Thomas Paine · Complete work
Part I, 5
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I have now to follow Mr. Burke through a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies, and a sort of descant upon governments, in which he asserts whatever he pleases, on the presumption of its being believed, without offering either evidence or reasons for so doing.
Before anything can be reasoned upon to a conclusion, certain facts, principles, or data, to reason from, must be established, admitted, or denied. Mr. Burke with his usual outrage, abused the Declaration of the Rights of Man, published by the National Assembly of France, as the basis on which the constitution of France is built. This he calls "paltry and blurred sheets of paper about the rights of man." Does Mr. Burke mean to deny that man has any rights? If he does, then he must mean that there are no such things as rights anywhere, and that he has none himself; for who is there in the world but man? But if Mr. Burke means to admit that man has rights, the question then will be: What are those rights, and how man came by them originally?
The error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man, is that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages of an hundred or a thousand years, and produce what was then done, as a rule for the present day. This is no authority at all. If we travel still farther into antiquity, we shall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively contradicting each other; but if we proceed on, we shall at last come out right; we shall come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. Man was his high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him. But of titles I shall speak hereafter.
We are now got at the origin of man, and at the origin of his rights. As to the manner in which the world has been governed from that day to this, it is no farther any concern of ours than to make a proper use of the errors or the improvements which the history of it presents. Those who lived an hundred or a thousand years ago, were then moderns, as we are now. They had their ancients, and those ancients had others, and we also shall be ancients in our turn. If the mere name of antiquity is to govern in the affairs of life, the people who are to live an hundred or a thousand years hence, may as well take us for a precedent, as we make a precedent of those who lived an hundred or a thousand years ago. The fact is, that portions of antiquity, by proving everything, establish nothing. It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of the rights of man at the creation. Here our enquiries find a resting-place, and our reason finds a home. If a dispute about the rights of man had arisen at the distance of an hundred years from the creation, it is to this source of authority they must have referred, and it is to this same source of authority that we must now refer.
Though I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of religion, yet it may be worth observing, that the genealogy of Christ is traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man? I will answer the question. Because there have been upstart governments, thrusting themselves between, and presumptuously working to un-make man.
If any generation of men ever possessed the right of dictating the mode by which the world should be governed for ever, it was the first generation that existed; and if that generation did it not, no succeeding generation can show any authority for doing it, nor can set any up. The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man (for it has its origin from the Maker of man) relates, not only to the living individuals, but to generations of men succeeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights to generations which preceded it, by the same rule that every individual is born equal in rights with his contemporary.
Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by which I mean that men are all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural right, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued by creation instead of generation, the latter being the only mode by which the former is carried forward; and consequently every child born into the world must be considered as deriving its existence from God. The world is as new to him as it was to the first man that existed, and his natural right in it is of the same kind.
The Mosaic account of the creation, whether taken as divine authority or merely historical, is full to this point, the unity or equality of man. The expression admits of no controversy. "And God said, Let us make man in our own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." The distinction of sexes is pointed out, but no other distinction is even implied. If this be not divine authority, it is at least historical authority, and shows that the equality of man, so far from being a modern doctrine, is the oldest upon record.
It is also to be observed that all the religions known in the world are founded, so far as they relate to man, on the unity of man, as being all of one degree. Whether in heaven or in hell, or in whatever state man may be supposed to exist hereafter, the good and the bad are the only distinctions. Nay, even the laws of governments are obliged to slide into this principle, by making degrees to consist in crimes and not in persons.
It is one of the greatest of all truths, and of the highest advantage to cultivate. By considering man in this light, and by instructing him to consider himself in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only when he forgets his origin, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes dissolute. It is not among the least of the evils of the present existing governments in all parts of Europe that man, considered as man, is thrown back to a vast distance from his Maker, and the artificial chasm filled up with a succession of barriers, or sort of turnpike gates, through which he has to pass. I will quote Mr. Burke's catalogue of barriers that he has set up between man and his Maker. Putting himself in the character of a herald, he says: "We fear God—we look with awe to kings—with affection to Parliaments with duty to magistrates—with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility." Mr. Burke has forgotten to put in "'chivalry." He has also forgotten to put in Peter.
The duty of man is not a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from one to the other. It is plain and simple, and consists but of two points. His duty to God, which every man must feel; and with respect to his neighbor, to do as he would be done by. If those to whom power is delegated do well, they will be respected: if not, they will be despised; and with regard to those to whom no power is delegated, but who assume it, the rational world can know nothing of them.
Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to show how the one originates from the other. Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights.
A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.
From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society.
The natural rights which he retains are all those in which the Power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned, are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; consequently religion is one of those rights. The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and so far as the right of the mind is concerned, he never surrenders it. But what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redress? He therefore deposits this right in the common stock of society, and takes the ann of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.
From these premisses two or three certain conclusions will follow:
First, That every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in other words, is a natural right exchanged.
Secondly, That civil power properly considered as such is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to the Purpose of every one.
Thirdly, That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself.
We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of society, and shown, or endeavoured to show, the quality of the natural rights retained, and of those which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply these principles to governments.
In casting our eyes over the world, it is extremely easy to distinguish the governments which have arisen out of society, or out of the social compact, from those which have not; but to place this in a clearer light than what a single glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the several sources from which governments have arisen and on which they have been founded.
They may be all comprehended under three heads.
First, Superstition.
Secondly, Power.
Thirdly, The common interest of society and the common rights of man.
The first was a government of priestcraft, the second of conquerors, and the third of reason.
When a set of artful men pretended, through the medium of oracles, to hold intercourse with the Deity, as familiarly as they now march up the back-stairs in European courts, the world was completely under the government of superstition. The oracles were consulted, and whatever they were made to say became the law; and this sort of government lasted as long as this sort of superstition lasted.
After these a race of conquerors arose, whose government, like that of William the Conqueror, was founded in power, and the sword assumed the name of a sceptre. Governments thus established last as long as the power to support them lasts; but that they might avail themselves of every engine in their favor, they united fraud to force, and set up an idol which they called Divine Right, and which, in imitation of the Pope, who affects to be spiritual and temporal, and in contradiction to the Founder of the Christian religion, twisted itself afterwards into an idol of another shape, called Church and State. The key of St. Peter and the key of the Treasury became quartered on one another, and the wondering cheated multitude worshipped the invention.
When I contemplate the natural dignity of man, when I feel (for Nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and happiness of its character, I become irritated at the attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were all knaves and fools, and can scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus imposed upon.
We have now to review the governments which arise out of society, in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest.
It has been thought a considerable advance towards establishing the principles of Freedom to say that Government is a compact between those who govern and those who are governed; but this cannot be true, because it is putting the effect before the cause; for as man must have existed before governments existed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exist, and consequently there could originally exist no governors to form such a compact with.
The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete English text of Parts I and II with Paine’s preface, appendix and author’s notes (Conway’s edition, 1894) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
I must now follow Mr. Burke into a trackless wilderness of rhapsodies and a kind of discourse on government in which he asserts whatever he likes, expecting to be believed without offering either evidence or reasons.
Before reasoning can lead to a conclusion, we must establish, accept, or reject certain facts, principles, or premises from which to reason. With his usual vehemence, Mr. Burke abused the Declaration of the Rights of Man, published by the National Assembly of France as the foundation of the French constitution. He calls it “paltry and blurred sheets of paper about the rights of man.” Does Mr. Burke mean to deny that human beings have any rights? If so, he must mean that rights do not exist anywhere, and that he himself has none: for who is there in the world but human beings? But if he admits that people have rights, the question becomes: What are those rights, and how did humanity first acquire them?
The error made by those who reason from ancient precedents about the rights of man is that they do not go far enough back. They stop short. They halt at some intermediate point an hundred or a thousand years ago and offer the practice of that time as a rule for today. That is no authority at all. Go further back, and we shall find directly contrary opinions and practices. If antiquity is an authority, we could summon a thousand such authorities, each contradicting the last. But if we continue, we shall at length reach the right place: the moment when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. That was his high and only title, and no higher title can be given him. But I shall speak of titles later.
We have now reached the origin of humanity and of its rights. How the world has been governed from that day until this concerns us only insofar as we can learn from the errors and improvements revealed by its history. Those who lived an hundred or a thousand years ago were modern in their own time, just as we are today. They had their ancients, and those ancients had others; we too shall be ancients in our turn. If the mere name of antiquity is to govern human affairs, people living an hundred or a thousand years from now might just as well take us as their precedent as we take those who lived an hundred or a thousand years before us. The truth is that fragments of antiquity prove everything and therefore establish nothing. One authority opposes another all the way back to the divine origin of the rights of man at creation. There our inquiries come to rest, and our reason finds a home. Had a dispute about the rights of man arisen an hundred years after creation, its participants would have referred to that source of authority. We must refer to that same source now.
Though I have no intention of entering into the doctrines of any religious sect, it is worth noting that Christ's genealogy is traced to Adam. Why not, then, trace the rights of man to the creation of man? I will answer: because upstart governments have pushed themselves between those points, presumptuously attempting to undo humanity.
If any generation ever had a right to dictate how the world should be governed forever, it was the first generation to exist. If it did not exercise that right, no later generation can claim or create any authority to do so. The enlightening and divine principle of the equal rights of man—for it has its origin in the Maker of man—embraces not only living individuals but successive generations. Every generation has rights equal to those of the generations before it, just as every individual is born equal in rights to his contemporaries.
Every account of creation and every inherited tradition, whether from a literate or an illiterate people, however much they differ in particular beliefs or opinions, agree on one point: the unity of humanity. By this I mean that all people are of one standing and therefore born equal, with equal natural rights, just as they would be if posterity continued through acts of creation rather than through generation, generation being merely the means by which creation continues. Consequently every child born into the world must be regarded as deriving its existence from God. To that child the world is as new as it was to the first human being; the child's natural right in it is of the same kind.
The Mosaic account of creation, whether received as divine authority or merely as history, is unambiguous on this point, the unity or equality of humanity. Its words admit no dispute: “And God said, Let us make man in our own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” It identifies a distinction of sex but implies no other distinction. If this is not divine authority, it is at least historical authority, and shows that equality, far from being a modern doctrine, is the oldest doctrine on record.
Observe, too, that every religion known to the world, insofar as it concerns humanity, rests on the unity of humanity, on all people being of one standing. Whether in heaven, in hell, or in any state in which people are thought to exist hereafter, the only distinctions are between the good and the bad. Even the laws of governments are compelled to come around to this principle, basing distinctions of standing on offenses rather than on persons.
This is one of the greatest truths, and one of the most valuable to cultivate. To see humanity in this light, and teach each person to see himself in it, is to bind him closely to all his duties, both to his Creator and to the creation of which he forms a part. Only when he forgets his origin—or, to use the more fashionable expression, his birth and family—does he become dissolute. Not the least of the evils of Europe's present governments is that man as man is placed at a vast distance from his Maker, and the artificial chasm is filled with a succession of barriers, like tollgates through which he must pass. I will quote Mr. Burke's list of the barriers he has set between man and his Maker. Casting himself as a herald, he says: “We fear God—we look with awe to kings—with affection to Parliaments with duty to magistrates—with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility.” Mr. Burke has forgotten to add “chivalry.” He has also forgotten Peter.
A person's duty is not a wilderness of tollgates to be crossed with tickets obtained at each successive gate. It is plain and simple and has only two parts: his duty to God, which every person must feel, and his duty to his neighbor, to treat others as he would wish to be treated. Those entrusted with power will be respected if they use it well, and despised if they do not. As for those who have been entrusted with no power but assume it anyway, the rational world need take no notice of them.
So far we have spoken only, and only in part, of the natural rights of man. We must now consider civil rights and show how they arise from natural rights. Man did not enter society to be worse off than before, or to possess fewer rights, but to secure those rights more effectively. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. To make this distinction more precise, however, we must identify the different characteristics of natural and civil rights.
A few words will make this clear. Natural rights belong to a person by virtue of existence. They include every intellectual right, or right of the mind, and every right to act as an individual for one's own comfort and happiness without harming the natural rights of others. Civil rights belong to a person by virtue of membership in society. Every civil right rests on a natural right already existing in the individual, but one that an individual's own power cannot always adequately secure. Rights concerning safety and protection are of this kind.
From this brief account we can readily distinguish the natural rights a person retains upon entering society from those he puts into the common stock as a member of it.
He retains the natural rights that he has as much power to exercise as he has a right to possess. These include, as noted above, every intellectual right, or right of the mind; religion is therefore among them. The natural rights he does not retain are those he possesses fully but lacks the power to enforce. By themselves, they cannot serve his purpose. A person has a natural right to judge his own case; insofar as this is a right of the mind, he never gives it up. But what good is his judgment if he cannot obtain redress? He therefore places this right in society's common stock and takes the arm of society, to which he belongs, instead of and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every person is an owner in society and draws upon its capital by right.
From these premises follow two or three certain conclusions:
First, every civil right grows out of a natural right; it is, in other words, a natural right exchanged.
Secondly, civil power, properly understood, consists of the combined natural rights whose exercise exceeds the power of individuals acting alone, and therefore cannot serve their purpose until brought together, when they become sufficient to serve the purpose of everyone.
Thirdly, the power thus produced by combining natural rights that individuals cannot adequately exercise must not be used to invade the natural rights individuals retain, which they can exercise as fully as they possess them.
We have now traced, briefly, the passage of man from a natural individual to a member of society, and shown—or tried to show—which natural rights he retains and which he exchanges for civil rights. Let us apply these principles to governments.
A glance around the world makes it easy to distinguish governments arising from society, or from the social compact, from governments that do not. But to show the distinction more clearly than a glance allows, we should review the several sources from which governments have arisen and on which they have been founded.
All may be placed under three headings.
First, superstition.
Secondly, power.
Thirdly, society's common interest and the common rights of humanity.
The first gave rise to government by priests, the second to government by conquerors, the third to government by reason.
When cunning men pretended through oracles to enjoy an intimate channel to the Deity, as intimate as the back stairs to a European court are to their successors today, the world lay wholly under the rule of superstition. People consulted the oracles; whatever their handlers made them say became law. This form of government lasted as long as the superstition did.
Next came a race of conquerors whose governments, like that of William the Conqueror, rested on force: the sword assumed the name of scepter. Governments so established last as long as the force supporting them lasts. To bring every instrument to their aid, however, they joined fraud to force and set up an idol called Divine Right. In imitation of the Pope, who claims both spiritual and temporal power, and in contradiction to the Founder of the Christian religion, this idol was later twisted into a new shape called Church and State. St. Peter's key and the Treasury's key were emblazoned together, and a bewildered, cheated multitude worshipped the invention.
When I contemplate the natural dignity of humanity, when I feel—as Nature has not kindly dulled my feelings—a concern for the honor and happiness of the human character, I am angered by the attempt to govern people through force and fraud, as if all were rogues and fools. I can scarcely help feeling disgust at those who let themselves be deceived.
We must now examine governments arising from society, as distinct from those born of superstition and conquest.
It has been considered a considerable step toward establishing the principles of freedom to say that government is a compact between governors and governed. But that cannot be true: it puts the effect before the cause. Since human beings existed before governments, there must have been a time without government and therefore without governors with whom to make such a compact.
The truth, then, must be that individuals themselves, each exercising a personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with one another to create a government. This is the only way governments can rightfully arise, and the only principle on which they can rightfully exist.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete English text of Parts I and II with Paine’s preface, appendix and author’s notes (Conway’s edition, 1894).
Now I must follow Mr. Burke through a maze of extravagant speeches and loose talk about governments. He says whatever he likes and expects to be believed, without giving evidence or reasons.
Before we can reach a reasoned conclusion, we have to establish, accept, or reject the facts and principles we start from. Mr. Burke attacked the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which the National Assembly of France published as the foundation of France’s constitution. He called it “paltry and blurred sheets of paper about the rights of man.” Does Mr. Burke mean that people have no rights? If so, he must mean there are no rights anywhere and that he himself has none. After all, who in the world is not a person? But if he accepts that people have rights, we must ask what those rights are and where they first came from.
People make a mistake when they use ancient precedents to argue about human rights: they do not go back far enough. They stop at some point an hundred or a thousand years ago and treat what people did then as a rule for today. That carries no authority. Go further back and you will find people doing and believing the opposite. If age gives something authority, we could find a thousand old precedents that contradict one another. But if we keep going, we will eventually reach the time when our Maker created humanity. What was a person then? A person. That was the only title, and the highest one possible. I will say more about titles later.
Now we have reached the origin of humanity and of human rights. We need look at how the world has been governed since then only to learn from its mistakes and improvements. Those who lived an hundred or a thousand years ago were modern in their own time, just as we are now. They had people they called ancient, those people had others, and we too will be ancient someday. If being old is enough to govern our lives, people living an hundred or a thousand years from now can use us as a precedent, just as we use people from an hundred or a thousand years ago. The truth is that selected pieces of antiquity can be used to prove anything, so they establish nothing. One old authority contradicts another until we reach the creation of humanity, the divine source of human rights. There our search and our reasoning can rest. If people had argued over human rights an hundred years after creation, they would have had to refer to this source. We must refer to it now too.
I do not intend to argue for any particular religious sect. Still, it is worth noting that Christ’s ancestry is traced back to Adam. Why not trace human rights back to the creation of humanity as well? Here is why people do not: governments that arose later have inserted themselves in between and arrogantly tried to strip people of their humanity.
If any generation ever had the right to dictate how the world should be governed forever, it was the first one. If that generation did not exercise such a right, no later generation has any authority to do so or claim it. The clear, divine principle of equal human rights comes from humanity’s Maker. It applies both to people alive today and to one generation after another. Every generation has the same rights as the generations before it, just as every person is born with the same rights as others born at the same time.
Every account and tradition about creation, whether from societies with writing or without it, agrees on one point, however much their details differ: humanity is one. I mean that all people have the same standing. So all are born equal, with equal natural rights. This would be true if each new generation were created directly rather than born from the previous one. Birth is simply the way creation continues. Each child’s existence must therefore be seen as coming from God. The world is as new to that child as it was to the first human being, and the child has the same kind of natural right in it.
The Mosaic account of creation makes this unity and equality clear, whether we treat it as divine authority or simply as history. Its words leave no room for dispute: “And God said, Let us make man in our own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” It names a difference between the sexes but suggests no other distinction. Even if this is not divine authority, it is at least historical testimony. It shows that human equality is not a new idea but the oldest one on record.
All known religions, in what they say about human beings, are also based on the idea that humanity is one and that everyone has the same standing. Whether people are thought to go to heaven, hell, or another state after death, the only distinction is between good and bad. Even governments’ laws have to follow this principle in a way. They distinguish people by their crimes rather than by their social standing.
This is one of the greatest truths, and it is very valuable to teach it. Seeing people this way, and teaching them to see themselves this way, connects them closely to all their duties: to their Creator and to the creation of which they are a part. A person becomes corrupt only by forgetting that origin—or, to use the fashionable phrase, that birth and family. One of the many evils of present-day European governments is that they put a huge distance between a human being, simply as a human being, and the Maker. They fill that artificial gap with a series of barriers, like tollgates people must pass through. Here is Mr. Burke’s list of those barriers between people and their Maker. Speaking as though he were announcing ranks and titles, he says: “We fear God—we look with awe to kings—with affection to Parliaments with duty to magistrates—with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility.” Mr. Burke forgot to include “chivalry.” He also forgot Peter.
A person’s duty is not a maze of tollgates requiring a ticket at each stop. It is simple and has only two parts. There is the duty to God, which everyone must feel. There is also the duty to treat a neighbor as one would want to be treated. If people given power do a good job, they will be respected. If they do not, they will be looked down on. As for those who simply claim power without being given it, reasonable people need not recognize their claims at all.
So far, we have discussed only some of our natural rights. Now we must consider civil rights and show how they come from natural rights. People did not join society to be worse off or to have fewer rights. They joined it to make those rights more secure. Natural rights are the basis of every civil right. To make this distinction clearer, we need to describe the different features of each kind of right.
This takes only a few words. Natural rights belong to people because they exist. These include all intellectual rights, or rights of the mind. They also include the right to act for one’s own comfort and happiness, provided this does not harm other people’s natural rights. Civil rights belong to people because they are members of society. Every civil right rests on a natural right that an individual already had but could not always exercise effectively alone. Rights involving safety and protection are examples.
This brief account lets us distinguish the natural rights a person keeps after joining society from those put into a shared pool as a member of society.
A person keeps the natural rights that an individual can exercise as fully as the rights themselves allow. As I said, intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, belong to this group. Religion is therefore one of them. A person gives up the independent exercise of natural rights when the right itself is complete but the individual lacks the power to enforce it. Alone, the right does not serve its purpose. By natural right, a person may judge a dispute in which that person is involved. People never give up their right to form their own judgment. But what good is that judgment if they have no power to put things right? They therefore put the right to enforce such judgments into society’s shared pool. They use the strength of society, to which they belong, instead of relying only on their own strength. Society gives them nothing as a gift. Everyone has a share in society and has the right to draw on its common resources.
Two or three definite conclusions follow from these points:
First, every civil right comes from a natural right. In other words, it is a natural right exchanged.
Second, civil power consists of the combined natural rights that individuals cannot effectively enforce alone. When brought together, those powers can serve everyone’s needs.
Third, the power formed by combining rights that individuals cannot enforce alone must not be used to violate the natural rights individuals keep and can exercise fully themselves.
In a few words, we have followed a person from independent life into membership in society. We have shown, or tried to show, which natural rights remain with the individual and which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us apply these principles to governments.
Looking around the world, it is easy to tell which governments came from society and a social agreement and which did not. To make the difference even clearer, we should look at the various sources from which governments have come and on which they rest.
They fall into three categories.
First, superstition.
Second, power.
Third, society’s common interest and people’s common rights.
The first gave us rule by priests, the second rule by conquerors, and the third rule by reason.
When clever men pretended they could speak with God through oracles as easily as people now go up the back stairs of European courts, the world was ruled by superstition. People consulted the oracles, and whatever those men made them say became law. That kind of government lasted as long as the superstition behind it.
Next came conquerors. Like William the Conqueror, they founded their rule on force. The sword was now called a scepter. Such governments last only while they have the power to keep themselves in place. To use every possible means of control, they joined deception to force. They created an idol called Divine Right. Then, imitating the Pope’s claim to both religious and worldly power, and contradicting the founder of Christianity, they turned this into another idol called Church and State. St. Peter’s key and the Treasury’s key were displayed together like symbols on a coat of arms. The deceived public looked on in wonder and worshipped the invention.
When I think of people’s natural dignity and care about their honor and happiness—for Nature has not made me unable to feel—I grow angry that anyone would rule humanity through force and lies, as though everyone were a cheat or a fool. I can scarcely help feeling disgust at the people taken in by it.
Now we must look at governments that come from society, rather than from superstition or conquest.
Some think it a major step toward freedom to say that government is an agreement between rulers and the ruled. But that cannot be right. It puts the result before its cause. People must have existed before governments did. There was therefore a time without governments and without governors who could make such an agreement.
The truth must be that individuals, each acting by their own personal and sovereign right, agreed with one another to create a government. This is the only legitimate way for governments to begin and the only principle that justifies their continued existence.