Book I, 350–354

350a “And someone skilled in medicine? When prescribing food or drink, would he wish to go further than another skilled doctor, or than that doctor's prescription?”

“Certainly not.”

“But further than someone without medical skill?”

“Yes.”

“Consider knowledge and ignorance in every field. Do you think any knowledgeable person would wish to choose to do or say more than another knowledgeable person does or says, rather than make the same choice as someone like himself in the same undertaking?”

“Perhaps,” he said, “that must be so.”

“What about the ignorant man? Wouldn't he want to get the better of both the knowledgeable 350b and the ignorant alike?”

“Perhaps.”

“And the knowledgeable man is wise?”

“Yes.”

“And the wise man good?”

“Yes.”

“Then the good and wise man will not wish to get the better of his like, but of his unlike and opposite.”

“So it seems,” he said.

“And the bad and ignorant man wants to get the better of both his like and his opposite.”

“Apparently.”

“Now, Thrasymachus,” I said, “our unjust man seeks to get the better of both his like and his unlike. Isn't that what you said?”

“It is,” he said. 350c

“But the just man will not seek to get the better of his like, only of his unlike?”

“Yes.”

“Then the just man resembles the wise and good man,” I said, “and the unjust resembles the bad and ignorant man.”

“It looks that way.”

“And yet we agreed that each is himself of the sort he resembles.”

“We did.”

“So the just man has proved to be good and wise, and the unjust man ignorant and bad.”

Thrasymachus conceded all this, 350d not as easily as I recount it now, but dragged to it with difficulty, sweating profusely, as it was summer. It was then that I saw Thrasymachus blush, something I had never seen before. When we had thus agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I said, “Very well, let that stand. We also said, didn't we, that injustice was strong. Or have you forgotten, Thrasymachus?”

“I remember,” he said. “But I don't like what you are saying now either, and I have something to say about it. If I were to say it, I know you would accuse me of making a public speech. So either let me say all I want, or if you want to ask questions, ask them. And I will say ‘So be it’ to you as I would to old women telling stories, 350e and nod or shake my head.”

“Never against your own judgment,” I said.

“To please you, then,” he said, “since you will not let me speak. What more do you want?”

“Nothing else, by Zeus,” I said. “But if you will do that, do it, and I will ask.”

“Ask away.”

“Then I ask what I asked a moment ago, so that we may pursue

351a the argument in order and see how justice stands in relation to injustice. It was said, I believe, that injustice is more powerful and stronger than justice. But now,” I said, “if justice is wisdom and virtue, I think it will readily prove stronger than injustice, since injustice is ignorance. No one could fail to see that. But I do not want to treat it quite so simply, Thrasymachus; I want to examine it this way. 351b Would you say that a city might be unjust, try unjustly to enslave other cities, succeed in enslaving them, and hold many in subjection?”

“Of course,” he said. “And the best city will do that especially, if it is most perfectly unjust.”

“I understand that this was your argument,” I said. “But here is what I want to consider about it: will the city that grows stronger than another have this power without justice, or must it have justice?” 351c

“If things are as you said just now, and justice is wisdom, it must have justice. But if they are as I said, it will have injustice.”

“I am delighted, Thrasymachus,” I said, “that you do not merely nod and shake your head, but give such fine answers.”

“I am doing it to please you,” he said.

“And well you do. Please grant me this too and tell me: do you think that a city, an army, a band of raiders or thieves, or any other group that undertakes some unjust act together could accomplish anything if its members wronged one another?” 351d

“Certainly not,” he said.

“But if they did not wrong one another, could they do more?”

“Certainly.”

“For injustice, Thrasymachus, surely brings factions, hatred, and fights among them, while justice brings concord and friendship. Isn't that so?”

“Let it be so,” he said, “so that I don't quarrel with you.”

“You are very kind, my friend. Now tell me this: if it is the work of injustice to breed hatred wherever it arises, will it not also, when it arises among free people or slaves, make them hate one another, fall into factions, and become unable to act 351e together?”

“Certainly.”

“And if it arises in two people, will they not disagree and hate each other and become enemies to each other and to the just?”

“They will,” he said.

“And if, astonishing man, injustice arises in a single person, will it lose its power, or retain it undiminished?”

“Let it retain it undiminished,” he said.

“Then its power appears to be this: wherever it arises, whether in a city, a people, an army, or

352a anything else, it first makes that thing incapable of acting in concert with itself because of faction and discord; and it makes it an enemy to itself, to everything opposed to it, and to what is just. Isn't that so?”

“Certainly.”

“And when it is present in one person, I think it will do the very things it is its nature to do. First, it will make him incapable of action by setting him against himself and robbing him of inner concord; then it will make him an enemy to himself and to just people. Isn't that so?”

“Yes.”

“And the gods, my friend, are just too, aren't they?”

“Let them be,” he said. 352b

“Then the unjust man will be an enemy to the gods as well, Thrasymachus, and the just man their friend.”

“Feast confidently on your argument,” he said. “I will not oppose you, for fear of making enemies of our friends here.”

“Come, then,” I said, “complete the rest of the feast for me by answering as you have been doing. For the just appear to be wiser, better, and more capable of action, while the unjust cannot even act together. 352c Indeed, when we speak of unjust people who have at times accomplished something together with force, we do not speak quite truly. If they had been utterly unjust, they would not have held back from wronging one another; plainly there was some justice in them, keeping them from wronging both one another and those they marched against at the same time. This enabled them to achieve what they achieved. They set out on their unjust enterprise only half-corrupted by injustice, for the wholly wicked and perfectly unjust are perfectly incapable of action. That, 352d I understand, is how things are, not as you first proposed. But whether the just also live better than the unjust and are happier—the further question we set ourselves—we must examine. They seem to be, even now, from what we have said; still, we must examine it more carefully. For the subject of our discussion is no trivial matter, but how one ought to live.”

“Then examine it,” he said.

“I will,” I said. “Tell me, do you think a horse has a function?” 352e

“I do.”

“Would you define the function of a horse, or of anything else, as what one can do with it alone, or do best with it?”

“I don't understand,” he said.

“Let me put it this way. Can you see with anything other than your eyes?”

“Certainly not.”

“And hear with anything other than your ears?”

“Not at all.”

“Then we are right to call these their functions?”

“Certainly.”

353a “But you could cut a vine shoot with a knife, a carving tool, and many other things?”

“Of course.”

“Yet I think you could do it best with a pruning hook made for that purpose.”

“True.”

“Then shall we call that its function?”

“We shall.”

“Now I think you may better understand what I asked just now, when I asked whether the function of each thing was what it alone, or better than anything else, accomplishes.”

“Yes,” he said, “I understand, and that seems to me to be the function of each 353b thing.”

“Very well,” I said. “And do you think that each thing assigned a function has an excellence too? Let us return to the same examples: we say the eyes have a function?”

“They do.”

“Do the eyes also have an excellence?”

“They do.”

“And the ears had a function?”

“Yes.”

“And therefore an excellence?”

“An excellence too.”

“What of all the other things? Is it not the same?”

“The same.”

“Consider, then: could eyes ever perform their function well 353c if they did not possess their own proper excellence, but had a defect instead?”

“How could they?” he said. “You mean blindness, perhaps, instead of sight.”

“Whatever their excellence may be,” I said. “I am not asking that yet, but whether things that act perform their own function well through their proper excellence, and badly through a defect.”

“That is true,” he said.

“And ears deprived of their own excellence will perform their function badly?”

“Certainly.” 353d

“Shall we apply the same account to everything else?”

“I think so.”

“Now consider this next. Is there a function of the soul that you could not perform with anything else in existence? For example, caring for things, ruling, deliberating, and all such activities: could we rightly assign them to anything but the soul, and say they belong to it in particular?”

“To nothing else.”

“And what about living? Shall we not say that it is a function of the soul?”

“Above all,” he said.

“Then we say that the soul has an excellence too?”

“We do.” 353e

“Could a soul ever perform its functions well, Thrasymachus, if deprived of its proper excellence? Or is that impossible?”

“Impossible.”

“Then a bad soul must rule and care for things badly, and a good soul must do all these things well.”

“It must.”

“And we agreed that justice is the soul's excellence, and injustice its defect?”

“We did.”

“Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man badly.”

“So it seems,” he said, “by your argument.”

354a “And someone who lives well is blessed and happy, while someone who does not is the opposite.”

“Of course.”

“Then the just man is happy and the unjust man wretched.”

“Let it be so,” he said.

“But it does not pay to be wretched; it pays to be happy.”

“Of course.”

“So injustice, my fortunate Thrasymachus, is never more profitable than justice.”

“Let that be your feast at the festival of Bendis, Socrates,” he said.

“A feast supplied by you, Thrasymachus,” I said, “since you grew gentle with me and stopped being angry. Yet I have not feasted well, 354b through my own fault, not yours. Like greedy diners who snatch a taste of each new dish as it is brought around before taking a proper share of the last, so I think I, before finding what we first set out to seek—what justice is—let that go and rushed on to examine whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue. And when another argument came up afterward, that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not keep from leaving the first question to pursue this one. So the result of our discussion is that I now know nothing. 354c For if I do not know what justice is, I can hardly know whether it happens to be a virtue or not, or whether the person who possesses it is unhappy or happy.”

350a “What about a doctor? When it comes to food and drink, would a doctor want to do more than another doctor, or go beyond another doctor's judgment or practice?”

“Certainly not.”

“But would he want to go beyond someone untrained in medicine?”

“Yes.”

“Now look at knowledge and ignorance in general. Do you think any knowledgeable person would choose to do or say more than another knowledgeable person in the same matter? Wouldn't he choose the same course as someone like himself?”

“Perhaps that must be so,” he said.

“What about an ignorant person? Wouldn't he equally try to get ahead of 350b both a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one?”

“Perhaps.”

“And someone with knowledge is wise?”

“Yes.”

“And someone wise is good?”

“Yes.”

“Then the good and wise person won't try to get ahead of someone like himself. He will try to get ahead of someone different from him and opposed to him.”

“So it seems,” he said.

“But the bad and ignorant person tries to get ahead of both someone like himself and someone opposed to him.”

“Apparently.”

“Now, Thrasymachus,” I said, “doesn't the unjust person try to get ahead of someone unlike himself and someone like himself? Isn't that what you said?”

“Yes,” he said. 350c

“But the just person won't try to get ahead of someone like himself, only someone unlike himself?”

“Yes.”

“Then the just person resembles the wise and good person, while the unjust person resembles the bad and ignorant person.”

“It looks that way.”

“And we agreed that each person is the kind of person he resembles.”

“Yes, we agreed.”

“So we have found that the just person is good and wise, and the unjust person ignorant and bad.”

Thrasymachus agreed to all this, but not as easily as I tell it now. I had to drag it out of him with great difficulty, and he sweated a remarkable amount, since it was summer. 350d Then for the first time I saw Thrasymachus blush. After we had agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance, I said, “All right, let that stand. But we also said injustice is powerful. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?”

“I remember,” he said. “But I don't like what you've just said, and I have something to say about it. If I said it, I know you'd accuse me of making a speech. So either let me say everything I want, or, if you want to ask questions, ask them. I'll say ‘Fine,’ as one does to old women telling stories, and nod or shake my head.” 350e

“Not if that goes against what you really think,” I said.

“So I'll say what pleases you, since you won't let me speak. What more do you want?”

“Nothing else, by Zeus,” I said. “If that's what you'll do, do it. I'll ask the questions.”

“Then ask.”

“I'll ask what I was asking just now, so that we can continue examining

351a how justice stands in relation to injustice. Someone said that injustice is more effective and powerful than justice. But now,” I said, “if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily turn out to be more powerful than injustice, since injustice is ignorance. No one could fail to see that. Still, Thrasymachus, I don't want to look at it quite so simply. I want to consider it this way. 351b Would you say a city can be unjust, can try unjustly to enslave other cities, and can succeed, holding many cities it has enslaved under its control?”

“Of course,” he said. “And the best city will do that especially well if its injustice is complete.”

“I understand that was your view,” I said. “But here's what I'm wondering about it. Will a city that has become stronger than another city have that power without justice, or will it need justice as well?” 351c

“If things are as you just said, and justice is wisdom, it will need justice,” he said. “If they are as I said, it will need injustice.”

“I'm very pleased, Thrasymachus,” I said, “that you aren't just nodding or shaking your head. You're giving excellent answers.”

“I'm doing it to please you,” he said.

“And I appreciate it. Now please do this too and tell me: do you think a city, an army, a band of robbers or thieves, or any other group that joins together in some unjust undertaking could achieve anything if its members wronged one another?” 351d

“Certainly not,” he said.

“And if they didn't wrong one another, would they do better?”

“Certainly.”

“After all, Thrasymachus, injustice produces conflict, hatred, and fighting among people, while justice produces agreement and friendship. Isn't that so?”

“Let it be so,” he said, “so I don't have to argue with you.”

“Thank you, my friend. Now tell me this: if injustice's effect is to cause hatred wherever it appears, won't it make free people and slaves hate one another, quarrel, and become unable to work 351e together?”

“Certainly.”

“What if it arises between two people? Won't they disagree, hate each other, and become enemies both to each other and to just people?”

“Yes,” he said.

“Now, my remarkable friend, if injustice arises within one person, will it lose its power, or keep it just as fully?”

“Let it keep it just as fully,” he said.

“Then it seems to have this power: wherever it arises, whether in a city, a family, an army, or

352a anything else, it first makes that group unable to act together because its members fight and disagree. It then makes it an enemy to itself, to everything opposed to it, and to the just. Isn't that right?”

“Certainly.”

“And when it is in one person, I think it will do the same things it naturally does. First, it will make him unable to act, because he will be at odds with himself rather than of one mind. Then it will make him an enemy to himself and to just people. Won't it?”

“Yes.”

“And the gods are just too, my friend?”

“Let that be so,” he said. 352b

“Then the unjust person will also be an enemy of the gods, Thrasymachus, while the just person will be their friend.”

“Enjoy your feast of arguments without fear,” he said. “I won't oppose you and make these people dislike me.”

“Come then,” I said, “finish serving me the rest of the feast by answering as you have been. Just people do seem wiser and better and more able to act, while unjust people cannot even work together. 352c And when we say that unjust people have sometimes acted effectively together, we aren't being entirely accurate. If they had been completely unjust, they wouldn't have refrained from wronging each other. Clearly they had some justice among them. It stopped them from wronging each other at the same time as they attacked others, and that let them do what they did. They set out on their unjust undertaking because they were unjust, but only half bad. People who are entirely bad and completely unjust are completely unable to act. 352d That is how I understand things now, rather than the way you first proposed. But we must examine whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust people. That was the question we proposed to examine later. What we have said so far already makes it look that way to me, but we still need to examine it more carefully. We aren't discussing some trivial matter. We are discussing how we ought to live.”

“Then examine it,” he said.

“I will,” I said. “Tell me, do you think a horse has a function?” 352e

“Yes.”

“Would you say the function of a horse, or of anything else, is what you can do only with that thing, or do best with it?”

“I don't understand,” he said.

“Let me put it this way. Can you see with anything other than eyes?”

“No.”

“Can you hear with anything other than ears?”

“Not at all.”

“Then we'd be right to call those their functions?”

“Certainly.”

353a “And you can cut a vine shoot with a knife, a carving blade, and many other tools?”

“Of course.”

“But I think nothing would do it as well as a pruning hook made for that purpose.”

“True.”

“So shall we call that the pruning hook's function?”

“Yes.”

“Now I think you can better understand what I was asking a moment ago: whether a thing's function is what it alone can do, or can do better than anything else.”

“Yes, I understand,” he said, “and I think that's the function of each 353b thing.”

“Good,” I said. “Now do you think each thing with an assigned function also has its own excellence? Let's go over the same examples again. We say eyes have a function?”

“Yes.”

“And do eyes have an excellence?”

“Yes, an excellence too.”

“Did ears have a function?”

“Yes.”

“And an excellence too?”

“Yes.”

“What about everything else? Isn't it the same?”

“Yes.”

“Hold on. Could eyes ever perform their function well 353c if they lacked their own proper excellence and had a defect instead?”

“How could they?” he said. “I suppose you mean blindness instead of sight.”

“Whatever their excellence may be,” I said. “I'm not asking that yet. I'm asking whether things that perform a function will perform it well through their own excellence, and badly through a defect.”

“Yes, that's true,” he said.

“And ears deprived of their own excellence will also perform their function badly?”

“Certainly.” 353d

“Shall we apply the same account to everything else?”

“I think so.”

“Now consider this next point. Is there a function of the soul that you couldn't perform with anything else? For example, looking after things, governing, making decisions, and all such activities: could we rightly assign them to anything other than the soul and say they belong to it alone?”

“To nothing else.”

“And what about living? Shall we say that is a function of the soul?”

“Yes, above all,” he said.

“And we say there is an excellence of the soul?”

“Yes.” 353e

“Now, Thrasymachus, could a soul ever perform its functions well if it lacked its own excellence, or is that impossible?”

“Impossible.”

“Then a bad soul must govern and look after things badly, while a good soul must do all these things well.”

“It must.”

“And didn't we agree that justice is an excellence of the soul, and injustice a defect?”

“We did.”

“Then the just soul and the just person will live well, and the unjust person will live badly.”

“So it appears, according to your argument,” he said.

354a “And someone who lives well is blessed and happy, while someone who doesn't is the opposite.”

“Of course.”

“So the just person is happy and the unjust person miserable.”

“Let it be so,” he said.

“And it doesn't pay to be miserable, but it does pay to be happy.”

“Of course.”

“Then, my dear Thrasymachus, injustice never pays better than justice.”

“Take that as your feast at the festival of Bendis, Socrates,” he said.

“It was you who served it, Thrasymachus,” I said, “now that you've become gentle with me and stopped being angry. But I haven't had a satisfying feast, 354b and that's my fault, not yours. Greedy people grab a taste of each new dish as it comes by before they've properly enjoyed the last one. I think I did the same. Before finding out the first thing we were examining, what justice actually is, I let that go and rushed to examine whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue. Then another claim came along, that injustice pays better than justice, and I couldn't keep from leaving the first question to pursue that one. The result of our discussion is that I know 354c nothing. If I don't know what justice is, I can hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, or whether the person who has it is unhappy or happy.”