Book IX, 587–592

587a reap the truest pleasures.

“Indeed.”

“But whenever one of the other parts gains the mastery, the result is that it cannot discover even its own proper pleasure, and compels the others to pursue a pleasure alien to them and not true.”

“So it is,” he said.

“Then the parts farthest removed from philosophy and reason would produce such results most of all?”

“By far.”

“And what is farthest from reason is surely what is farthest from law and order?”

“Clearly.”

“And were not the desires of love 587b and tyranny shown to be farthest away?”

“By far.”

“While kingly and orderly desires were least far away?”

“Yes.”

“Then I think the tyrant will stand farthest from true pleasure, the pleasure proper to him, and the king nearest.”

“Necessarily.”

“So the tyrant,” I said, “will live the least pleasant life, and the king the most pleasant.”

“Of absolute necessity.”

“Do you know,” I said, “how much less pleasantly the tyrant lives than the king?”

“If you tell me,” he said.

“There are, it seems, three kinds of pleasure, one legitimate and two 587c illegitimate. The tyrant has gone beyond the bounds even of the illegitimate pleasures, fleeing law and reason to dwell with a bodyguard of servile pleasures. How much he falls short is not altogether easy to say—except perhaps in this way.”

“How?” he said.

“The tyrant stood third in distance from the oligarchic man, with the democratic man between them.”

“Yes.”

“Then, if our earlier account was true, the pleasure he lives with would be an image three degrees removed from the pleasure of the oligarchic man, measured against the truth?”

“So it would.”

“And the oligarchic man in turn stands third from the kingly man, if 587d we count aristocratic and kingly as the same.”

“Third, indeed.”

“So the tyrant,” I said, “is three times three removed in number from true pleasure.”

“It appears so.”

“Then the image of tyrannical pleasure, measured by the number expressing its length, would seem to be a plane figure.”

“Exactly.”

“But when raised to the third power, its distance plainly becomes enormous.”

“Plain to anyone who can calculate,” he said.

“Then if someone reverses the calculation and states the distance of the king 587e from the tyrant in respect of true pleasure, he will find, once the multiplication is complete, that the king lives 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant suffers more painfully by that same distance.”

“What an extraordinary calculation you have brought down upon us,” he said, “of the difference 588a between the two men, the just and the unjust, in pleasure and pain!”

“Yet the number is both true,” I said, “and appropriate to lives, if days and nights and months and years are appropriate to them.”

“Of course they are,” he said.

“Then if the good and just man so far surpasses the bad and unjust man in pleasure, how immeasurably greater will his victory be in the dignity, beauty, and virtue of his life?”

“Immeasurably greater, by Zeus,” he said.

588b “Well then,” I said, “now that we have reached this point in the argument, let us take up what was said at the beginning, which brought us here. It was said, I believe, that injustice pays for the man who is perfectly unjust but reputed just. Was that not what was said?”

“It was.”

“Let us speak with its advocate now,” I said, “since we have agreed on the powers possessed by doing injustice and by acting justly.”

“How?” he said.

“By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the man who made that claim may see what he was saying.” 588c

“What kind of image?” he asked.

“One like those ancient creatures told of in myth,” I said, “the Chimaera, Scylla, and Cerberus, and the many others said to have been formed by the growth of several shapes into one.”

“So they are said,” he replied.

“Then fashion a single shape: a beast of many colors and many heads, with heads of tame beasts and wild beasts all around it, able to change and grow all these from within itself.”

588d “That is a task for a formidable sculptor,” he said. “But speech is easier to mold than wax or anything else of the kind; let it be fashioned.”

“Now fashion one other shape, a lion's, and one more, a man's. Let the first be by far the largest, and the second next in size.”

“Those are easier,” he said, “and they are fashioned.”

“Now join the three into one, so that they grow together somehow.”

“They are joined,” he said.

“Then mold around them, on the outside, the likeness of a single creature, a man, so that anyone unable to see within, seeing only the outer 588e covering, will see one living creature, a human being.”

“It is molded,” he said.

“Now let us tell the man who says injustice pays for this human being, while acting justly brings no profit, that what he says means nothing other than this: it pays him to feed the many-shaped beast into strength, and the lion and all that belongs to the lion, while starving 589a the man and making him weak, so that he is dragged wherever either of the others leads him; and to leave them without training them to live together or making them friends, allowing them instead to bite one another and fight and devour one another.”

“That is exactly what the man praising injustice would be saying,” he said.

“And conversely, would not the man who says justice pays maintain that we must act and speak in ways that give the human being within 589b the human being the fullest command? He will tend the many-headed creature like a farmer, nourishing and taming its gentle heads while preventing the wild ones from growing; he will make an ally of the lion's nature, care for all alike, and raise them in friendship with one another and with himself.”

“That is precisely what the man praising justice says in his turn.”

“In every way, then, the man who praises justice speaks truly, 589c and the man who praises injustice speaks falsely. Whether the question is pleasure, good repute, or advantage, the champion of justice tells the truth; his critic has nothing sound to say and does not even know what he is criticizing.”

“No, I think he does not,” he said, “not in any way.”

“Then let us persuade him gently—he does not err willingly—and ask: My fortunate friend, should we not say that our customs of honor and disgrace arose for these very reasons? Honorable customs bring the beastly elements of our nature under the 589d human part, or perhaps rather under the divine; disgraceful customs enslave the gentle to the wild. Will he agree, or what do you think?”

“If he listens to me,” he said.

“Can it profit anyone, then,” I said, “on this argument, to take gold unjustly, if by taking it he enslaves the best in himself 589e to the worst? If taking gold meant enslaving a son or daughter to savage and evil men, it would not profit him, however much gold he received; but if he enslaves the most divine thing in himself to the most godless and polluted, and feels no pity, is he not miserable, and is he not accepting gold as a bribe for a 590a far more dreadful ruin than Eriphyle did when she received the necklace at the cost of her husband's life?”

“Far more dreadful,” said Glaucon. “I will answer for him.”

“And do you think licentiousness has long been censured for this very reason: because in such a person the terrible creature, that huge and many-shaped beast, is given more freedom than it ought to have?”

“Clearly,” he said.

“And are arrogance and ill temper not censured when the lionlike 590b and serpentine element grows and strains beyond measure?”

“Certainly.”

“And are luxury and softness not censured because they relax and slacken this same element, breeding cowardice in it?”

“Of course.”

“And flattery and servility—are they not censured when someone places this same spirited element beneath the moblike beast, and, for the sake of money and that beast's insatiable appetite, trains it from youth through humiliations to become a monkey instead of a lion?”

590c “Very much so,” he said.

“And why do you think mechanical and manual labor bring reproach? Is it for any reason other than that a person may have the better part naturally weak, unable to rule the creatures within him but only to serve them and learn how to flatter them?”

“So it seems,” he said.

“Then, so that such a person too may be ruled by a principle like that which rules the best man, we say he should be the servant of that better man 590d who has the divine ruling principle within him. We do not think the servant should be ruled to his harm, as Thrasymachus thought of those under rule, but because it is better for everyone to be governed by what is divine and wise—best of all when it is his own within him, otherwise when it is set over him from without—so that, as far as possible, we may all be alike and friends, guided by the same principle.”

“Quite right,” he said.

590e “And the law,” I said, “also shows that this is what it desires, since it is an ally to everyone in the city;

so too does our governance of children: we do not let them go free until we have established a constitution in them as in a city, and, by nurturing their best part with the corresponding part in ourselves, have installed a guardian and ruler like it within them; only then 591a do we set them free.”

“That does show it,” he said.

“On what grounds, then, Glaucon, and by what reasoning, can we say that it pays to commit injustice, to live without restraint, or to do anything shameful, if it makes one worse though one gains more money or some other power?”

“On none,” he said.

“And how can it pay to commit injustice without being found out and brought to justice? 591b Does not the man who escapes detection become still worse, while in the man discovered and punished the beastly element is lulled and tamed, and the gentle element set free? His whole soul, restored to its best nature, acquires a state more precious through the possession of moderation, justice, and wisdom than the body acquires through strength and beauty together with health, by as much as the soul is more precious than the body.”

“Certainly,” he said.

591c “Then a person of understanding will direct his whole life toward this. First, he will honor the studies that make his soul such as this, and disregard the others.”

“Clearly,” he said.

“Next,” I said, “in the care and nourishment of his body, he will not turn his life over to beastly and irrational pleasure and make that his chief concern. Nor will he aim solely at health, or put first the prospect of becoming strong, healthy, or handsome, unless these things 591d will also make him moderate. Rather, he will always tune the harmony of his body for the sake of the concord of his soul.”

“Certainly,” he said, “if he is to be truly musical.”

“And will he not also seek order and concord in acquiring money? He will not be dazzled by the multitude's congratulations and increase his wealth without limit, thereby bringing upon himself troubles without limit?”

“I do not think he will,” he said.

591e “Instead,” I said, “he will look to the constitution within himself, guarding against any disturbance there from having too much property or too little. Steering by that principle, he will add to or spend his substance as far as he can.”

“Exactly,” he said.

592a “And with that same end in view he will willingly share in and taste the honors he believes will make him a better man, but avoid, in private and in public, those that would undo the condition he already has.”

“Then he will not be willing to engage in politics,” he said, “if he cares about this.”

“By the dog,” I said, “he certainly will in his own city, though perhaps not in his native land, unless some divine fortune intervenes.”

“I understand,” he said. “You mean the city we have just described in founding, the one laid down in words. I think it exists nowhere 592b on earth.”

“But perhaps,” I said, “a pattern of it is set up in heaven for anyone who wishes to look upon it and, seeing it, to found himself upon it. Whether it exists somewhere, or ever will, makes no difference: the affairs of this city alone are the ones he would undertake, and those of no other.”

“That seems likely,” he said.

587a enjoy the truest pleasures.

“Absolutely.”

“But whenever one of the other parts takes control, it cannot find its own pleasure. It also forces the other parts to chase a pleasure that belongs to someone else and is not real.”

“Yes,” he said.

“Then the parts furthest from philosophy and reason would produce the most pleasures of that sort?”

“By far.”

“And what is furthest from reason is also furthest from law and order?”

“Clearly.”

“And the desires furthest away proved to be the desires of love 587b and tyranny?”

“By far.”

“While the desires of a king, a disciplined person, were closest?”

“Yes.”

“So I think the tyrant will be furthest from pleasure that is real and properly his own, while the other man will be closest.”

“He must be.”

“The tyrant, then,” I said, “will live the least pleasant life, and the king the most pleasant.”

“They certainly will.”

“Do you know,” I asked, “how much less pleasantly the tyrant lives than the king?”

“Tell me,” he said.

“There seem to be three kinds of pleasure, one genuine and two 587c counterfeit. The tyrant goes beyond the counterfeit kinds. He runs from law and reason and lives with slave pleasures as his bodyguards. How far he falls short is not easy to say, except perhaps like this.”

“How?” he said.

“The tyrant stands third from the oligarchic man. The democratic man stands between them.”

“Yes.”

“If what we said earlier is true, then the pleasure he lives with is a third-level image of pleasure, measured from the oligarchic man toward reality?”

“Yes.”

“And the oligarchic man in turn stands third from the kingly man, if 587d we count the aristocratic and kingly man as one.”

“He does.”

“So,” I said, “the tyrant is three times three removed from true pleasure, if we count along a line.”

“Apparently.”

“Then the image of a tyrant’s pleasure seems to form a flat surface when we count its length.”

“Exactly.”

“But raise it to the third power, and it becomes clear how great the distance is.”

“Clear to anyone who can calculate,” he said.

“Then suppose someone reverses the calculation and states the true distance between the king’s pleasure 587e and the tyrant’s. When the multiplication is complete, he will find that the king lives 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant lives the same number of times more painfully.”

“You have come up with an astonishing calculation,” he said, “of the difference 588a between the two men, the just and the unjust, in pleasure and pain.”

“And it is a true number,” I said, “suited to human lives, if days and nights and months and years belong to those lives.”

“They certainly do,” he said.

“So if the good and just man beats the bad and unjust man by so much in pleasure, by how much more will he beat him in the grace, beauty, and excellence of his life?”

“By an astonishing amount, by Zeus,” he said. 588b

“Well then,” I said, “now that we have reached this point in our argument, let’s return to the first claim, the one that brought us here. Someone said injustice pays for a person who is completely unjust but is thought to be just. Wasn’t that the claim?”

“It was.”

“Now let’s talk with the person who made it. We have agreed on the effects of doing wrong and doing what is just.”

“How?” he said.

“Let’s make a picture of the soul in words, so the person who made that claim can see what he was saying.” 588c

“What kind of picture?” he asked.

“Something like the creatures said to have existed in old stories: the Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus. There are plenty of others said to combine many forms in one body.”

“There are,” he said.

“Imagine one form as a many-colored beast with many heads. It has the heads of tame and wild animals all around it and can change and grow all these heads out of itself.” 588d

“That would take a remarkable sculptor,” he said. “But words are easier to shape than wax or anything like it. So let’s imagine it.”

“Now imagine a second form, a lion, and a third, a human being. Let the first be much the largest and the second the next largest.”

“That’s easier,” he said. “Done.”

“Now join all three into one so that they grow together.”

“They’re joined,” he said.

“Give them an outer covering shaped like a single human being. Then someone who cannot see inside but sees only the outer 588e casing will think it is one creature, a human being.”

“Done,” he said.

“Now let’s speak to the man who says injustice pays for this human being and justice does not. What he really says is that a person profits by feeding the many-sided beast until it is strong, along with the lion and everything belonging to the lion. He should starve 589a the human being and make him weak, so either of the other two can drag him wherever it wants. He should not get them used to each other or make them friends. Instead, he should let them bite each other and fight and eat each other.”

“That is exactly what someone who praises injustice would be saying,” he said.

“On the other hand, someone who says justice pays would say that a person must act and speak in ways that give the human being inside 589b the most control over the whole person. He will care for the many-headed creature like a farmer. He will feed and tame its gentle heads and keep its wild heads from growing. He will make an ally of the lion’s nature, care for all of them together, and make them friendly to one another and to himself. That is how he will raise them.”

“That is exactly what someone who praises justice would say.”

“By every measure, then, the person who praises justice 589c would be telling the truth, and the person who praises injustice would be lying. Whether we look at pleasure, a good reputation, or benefit, the defender of justice speaks truly. Its critic says nothing sound. He criticizes what he does not understand.”

“I don’t think he understands it at all,” he said.

“Then let’s persuade him gently. He does not go wrong on purpose. Let’s ask: ‘My friend, wouldn’t we say this is also why customs about what is honorable and shameful arose? Honorable customs put the beastlike part of our nature under 589d the human part, or rather, perhaps, under the divine part. Shameful customs enslave the gentle part to the wild part.’ Would he agree, or not?”

“He would if he listened to me,” he said.

“Can anyone, by that argument, benefit from taking gold unjustly? Suppose that, as he takes the gold, he also enslaves the best part of himself 589e to the worst. If he took gold in exchange for enslaving a son or daughter to savage, wicked men, the money would do him no good, however large the sum. But when he mercilessly enslaves his most divine part to what is most godless and filthy, isn’t he miserable? Isn’t the ruin for which he takes gold 590a far worse than the ruin Eriphyle brought upon herself when she took a necklace in exchange for her husband’s life?”

“Far worse,” said Glaucon. “I’ll answer for him.”

“And don’t you think the reason people have always criticized a lack of self-control is that it lets that fearsome, huge, many-shaped creature loose beyond proper limits?”

“Clearly,” he said.

“And stubbornness and bad temper are criticized, aren’t they, when the lionlike 590b and snakelike part grows too strong and strains against the rest?”

“Certainly.”

“And luxury and softness are criticized because they loosen and relax that same part until it becomes cowardly?”

“Of course.”

“And flattery and a slavish character are criticized when someone puts that same spirited part under the crowdlike beast. For money, and to satisfy that beast’s greed, he gets it used to being abused from youth onward. Instead of a lion it becomes an ape.” 590c

“Exactly,” he said.

“Why do you think manual trades and craft work are treated with contempt? Isn’t it because someone whose best part is naturally weak cannot rule the creatures inside him? Instead, he serves them and can learn only how to please them?”

“That seems right,” he said.

“Then, so that such a person can be ruled by the same kind of principle that rules the best person, we say he should serve that better person, 590d who has the divine ruler within himself. We do not think he should be ruled to his own harm, as Thrasymachus thought about those who are ruled. Rather, everyone is better off being ruled by what is divine and wise, preferably within himself, but if not, governing him from outside. That way we can all be alike and friends as far as possible, guided by the same principle.”

“Quite right,” he said. 590e

“The law also shows that this is what it wants,” I said. “It is an ally to everyone in the city. The way we rule children shows the same thing. We do not let them be free until we establish a government in them as in a city. We nurture their best part using the best part in us, and set up a similar guardian 591a and ruler within them. Only then do we let them go free.”

“It does show that,” he said.

“So, Glaucon, on what grounds could we say it pays to do wrong, to lack self-control, or to do anything shameful, if the person becomes worse even while gaining more money or some other power?”

“On no grounds,” he said.

“And how could it pay to do wrong without being caught or punished? 591b Doesn’t the person who escapes notice become still worse? But in the person who is caught and punished, the beastlike part is quieted and tamed, and the gentle part is set free. As the whole soul is brought into its best condition, it gains self-control, justice, and wisdom. That state is more valuable than a body that gains strength and beauty along with health, just as the soul is more valuable than the body.”

“Absolutely,” he said. 591c

“Then a sensible person will direct everything in his life toward that goal. First, he will value studies that make his soul like that and disregard the others.”

“Clearly,” he said.

“Next,” I said, “he will not surrender the care and feeding of his body to animal pleasures without reason and devote his life to those. But he will not even take health as his sole goal. He will not prize becoming strong, healthy, or handsome unless 591d it also helps him become self-controlled. He will always bring his body into balance for the sake of harmony in his soul.”

“Yes, if he really intends to live in harmony,” he said.

“And won’t he also bring order and balance to his acquisition of money? He will not be dazzled when the crowd praises great wealth and keep adding to it without limit, bringing himself endless trouble.”

“I don’t think he will,” he said. 591e

“Instead,” I said, “he will watch the government within himself. He will guard against disturbing any of its parts through too much money or too little. In this way he will manage his affairs, adding to his property or spending from it as far as he can.”

“Exactly,” he said.

“592a With the same goal in mind, he will willingly take part in and enjoy honors he believes will make him better. He will avoid, in private or in public, honors that would upset his existing character.”

“Then if that is his concern, he will not want to take part in politics,” he said.

“By the dog,” I said, “he certainly will in his own city, though perhaps not in the land of his birth, unless some divine chance brings it about.”

“I see,” he said. “You mean the city we have just described in words as we founded it. I don’t think it exists anywhere 592b on earth.”

“But perhaps,” I said, “a model of it is laid up in heaven for anyone who wants to see it and, by seeing it, establish it within himself. It makes no difference whether that city exists anywhere or ever will. He would take part in the affairs of that city alone, and no other.”

“That seems likely,” he said.