Section 3
Original German
II.
Kritik des von Kant der Ethik gegebenen Fundaments.
Uebersicht.
Kant hat in der Ethik das große Verdienst, sie von allem Eudämonismus gereinigt zu haben. Die Ethik der Alten war Eudämonik; die der Neueren meistens Heilslehre. Die Alten wollten Tugend und Glücksäligkeit als identisch nachweisen: aber diese waren wie zwei Figuren, die sich nie decken, wie man sie auch legen mag. Die Neueren wollten nicht nach dem Satze der Identität, sondern nach dem des Grundes beide in Verbindung setzen, also die Glücksäligkeit zur Folge der Tugend machen; wobei sie aber entweder eine andere, als die möglicherweise erkennbare Welt, oder Sophismen zu Hülfe nehmen mußten. Unter den Alten macht Plato allein eine Ausnahme: seine Ethik ist nicht eudämonistisch; dafür aber wird sie mystisch. Hingegen ist sogar die Ethik der Kyniker und Stoiker nur ein Eudämonismus besonderer Art; welches zu beweisen es mir nicht an Gründen und Belegen, wohl aber, bei meinem jetzigen Vorhaben, an Raum gebricht.2 — Bei den Alten und Neueren also, Plato allein ausgenommen, war die Tugend nur Mittel zum Zweck. Freilich, wenn man es streng nehmen wollte; so hätte auch Kant den Eudämonismus mehr scheinbar, als wirklich aus der Ethik verbannt. Denn er läßt zwischen Tugend und Glücksäligkeit doch noch eine geheime Verbindung übrig, in seiner Lehre vom höchsten Gut, wo sie in einem entlegenen und dunkeln Kapitel zusammenkommen, während öffentlich die Tugend gegen die Glücksäligkeit ganz fremd thut. Davon abgesehen, tritt bei Kant das ethische Princip als ein von der Erfahrung und ihrer Belehrung ganz unabhängiges, ein transscendentales, oder metaphysisches auf. Er erkennt an, daß die menschliche Handlungsweise eine Bedeutung habe, die über alle Möglichkeit der Erfahrung hinausgeht und eben deshalb die eigentliche Brücke zu dem ist, was er die intelligible Welt, mundus noumenon, die Welt der Dinge an sich nennt.
Den Ruhm, welchen die Kantische Ethik erlangt hat, verdankt sie, neben ihren soeben berührten Vorzügen, der moralischen Reinigkeit und Erhabenheit ihrer Resultate. An diese hielten sich die Meisten, ohne sich sonderlich mit der Begründung derselben zu befassen, als welche sehr komplex, abstrakt und in einer überaus künstlichen Form dargestellt ist, auf welche Kant seinen ganzen Scharffinn und Kombinationsgabe verwenden mußte, um ihr ein haltbares Ansehen zu geben. Glücklicherweise hat er der Darstellung des Fundaments seiner Ethik, abgesondert von dieser selbst, ein eigenes Werk gewidmet, die „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“, deren Thema also genau das Selbe ist mit dem Gegenstande unserer Preisfrage. Denn er sagt daselbst, S. XIII der Vorrede: „Gegenwärtige Grundlegung ist nichts mehr, als die Aufsuchung und Festsetzung des obersten Princips der Moralität, welche allein ein, in seiner Absicht, ganzes und von aller andern sittlichen Untersuchung abzusonderndes Geschäft ausmacht.“ Wir finden in diesem Buche die Grundlage, also das Wesentliche seiner Ethik streng systematisch, bündig und scharf dargestellt, wie sonst in keinem andern. Außerdem hat dasselbe noch den bedeutenden Vorzug, das älteste seiner moralischen Werke, nur vier Jahre jünger, als die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, und mithin aus der Zeit zu seyn, wo, obwohl er schon 61 Jahre zählte, der nachtheilige Einfluß des Alters auf seinen Geist doch noch nicht merklich war. Dieser ist hingegen schon deutlich zu spüren in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, welche 1788, also ein Jahr später fällt, als die unglückliche Umarbeitung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in der zweiten Auflage, durch welche er dieses sein unsterbliches Hauptwerk offenbar verdorben hat; worüber wir in der Vorrede zur neuen, von Rosenkranz besorgten Ausgabe eine Auseinandersetzung erhalten haben, der ich, nach eigener Prüfung der Sache, nicht anders als beistimmen kann.3 Die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft enthält im Wesentlichen das Selbe, was die oben erwähnte „Grundlegung“; nur daß diese es in konciser und strengerer Form giebt, jene hingegen mit großer Breite der Ausführung und durch Abschweifungen unterbrochen, auch, zur Erhöhung des Eindrucks, durch einige moralische Deklamationen unterstützt. Kant hatte, als er dies schrieb, endlich und spät, seinen wohlverdienten Ruhm erlangt: dadurch einer gränzenlosen Aufmerksamkeit gewiß, ließ er der Redseligkeit des Alters schon mehr Spielraum. Als der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft hingegen eigenthümlich ist anzuführen erstlich die über alles Lob erhabene und gewiß früher abgefaßte Darstellung des Verhältnisses zwischen Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit (S. 169–179 der vierten Auflage, und S. 223–231 bei Rosenkranz), welche indessen gänzlich mit der übereinstimmt, die er in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (S. 560–586; R., S. 438 ff.) giebt; und zweitens die Moraltheologie, welche man mehr und mehr für Das erkennen wird, was Kant eigentlich damit gewollt hat. Endlich in den „Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Tugendlehre“, diesem Seitenstück zu seiner deplorablen „Rechtslehre“ und abgefaßt im Jahre 1797, ist der Einfluß der Altersschwäche überwiegend. Aus allen diesen Gründen nehme ich in gegenwärtiger Kritik die zuerst genannte „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“ zu meinem Leitfaden, und auf diese beziehen sich alle ohne weitern Beisatz von mir angeführten Seitenzahlen; welches ich zu merken bitte. Die beiden andern Werke aber werde ich nur accessorisch und sekundär in Betracht nehmen.
Dem Verständniß gegenwärtiger, die Kantische Ethik im tiefsten Grunde unterwühlenden Kritik wird es überaus förderlich seyn, wenn der Leser jene „Grundlegung“ Kants, auf die sie sich zunächst bezieht, zumal da diese nur 128 und XIV Seiten (bei Rosenkranz in Allem nur 100 Seiten) füllt, zuvor mit Aufmerksamkeit nochmals durchlesen will, um sich den Inhalt derselben wieder ganz zu vergegenwärtigen. Ich citire sie nach der dritten Auflage von 1792, und füge die Seitenzahl der neuen Gesammtausgabe von Rosenkranz mit vorgesetztem R. hinzu.
2 Die ausführliche Darlegung findet man in der „Welt als Wille und Vorstellung“, Bd. 1, §. 16, S. 103 ff., und Bd. 2, Kap. 16, S. 166 ff., der dritten Auflage.
3 Sie rührt von mir selbst her; aber hier spreche ich inkognito.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
II.
Critique of the Foundation Kant Gave to Ethics.
Overview.
Kant's great service to ethics was to purify it of all eudaimonism. The ethics of the ancients was a theory of happiness; that of the moderns was mostly a doctrine of salvation. The ancients sought to prove virtue and happiness identical, but these were like two figures that can never be made to coincide, however they are placed. The moderns sought to connect the two not through the principle of identity, but through the principle of sufficient reason, thus making happiness the consequence of virtue. To do so, however, they had to enlist either a world other than the one that can possibly be known, or sophistries. Among the ancients, Plato alone is an exception: his ethics is not eudaimonistic, but instead becomes mystical. Even the ethics of the Cynics and Stoics, however, is only a special kind of eudaimonism. To prove this I lack neither reasons nor evidence, but, in my present undertaking, space.2—Among both ancients and moderns, then, Plato alone excepted, virtue was merely a means to an end. Admittedly, if we wished to be strict, Kant too would have banished eudaimonism from ethics more in appearance than in reality. For he still leaves a secret connection between virtue and happiness in his doctrine of the highest good, where they meet in a remote and obscure chapter, while in public virtue acts as a complete stranger to happiness. Apart from this, in Kant the ethical principle appears as wholly independent of experience and its instruction, as a transcendental or metaphysical principle. He recognizes that human conduct has a significance that reaches beyond all possible experience and, for that very reason, is the true bridge to what he calls the intelligible world, the world of noumena, the world of things in themselves.
Besides the merits just touched on, Kant's ethics owes its fame to the moral purity and sublimity of its results. Most people fastened on these without troubling themselves much about their foundation, which is highly complex and abstract, and presented in an exceedingly contrived form. Kant had to bring all his acuteness and ingenuity to bear on this form to give it an appearance of solidity. Fortunately, he devoted a separate work to setting out the foundation of his ethics apart from ethics itself: the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," whose subject is therefore exactly the same as that of our prize question. For he says there, S. XIII of the preface: "The present Groundwork is nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which alone constitutes a task complete in its purpose and to be separated from every other moral inquiry." In this book we find the foundation, and thus the essential substance, of his ethics presented with a rigorous system, concision, and precision found in none of his other works. It also has the considerable advantage of being the earliest of his moral works, only four years later than the Critique of Pure Reason, and thus dating from a time when, although he was already 61, the harmful influence of age on his mind was not yet noticeable. By contrast, that influence can already be clearly felt in the Critique of Practical Reason, which appeared in 1788, a year after the unfortunate revision of the Critique of Pure Reason for its second edition, through which he plainly spoiled this immortal masterpiece. The preface to the new edition prepared by Rosenkranz gives us an account of this with which, after examining the matter for myself, I can only agree.3 The Critique of Practical Reason contains essentially the same material as the "Groundwork" mentioned above; only the latter gives it in a concise and more rigorous form, while the former elaborates it at great length, interrupts it with digressions, and reinforces it with a few moral declamations to heighten the effect. When Kant wrote this, he had finally, late in life, attained his well-deserved fame. Assured by this of boundless attention, he gave the loquacity of age more scope. As distinctive features of the Critique of Practical Reason, however, we must mention, first, its account of the relation between freedom and necessity, beyond all praise and certainly written earlier (S. 169–179 of the fourth edition, and S. 223–231 in Rosenkranz). This agrees entirely, however, with the account he gives in the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 560–586; R., S. 438 ff.). Second, there is its moral theology, which will increasingly be recognized as what Kant really intended it to be. Finally, in the "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue," the counterpart to his deplorable "Doctrine of Right," written in 1797, the influence of senile weakness predominates. For all these reasons I take the first-mentioned "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" as my guide in the present critique, and all page numbers I cite without further qualification refer to it; I ask the reader to bear this in mind. I shall consider the other two works only incidentally and secondarily.
It will greatly assist the understanding of the present critique, which undermines Kant's ethics at its deepest foundation, if the reader will first attentively reread Kant's "Groundwork," to which it chiefly refers, and thus bring its contents fully back to mind—especially since it occupies only 128 and XIV pages (only 100 pages in all in Rosenkranz). I cite it from the third edition of 1792 and add the page number in Rosenkranz's new collected edition, preceded by R.
2 The detailed account will be found in "The World as Will and Representation", Bd. 1, §. 16, S. 103 ff., and Bd. 2, Kap. 16, S. 166 ff., of the third edition.
3 I wrote it myself; but here I am speaking incognito.
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
II.
Criticism of the Foundation Kant Gave Ethics.
Overview.
Kant's great achievement in ethics was to clear it of every form of making happiness the goal. Ancient ethics was a theory of happiness; modern ethics was mostly a doctrine of salvation. The ancients wanted to show that virtue and happiness were identical. But they were like two shapes that never match, however you position them. Modern thinkers wanted to connect the two not through the law of identity but through the principle of sufficient reason, making happiness a consequence of virtue. To do this, however, they had to turn either to a world other than the one we can possibly know or to deceptive arguments. Among the ancients, Plato alone is an exception. His ethics does not make happiness the goal, but it becomes mystical instead. Even the ethics of the Cynics and Stoics, by contrast, is only a special kind of happiness-centered ethics. I lack neither reasons nor evidence to prove this, but I do lack the space for it in my present undertaking.2 So for both ancient and modern thinkers, with Plato alone excepted, virtue was only a means to an end. Strictly speaking, even Kant banished the pursuit of happiness from ethics more in appearance than in reality. He still leaves a secret connection between virtue and happiness in his doctrine of the highest good. There they meet in a remote, obscure chapter, while in public virtue acts as if happiness were a complete stranger. Apart from this, Kant's ethical principle appears as something entirely independent of experience and its lessons: something transcendental or metaphysical. He recognizes that human conduct has a meaning that goes beyond all possible experience. For that very reason, it is the actual bridge to what he calls the intelligible world, the world of noumena, the world of things in themselves.
Besides the advantages just mentioned, Kant's ethics owes its fame to the moral purity and loftiness of its results. Most people held on to these without troubling much about their foundation. That foundation is very complex and abstract, and presented in an extremely artificial form. Kant had to use all his insight and ability to combine ideas to make it look sound. Fortunately, he devoted a separate work to presenting the foundation of his ethics apart from the ethics itself: the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.” Its subject is therefore exactly the same as that of our prize question. He says there, S. XIII of the preface: “The present Groundwork is nothing more than the search for and establishment of the highest principle of morality. This alone constitutes a task complete in its purpose and to be separated from every other moral investigation.” In this book we find the foundation, and thus the essential part, of his ethics presented with strict organization, conciseness, and precision, as in no other. The book also has the important advantage of being his earliest work on morality, only four years later than the Critique of Pure Reason. It therefore comes from a time when, although he was already 61, age had not yet noticeably harmed his mind. That influence is already clearly felt, however, in the Critique of Practical Reason, which dates from 1788. That is one year after the unfortunate revision of the Critique of Pure Reason for its second edition, through which he plainly spoiled his immortal masterpiece. The preface to the new edition prepared by Rosenkranz gives us an account of this with which, after examining the matter myself, I can only agree.3 The Critique of Practical Reason contains essentially the same material as the “Groundwork” mentioned above. But the latter gives it in a concise and more rigorous form, while the former treats it at great length, interrupted by digressions and reinforced with some moral speeches to heighten the effect. By the time Kant wrote it, he had finally, late in life, achieved his well-earned fame. Sure of unlimited attention as a result, he already gave more room to the talkativeness of old age. As distinctive features of the Critique of Practical Reason, however, we should first mention the account of the relationship between freedom and necessity, which is beyond all praise and was certainly written earlier (S. 169–179 of the fourth edition, and S. 223–231 in Rosenkranz). This nevertheless agrees completely with the account he gives in the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 560–586; R., S. 438 ff.). Second comes its moral theology, which people will increasingly recognize as what Kant really intended by it. Finally, in the “Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue,” the companion to his deplorable “Doctrine of Right,” written in 1797, the influence of mental decline in old age predominates. For all these reasons, I take the first work mentioned, the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” as my guide in the present criticism. All page numbers I cite without further qualification refer to it; please keep this in mind. I will consider the other two works only as supplementary and secondary material.
It will greatly help the reader's understanding of this criticism, which undermines Kant's ethics at its deepest foundation, to first reread attentively that “Groundwork” of Kant's to which it primarily refers. This will bring its contents fully back to mind, especially since it occupies only 128 and XIV pages (only 100 pages in all in Rosenkranz). I cite the third edition of 1792 and add the page number in Rosenkranz's new collected edition, preceded by R.
2 The detailed account can be found in “The World as Will and Representation,” Bd. 1, §. 16, S. 103 ff., and Bd. 2, Kap. 16, S. 166 ff., of the third edition.
3 It is by me; but here I am speaking incognito.
About this section
Section 3 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 4 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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