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Part II: Chapter IV, 4

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Original 18th-century English

When extraordinary power and extraordinary pay are allotted to any individual in a government, he becomes the center, round which every kind of corruption generates and forms. Give to any man a million a year, and add thereto the power of creating and disposing of places, at the expense of a country, and the liberties of that country are no longer secure. What is called the splendour of a throne is no other than the corruption of the state. It is made up of a band of parasites, living in luxurious indolence, out of the public taxes.

When once such a vicious system is established it becomes the guard and protection of all inferior abuses. The man who is in the receipt of a million a year is the last person to promote a spirit of reform, lest, in the event, it should reach to himself. It is always his interest to defend inferior abuses, as so many outworks to protect the citadel; and on this species of political fortification, all the parts have such a common dependence that it is never to be expected they will attack each other.*24

Monarchy would not have continued so many ages in the world, had it not been for the abuses it protects. It is the master-fraud, which shelters all others. By admitting a participation of the spoil, it makes itself friends; and when it ceases to do this it will cease to be the idol of courtiers.

As the principle on which constitutions are now formed rejects all hereditary pretensions to government, it also rejects all that catalogue of assumptions known by the name of prerogatives.

If there is any government where prerogatives might with apparent safety be entrusted to any individual, it is in the federal government of America. The president of the United States of America is elected only for four years. He is not only responsible in the general sense of the word, but a particular mode is laid down in the constitution for trying him. He cannot be elected under thirty-five years of age; and he must be a native of the country.

In a comparison of these cases with the Government of England, the difference when applied to the latter amounts to an absurdity. In England the person who exercises prerogative is often a foreigner; always half a foreigner, and always married to a foreigner. He is never in full natural or political connection with the country, is not responsible for anything, and becomes of age at eighteen years; yet such a person is permitted to form foreign alliances, without even the knowledge of the nation, and to make war and peace without its consent.

But this is not all. Though such a person cannot dispose of the government in the manner of a testator, he dictates the marriage connections, which, in effect, accomplish a great part of the same end. He cannot directly bequeath half the government to Prussia, but he can form a marriage partnership that will produce almost the same thing. Under such circumstances, it is happy for England that she is not situated on the Continent, or she might, like Holland, fall under the dictatorship of Prussia. Holland, by marriage, is as effectually governed by Prussia, as if the old tyranny of bequeathing the government had been the means.

The presidency in America (or, as it is sometimes called, the executive) is the only office from which a foreigner is excluded, and in England it is the only one to which he is admitted. A foreigner cannot be a member of Parliament, but he may be what is called a king. If there is any reason for excluding foreigners, it ought to be from those offices where mischief can most be acted, and where, by uniting every bias of interest and attachment, the trust is best secured. But as nations proceed in the great business of forming constitutions, they will examine with more precision into the nature and business of that department which is called the executive. What the legislative and judicial departments are every one can see; but with respect to what, in Europe, is called the executive, as distinct from those two, it is either a political superfluity or a chaos of unknown things.

Some kind of official department, to which reports shall be made from the different parts of a nation, or from abroad, to be laid before the national representatives, is all that is necessary; but there is no consistency in calling this the executive; neither can it be considered in any other light than as inferior to the legislative. The sovereign authority in any country is the power of making laws, and everything else is an official department.

Next to the arrangement of the principles and the organization of the several parts of a constitution, is the provision to be made for the support of the persons to whom the nation shall confide the administration of the constitutional powers.

A nation can have no right to the time and services of any person at his own expense, whom it may choose to employ or entrust in any department whatever; neither can any reason be given for making provision for the support of any one part of a government and not for the other.

But admitting that the honour of being entrusted with any part of a government is to be considered a sufficient reward, it ought to be so to every person alike. If the members of the legislature of any country are to serve at their own expense that which is called the executive, whether monarchical or by any other name, ought to serve in like manner. It is inconsistent to pay the one, and accept the service of the other gratis.

In America, every department in the government is decently provided for; but no one is extravagantly paid. Every member of Congress, and of the Assemblies, is allowed a sufficiency for his expenses. Whereas in England, a most prodigal provision is made for the support of one part of the Government, and none for the other, the consequence of which is that the one is furnished with the means of corruption and the other is put into the condition of being corrupted. Less than a fourth part of such expense, applied as it is in America, would remedy a great part of the corruption.

Another reform in the American constitution is the exploding all oaths of personality. The oath of allegiance in America is to the nation only. The putting any individual as a figure for a nation is improper. The happiness of a nation is the superior object, and therefore the intention of an oath of allegiance ought not to be obscured by being figuratively taken, to, or in the name of, any person. The oath, called the civic oath, in France, viz., "the nation, the law, and the king," is improper. If taken at all, it ought to be as in America, to the nation only. The law may or may not be good; but, in this place, it can have no other meaning, than as being conducive to the happiness of a nation, and therefore is included in it. The remainder of the oath is improper, on the ground, that all personal oaths ought to be abolished. They are the remains of tyranny on one part and slavery on the other; and the name of the Creator ought not to be introduced to witness the degradation of his creation; or if taken, as is already mentioned, as figurative of the nation, it is in this place redundant. But whatever apology may be made for oaths at the first establishment of a government, they ought not to be permitted afterwards. If a government requires the support of oaths, it is a sign that it is not worth supporting, and ought not to be supported. Make government what it ought to be, and it will support itself.

To conclude this part of the subject:—One of the greatest improvements that have been made for the perpetual security and progress of constitutional liberty, is the provision which the new constitutions make for occasionally revising, altering, and amending them.

The principle upon which Mr. Burke formed his political creed, that of "binding and controlling posterity to the end of time, and of renouncing and abdicating the rights of all posterity, for ever," is now become too detestable to be made a subject of debate; and therefore, I pass it over with no other notice than exposing it.

Government is but now beginning to be known. Hitherto it has been the mere exercise of power, which forbade all effectual enquiry into rights, and grounded itself wholly on possession. While the enemy of liberty was its judge, the progress of its principles must have been small indeed.

The constitutions of America, and also that of France, have either affixed a period for their revision, or laid down the mode by which improvement shall be made. It is perhaps impossible to establish anything that combines principles with opinions and practice, which the progress of circumstances, through a length of years, will not in some measure derange, or render inconsistent; and, therefore, to prevent inconveniences accumulating, till they discourage reformations or provoke revolutions, it is best to provide the means of regulating them as they occur. The Rights of Man are the rights of all generations of men, and cannot be monopolised by any. That which is worth following, will be followed for the sake of its worth, and it is in this that its security lies, and not in any conditions with which it may be encumbered. When a man leaves property to his heirs, he does not connect it with an obligation that they shall accept it. Why, then, should we do otherwise with respect to constitutions? The best constitution that could now be devised, consistent with the condition of the present moment, may be far short of that excellence which a few years may afford. There is a morning of reason rising upon man on the subject of government, that has not appeared before. As the barbarism of the present old governments expires, the moral conditions of nations with respect to each other will be changed. Man will not be brought up with the savage idea of considering his species as his enemy, because the accident of birth gave the individuals existence in countries distinguished by different names; and as constitutions have always some relation to external as well as to domestic circumstances, the means of benefitting by every change, foreign or domestic, should be a part of every constitution. We already see an alteration in the national disposition of England and France towards each other, which, when we look back to only a few years, is itself a Revolution. Who could have foreseen, or who could have believed, that a French National Assembly would ever have been a popular toast in England, or that a friendly alliance of the two nations should become the wish of either? It shows that man, were he not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and that human nature is not of itself vicious. That spirit of jealousy and ferocity, which the governments of the two countries inspired, and which they rendered subservient to the purpose of taxation, is now yielding to the dictates of reason, interest, and humanity. The trade of courts is beginning to be understood, and the affectation of mystery, with all the artificial sorcery by which they imposed upon mankind, is on the decline. It has received its death-wound; and though it may linger, it will expire. Government ought to be as much open to improvement as anything which appertains to man, instead of which it has been monopolised from age to age, by the most ignorant and vicious of the human race. Need we any other proof of their wretched management, than the excess of debts and taxes with which every nation groans, and the quarrels into which they have precipitated the world? Just emerging from such a barbarous condition, it is too soon to determine to what extent of improvement government may yet be carried. For what we can foresee, all Europe may form but one great Republic, and man be free of the whole.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete English text of Parts I and II with Paine’s preface, appendix and author’s notes (Conway’s edition, 1894) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.

When extraordinary power and extraordinary pay are allotted to any person in a government, that person becomes the center around which every kind of corruption gathers and takes shape. Give a man a million a year, and the power to create and distribute offices at a country's expense, and that country's liberties are no longer safe. What is called the splendor of a throne is nothing but the corruption of the state. It consists of a band of parasites living in luxurious idleness on public taxes.

Once such a vicious system is established, it guards and protects every lesser abuse. The man who receives a million a year is the last person to encourage reform, for fear it will eventually reach him. It is always in his interest to defend lesser abuses as outworks protecting the citadel; in this kind of political fortification all the parts depend so closely on one another that none can be expected to attack the rest.*24

Monarchy would not have endured for so many centuries if it had not protected abuses. It is the master fraud that shelters all the others. By sharing the spoils it makes friends; when it stops doing so, it will cease to be the idol of courtiers.

The principle on which constitutions are now framed rejects all hereditary claims to government, and with them the whole catalog of assumed powers known as prerogatives.

If there is any government in which prerogatives might apparently be entrusted safely to an individual, it is the federal government of America. The president of the United States of America is elected for only four years. He is accountable not merely in the general sense: the constitution lays down a particular procedure for trying him. He cannot be elected before the age of thirty-five and must be a native of the country.

Compare these provisions with the Government of England, and their application to the latter becomes absurd. In England the person exercising prerogative is often a foreigner, always half a foreigner, and always married to a foreigner. He is never fully bound to the country by natural or political ties; he is answerable for nothing and comes of age at eighteen years. Yet he is permitted to form foreign alliances without even the nation's knowledge and to make war and peace without its consent.

Nor is that all. Though such a person cannot dispose of the government by a will, he dictates marital alliances that accomplish much the same end. He cannot directly bequeath half the government to Prussia, but he can arrange a marriage partnership that will produce almost the same result. In these circumstances England is fortunate not to be situated on the Continent, or it might, like Holland, fall under Prussia's command. Through marriage, Holland is governed by Prussia as effectively as if government had been bequeathed under the old tyranny.

The presidency in America (or, as it is sometimes called, the executive) is the only office from which a foreigner is excluded; in England the corresponding office is the only one to which he is admitted. A foreigner cannot sit in Parliament, but he can become what is called a king. If there is reason to exclude foreigners, it should be from those offices in which they could do the most harm and in which a common bond of interest and allegiance would best secure the public trust. But as nations undertake the great work of forming constitutions, they will examine more closely the nature and functions of the department called the executive. Everyone can see what the legislative and judicial departments are; but what Europe calls the executive, apart from those two, is either a political superfluity or a chaos of unknown things.

All that is necessary is some official department to receive reports from the different parts of a nation, or from abroad, and lay them before the nation's representatives. But it makes no sense to call that department the executive, and it can only be regarded as subordinate to the legislative. The sovereign authority in any country is the power to make laws; everything else is an official department.

After establishing the principles and organizing the various parts of a constitution, the next consideration is how to support those whom the nation entrusts with administering its constitutional powers.

A nation cannot claim anyone's time and service at that person's own expense merely because it chooses to employ or entrust that person in any department. Nor is there any reason to provide for the support of one part of government but not another.

But even if the honor of being entrusted with a part of government is considered sufficient reward, it should suffice equally for everyone. If members of a country's legislature are to serve at their own expense, those in what is called the executive, whether monarchical or bearing any other name, should serve on the same terms. It is inconsistent to pay one and accept the other's service without pay.

In America every department of government is adequately provided for, but none is paid extravagantly. Every member of Congress and of the Assemblies is given enough to meet expenses. In England, by contrast, one part of the Government receives a most lavish provision for its support and the other receives none. The result is that the first is equipped to corrupt and the second placed in a position to be corrupted. Less than a fourth of that expenditure, applied as it is in America, would remedy much of the corruption.

Another reform in the American constitution is the abolition of all oaths to individuals. The oath of allegiance in America is to the nation alone. It is wrong to make any person a stand-in for a nation. The happiness of a nation is the higher purpose, and the meaning of an oath of allegiance should not be obscured by directing it figuratively to a person or taking it in that person's name. The oath called the civic oath in France—“the nation, the law, and the king”—is improper. If any oath is taken, it should be as in America, to the nation alone. The law may be good or bad; but here it can mean only a law contributing to the nation's happiness, and so is already included in the nation. The rest of the oath is improper because all personal oaths should be abolished. They are remnants of tyranny on one side and slavery on the other; the Creator's name should not be called upon to witness the degradation of his creation. Or, if the king is intended, as already mentioned, to stand for the nation, his inclusion here is redundant. But whatever excuse can be made for oaths when a government is first established, they should not be allowed afterward. If a government needs oaths to sustain it, it is a sign that it is not worth sustaining and should not be sustained. Make government what it ought to be, and it will sustain itself.

To conclude this part of the subject: one of the greatest advances in securing and extending constitutional liberty for all time is the provision the new constitutions make for their periodic revision, alteration, and amendment.

The principle on which Mr. Burke based his political creed—“binding and controlling posterity to the end of time, and of renouncing and abdicating the rights of all posterity, for ever”—has now become too detestable even to debate; I will therefore do no more than expose it.

Government is only now beginning to be understood. Until now it has been merely an exercise of power, forbidding any effective inquiry into rights and grounding itself entirely in possession. While liberty's enemy was its judge, its principles could make little progress indeed.

The constitutions of America, and also that of France, either set a time for their revision or lay down a method for improvement. Perhaps nothing can be established that combines principles, opinions, and practice without the passage of years and the change of circumstances eventually disturbing it or making some part of it inconsistent. So, to prevent problems from accumulating until they discourage reform or provoke revolution, it is best to provide the means to correct them as they arise. The Rights of Man belong to every generation and cannot be monopolized by any. What is worth following will be followed for its worth: in this lies its security, not in any conditions imposed on it. When a man leaves property to his heirs, he does not make it a condition that they accept it. Why should we do otherwise with constitutions? The best constitution we could devise now, suited to the present moment, may fall far short of the excellence that a few years may make possible. A dawn of reason concerning government is breaking over mankind such as has never appeared before. As the barbarism of the old governments now in power dies out, the moral relations among nations will change. People will no longer be raised with the savage idea that others of their own species are enemies because the accident of birth placed them in countries with different names. And since constitutions always bear some relation to external as well as domestic circumstances, every constitution should include the means of benefiting from changes abroad and at home. We can already see a change in the feelings of England and France toward each other which, looking back only a few years, is itself a Revolution. Who could have foreseen, or believed, that a French National Assembly would ever be a popular toast in England, or that either nation would wish for a friendly alliance with the other? It shows that people, if governments had not corrupted them, would naturally be friends to one another, and that human nature is not inherently vicious. The jealousy and ferocity fostered by the governments of the two countries, and made to serve their taxation, are now giving way to the dictates of reason, interest, and humanity. The business of courts is beginning to be understood, and the pretense of mystery, with all the artificial sorcery by which they imposed on mankind, is fading. It has received its fatal wound; though it may linger, it will die. Government should be as open to improvement as anything else concerning humanity, yet from age to age it has been monopolized by the most ignorant and vicious of the human race. Do we need any further proof of their miserable management than the burden of debts and taxes under which every nation groans, and the quarrels into which they have plunged the world? Just emerging from such a barbarous condition, we cannot yet say how far government may be improved. For all we can foresee, all Europe may become one great Republic, and every person may be free throughout it.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete English text of Parts I and II with Paine’s preface, appendix and author’s notes (Conway’s edition, 1894).

When one person in a government gets extraordinary power and pay, that person becomes the center around which every kind of corruption grows. Give someone a million a year and the power to create and hand out government jobs at the country's expense, and the country's freedom is no longer safe. What people call the splendor of a throne is really the corruption of the state. It consists of a group of hangers-on who live in lazy luxury on public taxes.

Once this bad system takes hold, it protects every lesser abuse. A person receiving a million a year will be the last to encourage reform, for fear reform might eventually reach him. He benefits from defending lesser abuses. They are outer defenses protecting his own position, like fortifications around a stronghold. All parts of this political defense depend so much on each other that we should never expect them to attack one another.*24

Monarchy would not have lasted so many centuries if it did not protect abuses. It is the chief fraud, sheltering all the others. It makes friends by letting them share what it takes. When it stops doing that, courtiers will stop worshipping it.

The principle behind modern constitutions rejects every hereditary claim to govern. It also rejects the whole list of claimed special powers known as prerogatives.

If any government could safely give such special powers to one person, it would appear to be America's federal government. The president of the United States of America is elected for only four years. He is answerable for his actions, and the constitution even lays out a specific way to put him on trial. He cannot be elected before he is thirty-five years old, and he must be a native of the country.

Compare these conditions with the government of England, and the difference makes the English case absurd. In England the person using these special powers is often a foreigner, is always half a foreigner, and is always married to a foreigner. He never has a full natural or political connection with the country. He is accountable for nothing and comes of age at eighteen years. Yet he may make foreign alliances without even telling the nation, and may make war and peace without its consent.

There is more. He cannot leave the government to someone in his will, but he decides marriage arrangements that achieve much the same result. He cannot directly leave half the government to Prussia, but a marriage alliance can have almost the same effect. England is fortunate under these conditions not to be on the Continent. Otherwise it might come under Prussia's control, as Holland has. Marriage has placed Holland under Prussia's rule just as effectively as the old practice of leaving a government to someone in a will would have done.

In America the presidency, sometimes called the executive, is the only office closed to foreigners. In England the comparable office is the only one open to them. A foreigner cannot sit in Parliament but can become what is called a king. If there is a reason to keep foreigners out of office, it applies most strongly to offices where they can do the most harm. Those are also the offices where loyalty is best protected when a person's interests and personal ties all point to the nation. As nations continue the important work of making constitutions, they will look more closely at the nature and duties of the branch called the executive. Anyone can see what the legislative and judicial branches do. But Europe's so-called executive, apart from those two, is either an unnecessary political addition or a jumble of duties no one has defined.

All that is needed is an official department to receive reports from different parts of the country and from abroad and present them to the nation's representatives. It makes no sense to call that department the executive. It can only be subordinate to the legislature. In any country, the highest authority is the power to make laws. Everything else is an administrative office.

Once a constitution's principles and branches are arranged, the next task is to provide support for the people whom the nation entrusts with carrying out its constitutional powers.

A nation has no right to demand anyone's time and service at that person's expense, no matter which office it chooses the person to fill. Nor is there a reason to pay the people in one branch of government but not another.

Suppose the honor of holding a government office is considered enough reward by itself. Then it should be enough for everyone alike. If legislators must pay their own expenses, the so-called executive must do the same, whether it is a monarch or has some other name. It makes no sense to pay one and demand that the other serve for free.

In America every branch of government receives decent support, but no one gets extravagant pay. Members of Congress and of the Assemblies receive enough to cover their expenses. In England, by contrast, one branch of government receives lavish funding and another receives none. As a result, one is given the means to corrupt, while the other is put in a position to be corrupted. Less than a fourth of that expenditure, used as it is in America, would cure much of the corruption.

Another reform in the American constitutions is doing away with oaths of loyalty to individuals. In America the oath of allegiance is to the nation alone. It is wrong to make one person stand for an entire nation. The nation's happiness is the higher aim. The meaning of an oath of allegiance should not be blurred by swearing it figuratively to, or in the name of, a person. The oath called the civic oath in France says “the nation, the law, and the king.” That is wrong. If an oath is taken at all, it should follow America's example and name only the nation. A law may be good or bad. But here it can only mean something that serves the nation's happiness, and so is already included in the nation. The rest of the oath is wrong because all oaths to individuals should be abolished. They are leftovers from tyranny by one side and slavery by the other. The Creator's name should not be called on to witness the degradation of his creation. And if the king is intended only to stand for the nation, as I have already mentioned, naming him is unnecessary. Whatever excuse there might be for oaths when a government is first established, they should not be allowed afterward. If a government needs oaths to keep it going, it is not worth supporting and should not be supported. Make government what it should be and it will stand on its own.

To finish this part of the discussion: one of the greatest advances in protecting and expanding constitutional freedom over time is that the new constitutions provide for reviewing, changing, and improving themselves when needed.

Mr. Burke bases his political beliefs on “binding and controlling posterity to the end of time, and of renouncing and abdicating the rights of all posterity, for ever.” That principle has become too hateful to deserve debate. I will do no more than bring it into the open.

We are only beginning to understand government. Until now it has been little more than the exercise of power. It blocked any serious inquiry into rights and based its entire claim on possession of power. As long as freedom's enemy was allowed to judge freedom, its principles could make very little progress.

The constitutions of America and France either set dates for review or lay out a method for making improvements. It may be impossible to establish any system that joins principles to opinions and actual practice without changing circumstances over many years throwing some of it out of balance or making its parts inconsistent. It is therefore best to provide ways to make adjustments as problems arise. Otherwise, problems build up until they discourage reform or provoke revolution. The Rights of Man belong to every generation. No generation can claim them for itself alone. People will follow what is worth following because it is worthwhile. Its security lies in its value, not in conditions attached to it. When someone leaves property to heirs, he does not require them to accept it. Why treat constitutions differently? Even the best constitution we could design for our present circumstances may fall far short of what can be achieved in a few years. A new age of reason about government is beginning, unlike anything people have seen before. As the barbarity of today's old governments comes to an end, nations will change how they treat one another. People will no longer be raised to see other human beings as enemies just because they happened to be born in countries with different names. Constitutions must respond to circumstances abroad as well as at home. Each constitution should therefore allow people to benefit from changes in either place. Already we see a change in how England and France feel about each other. Looking back only a few years, this change is itself a revolution. Who could have predicted, or believed, that people in England would ever happily raise a toast to a French National Assembly? Who expected either country to want a friendly alliance between them? This shows that, without corruption by governments, people are naturally friends to one another. Human nature is not bad in itself. The governments of both countries fostered jealousy and hostility and used those feelings to raise taxes. Now those feelings are giving way to reason, common interests, and human concern. People are beginning to understand what royal courts really do. The courts' pretense of mystery, and all the artificial tricks with which they deceived people, are losing their power. That system has received a fatal wound. It may linger, but it will die. Government should be as open to improvement as anything else people do. Instead, for generations it has been controlled by some of humanity's most ignorant and immoral members. What better proof of their terrible management do we need than the huge debts and taxes burdening every nation, and the conflicts into which they have driven the world? We are only just emerging from that barbaric condition. It is too early to decide how far government can yet improve. For all we know, Europe may become one great Republic, with everyone free throughout it.

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