie ist nichts als Glaube an die Sinne, Glaube an die Lüge. Moral: Neinsagen zu Allem, was den Sinnen Glauben schenkt, zum ganzen Rest der Menschheit: das ist Alles `Volk`. Philosoph sein, Mumie sein, den Monotono-Theismus durch eine Todtengräber-Mimik darstellen! - Und weg vor Allem mit dem Leibe, dieser erbarmungswürdigen idée fixe der Sinne! behaftet mit allen Fehlern der Logik, die es giebt, widerlegt, unmöglich sogar, ob er schon frech genug ist, sich als wirklich zu gebärden!"…
2 Ich nehme, mit hoher Ehrerbietung, den Namen Heraklit's bei Seite. Wenn das andre Philosophen-Volk das Zeugniss der Sinne verwarf, weil dieselben Vielheit und Veränderung zeigten, verwarf er deren Zeugniss, weil sie die Dinge zeigten, als ob sie Dauer und Einheit hätten. Auch Heraklit that den Sinnen Unrecht. Dieselben lügen weder in der Art, wie die Eleaten es glauben, noch wie er es glaubte, - sie lügen überhaupt nicht. Was wir aus ihrem Zeugniss machen, das legt erst die Lüge hinein, zum Beispiel die Lüge der Einheit, die Lüge der Dinglichkeit, der Substanz, der Dauer… Die "Vernunft" ist die Ursache, dass wir das Zeugniss der Sinne fälschen. Sofern die Sinne das Werden, das Vergehn, den Wechsel zeigen, lügen sie nicht… Aber damit wird Heraklit ewig Recht behalten, dass das Sein eine leere Fiktion ist. Die "scheinbare" Welt ist die einzige: die wahre Welt ist nur hinzugelogen…
3 - Und was für feine Werkzeuge der Beobachtung haben wir an unsren Sinnen! Diese Nase zum Beispiel, von der noch kein Philosoph mit Verehrung und Dankbarkeit gesprochen hat, ist sogar einstweilen das delikateste Instrument, das uns zu Gebote steht: es vermag noch Minimaldifferenzen der Bewegung zu constatiren, die selbst das Spektroskop nicht constatirt. Wir besitzen heute genau so weit Wissenschaft, als wir uns entschlossen haben, das Zeugniss der Sinne anzunehmen, - als wir sie noch schärfen, bewaffnen, zu Ende denken lernten. Der Rest ist Missgeburt und Noch-nicht-Wissenschaft: will sagen Metaphysik, Theologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnisstheorie. Oder Formal-Wissenschaft, Zeichenlehre: wie die Logik und jene angewandte Logik, die Mathematik. In ihnen kommt die Wirklichkeit gar nicht vor, nicht einmal als Problem; ebensowenig als die Frage, welchen Werth überhaupt eine solche Zeichen-Convention, wie die Logik ist, hat. -
4 Die andre Idiosynkrasie der Philosophen ist nicht weniger gefährlich: sie besteht darin, das Letzte und das Erste zu verwechseln. Sie setzen Das, was am Ende kommt - leider! denn es sollte gar nicht kommen! - die "höchsten Begriffe", das heisst die allgemeinsten, die leersten Begriffe, den letzten Rauch der verdunstenden Realität an den Anfang als Anfang. Es ist dies wieder nur der Ausdruck ihrer Art zu verehren: das Höhere darf nicht aus dem Niederen wachsen, darf überhaupt nicht gewachsen sein… Moral: Alles, was ersten Ranges ist, muss causa sui sein. Die Herkunft aus etwas Anderem gilt als Einwand, als Werth-Anzweifelung. Alle obersten Werthe sind ersten Ranges, alle höchsten Begriffe, das Seiende, das Unbedingte, das Gute, das Wahre, das Vollkommne - das Alles kann nicht geworden sein, muss folglich causa sui sein. Das Alles aber kann auch nicht einander ungleich, kann nicht mit sich im Widerspruch sein… Damit haben sie ihren stupenden Begriff "Gott"… Das Letzte, Dünnste, Leerste wird als Erstes gesetzt, als Ursache an sich, als ens realissimum… Dass die Menschheit die Gehirnleiden kranker Spinneweber hat ernst nehmen müssen! - Und sie hat theuer dafür gezahlt!…
5 - Stellen wir endlich dagegen, auf welche verschiedne Art wir (- ich sage höflicher Weise wir… ) das Problem des Irrthums und der Scheinbarkeit in's Auge fassen. Ehemals nahm man die Veränderung, den Wechsel, das Werden überhaupt als Beweis für Scheinbarkeit, als Zeichen dafür, dass Etwas da sein müsse, das uns irre führe. Heute umgekehrt sehen wir, genau so weit als das Vernunft-Vorurtheil uns zwingt, Einheit, Identität, Dauer, Substanz, Ursache, Dinglichkeit, Sein anzusetzen, uns gewissermaassen verstrickt in den Irrthum, necessitirt zum Irrthum; so sicher wir auf Grund einer strengen Nachrechnung bei uns darüber sind, dass hier der Irrthum ist. Es steht damit nicht anders als mit den Bewegungen des grossen Gestirns: bei ihnen hat der Irrthum unser Auge, hier hat er unsre Sprache zum beständigen Anwalt. Die Sprache gehört ihrer Entstehung nach in die Zeit der rudimentärsten Form von Psychologie: wir kommen in ein grobes Fetischwesen hinein, wenn wir uns die Grundvoraussetzungen der Sprach-Metaphysik, auf deutsch: der Vernunft, zum Bewusstsein bringen. Das sieht überall Thäter und Thun: das glaubt an Willen als Ursache überhaupt; das glaubt an's "Ich", an's Ich als Sein, an's Ich als Substanz und projicirt den Glauben an die Ich-Substanz auf alle Dinge - es schafft erst damit den Begriff "Ding"… Das Sein wird überall als Ursache hineingedacht, untergeschoben; aus der Conception "Ich" folgt erst, als abgeleitet, der Begriff "Sein"… Am Anfang steht das grosse Verhängniss von Irrthum, dass der Wille Etwas ist, das wirkt, - dass Wille ein Vermögen ist… Heute wissen wir, dass er bloss ein Wort ist… Sehr viel später, in einer tausendfach aufgeklärteren Welt kam die Sicherheit, die subjektive Gewissheit in der Handhabung der Vernunft-Kategorien den Philosophen mit Überraschung zum Bewusstsein: sie schlossen, dass dieselben nicht aus der Empirie stammen könnten, - die ganze Empirie stehe ja zu ihnen in Widerspruch. Woher also stammen sie? - Und in Indien wie in Griechenland hat man den gleichen Fehlgriff gemacht: "wir müssen schon einmal in einer höheren Welt heimisch gewesen sein (- statt in einer sehr viel niederen: was die Wahrheit gewesen wäre!), wir müssen göttlich gewesen sein, denn wir haben die Vernunft!"… In der That, Nichts hat bisher eine naivere Überredungskraft gehabt als der Irrthum vom Sein, wie er zum Beispiel von den Eleaten formulirt wurde: er hat ja jedes Wort für sich, jeden Satz für sich, den wir sprechen! - Auch die Gegner der Eleaten unterlagen noch der Verführung ihres Seins-Begriffs: Demokrit unter Anderen, als er sein Atom erfand… Die "Vernunft" in der Sprache: oh was für eine alte betrügerische Weibsperson! Ich fürchte, wir werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an die Grammatik glauben…
6 Man wird mir dankbar sein, wenn ich eine so wesentliche, so neueEinsicht in vier Thesen zusammendränge: ich erleichtere damit dasVerstehen, ich fordere damit den Widerspruch heraus.
Erster Satz. Die Gründe, darauf hin "diese" Welt als scheinbar bezeichnet worden ist, begründen vielmehr deren Realität, - eine andre Art Realität ist absolut unnachweisbar.
Zweiter Satz. Die Kennzeichen, welche man dem "wahren Sein" der Dinge gegeben hat, sind die Kennzeichen des Nicht Seins, des Nichts, - man hat die "wahre Welt" aus dem Widerspruch zur wirklichen Welt aufgebaut: eine scheinbare Welt in der That, insofern sie bloss eine moralisch-optische Täuschung ist.
Dritter Satz. Von einer "andren" Welt als dieser zu fabeln hat gar keinen Sinn, vorausgesetzt, dass nicht ein Instinkt der Verleumdung, Verkleinerung, Verdächtigung des Lebens in uns mächtig ist: im letzteren Falle rächen wir uns am Leben mit der Phantasmagorie eines "anderen", eines "besseren" Lebens.
Vierter Satz. Die Welt scheiden in eine "wahre" und eine "scheinbare", sei es in der Art des Christenthums, sei es in der Art Kant's (eines hinterlistigen Christen zu guterletzt) ist nur eine Suggestion der décadence, - ein Symptom niedergehenden Lebens… Dass der Künstler den Schein höher schätzt als die Realität, ist kein Einwand gegen diesen Satz. Denn "der Schein" bedeutet hier die Realität noch einmal, nur in einer Auswahl, Verstärkung, Correctur… Der tragische Künstler ist kein Pessimist, - er sagt gerade Ja zu allem Fragwürdigen und Furchtbaren selbst, er ist dionysisch…
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German in independent chapter tasks. Includes all 44 Maxims and Arrows and The Hammer Speaks.
1 You ask me just what in philosophers is idiosyncrasy?… Their lack of historical sense, for example, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They believe they are doing a thing honor when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni—when they make a mummy of it. Everything philosophers have handled for millennia consisted of concept-mummies; nothing real came living out of their hands. They kill, they stuff, these gentlemen idolaters of concepts, when they worship—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, just as much as procreation and growth, are for them objections—even refutations. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not… Now they all believe, even in despair, in what is. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is being withheld from them. “There must be an illusion, a deception, behind our failure to perceive what is: where does the deceiver hide?”—“We have him,” they cry blissfully, “it is sensuality! These senses, which are so immoral in other respects too, deceive us about the true world. Moral: get free of the deception of the senses, of becoming, of history, of the lie—history is nothing but belief in the senses, belief in the lie. Moral: say No to everything that gives credence to the senses, to all the rest of humanity: that is all ‘the people.’ Be a philosopher, be a mummy, act out monotono-theism with a gravedigger’s pantomime!—And away above all with the body, this pitiable idée fixe of the senses! afflicted with every fault of logic there is, refuted, impossible even, though it is impudent enough to behave as if it were real!”…
2 I set aside, with the highest reverence, the name of Heraclitus. When the rest of the philosophic folk rejected the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their testimony because they showed things as though they had duration and unity. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believe nor in the way he believed—they do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony is what first puts the lie into it, for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of duration… “Reason” is the cause of our falsifying the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie… But Heraclitus will be right forever in this, that being is an empty fiction. The “apparent” world is the only one: the “true world” is merely a lie added to it…
3 —And what fine instruments of observation we have in our senses! This nose, for example, of which no philosopher has yet spoken with reverence and gratitude, is for the present actually the most delicate instrument at our disposal: it can still detect minimal differences of motion that even the spectroscope does not detect. We possess science today exactly to the extent that we have resolved to accept the testimony of the senses—to the extent that we have further learned to sharpen them, to arm them, to think them through to the end. The rest is monstrosity and not-yet-science: I mean metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology. Or formal science, the doctrine of signs: such as logic and that applied logic, mathematics. In them reality does not occur at all, not even as a problem; just as little as the question of what value such a convention of signs as logic has in the first place.—
4 The other idiosyncrasy of philosophers is no less dangerous: it consists in confusing the last with the first. They place what comes at the end—unfortunately! for it should not come at all!—the “highest concepts,” that is, the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of evaporating reality, at the beginning, as the beginning. This is again merely the expression of their way of revering: the higher may not grow out of the lower, may not have grown at all… Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as a casting of doubt on value. All the supreme values are of the first rank, all the highest concepts, being, the unconditioned, the good, the true, the perfect—all of that cannot have become, and must consequently be causa sui. But all of that also cannot differ from itself, cannot contradict itself… With that they have their stupendous concept “God”… The last, thinnest, emptiest thing is posited as the first, as cause in itself, as ens realissimum… That humanity has had to take seriously the brain disorders of sick cobweb-weavers!—And it has paid dearly for it!…
5 —Let us finally set against this the different ways in which we (—I say “we” out of politeness…) take up the problem of error and appearance. Formerly people took change, alteration, becoming in general as proof of appearance, as a sign that there must be something that leads us astray. Today, conversely, we see that precisely to the extent that the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we are in a manner entangled in error, compelled to error; although we are quite certain, on the strength of a strict recalculation, that this is where the error lies. It is no different here than with the motions of the great star: in their case error has our eye as its constant advocate, here it has our language. Language belongs by its origin to the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we enter a crude fetishism when we bring to consciousness the fundamental presuppositions of the metaphysics of language—in plain speech: of reason. This sees doer and doing everywhere: this believes in will as cause in general; this believes in the “I,” in the I as being, in the I as substance, and projects the belief in I-substance onto all things—it creates the concept “thing” only thereby… Being is everywhere thought in, slipped underneath, as cause; from the conception “I” there follows, as derived, the concept “being”… At the beginning stands the great calamity of error, that the will is something that works—that will is a faculty… Today we know it is merely a word… Much later, in a world a thousand times more enlightened, the sureness, the subjective certainty in the handling of the categories of reason came to the philosophers’ consciousness with surprise: they concluded that these could not come from experience—all experience, after all, stood in contradiction to them. Where do they come from, then?—And in India as in Greece the same blunder was made: “we must once have been at home in a higher world (—instead of a much lower one: which would have been the truth!), we must have been divine, for we have reason!”… Indeed, nothing so far has had a more naive power of persuasion than the error of being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics, for example: it has, after all, every word in its favor, every sentence we speak!—Even the opponents of the Eleatics still succumbed to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus among others, when he invented his atom… “Reason” in language: oh, what an old deceitful female! I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar…
6 People will be grateful to me if I compress an insight so essential, so new, into four propositions: thereby I make it easier to understand, thereby I provoke contradiction.
First proposition. The grounds on which “this” world has been called apparent establish rather its reality—another kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable.
Second proposition. The marks that have been given to the “true being” of things are the marks of non-being, of nothingness—the “true world” has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: an apparent world in fact, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion.
Third proposition. To tell fables about an “other” world than this one makes no sense at all, provided an instinct of slander, belittlement, and suspicion of life is not powerful in us: in the latter case we take revenge on life with the phantasmagoria of an “other,” a “better” life.
Fourth proposition. To divide the world into a “true” one and an “apparent” one, whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of Kant (a crafty Christian to the last), is only a suggestion of décadence—a symptom of declining life… That the artist values appearance more highly than reality is no objection to this proposition. For “appearance” here means reality once more, only in selection, intensification, correction… The tragic artist is no pessimist—he says Yes precisely to everything questionable and terrible itself, he is Dionysian…
Plain English translation
A complete machine-assisted Plain English translation made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation.
1 You ask me what peculiarities philosophers have?… Their lack of a sense of history, for example, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they honor something when they remove it from history and view it from the standpoint of eternity—when they make a mummy of it. Everything philosophers have handled for thousands of years has been a mummy of a concept; nothing real has come out of their hands alive. These gentlemen who worship conceptual idols kill and stuff things when they worship—they endanger the life of everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are objections to them—even refutations. What is does not become; what becomes is not… Now all of them believe, even desperately, in what is. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is being kept from them. “There must be some illusion, some deception involved in our not perceiving what is: where is the deceiver?”—“We’ve got him,” they cry joyfully, “it’s the senses! These senses, so immoral in other ways too, deceive us about the true world. Moral: get free of the senses’ deception, of becoming, of history, of the lie—history is nothing but belief in the senses, belief in the lie. Moral: say no to everything that trusts the senses, to the whole rest of humanity: they are all ‘common people.’ Be a philosopher, be a mummy, portray monotonous monotheism with a gravedigger’s gestures!—And above all, away with the body, that pitiful fixed idea of the senses! Riddled with every logical error there is, refuted, even impossible, although it is shameless enough to behave as if it were real!”…
2 With great respect, I set the name of Heraclitus apart. While the other tribe of philosophers rejected the evidence of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their evidence because they showed things as though they had permanence and unity. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed nor in the way he believed—they do not lie at all. What we make of their evidence first puts the lie into it: the lie of unity, for example, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence… “Reason” is what causes us to falsify the evidence of the senses. To the extent that the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie… But Heraclitus will always be right that being is an empty fiction. The “apparent” world is the only one: the true world is just a lie added to it…
3 —And what fine tools of observation we have in our senses! This nose, for example, which no philosopher has yet spoken of with respect and gratitude, is actually, for now, the most delicate instrument available to us. It can detect even tiny differences in movement that the spectroscope itself cannot detect. Today we have science to exactly the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the senses—that we have also learned to sharpen them, equip them, and think their evidence through to the end. The rest is a malformed birth and not yet science: meaning metaphysics, theology, psychology, the theory of knowledge. Or else formal science, the study of signs: such as logic and that applied logic, mathematics. Reality does not appear in them at all, not even as a problem; nor does the question of what value such a convention of signs as logic has at all.—
4 The other peculiarity of philosophers is no less dangerous: it consists in confusing the last with the first. What comes at the end—unfortunately! For it should not come at all!—they put at the beginning, as the beginning: the “highest concepts,” meaning the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of reality as it evaporates. This too is just an expression of their way of worshipping: the higher must not grow out of the lower; it must not have grown at all… Moral: everything of the first rank must be its own cause. Coming from something else counts as an objection, as casting doubt on its value. All the supreme values are of the first rank; all the highest concepts, what is, the unconditioned, the good, the true, the perfect—all this cannot have come into being, and must therefore be its own cause. But none of this can be unlike the rest, or contradict itself… That gives them their stupendous concept “God”… The last, thinnest, emptiest thing is put first, as the cause in itself, as the most real being… To think that humanity has had to take the brain disorders of sick web-spinners seriously!—And it has paid dearly for doing so!…
5 —Let us finally contrast this with the different way we (—I say “we” out of politeness…) look at the problem of error and appearance. In the past, people took alteration, change, becoming in general as proof of mere appearance, as a sign that something must be there to lead us astray. Today, on the contrary, we see ourselves as caught up in error, in a sense, forced into error, precisely to the extent that our prejudice in favor of reason forces us to assume unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being. At the same time, careful checking makes us certain that the error lies here. It is no different from the movements of the great heavenly body: in that case, error has our eye as its constant advocate; in this case, it has our language. Language originated in the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology. We enter a crude world of fetishism when we bring to awareness the basic assumptions of the metaphysics of language—in plain terms, of reason. This sees doers and deeds everywhere; it believes in will as a cause in general; it believes in the “I,” in the I as being, in the I as substance, and projects this belief in the I as substance onto all things—only in this way does it create the concept “thing”… Being is thought into everything as a cause, slipped in underneath it; only from the conception “I” does the concept “being” follow, as something derived… At the beginning stands the great, disastrous error that the will is something that acts—that will is a faculty… Today we know it is only a word… Much later, in a world a thousand times more enlightened, philosophers became aware, to their surprise, of the confidence, the subjective certainty, with which they used the categories of reason. They concluded that these could not come from experience—after all, the whole of experience contradicted them. Where, then, did they come from?—And in India as in Greece, people made the same mistake: “We must once have been at home in a higher world (—instead of a much lower one, which would have been the truth!); we must have been divine, because we have reason!”… In fact, nothing so far has had a more naive power to persuade than the error about being, as formulated by the Eleatics, for example: after all, it has every word, every sentence we speak on its side!—Even the Eleatics’ opponents fell for the lure of their concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom… “Reason” in language—oh, what an old, deceitful woman! I’m afraid we won’t get rid of God because we still believe in grammar…
6 People will thank me if I compress such an essential, such a newinsight into four propositions: that makes it easier tounderstand, and challenges people to contradict it.
First proposition. The reasons for calling “this” world apparent instead establish its reality—any other kind of reality is absolutely impossible to demonstrate.
Second proposition. The features people have assigned to the “true being” of things are the features of nonbeing, of nothingness—they have built the “true world” out of its opposition to the real world: an apparent world indeed, since it is merely a moral-optical illusion.
Third proposition. Inventing tales about a world “other” than this one makes no sense at all, unless an instinct to slander, belittle, and cast suspicion on life is powerful within us. In that case, we take revenge on life with the fantasy spectacle of an “other,” a “better” life.
Fourth proposition. Dividing the world into a “true” and an “apparent” one, whether in the Christian way or in Kant’s way (a sly Christian after all), is only a suggestion prompted by decadence—a symptom of life in decline… The fact that the artist values appearance more highly than reality is no objection to this proposition. For “appearance” here means reality once again, only selected, intensified, corrected… The tragic artist is no pessimist—he says yes precisely to everything questionable and terrible itself; he is Dionysian…
About this section
"Reason" in Philosophy is part of Twilight of the Idols by Friedrich Nietzsche. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 4 of 12 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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