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Dominion, Chapter XIII, 1
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CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE
1 The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best according to their own consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists. 7. That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8. That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness, in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal distributions of public offices conduces much to the preservation of peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses. 12. It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down ambitious men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must have right done them against corrupt judges.
The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise.
1 By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the power of the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said nothing of the duties of rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme authority; for they can be divided. As for example, when he who hath the right, either cannot or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where the right and exercise are severed, there the government of the commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties, who exercise authority, whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of each commonweal.
The safety of the people is the supreme law.
2 Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, the safety of the people is the supreme law. For although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in any state.
It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.
3 By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person, namely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects which are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal; and therefore he hath fully discharged himself, if he have thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which could not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men do suffer.
By safety is understood all manner of benefits.
4 But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin against the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.
Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best in their own consciences.
5 And first of all, princes do believe that it mainly concerns eternal salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what manner of worship he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it may be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever they be, whether one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the law of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised, or permit a contrary to be taught and practised, as they believe necessarily conduceth to the eternal salvation of their subjects. It is manifest that they act against their conscience; and that they will, as much as in them lies, the eternal perdition of their subjects. For if they willed it not, I see no reason why they should suffer (when being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they believe them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this difficulty in suspense.
Wherein the safety of the people consists.
6 The benefits of subjects, respecting this life only, may be distributed into four kinds. 1. That they be defended against foreign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they enjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme commanders can confer no more to their civil happiness, than that being preserved from foreign and civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own industry.
That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people.
7 There are two things necessary for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be forearmed. For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile. Neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values his security not according to the pacts, but the forces and counsels of his adversary. And this by natural right, as hath been showed in chap. II. art. 11, from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore necessary to the defence of the city, first, that there be some who may, as near as may be, search into and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For discoverers to ministers of state, are like the beams of the sun to the human soul. And we may more truly say in vision political, than natural, that the sensible and intelligible species of outward things, not well considered by others, are by the air transported to the soul; that is to say, to them who have the supreme authority: and therefore are they no less necessary to the preservation of the state, than the rays of the light are to the conservation of man. Or if they be compared to spider’s webs, which, extended on all sides by the finest threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes, of all outward motions; they who bear rule, can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without spies, than those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and whither they shall repair, without the motion of those threads.
To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness in time of peace, is necessary for the people’s defence.
8 Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the people’s defence, that they be forearmed. Now to be forearmed is to be furnished with soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger be instant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a blow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like manner, not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient places before the frontiers are invaded, is to be like those country swains, (as Demosthenes said), who ignorant of the art of fencing, with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other charges of war, when the danger begins to show itself, they consider not, surely, how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men, what they once reckon in the number of their goods, do judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to employ but the least part of it for the public good. Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs. We must therefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard up good sums, if we intend the safety of the commonweal. Since therefore it necessarily belongs to rulers, for the subjects’ safety to discover the enemy’s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have money in continual readiness; and that princes are, by the law of nature, bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their subjects: it follows, that it is not only lawful for them to send out spies, to maintain soldiers, to build forts, and to require monies for these purposes; but also not to do thus is unlawful. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by slight or force. For rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence.
A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace.
9 But many things are required to the conservation of inward peace; because many things concur (as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter) to its perturbation. We have there showed, that some things there are, which dispose the minds of men to sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse doctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief authority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but against the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the foregoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly from the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by reason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to study; and they got into these men’s minds by the teachers of their youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the academies. There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine are to be laid; wherewith young men, being once endued, they may afterward, both in private and public, instruct the vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach. For seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no more intelligible than if a man should join together a company of terms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings and the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of supreme officers, to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to be written, and to command them to be taught in all the colleges of their several dominions.
Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THOSE WHO GOVERN
1 The right of supreme authority is distinct from its exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. Princes should regard the common benefit of the many, not the private interest of this person or that. 4. Safety includes every kind of benefit. 5. A question: whether kings have a duty to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls as they judge best according to their own consciences. 6. What constitutes the safety of the people. 7. Intelligence gatherers are necessary for the defense of the people. 8. Soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money must be kept ready in peacetime for the defense of the people. 9. Sound instruction of subjects in civil doctrines is necessary to preserve peace. 10. Equal distribution of public offices contributes greatly to the preservation of peace. 11. Natural equity requires that taxes be levied according to what each person spends, not what he possesses. 12. Keeping ambitious people in check helps preserve peace. 13. So does breaking up factions. 14. Laws that encourage profitable arts and restrain excessive spending help enrich the subjects. 15. Laws should prescribe no more than the benefit of prince and subjects requires. 16. No greater punishments should be imposed than those prescribed by law. 13. Subjects must obtain justice against corrupt judges.
The right of supreme authority is distinct from its exercise.
1 What has been said thus far makes clear the duties of citizens and subjects under every kind of government, and the supreme ruler's power over them. But we have not yet spoken of the duties of rulers, or how they should conduct themselves toward their subjects. We must distinguish, then, between the right to supreme authority and its exercise, for the two can be separated. This happens, for example, when the holder of the right cannot or will not attend to the judgment of offenses or the deliberation of affairs. Sometimes kings cannot manage affairs because of age; sometimes, though capable of doing so themselves, they think it better to exercise their power through officers and counselors in whose selection they have confidence. When right and exercise are separated, the government of the commonwealth resembles the ordinary government of the world, in which God, the mover of all things, brings about natural effects by secondary causes. But when the person entitled to rule attends in person to every court, deliberation, and public act, the administration is as if God, departing from nature's ordinary course, applied himself immediately to every matter. In this chapter, then, we shall briefly say something about the duties of those who exercise authority, whether in their own right or another's. I do not mean to descend to matters in which one prince may differ from another; these belong to the political practice of each commonwealth.
The safety of the people is the supreme law.
2 All the duties of rulers are contained in one sentence: the safety of the people is the supreme law. Those who hold supreme dominion among human beings cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is, to the will of human beings, since to be supreme and to be subject are contradictory. Yet they have a duty in all things, as far as they possibly can, to obey right reason, which is natural, moral, and divine law. Because governments were established for peace, and peace was sought for safety, a ruler who uses his power for any purpose other than the people's safety acts against the grounds of peace—that is, against the laws of nature. And just as the people's safety lays down a law by which princes know their duty, so it teaches them an art for securing their own advantage: the power of the citizens is the power of the city, that is, of whoever holds supreme rule in a state.
Princes have a duty to regard the common benefit of the many, not the private interest of this person or that.
3 Here by the people we mean not a single civil person, namely the governing city itself, but the multitude of subjects governed. The city was established for the sake of its subjects, not for its own sake; nevertheless, particular care is not required for this or that individual. The ruler as ruler provides for his people's safety through his laws, which apply universally. He has therefore fully discharged his duty if he has earnestly sought, through sound institutions, to establish the welfare of most people and make it as lasting as possible, and to ensure that no one suffers harm except through his own fault or an accident that could not be prevented. Sometimes the safety of the greater number requires wicked people to suffer.
Safety includes every kind of benefit.
4 Safety means not merely preserving life in any condition whatever, but preserving it for happiness. For this end people freely assembled and instituted government: to live as pleasantly as their human condition allows. Those who undertake the administration of power in such a government would therefore sin against the law of nature, because they would betray the trust of those who committed that power to them, if they did not strive, insofar as good laws can accomplish it, to furnish their subjects abundantly not only with life's necessities but also with what makes life pleasurable. Those who have acquired dominion by force of arms all wish their subjects to be strong in body and mind, so that they may serve them better. If, therefore, they did not try to provide not only what their subjects need to live but also what makes them strong and vigorous, they would act against their own purpose and end.
A question: whether kings have a duty to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls as they judge best in their own consciences.
5 To begin with, princes believe that the opinions held about the Deity and the manner in which he is worshiped are of the greatest concern to eternal salvation. Assuming this, we may ask whether supreme rulers, whoever they are, one or several, who exercise supreme authority, sin against the law of nature if they do not cause that doctrine and worship to be taught and practiced which they believe necessary to their subjects’ eternal salvation, or if they permit contrary doctrine and worship to be taught and practiced. Plainly they act against their consciences, and will their subjects’ eternal ruin as far as lies within their power. For if they did not will it, I see no reason why they should allow doctrines and practices which they believe place their subjects in a state of damnation, when as supreme rulers they cannot be compelled to allow them. But we shall leave this difficulty unresolved.
What constitutes the safety of the people.
6 The benefits enjoyed by subjects in this life may be divided into four kinds: 1. Defense against foreign enemies. 2. Peace at home. 3. Enrichment as far as is consistent with public security. 4. The enjoyment of a liberty that does no harm. Supreme rulers can add nothing more to their civil happiness than to protect them from foreign and civil wars, so that they may quietly enjoy the wealth they have acquired by their own industry.
Intelligence gatherers are necessary for the defense of the people.
7 Two things are necessary to defend the people: warning and preparation. The condition of commonwealths in relation to one another is natural, that is, hostile. If they stop fighting, the result is not therefore peace but rather a pause for breath, during which each enemy watches the other's movements and bearing and measures his own security not by agreements but by his adversary's forces and plans. This follows from natural right, as shown in chap. II. art. 11: in the state of nature contracts are invalid whenever a justified fear intervenes. The defense of the city therefore requires, first, people who can investigate and uncover as closely as possible the plans and movements of all who might harm it. Intelligence gatherers are to ministers of state what the sun's rays are to the human soul. In political vision, more truly than in natural vision, we might say that the sensible and intelligible forms of external things, unnoticed by others, are carried through the air to the soul—that is, to those who hold supreme authority. They are thus no less necessary to preserving the state than rays of light are to preserving a human being. Or compare them to spiders’ webs, spread out on all sides in the finest threads, which alert spiders hiding in their little holes to every external movement: rulers without spies can no more know what commands are needed to defend their subjects than spiders without the movement of those threads can know when to emerge or where to go.
Soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money must be kept ready in peacetime for the people's defense.
8 Moreover, the people's defense requires them to be prepared in advance. This means providing soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and money before danger is imminent, for recruiting soldiers and taking up arms after a blow has been struck is too late, if not impossible. Likewise, failure to build forts and station garrisons at suitable places before the frontiers are invaded is to behave like the countrymen Demosthenes described: ignorant of fencing, they held their shields over whatever parts of their bodies had just felt the blows. Those who think it soon enough to raise money for soldiers and the other costs of war when danger first appears surely fail to consider how difficult it is to extract so vast a sum all at once from tight-fisted people. For almost everyone believes that once something is counted among his goods, he has such a right of property in it that he is wronged if forced to devote even the smallest part to the public good. And a sufficient reserve of money to defend the country by force of arms cannot quickly be raised from duties and customs revenue. For fear of war, then, we must amass substantial sums in peacetime if we mean to secure the commonwealth. Since the safety of their subjects requires rulers to discover the enemy's plans, maintain garrisons, and keep money constantly ready, and since the law of nature binds princes to devote their full efforts to their subjects’ welfare, it follows not only that sending spies, maintaining soldiers, building forts, and demanding money for these purposes are lawful, but that failing to do so is unlawful. We may add whatever appears likely to diminish the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by stratagem or by force. Rulers are bound, to the extent of their power, to forestall the evils they suspect, lest those evils come about through their negligence.
Sound instruction of subjects in civil doctrines is necessary to preserve peace.
9 Many things are required to preserve peace at home, for many things combine, as the preceding chapter showed, to disturb it. There we showed that some things predispose minds to sedition, while others stir up minds already so predisposed. Among the things that predispose them we counted, first, certain perverse doctrines. Those who hold supreme authority therefore have a duty to root these doctrines out of people's minds, not by command but by teaching; not through fear of penalties but through the clarity of reasons. Laws intended to counter this evil should be directed not against the people who err but against the errors themselves. The errors that we said in the preceding chapter were incompatible with the commonwealth's peace have entered the minds of the ignorant partly from pulpits, partly through the daily talk of people whose other occupations are so few that they have ample time to study. Those speakers, in turn, acquired the errors from the teachers of their youth in public schools. Conversely, then, anyone wishing to introduce sound doctrine must begin in the academies. There the true and genuinely demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine must be laid; once young people have acquired them, they can instruct ordinary people afterward, in private and in public. And they will do this with all the more eagerness and force the more certain they are of the truth of what they profess and teach. Today people accept propositions, though false and no more intelligible than a random collection of terms drawn from an urn, simply because they hear them so often; how much more readily, for the same reason, would they accept true doctrines suited to their understanding and to the nature of things? I therefore consider it a duty of supreme officers to have the true elements of civil doctrine written down and to order their teaching in all the colleges throughout their dominions.
Equal distribution of public burdens contributes greatly to the preservation of peace.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE DUTIES OF THOSE WHO GOVERN
1 The right to supreme authority differs from its exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the highest law. 3. Rulers must look to the shared benefit of many people, not to the particular interest of this or that person. 4. Safety means every kind of benefit. 5. The question whether kings must provide for the salvation of their subjects' souls as they think best according to their consciences. 6. What the safety of the people consists of. 7. Why informants are necessary to defend the people. 8. Why soldiers, weapons, garrisons, and money must be ready even in peacetime to defend the people. 9. Why properly teaching subjects about civil government is necessary to preserve peace. 10. How assigning public offices equally greatly helps preserve peace. 11. Why natural fairness requires taxes to depend on what each person spends, not on what he owns. 12. Why restraining ambitious people helps preserve peace. 13. Why factions must be broken up. 14. How laws that encourage profitable trades and limit large expenses help enrich subjects. 15. Why laws should not settle more than the interests of ruler and subjects require. 16. Why punishments must not be greater than those set by law. 13. Subjects must receive justice against corrupt judges.
The right to supreme authority differs from its exercise.
1 What has been said so far makes clear the duties of citizens and subjects under every form of government, and the supreme ruler's power over them. But I have not yet said anything about rulers' duties or how they should treat their subjects. We must distinguish between the right to supreme authority and its exercise, since the two can be separated. For example, the person who has the right may be unwilling or unable to attend the trial of offenses or discussions of public affairs. Sometimes kings cannot run their affairs because of their age. At other times they are able to do so, but think it better to act through officers and counselors they trust to choose well. When the right and its exercise are separate, governing the commonwealth resembles God's ordinary governance of the world. God moves all things but produces natural effects through secondary causes. When the person entitled to govern personally attends every court, consultation, and public action, governing resembles God directly taking part in every matter beyond the ordinary course of nature. In this chapter I will therefore briefly discuss the duties of those who exercise authority, whether the right belongs to them or to someone else. I do not mean to go into the particular measures that different rulers may take. Those are matters for the political practices of each commonwealth.
The safety of the people is the highest law.
2 All rulers' duties are contained in a single sentence: the safety of the people is the highest law. Those who hold supreme power among people cannot be subject to laws in the strict sense, meaning the will of other people. Being supreme and being subject are contradictory. Even so, their duty in everything is to obey sound reason as far as possible. Sound reason is natural, moral, and divine law. Governments were established for peace, and peace was sought for safety. So anyone who uses governing authority for something other than the people's safety acts against the reasons for peace, and therefore against the laws of nature. The people's safety gives rulers a rule for their duties and also shows them how to benefit themselves. The citizens' power is the commonwealth's power, which means it is the power of whoever holds supreme authority in the state.
Rulers must look to the shared benefit of many people, not the particular interest of this or that person.
3 Here by the people I do not mean a single legal person, the commonwealth itself that governs. I mean the many subjects who are governed. The commonwealth was established for the subjects' sake, not its own. But that does not mean a ruler must look after each person individually. As ruler, he provides for the people's safety through general laws. He has therefore fully done his duty if he has worked thoroughly to establish the welfare of most people through sound regulations and to make that welfare as lasting as possible. He must also work so that no one is harmed except through his own fault or through an accident that could not be prevented. Sometimes the safety of most people requires that wicked people suffer.
Safety means every kind of benefit.
4 Safety does not mean simply keeping people alive, whatever their condition. It means preserving life in a way that allows happiness. People freely gathered together and founded government so they could live as pleasantly as the human condition allows. Those entrusted with governing would therefore violate the law of nature and betray the people who gave them power if they did not use good laws, as far as they could, to supply their subjects abundantly with both the necessities of life and things that make it enjoyable. Those who gain control by force of arms all want strong subjects, in body and mind, so that the subjects can serve them better. If such rulers failed to provide not only what their subjects need to live but also what they need to grow strong and healthy, they would act against their own aims.
The question whether kings must provide for the salvation of their subjects' souls as they think best according to their consciences.
5 First, rulers believe that people's views of God and their manner of worship are of the greatest importance to eternal salvation. Given that belief, we may ask whether supreme rulers, whether one person or several, violate the law of nature if they do not arrange for the teaching and practice of the doctrines and worship that they themselves believe necessary for their subjects' eternal salvation, or if they allow contrary doctrines and practices. Clearly, they act against their consciences and, as far as their actions can do so, wish eternal damnation on their subjects. If they did not wish it, I cannot see why they would allow teachings and actions that they believe put their subjects in danger of damnation, when their supreme authority means that nobody can force them to do so. But I will leave the question unresolved.
What the safety of the people consists of.
6 Subjects' benefits in this life fall into four kinds. 1. Protection from foreign enemies. 2. Preservation of peace at home. 3. The greatest prosperity consistent with public safety. 4. Freedom that harms nobody. Supreme rulers can do no more for their subjects' happiness in civil society than preserve them from foreign and civil wars, so that they can peacefully enjoy the wealth earned by their own efforts.
Informants are necessary to defend the people.
7 Defending the people requires two things: warning and preparation. Commonwealths stand toward one another in the natural condition—that is, in hostility. Even when they stop fighting, their condition is not peace. It is more like a breathing space. Each enemy watches the other's movements and attitude, and judges its own safety by the other's forces and plans rather than by agreements. It may do this by natural right. As shown in chapter II, article 11, contracts in the state of nature are invalid whenever a reasonable fear arises. To defend a commonwealth, then, there must first be people who seek out, as closely as possible, the plans and movements of anyone who might harm it. Informants are to ministers of state what rays of sunlight are to the human soul. More truly in political vision than in physical vision, we can say that the images of outside things, both perceptible and intelligible, travel through the air to the soul, though others do not examine them well. Here the soul means those who hold supreme authority. Such informants are as necessary for the state's survival as rays of light are for a person's. Or compare them to a spider's web, whose very fine threads spread in every direction. Movements outside the web alert the spider in its little hole. Without spies, rulers can no more know what orders are needed to protect their subjects than spiders could know when to come out or where to go without the movement of those threads.
Soldiers, weapons, garrisons, and money must be ready in peacetime to defend the people.
8 The people's defense also requires preparation beforehand. That means having soldiers, weapons, ships, forts, and money before danger arrives. Calling up soldiers and taking up arms after an attack is too late, if it is possible at all. Likewise, failing to build forts and station garrisons in suitable places before the borders are invaded makes rulers like the countrymen Demosthenes described. These men knew nothing about fencing and used their shields to guard only the places where they had already been struck. People who think they have time to raise money for soldiers and other war costs once danger appears fail to consider how hard it is to get such a huge sum suddenly from people unwilling to part with their money. Almost everyone thinks that whatever he counts as his property belongs to him so completely that any forced use of even the smallest part for the public good wrongs him. A sufficient fund for armed defense cannot quickly be collected from taxes and customs duties. If we mean to keep the commonwealth safe, we must therefore save large sums in peacetime against the possibility of war. Rulers must discover enemies' plans, maintain garrisons, and keep money constantly ready for their subjects' safety. Under the law of nature, rulers must make every effort to secure their subjects' welfare. So it is lawful for them to send spies, maintain soldiers, build forts, and demand money for these purposes. Indeed, failing to do so is unlawful. We may add anything else they think will weaken foreign powers they suspect, whether by cunning or by force. Rulers must do what lies within their power to prevent dangers they suspect, so those dangers do not come about through negligence.
Properly teaching subjects about civil government is necessary to preserve peace.
9 Preserving peace at home requires many measures, because, as the preceding chapter showed, many things can disturb it. Some make people inclined to rebel; others spur people who are already so inclined to action. Among the things that make people inclined, I listed certain false doctrines first. Those who hold supreme authority therefore have a duty to remove them from people's minds. They should do this by teaching, not by issuing commands, and through clear reasons, not through fear of punishment. Laws directed against this evil should target the errors, not the people who hold them. The errors that the preceding chapter found incompatible with a peaceful commonwealth reached ignorant people partly through sermons and partly through everyday conversations. The speakers had enough time to study because they had little other work, and had themselves acquired the errors from their schoolteachers when young. Anyone seeking to introduce sound doctrine must, in turn, begin with the academies. The true foundations of the teaching of civil government must be established there and demonstrated properly. Young people taught those foundations can later instruct ordinary people, both privately and publicly. They will do so more readily and effectively the more firmly they themselves are convinced that what they teach is true. Today, people accept statements merely because they hear them often, even when they are false and make no more sense than a random assortment of words drawn from an urn. How much more readily would they accept true teachings, understandable to them and consistent with the nature of things, if they heard them as often? I therefore believe supreme officials should have the true basic principles of civil government written down and order them taught in all colleges throughout their territories.
Sharing public burdens equally greatly helps preserve peace.