Section 5
Original German
Von der Annahme von Pflichten gegen uns selbst, insbesondere.
Kant ließ aber diese ihm so sehr willkommene Form der Pflichtenlehre auch in der Ausführung insofern unangetastet, als er, wie seine Vorgänger, neben den Pflichten gegen Andere, auch Pflichten gegen uns selbst aufstellte. Da ich diese Annahme geradezu verwerfe; so will ich hier, wo der Zusammenhang es am besten verträgt, meine Erklärung darüber episodisch einschalten.
Pflichten gegen uns selbst müssen, wie alle Pflichten, entweder Rechts- oder Liebespflichten seyn. Rechtspflichten gegen uns selbst sind unmöglich, wegen des selbst-evidenten Grundsatzes volenti non fit injuria: da nämlich Das, was ich thue, alle Mal Das ist, was ich will; so geschieht mir von mir selbst auch stets nur was ich will, folglich nie Unrecht. Was aber die Liebespflichten gegen uns selbst betrifft, so findet hier die Moral ihre Arbeit bereits gethan und kommt zu spät. Die Unmöglichkeit der Verletzung der Pflicht der Selbstliebe wird schon vom obersten Gebot der Christlichen Moral vorausgesetzt: „Liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst“; wonach die Liebe, die Jeder zu sich selbst hegt, als das Maximum und die Bedingung jeder andern Liebe vorweg angenommen, keineswegs aber hinzugesetzt wird: „Liebe dich selbst wie deinen Nächsten“; als wobei Jeder fühlen würde, daß es zu wenig gefordert sei: auch würde dieses die einzige Pflicht seyn, bei der ein Opus supererogationis an der Tagesordnung wäre. Selbst Kant sagt, in den „Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen zur Tugendlehre“, S. 13 (R., S. 230): „Was Jeder unvermeidlich schon von selbst will, das gehört nicht unter den Begriff der Pflicht.“ Dieser Begriff von Pflichten gegen uns selbst hat sich indessen noch immer in Ansehen erhalten und steht allgemein in besonderer Gunst; worüber man sich nicht zu wundern hat. Aber eine belustigende Wirkung thut er in Fällen, wo die Leute anfangen, um ihre Person besorgt zu werden, und nun ganz ernsthaft von der Pflicht der Selbsterhaltung reden; während man genugsam merkt, daß die Furcht ihnen schon Beine machen wird und es keines Pflichtgebots bedarf, um nachzuschieben.
Was man gewöhnlich als Pflichten gegen uns selbst aufstellt, ist zuvörderst ein in Vorurtheilen stark befangenes und aus den seichtesten Gründen geführtes Räsonnement gegen den Selbstmord. Dem Menschen allein, der nicht, wie das Thier, bloß den körperlichen, auf die Gegenwart beschränkten, sondern auch den ungleich größeren, von Zukunft und Vergangenheit borgenden, geistigen Leiden Preis gegeben ist, hat die Natur, als Kompensation, das Vorrecht verliehen, sein Leben, auch ehe sie selbst ihm ein Ziel setzt, beliebig enden zu können und demnach nicht wie das Thier, nothwendig so lange er kann, sondern auch nur so lange er will zu leben. Ob er nun, aus ethischen Gründen, dieses Vorrechts sich wieder zu begeben habe, ist eine schwierige Frage, die wenigstens nicht durch die gebräuchlichen, seichten Argumente entschieden werden kann. Auch die Gründe gegen den Selbstmord, welche Kant, S. 53 (R., S. 48) und S. 67 (R., S. 57) anzuführen nicht verschmäht, kann ich gewissenhafterweise nicht anders betiteln, als Armsäligkeiten, die nicht einmal eine Antwort verdienen. Man muß lachen, wenn man denkt, daß dergleichen Reflexionen dem Kato, der Kleopatra, dem Koccejus Nerva (Tac. Ann., VI, 26), oder der Arria des Pätus (Plin. Ep., III, 16) den Dolch hätten aus den Händen winden sollen. Wenn es wirklich ächte moralische Motive gegen den Selbstmord giebt, so liegen diese jedenfalls sehr tief und sind nicht mit dem Senkblei der gewöhnlichen Ethik zu erreichen; sondern gehören einer höhern Betrachtungsweise an, als sogar dem Standpunkt gegenwärtiger Abhandlung angemessen ist.5
Was nun noch außerdem unter der Rubrik von Selbstpflichten vorgetragen zu werden pflegt, sind theils Klugheitsregeln, theils diätetische Vorschriften, welche alle beide nicht in die eigentliche Moral gehören. Endlich noch zieht man hieher das Verbot widernatürlicher Wollust, also der Onanie, Päderastie und Bestialität. Von diesen nun ist erstlich die Onanie hauptsächlich ein Laster der Kindheit, und sie zu bekämpfen ist viel mehr Sache der Diätetik, als der Ethik; daher eben auch die Bücher gegen sie von Medicinern (wie Tissot u. A.) verfaßt sind, nicht von Moralisten. Wenn, nachdem Diätetik und Hygieine das Ihrige in dieser Sache gethan und mit unabweisbaren Gründen sie niedergeschmettert haben, jetzt noch die Moral sie in die Hand nehmen will, findet sie so sehr schon gethane Arbeit, daß ihr wenig übrig bleibt. — Die Bestialität nun wieder ist ein völlig abnormales, sehr selten vorkommendes Vergehen, also wirklich etwas Exceptionelles, und dabei in so hohem Grade empörend und der menschlichen Natur entgegen, daß es selbst mehr, als irgend welche Vernunftgründe vermöchten, gegen sich selbst spricht und abschreckt. Uebrigens ist es, als Degradation der menschlichen Natur, ganz eigentlich ein Vergehen gegen die Species als solche und in abstracto; nicht gegen menschliche Individuen. — Von den drei in Rede stehenden Geschlechtsvergehen fällt demnach bloß die Päderastie der Ethik anheim, und wird daselbst ungezwungen ihre Stelle finden, bei Abhandlung der Gerechtigkeit: diese nämlich wird durch sie verletzt, und kann hiegegen das volenti non fit injuria nicht geltend gemacht werden: denn das Unrecht besteht in der Verführung des jüngern und unerfahrenen Theils, welcher physisch und moralisch dadurch verdorben wird.
5 Es sind asketische Gründe: man findet sie im vierten Buche meines Hauptwerks, Bd. I, §. 69.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
On the Assumption of Duties to Ourselves in Particular.
Kant also left this form of a doctrine of duties, so welcome to him, untouched in its application insofar as, like his predecessors, he laid down duties to ourselves alongside duties to others. Since I reject this assumption outright, I shall insert my explanation here as a digression, where it best suits the course of the argument.
Duties to ourselves, like all duties, must be either duties of justice or duties of love. Duties of justice to ourselves are impossible, by the self-evident principle that no wrong is done to one who consents: for since what I do is always what I will, what I do to myself is likewise always only what I will, and therefore never a wrong. As for duties of love to ourselves, morality finds its work already done and arrives too late. The impossibility of violating the duty of self-love is already presupposed by the supreme commandment of Christian morality: "Love your neighbor as yourself." Here the love each person bears himself is assumed in advance as the maximum and the condition of every other love. By no means is it added: "Love yourself as your neighbor"—for everyone would feel that this asked too little. It would also be the one duty in which doing more than was required would be the order of the day. Even Kant says, in the "Metaphysical Foundations of the Doctrine of Virtue," p. 13 (R., p. 230): "What everyone inevitably already wills of his own accord does not fall under the concept of duty." Nevertheless, this concept of duties to ourselves has retained its standing and enjoys particular favor everywhere, which is hardly surprising. But it has an amusing effect when people begin to fear for their own safety and then speak in all seriousness of the duty of self-preservation, although it is plain enough that fear will set them running without any command of duty to give them a push.
What is usually set forth as duties to ourselves consists, first of all, in an argument against suicide, deeply entangled in prejudices and conducted on the shallowest grounds. The human being alone is exposed not merely, like the animal, to bodily sufferings confined to the present, but also to the incomparably greater sufferings of the mind, which borrow from the future and the past. As compensation, nature has granted him the privilege of ending his life at will, even before she herself sets its limit: thus, unlike the animal, he need not live as long as he can, but only as long as he wants to. Whether ethical grounds require him to renounce this privilege is a difficult question, one that certainly cannot be settled by the customary shallow arguments. Even the reasons against suicide which Kant does not disdain to advance on p. 53 (R., p. 48) and p. 67 (R., p. 57) I cannot in good conscience call anything but paltry things that do not even deserve an answer. One cannot help laughing at the thought that reflections of this kind were supposed to have wrested the dagger from the hands of Cato, Cleopatra, Cocceius Nerva (Tac. Ann., VI, 26), or Arria, the wife of Paetus (Plin. Ep., III, 16). If genuinely moral motives against suicide do exist, they lie very deep in any case and cannot be reached by the plumb line of ordinary ethics; rather, they belong to a higher mode of reflection than even the standpoint of the present essay permits.5
What is usually presented besides this under the heading of duties to oneself consists partly of rules of prudence, partly of precepts for healthy living, neither of which belongs to morality proper. Finally, the prohibition of unnatural sexual pleasure is also placed here: masturbation, pederasty, and bestiality. Of these, masturbation is chiefly a vice of childhood, and combating it is far more a matter of health regimens than of ethics. That is precisely why the books against it have been written by physicians, such as Tissot and others, not by moralists. Once the science of health regimens and hygiene have done their part in this matter and struck it down with irrefutable arguments, if morality now wishes to take it in hand, it finds the work so thoroughly done that little remains for it.—Bestiality, in turn, is a wholly abnormal offense, very rarely encountered, and thus truly exceptional; it is also so profoundly repugnant and contrary to human nature that it speaks against itself and deters more powerfully than any rational arguments could. Moreover, as a degradation of human nature, it is quite properly an offense against the species as such and in the abstract, not against individual human beings.—Of the three sexual offenses under discussion, then, only pederasty falls within the province of ethics, where it will naturally find its place in the treatment of justice. For it violates justice, and the principle that no wrong is done to one who consents cannot be invoked against this: the wrong lies in seducing the younger, inexperienced party, who is thereby corrupted physically and morally.
5 These are ascetic grounds: they can be found in the fourth book of my principal work, vol. I, §. 69.
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
The assumption of duties to ourselves, in particular.
But Kant left this form of the doctrine of duties, which was so welcome to him, untouched even when he worked it out, in that he, like his predecessors, set up duties to ourselves alongside duties to others. I flatly reject this assumption. So here, where the context best allows it, I will insert my explanation of it as a side episode.
Duties to ourselves, like all duties, must be either duties of right or duties of love. Duties of right to ourselves are impossible, because of the self-evident principle that no wrong is done to someone who is willing. What I do is always what I want. So what happens to me from myself is also always only what I want, and therefore never an injustice. As for duties of love to ourselves, morality finds its work already done here and arrives too late. The highest commandment of Christian morality already takes for granted that the duty of self-love cannot be violated: "Love your neighbor as yourself." By this commandment, the love that everyone has for themselves is assumed in advance as the maximum and the condition of every other love. It is by no means added as a command: "Love yourself as your neighbor." Then everyone would feel that too little was being demanded. This would also be the only duty for which doing more than duty requires would be an everyday matter. Even Kant says, in the "Metaphysical First Principles for the Doctrine of Virtue," S. 13 (R., S. 230): "What everyone unavoidably wants already of their own accord does not belong under the concept of duty." Still, this concept of duties to ourselves has kept its standing, and it is generally in special favor. There is no reason to be surprised at that. But it has an amusing effect in cases where people begin to worry about their own person and then speak in all seriousness of the duty of self-preservation. Meanwhile it is plain enough that fear will get them moving on its own, and that no command of duty is needed to give them a shove from behind.
What people usually set up as duties to ourselves is first of all an argument against suicide. It is deeply caught up in prejudices and conducted on the shallowest grounds. Human beings alone are exposed not only to bodily suffering, as animals are, which is limited to the present. They are also exposed to mental suffering, which is incomparably greater and which borrows from the future and the past. To humans alone nature has granted, as compensation, the privilege of ending their life at will, even before nature itself sets an end to it. So a human being, unlike an animal, does not necessarily live as long as possible, but only as long as that human being wants to. Whether a person must give up this privilege again, on ethical grounds, is a difficult question. At the least, it cannot be decided by the usual shallow arguments. As for the reasons against suicide that Kant does not disdain to give, on S. 53 (R., S. 48) and S. 67 (R., S. 57), in good conscience I cannot call them anything but wretched trifles that do not even deserve an answer. One has to laugh at the thought that such reflections were supposed to wrest the dagger from the hands of Cato, of Cleopatra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac. Ann., VI, 26), or of the Arria of Paetus (Plin. Ep., III, 16). If there really are genuine moral motives against suicide, they lie, in any case, very deep. The plumb line of ordinary ethics cannot reach them. They belong to a higher way of looking at things than even the standpoint of the present treatise is suited for.5
What else is usually presented under the heading of duties to oneself consists partly of rules of prudence and partly of rules for healthy living. Neither kind belongs to morality proper. Finally, people also bring in here the ban on unnatural lust, that is, masturbation, pederasty, and bestiality. Of these, first, masturbation is mainly a vice of childhood, and fighting it is far more a matter for the science of healthy living than for ethics. That is why the books against it were written by physicians (such as Tissot and others), not by moralists. The science of healthy living and hygiene have done their part in this matter and have crushed it with irrefutable arguments. If morality now still wants to take it in hand, it finds the work so thoroughly done already that little is left for it. Bestiality, in turn, is a completely abnormal offense that occurs very rarely, so it is truly something exceptional. It is also so outrageous and so contrary to human nature that it speaks against itself and deters, more than any arguments of reason could. Besides, as a degradation of human nature it is, strictly speaking, an offense against the species as such and in the abstract, not against human individuals. Of the three sexual offenses under discussion, then, only pederasty falls to ethics. It will find its place there naturally, in the treatment of justice. For justice is violated by it, and the principle that no wrong is done to someone who is willing cannot be raised against this, because the wrong consists in the seduction of the younger, inexperienced party, who is corrupted physically and morally by it.
5 They are ascetic reasons. You can find them in the fourth book of my main work, Bd. I, §. 69.
About this section
Section 5 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 6 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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