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Dominion, Chapter XII, 1
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OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE DISSOLUTION OF ANY GOVERNMENT
1 That the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is a seditious opinion. 2. That subjects do sin by obeying their princes is a seditious opinion. 3. That tyrannicide is lawful is a seditious opinion. 4. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion. 5. That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion. 6. That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion. 7. That each subject hath a propriety or absolute dominion of his own goods is a seditious opinion. 8. Not to understand the difference between the people and the multitude, prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, prepares toward sedition. 10. Ambition disposeth us to sedition. 11. So doth the hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only faculty needful to raise seditions. 13. How the folly of the common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the destruction of a common-weal.
That the judgment of good and evil belongs to private persons, is a seditious opinion.
1 Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes and pacts commonweals are constituted, and what the rights of princes are over their subjects. Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of natural bodies three things are to be considered, namely, internal disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the external agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and the action itself: so also in a commonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves to our regard; first, the doctrines and the passions contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted and disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit, assemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms and quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, proved it in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. XI. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil? Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things; and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God’s commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil: and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God’s expostulation with man, (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil.
That subjects do sin in obeying their princes, is a seditious opinion.
2 Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin; for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man’s sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right lord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly; but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey, they sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right, they do, as much as in them lies, abolish human society and the civil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sin when they obey their prince’s commands which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that original error which we have observed above, in the foregoing article. For by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil, we are the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.
CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.
That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion.
3 The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that tyrannicide is lawful; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of tyrants, they mean not only monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those Thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called tyrants. But he whom men require to be put to death as being a tyrant, commands either by right or without right. If without right, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a tyrant, but an enemy. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: Who hath told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king, except that thou, being a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good and evil? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is monarchical, we may hence discern; namely, that by it every king, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every murderous villain.
That even they who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws, is a seditious opinion.
4 The fourth opinion adversary to civil society, is their’s who hold, that they who bear rule are subject also to the civil laws. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true, in chap VI. art. 14, from this argument: that a city can neither be bound to itself, nor to any subject; not to itself, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any subject, because the single wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city; insomuch that if the city will be free from all such obligation, the subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a city, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men who have the supreme authority; for they make a city, which hath no being but by their supreme power. Now that this opinion cannot consist with the very being of government, is evident from hence; that by it the knowledge of what is good and evil, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against the laws, would return to each single person. Obedience therefore will cease, as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the civil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction; which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of government. Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle and others; who, by reason of human infirmity, suppose the supreme power to be committed with most security to the laws only. But they seem to have looked very shallowly into the nature of government, who thought that the constraining power, the interpretation of laws, and the making of laws, all which are powers necessarily belonging to government, should be left wholly to the laws themselves. Now although particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgment, and go to law with the supreme magistrate; yet this is only then, when the question is not what the magistrate may, but what by a certain rule he hath declared he would do. As, when by any law the judges sit upon the life of a subject, the question is not whether the magistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life; but whether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it. But his will was, he should, if he brake the law; else his will was, he should not. This therefore, that a subject may have an action of law against his supreme magistrate, is not strength of argument sufficient to prove, that he is tied to his own laws. On the contrary, it is evident that he is not tied to his own laws; because no man is bound to himself. Laws therefore are set for Titius and Caius, not for the ruler. However, by the ambition of lawyers it is so ordered, that the laws to unskilful men seem not to depend on the authority of the magistrate, but their prudence.
That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious opinion.
5 In the fifth place, that the supreme authority may be divided, is a most fatal opinion to all commonweals. But diverse men divide it diverse ways. For some divide it, so as to grant a supremacy to the civil power in matters pertaining to peace and the benefits of this life; but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they transfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to salvation, it happens that subjects measuring justice, not as they ought, by the civil laws, but by the precepts and doctrines of them who, in regard of the magistrate, are either private men or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their princes; through fear falling into that which they most feared. Now what can be more pernicious to any state, than that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting torments, be deterred from obeying their princes, that is to say, the laws; or from being just? There are also some, who divide the supreme authority so as to allow the power of war and peace unto one whom they call a monarch; but the right of raising money they give to some others, and not to him. But because monies are the sinews of war and peace, they who thus divide the authority, do either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another: or if they do really divide it, they dissolve the government. For neither upon necessity can war be waged, nor can the public peace be preserved without money.
That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason, but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE INTERNAL CAUSES THAT TEND TO DISSOLVE ANY GOVERNMENT
1 The view that private persons may judge good and evil is seditious. 2. The view that subjects sin by obeying their princes is seditious. 3. The view that killing a tyrant is lawful is seditious. 4. The view that those who hold supreme power are subject to civil laws is seditious. 5. The view that supreme power may be divided is seditious. 6. The view that faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason but are always infused and inspired supernaturally is seditious. 7. The view that each subject has property in, or absolute dominion over, his own goods is seditious. 8. Failure to understand the difference between the people and the multitude prepares the way for sedition. 9. Excessive taxation, however just and necessary, prepares the way for sedition. 10. Ambition disposes us to sedition. 11. So does the hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone, without wisdom, is the only faculty needed to stir up sedition. 13. How the folly of ordinary people and the eloquence of ambitious men combine to destroy a commonwealth.
The view that private persons may judge good and evil is seditious.
1 So far we have discussed the causes and covenants by which commonwealths are established, and the rights princes hold over their subjects. Now we shall briefly discuss the causes of their dissolution, or the reasons for seditions. Just as three things must be considered in the motion of natural bodies—their internal disposition to receive the motion to be produced, the external agent by which a definite motion may actually be produced, and the action itself—so, when subjects begin to raise tumults in a commonwealth, three things present themselves for consideration. First come the doctrines and passions opposed to peace, which prepare and dispose people's minds; next, the character and condition of those who urge, assemble, and direct those so disposed to take up arms and renounce their allegiance; and last, the manner in which this is done, or the faction itself. One doctrine, and the first, that disposes them to sedition is that each individual has the knowledge of good and evil. In the state of nature, where everyone lives by equal right and has not submitted by mutual covenants to the command of others, we have acknowledged this as true—indeed, proved it in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil laws are the standards of good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable; what the lawgiver commands must therefore be held good, and what he forbids, evil. The lawgiver is always whoever holds supreme power in the commonwealth: in a monarchy, the monarch. We confirmed the same truth in chap. XI. art. 2 from the words of Solomon. For if private persons may pursue whatever seems good to them and avoid whatever seems evil, what purpose is served by his words: “Give your servant an understanding heart to judge your people, that I may discern between good and evil”? Since discerning good and evil belongs to kings, those familiar sayings are wicked: that only a man who acts rightly is a king, that kings should not be obeyed unless they command what is just, and many more like them. Before government existed, just and unjust did not exist; their nature depends entirely upon a command. Every action is indifferent in itself; whether it becomes just or unjust proceeds from the magistrate's right. Legitimate kings therefore make what they command just by commanding it, and what they forbid unjust by forbidding it. But when private persons claim the knowledge of good and evil for themselves, they aspire to be kings themselves, to the ruin of the commonwealth. The oldest of all God's commands is (Gen. ii. 17): “You shall not eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil”; and the oldest of all the devil's temptations is (Gen. iii. 5): “You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” Then God questions man (verse 11): “Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?” As though he had said: How did you come to judge shameful the nakedness in which it pleased me to create you, unless you have arrogated to yourself the knowledge of good and evil?
The view that subjects sin in obeying their princes is seditious.
2 Whatever anyone does against his conscience is a sin, for in doing so he holds the law in contempt. But we must distinguish: what I believe to be my own sin is indeed a sin for me to commit; yet what I believe to be another person's sin I may sometimes do without sinning myself. For if one who is rightfully my lord commands me to do something that is a sin for him to command, I do not sin by doing it. If I wage war at my prince's command, though I believe the war to have been undertaken unjustly, I do not thereby act unjustly. Rather, I would do so if I refused, claiming for myself the knowledge of just and unjust that belongs only to my prince. Those who neglect this distinction will be driven to sin whenever they are commanded to do anything that is, or seems to them, unlawful: if they obey, they sin against their conscience; if they disobey, against right. In sinning against conscience they show that they do not fear the pains of the world to come; in sinning against right they do what they can to abolish human society and civil life in this world. Thus the opinion of those who teach that subjects sin by obeying commands of their prince that seem unjust to them is both mistaken and hostile to civil obedience. It rests on the original error observed in the preceding article: by taking it upon ourselves to judge good and evil, we make both our obedience and our disobedience sinful for ourselves.
CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THOSE WHO GOVERN.
The view that killing a tyrant is lawful is seditious.
3 A third seditious doctrine springs from the same root: that killing a tyrant is lawful. Today many theologians, and in antiquity all the philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the other defenders of Greek and Roman anarchies—have held it not only lawful but worthy of the highest praise. By tyrants they mean not only monarchs but all who bear chief rule in any kind of government: not only Pisistratus at Athens but also the Thirty who succeeded him and ruled together were called tyrants. Yet the man whom people demand be put to death as a tyrant rules either by right or without right. If without right, he is an enemy and may rightfully be put to death; but then it should be called the killing of an enemy, not of a tyrant. If he rules by right, the divine question applies: Who told you he was a tyrant? Have you eaten from the tree of which I commanded you not to eat? Why do you call a man whom God made king a tyrant, unless you, a private person, have usurped the knowledge of good and evil? How harmful this opinion is to every government, and especially monarchy, is clear from this: it leaves every king, good or bad, exposed to condemnation by the judgment and death at the hands of any murderous villain.
The view that even those who hold supreme power are subject to civil laws is seditious.
4 The fourth opinion hostile to civil society is that rulers are themselves subject to the civil laws. That this is untrue has been sufficiently proved already, in chap VI. art. 14, by the argument that a city cannot be bound either to itself or to any subject. It cannot be bound to itself because one person can be obliged only to another; nor can it be bound to a subject because the individual wills of subjects are contained in the will of the city, so that if the city wills to be free of any such obligation, its subjects will also will this, and consequently it is free. What holds true of a city must also hold true of the person or assembly holding supreme authority; for they constitute the city, which exists only through their supreme power. It is clear that this opinion is incompatible with the very existence of government: through it, knowledge of good and evil—that is, the authority to define what does or does not violate the laws—would return to each individual. Obedience would then cease whenever a command seemed contrary to the civil laws, and coercive jurisdiction would cease with it; the very essence of government could not survive. Yet this error has powerful supporters, Aristotle and others, who suppose, on account of human weakness, that supreme power is safest when entrusted to the laws alone. But those who think the power to enforce and interpret laws and the power to make them—all powers necessarily belonging to government—should be left entirely to the laws themselves have looked only superficially into the nature of government. Although individual subjects may sometimes bring a lawsuit against the supreme magistrate, the question then is not what the magistrate may do, but what he has declared by a particular rule that he will do. When judges sit in judgment on a subject's life under some law, for example, the question is not whether the magistrate has an absolute right to take his life, but whether under that law he willed his life to be taken. His will was that it should be taken if the subject broke the law, and otherwise that it should not. Thus the ability of a subject to bring an action against his supreme magistrate does not sufficiently prove that the magistrate is bound by his own laws. On the contrary, he plainly is not bound by them, since no one is bound to himself. Laws are therefore established for Titius and Caius, not for the ruler. By the ambition of lawyers, however, the unskilled have come to think that laws depend not on the magistrate's authority but on the lawyers' own prudence.
The view that supreme power may be divided is seditious.
5 Fifth, the belief that supreme authority may be divided is fatal to all commonwealths. Different people divide it in different ways. Some grant civil power supremacy in matters of peace and the benefits of this life, but transfer supremacy in matters concerning salvation of the soul to others. Since justice is among the things most necessary for salvation, subjects then measure it not, as they ought, by civil laws, but by the precepts and doctrines of people who, in relation to the magistrate, are private persons or strangers. Superstitious fear makes them shrink from the obedience owed to their princes; in their fear, they fall into precisely what they feared most. What could be more harmful to any state than for people to be deterred by fear of eternal torment from obeying their princes—that is, the laws—or from acting justly? Others divide supreme authority by assigning the power to make war and peace to someone they call a monarch while giving the right to raise money to others instead. But money is the sinew of war and peace. Those who divide authority in this way either do not really divide it at all, but place it wholly in the hands of those who control the money while giving its name to another; or, if they truly divide it, they dissolve the government. For without money, war cannot be waged even when necessary, nor can public peace be preserved.
The view that faith and holiness are not acquired through study and reason but are always infused and inspired supernaturally is seditious.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
On the Internal Causes That Can Destroy Any Government
1 It encourages rebellion to say that private individuals can judge good and evil. 2. It encourages rebellion to say that subjects sin when they obey their princes. 3. It encourages rebellion to say that killing a tyrant is lawful. 4. It encourages rebellion to say that those with supreme power are subject to civil laws. 5. It encourages rebellion to say that supreme power can be divided. 6. It encourages rebellion to say that faith and holiness always come through supernatural inspiration, not through study and reason. 7. It encourages rebellion to say that every subject has absolute ownership and control of his own property. 8. Failing to distinguish the people from the multitude helps prepare the way for rebellion. 9. An excessively heavy tax, however just and necessary, helps prepare the way for rebellion. 10. Ambition inclines us toward rebellion. 11. So does hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone, without wisdom, is the only skill needed to start rebellions. 13. How the foolishness of ordinary people and the speaking skills of ambitious men combine to destroy a commonwealth.
It encourages rebellion to say that private individuals can judge good and evil.
1 So far we have discussed the causes and agreements that establish commonwealths, and the rights princes hold over their subjects. Now we will briefly discuss what destroys commonwealths, or what causes rebellion. Consider the movement of physical bodies. Three things matter: an internal condition that makes a body capable of a given movement, an external agent that causes a specific movement, and the movement itself. Similarly, when subjects begin to stir up unrest in a commonwealth, we must consider three things. First come the teachings and passions opposed to peace, which prepare people's minds for unrest. Next come the character and position of those who urge, gather, and lead these prepared people to take up arms and abandon their allegiance. Last comes how they carry this out: the faction itself. The first belief that prepares people for rebellion is that each individual has the right to decide what is good and evil. We have admitted that this is true in the state of nature. There everyone has equal rights and no one has agreed with others to submit to their command; we even proved the point in chap. I. art. 9. But it is false in a civil state. We showed in chap. VI. art. 9 that civil laws establish the standards of good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. Whatever the lawmaker commands must therefore be considered good, and whatever he forbids evil. The lawmaker is always the person holding supreme power in the commonwealth: the monarch, in a monarchy. We confirmed this same truth from Solomon's words in chap. XI. art. 2. If private individuals can pursue what seems good to them and avoid what seems evil, why did Solomon say, "Give your servant an understanding heart to judge your people, so that I may tell good from evil"? Since kings are responsible for distinguishing good from evil, certain common sayings are wicked: that only someone who rules justly is a king, that kings need not be obeyed unless their commands are just, and many others like these. Before there was government, justice and injustice did not exist, since they are defined in relation to commands. Every action is neutral in itself. Whether it becomes just or unjust depends on the magistrate's authority. Legitimate kings make their commands just by commanding them and make forbidden acts unjust by forbidding them. Private individuals who claim the right to judge good and evil want to become kings themselves. That cannot be done without endangering the commonwealth. God's earliest command was (Gen. ii. 17): "You must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil." The devil's earliest temptation was (Gen. iii. 5): "You will be like gods, knowing good and evil." And God asked man (verse 11): "Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree I told you not to eat from?" It was as if he had said: Why do you judge the nakedness in which I chose to create you to be shameful, unless you have taken it on yourself to decide good and evil?
It encourages rebellion to say that subjects sin by obeying their princes.
2 Anything a person does against his conscience is a sin, because he thereby scorns the law. But we must make a distinction. If I do something I believe is my own sin, I do sin. Yet I can sometimes do something I believe is another person's sin without sinning myself. Suppose someone with rightful authority over me orders me to do something that is sinful for him to order. If I do it, I do not sin. If my prince orders me to fight a war that I believe he started unjustly, I do no injustice by fighting. Instead, I would do wrong by refusing. I would be claiming for myself the power to decide what is just and unjust, which belongs to my prince alone. Those who miss this distinction will have to sin whenever they are ordered to do something that is, or seems to them to be, unlawful. If they obey, they sin against their conscience. If they disobey, they sin against rightful authority. If they sin against conscience, they show no fear of punishment in the next world. If they sin against rightful authority, they do what they can to destroy human society and civil life in this world. The teaching that subjects sin when they obey commands they think unjust is therefore mistaken and hostile to civil obedience. It stems from the basic error identified in the previous article. When we claim the right to judge good and evil for ourselves, we make both obedience and disobedience sinful for us.
Chapter XIII. On the Duties of Rulers.
It encourages rebellion to say that killing a tyrant is lawful.
3 A third rebellious doctrine grows from the same root: that it is lawful to kill a tyrant. Many theologians today, and in the past all the philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the other defenders of Greek and Roman anarchy—have even considered it worthy of the highest praise. By "tyrants" they mean not just monarchs but anyone holding supreme authority under any form of government. In Athens, not only Pisistratus but also the Thirty who succeeded him and ruled jointly were all called tyrants. Now, the person someone wants killed as a tyrant either rules lawfully or rules without lawful authority. If he rules without lawful authority, he is an enemy who may lawfully be killed. But that is killing an enemy, not killing a tyrant. If he rules lawfully, then the question God asked applies: "Who told you he was a tyrant? Have you eaten from the tree I told you not to eat from?" Why call someone God made a king a tyrant unless, as a private individual, you have seized the right to judge good and evil? We can see how harmful this doctrine is to all governments, especially monarchies. Under it, every king, good or bad, can be condemned in the judgment of any murderous criminal and killed by his hand.
It encourages rebellion to say that even those with supreme power are subject to civil laws.
4 A fourth belief opposed to civil society is that rulers themselves are subject to civil laws. In chap VI. art. 14, we gave sufficient proof that this is false. A city cannot be bound either to itself or to one of its subjects. It cannot be bound to itself because no one can have an obligation except to another person. It cannot be bound to a subject because each subject's will is included in the city's will. If the city wills to be released from such an obligation, the subjects will the same thing, and so the city is released. What is true of a city must also be true of the man or assembly holding supreme authority. That man or assembly constitutes the city, which exists only through its supreme power. Clearly this belief cannot coexist with government itself. It would return to each individual the right to decide what is good and evil, meaning what does or does not violate the laws. Whenever someone thought a command violated civil law, obedience would stop. The power to enforce the law would stop with it, destroying the very basis of government. Yet this mistake has influential supporters, including Aristotle and others. Because of human weakness, they think supreme power is safest when entrusted only to the laws. They must have given little thought to the nature of government if they believed the power to compel, to interpret laws, and to make laws—all essential powers of government—could be left entirely to laws themselves. An individual subject can sometimes bring a legal case against the supreme magistrate. But such a case concerns not what the magistrate has the power to do, but what he has declared he will do under a particular rule. For instance, when judges consider a subject's life under a law, the question is not whether the magistrate has the absolute right to take that life. The question is whether he intended it to be taken under that law. His intention was that the subject should die if he broke the law, and should not die if he did not. A subject's ability to sue the supreme magistrate therefore does not prove that the magistrate is bound by his own laws. On the contrary, he plainly is not bound by them, since no one is bound to himself. Laws are made for Titius and Caius, not for the ruler. Yet lawyers, out of ambition, have arranged matters so that people unfamiliar with the subject think the laws depend on lawyers' wisdom rather than on the magistrate's authority.
It encourages rebellion to say that supreme power can be divided.
5 Fifth, the belief that supreme authority can be divided is disastrous for every commonwealth. Different people propose different divisions. Some grant the civil authority supremacy over peace and the benefits of this life, but transfer authority over the soul's salvation to others. Yet justice is among the things most necessary for salvation. Subjects then measure justice by the teachings of those who, in relation to the magistrate, are private persons or outsiders, instead of measuring it by civil law as they should. Their superstitious fear prevents them from obeying their princes, and through fear they fall into the very thing they most feared. What could harm a state more than people being deterred by fear of eternal torment from obeying their princes—that is, from obeying the laws and acting justly? Others divide supreme authority by giving the power to make war and peace to someone they call a monarch, while giving someone else the right to raise money. But money is what makes war and peace possible. People who divide authority this way either do not really divide it, but put all the power in the hands of those who control the money and give someone else the title; or else they truly divide it and destroy the government. Without money, they can neither wage a necessary war nor preserve the public peace.
It encourages rebellion to say that faith and holiness always come through supernatural inspiration, not through study and reason.