Section 21
Original German
IV.
Zur metaphysischen Auslegung des ethischen Urphänomens.
Verständigung über diese Zugabe.
Im Bisherigen habe ich die moralische Triebfeder als Thatsache nachgewiesen, und habe gezeigt, daß aus ihr allein uneigennützige Gerechtigkeit und ächte Menschenliebe hervorgehen können, auf welchen zwei Kardinaltugenden alle übrigen beruhen. Zur Begründung der Ethik ist dies hinreichend, sofern diese nothwendig auf irgend etwas thatsächlich und nachweisbar Vorhandenes, sei es nun in der Außenwelt oder im Bewußtseyn gegeben, gestützt werden muß; wenn man nicht etwan, wie manche meiner Vorgänger, bloß einen abstrakten Satz beliebig annehmen und aus ihm die ethischen Vorschriften ableiten, oder, wie Kant, mit einem bloßen Begriff, dem des Gesetzes, eben so verfahren will. Der von der Königlichen Societät gestellten Aufgabe scheint mir hiedurch genügt zu seyn, da solche auf das Fundament der Ethik gerichtet ist und nicht noch eine Metaphysik dazu verlangt, um wieder jenes zu begründen. Inzwischen sehe ich sehr wohl, daß der menschliche Geist hiebei die letzte Befriedigung und Beruhigung noch nicht findet. Wie am Ende jeder Forschung und jeder Realwissenschaft, so steht er auch hier vor einem Urphänomen, welches zwar Alles unter ihm Begriffene und aus ihm Folgende erklärt, selbst aber unerklärt bleibt und als ein Räthsel vorliegt. Auch hier also stellt sich die Forderung einer Metaphysik ein, d. h. einer letzten Erklärung der Urphänomene als solcher und, wenn in ihrer Gesammtheit genommen, der Welt. Diese Forderung erhebt auch hier die Frage, warum das Vorhandene und Verstandene sich so und nicht anders verhalte, und wie aus dem Wesen an sich der Dinge der dargelegte Charakter der Erscheinung hervorgehe. Ja, bei der Ethik ist das Bedürfniß einer metaphysischen Grundlage um so dringender, als die philosophischen, wie die religiösen Systeme darüber einig sind, daß die ethische Bedeutsamkeit der Handlungen zugleich eine metaphysische, d. h. über die bloße Erscheinung der Dinge und somit auch über alle Möglichkeit der Erfahrung hinausreichende, demnach mit dem ganzen Daseyn der Welt und dem Loose des Menschen in engster Beziehung stehende seyn müsse; indem die letzte Spitze, in welche die Bedeutung des Daseyns überhaupt auslaufe, zuverlässig das Ethische sei. Dies Letztere bewährt sich auch durch die unleugbare Thatsache, daß, bei Annäherung des Todes, der Gedankengang eines jeden Menschen, gleichviel ob dieser religiösen Dogmen angehangen habe oder nicht, eine moralische Richtung nimmt und er die Rechnung über seinen vollbrachten Lebenslauf durchaus in moralischer Rücksicht abzuschließen bemüht ist. Hierüber sind besonders die Zeugnisse der Alten von Gewicht; weil sie nicht unter Christlichem Einfluß stehen. Ich führe demnach an, daß wir diese Thatsache bereits ausgesprochen finden in einer, dem uralten Gesetzgeber Zaleukos zugeschriebenen, nach Bentley und Heyne jedoch von einem Pythagoreer herrührenden Stelle, welche Stobäos (Floril., Tit. 44, §. 20) uns aufbehalten hat: Δεῖ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλος ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ ζῆν. Πᾶσι γὰρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῖς μέλλουσι τελευτᾶν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἠδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τοῦ βούλεσθαι πάντα πεπρᾶχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς. (Oportet ante oculos sibi ponere punctum temporis illud, quo unicuique e vita excedendum est: omnes enim moribundos poenitentia corripit, e memoria eorum, quae injuste egerint, ac vehementer optant, omnia sibi juste peracta fuisse.) Ingleichen sehen wir, um an ein historisches Beispiel zu erinnern, den Perikles, auf dem Sterbebette, von allen seinen Großthaten nichts hören wollen, sondern nur davon, daß er nie einen Bürger in Trauer versetzt hatte (Plut. in Pericl.). Um nun aber einen sehr heterogenen Fall daneben zu stellen, so ist mir aus dem Berichte der Aussagen vor einer Englischen Jury erinnerlich, daß ein roher, fünfzehnjähriger Negerjunge, auf einem Schiffe, im Begriff an einer so eben in einer Schlägerei erhaltenen Verletzung zu sterben, eilig alle Kameraden herbeiholen ließ, um sie zu fragen, ob er jemals einen von ihnen gekränkt oder beleidigt hätte, und bei der Verneinung große Beruhigung fand. Durchgängig lehrt die Erfahrung, daß Sterbende sich vor dem Scheiden mit Jedem zu versöhnen wünschen. Einen anderartigen Beleg zu unserm Satze giebt die bekannte Erfahrung, daß, während für intellektuelle Leistungen, und wären sie die ersten Meisterstücke der Welt, der Urheber sehr gern einen Lohn annimmt, wenn er ihn nur erhalten kann, fast Jeder, der etwas moralisch Ausgezeichnetes geleistet hat, allen Lohn dafür abweist. Dies ist besonders der Fall bei moralischen Großthaten, wann z. B. Einer das Leben eines Andern, oder gar Vieler, mit Gefährdung seines eigenen, gerettet hat; als wo er, in der Regel, selbst wenn er arm ist, schlechterdings keinen Lohn annimmt; weil er fühlt, daß der metaphysische Werth seiner Handlung darunter leiden würde. Eine poetische Darstellung dieses Herganges liefert uns Bürger am Schlusse des Liedes vom braven Mann. Aber auch in der Wirklichkeit fällt es meistens so aus, und ist mir in Englischen Zeitungen mehrmals vorgekommen. — Diese Thatsachen sind allgemein und treten ohne Unterschied der Religion ein. Wegen dieser unleugbaren ethisch-metaphysischen Tendenz des Lebens könnte auch, ohne eine in diesem Sinn gegebene Auslegung desselben, keine Religion in der Welt Fuß fassen: denn mittelst ihrer ethischen Seite hat jede ihren Anhaltspunkt in den Gemüthern. Jede Religion legt ihr Dogma der jedem Menschen fühlbaren, aber deshalb noch nicht verständlichen, moralischen Triebfeder zum Grunde und verknüpft es so eng mit derselben, daß beide als unzertrennlich erscheinen: ja, die Priester sind bemüht, Unglauben und Immoralität für Eins und Dasselbe auszugeben. Hierauf beruht es, daß dem Gläubigen der Ungläubige für identisch mit dem moralisch Schlechten gilt, wie wir schon daran sehen, daß Ausdrücke, wie Gottlos, Atheistisch, Unchristlich, Ketzer u. dgl. als synonym mit moralisch Schlecht gebraucht werden. Den Religionen ist die Sache dadurch leicht gemacht, daß sie, vom Glauben ausgehend, diesen für ihr Dogma schlechthin, ja, unter Drohungen fordern dürfen. Aber die philosophischen Systeme haben hier nicht so leichtes Spiel: daher man bei Untersuchung aller Systeme finden wird, daß es, wie mit der Begründung der Ethik, so auch mit dem Anknüpfungspunkte derselben an die gegebene Metaphysik überall äußerst schlecht bestellt ist. Und doch ist die Forderung, daß die Ethik sich auf die Metaphysik stütze, unabweisbar, wie ich dies schon in der Einleitung durch Wolffs und Kants Autorität bekräftigt habe.
Nun aber ist das Problem der Metaphysik so sehr das schwerste aller den menschlichen Geist beschäftigenden Probleme, daß es von vielen Denkern für schlechthin unauflösbar gehalten wird. Für mich kommt, in gegenwärtigem Fall, noch der ganz besondere Nachtheil hinzu, den die Form einer abgerissenen Monographie herbeiführt, daß ich nämlich nicht von einem bestimmten metaphysischen Systeme, zu welchem ich mich etwan bekenne, ausgehen darf; weil ich es entweder darzulegen, welches viel zu weitläuftig, oder als gegeben und gewiß anzunehmen hätte, welches höchst mißlich seyn würde. Hieraus wieder folgt, daß ich hier so wenig, als im Vorhergehenden, die synthetische, sondern nur die analytische Methode anwenden darf, d. h. nicht vom Grunde auf die Folgen, sondern von den Folgen auf den Grund zu gehen habe. Diese harte Nothwendigkeit aber, voraussetzungslos zu verfahren und von keinem andern, als dem Allen gemeinsamen Standpunkt auszugehen, hat mir schon die Darlegung des Fundaments der Ethik so sehr erschwert, daß ich jetzt auf dieselbe zurücksehe, wie auf ein zu Stande gebrachtes schweres Kunststück, dem analog, wo Einer aus freier Hand gemacht hat, was sonst überall nur auf einer festen Unterlage ausgeführt wird. Vollends aber jetzt, wo die Frage nach der metaphysischen Auslegung der ethischen Grundlage angeregt ist, wird die Schwierigkeit des voraussetzungslosen Verfahrens so überwiegend, daß ich nur den Ausweg sehe, es bei ganz allgemeinen Umrissen bewenden zu lassen, mehr Andeutungen, als Ausführungen zu geben, den Weg, der hier zum Ziele führt, zu zeigen, aber nicht ihn bis ans Ende zu verfolgen, und überhaupt nur einen sehr geringen Theil von dem zu sagen, was ich unter andern Umständen hier vorzubringen hätte. Bei diesem Verfahren aber berufe ich mich, neben den eben dargelegten Gründen, darauf, daß die eigentliche Aufgabe in den vorhergehenden Abschnitten gelöst ist, folglich was ich hier noch darüber leiste ein opus supererogationis, eine beliebig zu gebende und beliebig zu nehmende Zugabe ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
IV.
Toward a Metaphysical Interpretation of the Primal Phenomenon of Ethics.
An Understanding About This Supplement.
So far I have established the moral incentive as a fact and shown that from it alone can arise disinterested justice and genuine human kindness, the two cardinal virtues on which all the others rest. This is sufficient to ground ethics, since ethics must necessarily rest on something that actually and demonstrably exists, whether given in the external world or in consciousness—unless, like some of my predecessors, we choose merely to assume an abstract proposition at will and derive ethical precepts from it, or, like Kant, to do the same with a mere concept, that of law. It seems to me that this answers the question posed by the Royal Society, since it asks for the foundation of ethics and does not also demand a metaphysics to ground that foundation in turn. Yet I see very well that the human mind has not found its final satisfaction and repose here. As at the end of every investigation and every empirical science, here too it confronts a primal phenomenon that explains everything falling under it and following from it, but itself remains unexplained, a riddle before us. Here too, then, the demand arises for a metaphysics: that is, an ultimate explanation of primal phenomena as such and, taken together, of the world. Here too this demand raises the question of why what exists and has been understood should be as it is and not otherwise, and how the character of appearance we have set out arises from the essence of things in themselves. Indeed, in ethics the need for a metaphysical foundation is all the more urgent because philosophical and religious systems agree that the ethical significance of actions must also be metaphysical: it must reach beyond the mere appearance of things, and therefore beyond all possibility of experience, and so stand in the closest relation to the entire existence of the world and the destiny of humanity; for the final point toward which the meaning of existence as a whole converges must surely be the ethical. This last claim is also confirmed by the undeniable fact that, as death approaches, the course of every person's thoughts, whether or not that person has adhered to religious dogmas, takes a moral direction, and each strives to settle the account of a completed life entirely in moral terms. The testimony of the ancients carries particular weight here, since it is free of Christian influence. I therefore point out that we already find this fact expressed in a passage attributed to the most ancient lawgiver Zaleucus, though according to Bentley and Heyne it comes from a Pythagorean, and preserved for us by Stobaeus (Floril., Tit. 44, §. 20): “We must set before our eyes that moment when each of us reaches the end and must depart from life. For all who are about to die are seized with remorse as they remember the wrongs they have done, and with the desire that everything they had done should have been just.” (We must set before our eyes that point in time when each of us must leave life: for all the dying are seized with repentance as they remember what they have done unjustly, and they long earnestly to have acted justly in everything.) Likewise, to recall a historical example, we see Pericles on his deathbed refusing to hear of all his great deeds, and wishing to hear only that he had never brought mourning upon a citizen (Plut. in Pericl.). To set a very different case beside this, I remember from a report of testimony before an English jury that an uncouth fifteen-year-old Black boy aboard a ship, about to die of an injury he had just received in a fight, hurriedly had all his shipmates called to him, to ask whether he had ever hurt or insulted any of them, and found great reassurance when they said no. Experience consistently teaches that the dying wish to be reconciled with everyone before they depart. Another kind of evidence for our proposition comes from the familiar experience that, while the author of intellectual achievements, even the world's greatest masterpieces, very gladly accepts a reward if only one is available, almost anyone who has done something morally outstanding refuses all reward for it. This is especially true of great moral deeds: when, for example, someone has risked his own life to save another's, or even the lives of many, he generally refuses absolutely to accept a reward, even if he is poor, because he feels that it would diminish the metaphysical worth of his action. Bürger gives us a poetic portrayal of this at the end of his Song of the Brave Man. But it usually happens this way in real life too, and I have encountered it several times in English newspapers.—These facts are universal and occur without distinction of religion. Because life has this undeniable ethical and metaphysical tendency, no religion could gain a foothold in the world without interpreting life in these terms: for every religion finds its hold on human hearts through its ethical side. Every religion lays its dogma beneath the moral incentive that everyone feels, though without yet understanding it, and binds the two so closely together that they seem inseparable; indeed, priests strive to pass off unbelief and immorality as one and the same. This is why, for the believer, the unbeliever is identical with the morally bad person, as we can already see in the use of such expressions as godless, atheistic, unchristian, heretic, and the like as synonyms for morally bad. Religions have an easy task here, since they begin with faith and may demand it unconditionally for their dogma, even under threat. Philosophical systems, however, have no such easy game to play: thus an examination of all systems will show that their grounding of ethics, and likewise the point at which they connect it to their given metaphysics, are everywhere in an exceedingly sorry state. And yet the demand that ethics rest on metaphysics cannot be dismissed, as I have already affirmed in the introduction on the authority of Wolff and Kant.
But the problem of metaphysics is so far the hardest of all the problems that occupy the human mind that many thinkers regard it as utterly insoluble. In the present case I face the further, quite particular disadvantage imposed by the form of a detached monograph: I cannot begin from some definite metaphysical system to which I might subscribe, since I would either have to set it out, which would take far too long, or assume it as given and certain, which would be highly questionable. It follows in turn that here, no less than before, I may use only the analytic method, not the synthetic: I must proceed not from the ground to its consequences, but from the consequences to their ground. This harsh necessity of proceeding without presuppositions and starting from no standpoint other than the one common to everyone has already made the exposition of the foundation of ethics so difficult for me that I now look back on it as a difficult feat successfully accomplished, much as when someone has done freehand what is otherwise done only on a firm support. Now, however, with the question of a metaphysical interpretation of the ethical foundation before us, the difficulty of proceeding without presuppositions becomes so overwhelming that I see only one way out: to be content with very general outlines; to offer suggestions rather than a full exposition; to show the path that leads to the goal without following it to the end; and, in general, to say only a very small part of what I would have to present here under other circumstances. In taking this course I appeal not only to the reasons just given, but also to the fact that the actual question has been answered in the preceding sections. Whatever I offer beyond it here is therefore a work beyond what is required, a supplement freely given and freely accepted.
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
IV.
Toward a metaphysical explanation of the basic ethical phenomenon.
An understanding about this addition.
So far, I have established the moral motive as a fact. I have shown that it alone can produce unselfish justice and genuine love for other people, the two cardinal virtues on which all the others rest. This is enough to establish ethics, since ethics must necessarily rest on something that actually and demonstrably exists, whether in the outside world or in consciousness. The alternative would be to follow some of my predecessors and simply choose an abstract proposition at will, then derive moral rules from it—or to follow Kant and do the same with a mere concept, that of law. It seems to me that this meets the Royal Society’s question, since the question asks for the foundation of ethics, not for a metaphysics to establish that foundation in turn. Still, I see very well that the human mind does not yet find its final satisfaction and peace here. As at the end of every inquiry and every science of actual things, it stands before a basic phenomenon. This explains everything that falls under it and follows from it, but remains unexplained itself, confronting us as a riddle. So here too the demand for a metaphysics arises: that is, for an ultimate explanation of the basic phenomena as such and, taken together, of the world. Here too this demand raises the question of why what exists and has been understood is this way rather than another, and how the character of appearance that we have described emerges from the inner nature of things as they are in themselves. Indeed, ethics has an especially urgent need for a metaphysical foundation. Philosophical and religious systems agree that the ethical significance of actions must also be metaphysical. It must extend beyond the mere appearance of things, and therefore beyond every possibility of experience, and so be closely connected with the whole existence of the world and with human destiny. For the ultimate point at which the meaning of existence as a whole culminates must surely be ethical. This last point is also confirmed by an undeniable fact. As death approaches, everyone’s thoughts, whether or not they have accepted religious dogmas, take a moral direction. They try to settle the account of their completed life entirely from a moral standpoint. The testimony of the ancients carries particular weight here, because it is not under Christian influence. I therefore point out that this fact is already stated in a passage attributed to the very ancient lawgiver Zaleucus, though Bentley and Heyne consider it the work of a Pythagorean. Stobaeus has preserved it for us (Floril., Tit. 44, §. 20): “We must keep before our eyes the moment when each of us reaches the end and leaves life. For everyone about to die is seized by regret, remembering the wrongs they have done, and by the urge to wish that everything they had done had been just.” (We must set before our eyes that moment when each of us must depart from life: for remorse seizes all who are dying, as they remember what they have done unjustly, and they long deeply to have done everything justly.) Likewise, to recall a historical example, we see Pericles on his deathbed refusing to hear about all his great deeds, and wanting to hear only that he had never put a citizen into mourning (Plut. in Pericl.). To set a very different case beside this, I remember reading a report of testimony before an English jury about a rough, fifteen-year-old Black boy aboard a ship. About to die from an injury he had just received in a fight, he hurriedly had all his shipmates brought to him to ask whether he had ever hurt or insulted any of them. Their answer that he had not gave him great peace. Experience consistently teaches that dying people wish to make peace with everyone before they leave. Another kind of evidence for our claim comes from a familiar experience. People very willingly accept payment for intellectual achievements, even the world’s greatest masterpieces, if they can get it. But almost everyone who has done something morally outstanding refuses any reward for it. This is especially true of great moral deeds, as when someone has saved another person’s life, or even many lives, at the risk of their own. In such cases they generally refuse any reward at all, even if they are poor, because they feel that accepting it would harm the metaphysical value of their action. Bürger gives us a poetic account of this at the end of his Song of the Brave Man. But it usually happens this way in real life too, and I have come across it several times in English newspapers.—These facts are universal and occur regardless of religion. Because life has this undeniable ethical and metaphysical tendency, no religion could gain a foothold in the world without interpreting life in this sense. Every religion gains its hold on people’s hearts through its ethical side. Each makes its dogma the foundation of the moral motive that everyone feels but does not therefore understand, and joins the two so closely that they appear inseparable. Indeed, priests try to present unbelief and immorality as one and the same thing. This is why believers regard an unbeliever as identical with a morally bad person. We can already see this in the use of words such as godless, atheistic, unchristian, heretic, and the like as synonyms for morally bad. Religions have an easy task here. Starting from faith, they may demand it unconditionally for their dogma, even with threats. Philosophical systems do not have things so easy. Thus, if we examine all the systems, we will find that both their foundation of ethics and the point where ethics connects with their stated metaphysics are in an extremely bad state everywhere. Yet the demand that ethics rest on metaphysics cannot be dismissed, as I have already confirmed in the introduction by citing the authority of Wolff and Kant.
But the problem of metaphysics is so much harder than any other problem that occupies the human mind that many thinkers consider it completely insoluble. In this particular case I face a further, quite special disadvantage caused by the form of a detached study: I cannot begin from a definite metaphysical system that I might accept. I would either have to explain it, which would take far too much space, or assume it as given and certain, which would be highly questionable. This in turn means that here, just as in what came before, I cannot use the synthetic method, but only the analytical one. I must go not from the ground to its consequences, but from the consequences to their ground. This hard necessity of proceeding without assumptions, and starting from no standpoint except the one common to everyone, has already made explaining the foundation of ethics so difficult for me that I now look back on it as a difficult feat I have accomplished. It is like doing something freehand that is normally done only with a firm support underneath. Now, with the question of a metaphysical explanation of the ethical foundation before us, the difficulty of proceeding without assumptions becomes so overwhelming that I see only one way out. I must limit myself to very general outlines, give suggestions rather than full explanations, show the path that leads to the goal here without following it to the end, and, in general, say only a very small part of what I would have to present under other circumstances. To justify this approach, besides the reasons just given, I appeal to the fact that the actual question has been answered in the preceding sections. Whatever else I offer here is therefore work beyond what is required, an addition that I am free to give and the reader free to take.
About this section
Section 21 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 22 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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