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Religion, Chapter XVI, 3

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Original 17th-century English

14 In Joshua’s time the interpretation of the laws, and of the word of God, belonged to Eleazar the high-priest; who was also, under God, their absolute king. Which is collected, first of all, out of the covenant itself; in which the commonwealth of Israel is called a priestly kingdom, or, as it is recited in 1 Peter ii. 9, a royal priesthood. Which could in no wise be said, unless by the institution and covenant of the people, the regal power were understood to belong to the high-priest. Neither doth this repugn what hath been said before, where Moses, and not Aaron, had the kingdom under God. Since it is necessary, when one man institutes the form of a future commonwealth, that one should govern the kingdom which he institutes during his life, (whether it be monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy); and have all that power for the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future. Now, that Eleazar the priest had not only the priesthood, but also the sovereignty, is expressly set down in Joshua’s call to the administration. For thus it is written (Numb, xxvii. 18, 19, 20, 21): Take thee Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit, and lay thine hand upon him, and set him before Eleazar the priest, and before all the congregation, and give him a charge in their sight; and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him, that all the congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient; and he shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him after the judgment of Urim, before the Lord; at his word shall they go out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the children of Israel with him, even all the congregation. Where to ask counsel of God for whatsoever is to be done, that is, to interpret God’s word, and in the name of God to command in all matters, belongs to Eleazar; and to go out and to come in at his word, that is to say, to obey, belongs both to Joshua and to all the people. It is to be observed also, that that speech, part of thy glory, clearly denotes that Joshua had not a power equal with that which Moses had. In the meantime it is manifest, that even in Joshua’s time the supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were both in one person.

They were also united in the high-priest, until king Saul’s time.

15 After Joshua’s death follow the times of the Judges until king Saul; in which it is manifest that the right of the kingdom instituted by God, remained with the high-priest. For the kingdom was by covenant priestly, that is to say, God’s government by priests. And such ought it to have been, until that form, with God’s consent, were changed by the people themselves; which was not done before that requiring a king God consented unto them, and said unto Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 7): Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. The supreme civil power was therefore rightly due by God’s own institution to the high-priest; but actually that power was in the prophets, to whom (being raised by God in an extraordinary manner) the Israelites, a people greedy of prophets, submitted themselves to be protected and judged, by reason of the great esteem they had of prophecies. The reason of this thing was, because that though penalties were set and judges appointed in the institution of God’s priestly kingdom; yet, the right of inflicting punishment depended wholly on private judgment; and it belonged to a dissolute multitude and each single person to punish or not to punish, according as their private zeal should stir them up. And therefore Moses by his own command punished no man with death; but when any man was to be put to death, one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them, by divine authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord. Now this was conformable to the nature of God’s peculiar kingdom. For there God reigns indeed, where his laws are obeyed not for fear of men, but for fear of himself. And truly, if men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state of civil government; but as men are, there is a coercive power (in which I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them. And therefore also God, from the beginning, prescribed laws by Moses for the future kings (Deut. xvii. 14-20). And Moses foretold this in his last words to the people, saying (Deut. xxxi. 29): I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you, &c. When therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation (Judges ii. 10-11) who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel, the children of Israel did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served Balaam; to wit, they cast off God’s government, that is to say, that of the priest, by whom God ruled; and afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies and oppressed with bondage, they looked for God’s will, not at the hands of the priest any more, but of the prophets. These therefore actually judged Israel; but their obedience was rightly due to the high-priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom, after the death of Moses and Joshua, was without power; yet was it not without right. Now that the interpretation of God’s word did belong to the same high-priest, is manifest by this; that God, after the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated, spake no more in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the propitiatory which was between the cherubims, whither it was not lawful for any to approach except the high-priest. If therefore regard be had to the right of the kingdom, the supreme civil power and the authority of interpreting God’s word were joined in the high-priest. If we consider the fact, they were united in the prophets who judged Israel. For as judges, they had the civil authority; as prophets, they interpreted God’s word. And thus every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable.

They were united in the kings, until the captivity.

16 Kings being once constituted, it is no doubt but the civil authority belonged to them. For the kingdom of God by the way of priesthood (God consenting to the request of the Israelites) was ended; which Hierom also marks, speaking of the books of Samuel. Samuel, says he, Eli being dead and Saul slain, declares the old law abolished. Furthermore, the oaths of the new priesthood and new sovereignty in Zadok and David, do testify that the right, whereby the kings did rule, was founded in the very concession of the people. The priest could rightly do whatsoever every man could rightly do himself; for the Israelites granted him a right to judge of all things, and to wage war for all men; in which two are contained all right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man. Our king say they (1 Sam. viii. 20) shall judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles. Judicature therefore belonged to the kings. But to judge is nothing else, than by interpreting to apply the laws to the facts. To them therefore belonged the interpretation of laws too. And because there was no other written word of God acknowledged beside the law of Moses, until the captivity; the authority of interpreting God’s word did also belong to the kings. Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken for a law, if there had been another written word beside the Mosaical law, seeing the interpretation of laws belonged to the kings, the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them. When the book of Deuteronomy, in which the whole Mosaical law was contained, being a long time lost was found again; the priests indeed asked counsel of God concerning that book, but not by their own authority, but by the commandment of Josiah; and not immediately neither, but by the means of Holda the prophetess. Whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of God, belonged not to the priest. Neither yet follows it, that that authority belonged to the prophetess; because others did judge of the prophets, whether they were to be held for true or not. For to what end did God give signs and tokens to all the people, whereby the true prophets might be discerned from the false; namely, the event of predictions, and conformity with the religion established by Moses; if they might not use those marks? The authority therefore of admitting books for the word of God, belonged to the king; and thus that book of the law was approved, and received again by the authority of king Josiah; as appears by the second book of the Kings, chap, xxii. xxiii.: where it is reported that he gathered together all the several degrees of his kingdom, the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all the words of the covenant; that is to say, he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaical covenant; that is to say, for the word of God; and to be again received and confirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the power of discerning God’s word from the words of men, and of interpreting God’s word even in the days of the kings, was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with authority, but in the form and by the right of proclaimers and preachers, of whom the hearers did judge. And if perhaps these were punished who did not listen to them plainly, teaching easy things; it doth not thence follow, that the kings were obliged to follow all things which they, in God’s name, did declare were to be followed. For though Josiah, the good king of Judah, were slain because he obeyed not the word of the Lord from the mouth of Necho king of Egypt; that is to say, because he rejected good counsel though it seemed to come from an enemy; yet no man I hope will say that Josiah was, by any bond either of divine or human laws, obliged to believe Pharaoh Necho king of Egypt, because he said that God had spoken to him. But what some man may object against kings, that for want of learning they are seldom able enough to interpret those books of antiquity, in the which God’s word is contained; and that for this cause, it is not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority; he may object as much against the priests and all mortal men; for they may err. And although priests were better instructed in nature and arts than other men, yet kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters under them; and so, though kings did not themselves interpret the word of God, yet the office of interpreting them might depend on their authority. And they who therefore refuse to yield up this authority to kings, because they cannot practice the office itself, do as much as if they should say, that the authority of teaching geometry must not depend upon kings, except they themselves were geometricians. We read that kings have prayed for the people; that they have blessed the people; that they have consecrated the temple; that they have commanded the priests; that they have removed priests from their office; that they have constituted others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered; for that was hereditary to Aaron and his sons. But it is manifest, as in Moses’ lifetime, so throughout all ages, from king Saul to the captivity of Babylon, that the priesthood was not a maistry, but a ministry.

The same were united in the priests, after the captivity.

17 After their return from Babylonian bondage, the covenant being renewed and signed, the priestly kingdom was restored to the same manner it was in from the death of Joshua to the beginning of the kings; excepting that it is not expressly set down, that the returned Jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras, by whose direction they ordered their state, or to any other beside God himself. That reformation seems rather to be nothing else, than the bare promises and vows of every man, to observe those things which were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding, (perhaps not by the people’s intention), by virtue of the covenant which they then renewed, (for the covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai), that same state was a priestly kingdom; that is to say, the supreme civil authority and the sacred were united in the priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the priesthood, and by the interposition of foreign princes, it was so troubled till our Saviour Jesus Christ’s time, that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times, where that authority resided; yet it is plain, that in those times the power of interpreting God’s word was not severed from the supreme civil power.

Among the Jews, the denial of the Divine providence and idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine Majesty: in all other things they ought to obey their princes.

18 Out of all this, we may easily know how the Jews, in all times from Abraham unto Christ, were to behave themselves in the commands of their princes. For as in kingdoms merely human, men must obey a subordinate magistrate in all things, excepting when his commands contain in them some treason; so in the kingdom of God, the Jews were bound to obey their princes, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, the priest, the king, every one during their time in all things, except when their commands did contain some treason against the Divine Majesty. Now treason against the Divine Majesty was, first, the denial of divine providence; for this was to deny God to be a king by nature: next, idolatry, or the worship not of other, (for there is but one God), but of strange Gods; that is to say, a worship though of one God, yet under other titles, attributes, and rites, than what were established by Abraham and Moses; for this was to deny the God of Abraham to be their king by covenant made with Abraham and themselves. In all other things they were to obey. And if a king or priest, having the sovereign authority, had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the laws, that had been his sin, and not his subject’s; whose duty it is, not to dispute, but to obey the commands of his superiors.

20 In images made with hands. In chap. XV. art. 14, there we have showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if it be done by the command of a city, to whom the written word of God is not known nor received, we have then showed this worship (in article 18) to be rational. But where God reigns by way of covenant, in which it is expressly warned not to worship thus, as in the covenant made with Abraham; there, whether it be with or without the command of the city, it is ill done.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.

14 In Joshua’s time, interpretation of the laws and the word of God belonged to the high priest Eleazar, who was also, under God, their absolute king. This follows first from the covenant itself, which calls the commonwealth of Israel a priestly kingdom or, as 1 Peter ii. 9 puts it, a royal priesthood. This could not have been said unless the institution and covenant of the people assigned the kingly power to the high priest. Nor does it contradict what was said before, that Moses, not Aaron, held the kingdom under God. When one person institutes the form of a future commonwealth, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, that person must govern the kingdom he institutes during his lifetime. For the present he must hold all the power he is assigning to others for the future. That Eleazar held not only the priesthood but also sovereignty is expressly stated in Joshua’s appointment to govern. For it is written (Numb, xxvii. 18, 19, 20, 21): “Take Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit, and lay your hand upon him. Set him before Eleazar the priest and before all the congregation, and charge him in their sight. You shall put some of your honor upon him, so that all the congregation of the children of Israel may obey. He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall seek counsel for him by the judgment of Urim before the Lord. At his word they shall go out and at his word they shall come in, Joshua and all the children of Israel with him, the entire congregation.” Seeking God’s counsel on whatever is to be done—that is, interpreting his word—and commanding in God’s name in all matters belong to Eleazar; going out and coming in at his word—that is, obeying—belong both to Joshua and to all the people. Notice too that “some of your honor” clearly shows that Joshua did not have power equal to Moses’. It is plain, then, that even in Joshua’s time supreme power and authority to interpret God’s word resided together in one person.

They remained united in the high priest until the time of king Saul.

15 After Joshua’s death came the time of the Judges, lasting until king Saul. Throughout that period the right to the kingdom established by God plainly remained with the high priest. By covenant the kingdom was priestly: it was God’s government through priests. It had to remain so until, with God’s consent, the people themselves changed that form of government. This did not happen until they asked for a king and God agreed, saying to Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 7): “Listen to the voice of the people in all they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me, so that I should not reign over them.” By God’s own institution, therefore, the supreme civil power rightly belonged to the high priest. In practice, however, it belonged to the prophets, whom God raised up in an extraordinary way and to whom the Israelites, a people hungry for prophets, submitted themselves for protection and judgment because they held prophecy in such high esteem. The reason was this: although penalties were set and judges appointed when God’s priestly kingdom was instituted, the right to inflict punishment depended entirely on private judgment. It fell to an unruly multitude or to each individual to punish or not to punish as private zeal moved them. Thus Moses put no one to death by his own command. When someone was to be executed, one or more persons stirred up the multitude against the accused, invoking divine authority and saying, “Thus says the Lord.” This was in keeping with the nature of God’s particular kingdom. God truly reigns where his laws are obeyed not from fear of men but from fear of him. If human beings were what they ought to be, this would indeed be an excellent form of civil government. But as they are, coercive power—by which I mean both right and might—is necessary to govern them. God therefore gave Moses laws for future kings from the beginning (Deut. xvii. 14-20). Moses also foretold this outcome in his last words to the people (Deut. xxxi. 29): “I know that after my death you will utterly corrupt yourselves and turn away from the path I commanded you,” etc. And so, when in fulfillment of his prediction another generation arose (Judges ii. 10-11) that “did not know the Lord or the works he had done for Israel,” the children of Israel “did evil in the sight of the Lord and served Balaam.” That is, they cast off God’s government through the priest by whom he ruled. Later, when their enemies defeated and enslaved them, they sought God’s will not from the priest any longer but from the prophets. The prophets therefore judged Israel in practice, though obedience was rightly owed to the high priest. After the deaths of Moses and Joshua, then, the priestly kingdom lacked power but not right. It is plain that interpretation of God’s word belonged to the same high priest. After the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant were consecrated, God no longer spoke on Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the mercy seat between the cherubim; only the high priest was permitted to approach it. In right, then, supreme civil power and authority to interpret God’s word were joined in the high priest. In practice they were united in the prophets who judged Israel: as judges they had civil authority, and as prophets they interpreted God’s word. Thus these two powers remained inseparable in either case.

They were united in the kings until the captivity.

16 Once kings were established, there can be no doubt that civil authority belonged to them. With God’s consent to the Israelites’ request, his kingdom through the priesthood came to an end. Hierom observes this too in speaking of the books of Samuel: “Samuel,” he says, “with Eli dead and Saul slain, declares the old law abolished.” Moreover, the oaths concerning the new priesthood and the new sovereignty in Zadok and David show that the kings’ right to govern rested on the people’s own concession. The priest could rightly do whatever each person could rightly do for himself; for the Israelites granted him the right to judge all things and to wage war on behalf of all. These two powers embrace every right one person can grant another. “Our king,” they say (1 Sam. viii. 20), “shall judge us, go out before us, and fight our battles.” Judgment therefore belonged to kings. But to judge is simply to apply laws to facts by interpreting them. Kings therefore had authority to interpret the laws as well. And since no written word of God besides the law of Moses was acknowledged before the captivity, kings also had authority to interpret God’s word. Indeed, since God’s word must be taken as law, even if there had been another written word besides the Mosaic law, its interpretation would have belonged to the kings, to whom the interpretation of laws belonged. When the long-lost book of Deuteronomy, containing the whole Mosaic law, was found again, the priests did consult God about the book, but not on their own authority: they did so at Josiah’s command, and not directly but through Holda the prophetess. Thus authority to admit books as the word of God did not belong to the priest. Nor does it follow that this authority belonged to the prophetess, since others judged whether prophets were to be held true. Why else would God have given the whole people signs by which they could distinguish true prophets from false ones—the fulfillment of predictions and conformity to the religion established by Moses—if they were not allowed to use them? Authority to admit books as God’s word therefore belonged to the king. Thus the book of the law was approved and received again by the authority of king Josiah, as appears from the second book of the Kings, chap, xxii. xxiii. There we read that he assembled every rank of his kingdom—the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people—and read to them every word of the covenant. In other words, he caused them to acknowledge that covenant as the Mosaic covenant, hence as God’s word, and caused the Israelites to receive and confirm it anew. Civil power, authority to distinguish God’s word from human words, and authority to interpret God’s word belonged entirely to the kings even during their reign. Prophets were sent not with authority but in the manner and by the right of heralds and preachers, whose hearers judged what they said. And if people were sometimes punished for failing to listen when prophets taught plain and simple things, it does not follow that kings were bound to follow everything they said must be followed in God’s name. Josiah, the good king of Judah, was indeed killed because he did not obey the word of the Lord spoken by Necho, king of Egypt—that is, because he rejected good counsel, though it seemed to come from an enemy. Yet no one, I hope, would say that any divine or human law bound Josiah to believe Pharaoh Necho, king of Egypt, merely because Necho claimed that God had spoken to him. Someone might object that kings seldom have enough learning to interpret those ancient books that contain God’s word, and therefore this office should not depend on their authority. But the same objection applies to priests and all mortals: they too can err. Even if priests were better educated in the natural world and the arts than other people, kings could appoint qualified interpreters under them. So even if kings did not interpret God’s word themselves, the office of interpretation could still depend on their authority. To refuse kings this authority because they cannot themselves perform the work is as absurd as saying that authority over the teaching of geometry must not belong to kings unless they themselves are geometricians. We read that kings have prayed for the people, blessed the people, consecrated the temple, commanded priests, removed priests from office, and appointed others. They have not offered sacrifices, for that function belonged by inheritance to Aaron and his sons. But it is plain that, as in Moses’ lifetime, so in every age from king Saul to the Babylonian captivity, the priesthood was a ministry, not a position of mastery.

They were united in the priests after the captivity.

17 After the Jews returned from Babylonian captivity, the covenant was renewed and confirmed, and the priestly kingdom was restored to the form it had held from Joshua’s death until the rise of kings. There is one exception: no text expressly states that the returning Jews gave up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras, under whose direction they arranged their state, or to anyone besides God himself. That reformation seems rather to have consisted simply in each person’s promises and vows to observe what was written in the book of the law. Nevertheless, perhaps without the people’s intending it, the covenant they renewed—being the same covenant made at Mount Sinai—made their state a priestly kingdom: supreme civil and sacred authority were united in the priests. Their state was so troubled by the ambition of rivals for the priesthood and the intervention of foreign princes until the time of our Savior Jesus Christ that the histories of those times do not tell us where that authority rested. Yet it is plain that during those times authority to interpret God’s word was not separated from supreme civil power.

Among the Jews, denial of divine providence and idolatry were the only treasons against the Divine Majesty; in everything else they were bound to obey their princes.

18 From all this we can readily understand how the Jews were to respond to the commands of their princes from Abraham to Christ. In merely human kingdoms, people must obey a subordinate magistrate in everything except commands that entail treason. So in God’s kingdom the Jews were bound to obey their princes—Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, the priest, and the king, each in his own time—in everything except commands that entailed treason against the Divine Majesty. Such treason consisted, first, in denial of divine providence, for this denied that God was king by nature; and second, in idolatry, or the worship not of other gods, since there is only one God, but of alien gods. This means worshipping even the one God under titles, attributes, and rites other than those established by Abraham and Moses; for that denied that the God of Abraham was their king by the covenant made with Abraham and with themselves. In every other matter they were to obey. If a king or priest possessing sovereign authority had commanded something contrary to the laws, the sin would have been his and not his subject’s. The subject’s duty is not to dispute but to obey the commands of superiors.

20 In images made by human hands. In chap. XV. art. 14, we showed this kind of worship to be irrational. But if a city commands it and the written word of God is neither known nor received there, we showed (in article 18) that the worship is rational. Where God reigns by covenant, however, and the covenant expressly forbids such worship, as the covenant with Abraham does, it is wrong whether or not the city commands it.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.

14 In Joshua's time, Eleazar the high priest interpreted the laws and God's word. Under God, he was also their absolute king. We can see this first from the covenant itself. It calls the commonwealth of Israel a priestly kingdom, or, as 1 Peter ii. 9 puts it, a royal priesthood. This could not be said unless the people's founding covenant assigned royal power to the high priest. This does not conflict with what was said earlier about Moses rather than Aaron holding the kingdom under God. When one person establishes the form of a future commonwealth, that person must govern the kingdom he is establishing during his own life, whether its form is monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. For the present he must have all the power he is assigning to others for the future. The appointment of Joshua to office explicitly shows that Eleazar the priest held sovereign power as well as the priesthood. Scripture says (Numb. xxvii. 18, 19, 20, 21): “Take Joshua son of Nun, a man who has the Spirit, and lay your hand on him. Bring him before Eleazar the priest and before the whole congregation, and commission him in their sight. Give him some of your honor, so that the whole congregation of the children of Israel may obey him. He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall seek counsel for him before the Lord by the judgment of Urim. At Eleazar's word they shall go out, and at his word they shall come in, Joshua and all the children of Israel with him, the whole congregation.” Seeking God's counsel about everything they should do means interpreting God's word. Eleazar had this task and could command in God's name in all matters. Joshua and all the people had to go out and come in at his word—that is, obey him. Notice also that the words “some of your honor” clearly mean Joshua did not have as much power as Moses. Even in Joshua's time, then, supreme power and the authority to interpret God's word belonged to one person.

The high priest held both powers until the time of King Saul.

15 The period of the judges followed Joshua's death and lasted until King Saul. During that time, the high priest clearly retained the right to rule the kingdom God had established. The covenant made it a priestly kingdom, in which God governed through priests. It had to remain so until the people changed its form with God's consent. They did not do that until they asked for a king and God agreed, saying to Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 7): “Listen to everything the people say to you. They have not rejected you; they have rejected me as their king.” By God's own arrangement, then, supreme civil power rightfully belonged to the high priest. In practice, however, the prophets held that power. God raised them up in an extraordinary way, and the Israelites, who eagerly sought prophets and highly valued prophecy, submitted to their protection and judgment. Here is why this happened. God's priestly kingdom had set penalties and appointed judges, but the actual power to punish depended entirely on private judgment. The disorderly crowd and each individual decided whether to punish someone, as their personal zeal moved them. Thus Moses did not have anyone put to death simply by his own command. When anyone was to be put to death, one or several people stirred up the crowd against the accused, claiming divine authority and saying, “Thus says the Lord.” This suited the special character of God's kingdom. God truly reigns where people obey his laws because they fear him, not because they fear other people. If people behaved as they should, this would indeed be an excellent form of civil government. But people being as they are, they need a coercive power to rule them. By that I mean both the right and the ability to compel. That is also why God, from the beginning, set down laws through Moses for future kings (Deut. xvii. 14-20). Moses predicted the change in his final words to the people (Deut. xxxi. 29): “I know that after my death you will utterly corrupt yourselves and turn away from the path I have commanded you,” and so on. As he predicted, another generation arose (Judges ii. 10-11) that did not know the Lord or what he had done for Israel. The children of Israel did evil in the Lord's sight and served Balaam. In other words, they cast off God's government through the priest. Later, when enemies defeated and enslaved them, they no longer asked the priest for God's will. Instead, they went to the prophets. The prophets therefore judged Israel in practice, although the people rightfully owed obedience to the high priest. After Moses and Joshua died, the priestly kingdom lacked effective power, but it still had a right to rule. The high priest also had the right to interpret God's word. This is clear because after the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant were consecrated, God no longer spoke on Mount Sinai. He spoke instead in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the mercy seat between the cherubim, which no one except the high priest was allowed to approach. If we look at who had the right to rule, both supreme civil power and the authority to interpret God's word belonged to the high priest. If we look at who actually governed, both belonged to the prophets who judged Israel. They had civil authority as judges and interpreted God's word as prophets. Either way, up to this point the two powers were never separated.

The kings held both powers until the captivity.

16 Once kings were appointed, civil authority plainly belonged to them. God had agreed to the Israelites' request, so his kingdom governed through the priesthood ended. Hierom also observes this when discussing the books of Samuel. He says that after Eli died and Saul was killed, Samuel declared the old law abolished. Furthermore, the pledges establishing a new priesthood under Zadok and new sovereign rule under David show that the kings' right to rule came from the people's own consent. The priest could rightly do whatever each person could rightly do for himself, because the Israelites granted him the right to judge everything and make war on behalf of everyone. These two rights include every right one person can grant to another. They said (1 Sam. viii. 20), “Our king shall judge us, go out before us, and fight our battles.” So the right to judge belonged to kings. Judging means applying laws to events by interpreting those laws. The kings therefore had the right to interpret laws as well. And since no written word of God other than the law of Moses was acknowledged before the captivity, the kings also had the authority to interpret God's word. Indeed, since God's word must be treated as law, even if there had been other written words of God besides the law of Moses, their interpretation would still have belonged to the kings, who had the right to interpret laws. Consider the book of Deuteronomy, which contained the whole Mosaic law. It had been lost for a long time when it was found again. The priests did ask God for guidance about the book, but they acted on Josiah's orders, not on their own authority. They did not consult God directly, either, but went through Holda the prophetess. The authority to accept books as God's word therefore did not belong to the priest. It does not follow that it belonged to the prophetess, either, because other people had to judge whether prophets were genuine. Why would God have given all the people signs to distinguish true prophets from false ones—the fulfillment of their predictions and their agreement with the religion Moses established—if they could not use those signs? The authority to accept books as God's word therefore belonged to the king. By King Josiah's authority, the book of the law was approved and accepted again, as reported in the second book of the Kings, chapters xxii. xxiii. He gathered together every rank of his kingdom: elders, priests, prophets, and all the people. He read aloud to them all the words of the covenant. That is, he had them acknowledge it as the Mosaic covenant and thus as God's word, and had the Israelites accept and affirm it again. So throughout the time of the kings, civil power, the authority to distinguish God's word from human words, and the authority to interpret God's word all belonged entirely to the kings. Prophets were sent not as authorities but as heralds and preachers, whose listeners judged their messages. Some people may have been punished for failing to listen when prophets clearly taught simple things. It does not follow that kings were required to obey every instruction those prophets claimed to deliver in God's name. Josiah, the good king of Judah, was killed because he did not obey the Lord's word spoken by Necho, king of Egypt. In other words, Josiah rejected sound advice, though it seemed to come from an enemy. But surely no one will say that divine or human law required Josiah to believe Pharaoh Necho, king of Egypt, just because Necho claimed God had spoken to him. Someone may object that kings usually lack the learning needed to interpret the ancient books that contain God's word. Therefore, this person might say, the authority to interpret them should not depend on kings. But the same objection applies to priests and all other mortals: they too can make mistakes. Even if priests knew more than others about nature and the arts, kings could still appoint qualified interpreters under them. Thus the authority over interpretation could belong to kings even if they did not personally interpret God's word. Anyone who denies kings this authority because they cannot perform the task themselves might as well say that a king has no authority over the teaching of geometry unless he is a geometer himself. We read that kings prayed for the people, blessed the people, consecrated the temple, gave orders to priests, removed priests from office, and appointed replacements. Kings did not offer sacrifices, because the right to do that was inherited by Aaron and his sons. But it is clear that throughout Moses' life and every period from King Saul to the Babylonian captivity, the priesthood was a service, not a position of command.

After the captivity, the priests held both powers.

17 After the Jews returned from captivity in Babylon, they renewed and signed the covenant. The priestly kingdom was then restored to the form it had had between Joshua's death and the beginning of kingship. There is one exception: the text does not explicitly say that the returning Jews gave sovereign authority to Esdras, whose guidance shaped their government, or to anyone else besides God himself. Their reform seems instead to have consisted simply of each person's promises and vows to obey what the book of the law said. Nevertheless, whether or not the people intended it, renewing that covenant restored the priestly kingdom, since it was the same covenant made at Mount Sinai. That is, the priests held both supreme civil and religious authority. Rival claimants to the priesthood were ambitious, and foreign rulers intervened. By the time of our Savior Jesus Christ, the situation had become so confused that the histories of the period do not show clearly who held this authority. Still, it is clear that during those years the power to interpret God's word was not separated from supreme civil power.

For the Jews, denying divine providence and practicing idolatry were the only forms of treason against divine majesty. In everything else they had to obey their rulers.

18 From all this, we can readily understand how the Jews were supposed to respond to their rulers' commands throughout the period from Abraham to Christ. In a purely human kingdom, people must obey a subordinate official in everything except commands that involve treason. Likewise, in God's kingdom the Jews had to obey each ruler during that ruler's time—Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, the priest, or the king—in everything except a command involving treason against divine majesty. The first kind of treason against divine majesty was denying divine providence, because that meant denying that God is king by nature. The second was idolatry. This meant worshipping not another God, since there is only one, but strange gods. In other words, it meant worshipping the one God under names, attributes, and rites different from those established by Abraham and Moses. That denied the God of Abraham as their king under the covenant made with Abraham and with themselves. In every other respect they had to obey. If a king or priest holding sovereign authority ordered something contrary to the laws, that was the ruler's sin, not the subject's. The subject's duty was to obey superiors' commands rather than dispute them.

20 In handmade images. In chapter XV, article 14, we showed that this kind of worship is irrational. But we also showed in article 18 that it is rational if a city commands it and the city does not know or accept God's written word. Where God rules through a covenant that expressly forbids this worship, however, as in the covenant with Abraham, it is wrong whether or not the city commands it.

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