Book VI, 484–492

484a “So, Glaucon,” I said, “after a long and arduous argument, we have at last brought to light who the philosophers are and who are not.”

“Perhaps,” he said, “it could hardly have been done briefly.”

“Apparently not. Yet I think they would have come into clearer view if we had only this to discuss, and did not still have so much to traverse before we can see how the life of the just person differs 484b from that of the unjust.”

“What comes next, then?” he asked.

“What else,” I said, “but the next question? Since philosophers are those able to grasp what remains forever in the same condition, while those who cannot, wandering among things many and various, are not philosophers, which of the two should lead the city?”

“How should we put the answer fairly?” he asked.

“Whichever are shown capable of guarding the laws and customs of cities,” I said, “those are the ones to appoint 484c guardians.”

“Right,” he said.

“And this,” I said: “is it clear whether the guardian set to watch over anything should be blind or keen-sighted?”

“How could it not be clear?” he said.

“Do you think those who truly lack knowledge of the being of each thing differ at all from the blind? They have no clear pattern in their souls, and cannot, like painters looking toward the truest original, continually referring back to it 484d and studying it as exactly as possible, establish laws here concerning beautiful, just, and good things when laws need establishing, or preserve the laws already established by guarding them.”

“By Zeus,” he said, “there is little difference.”

“Shall we then appoint these as guardians rather than those who know the being of each thing, yet are no less experienced than the others and inferior in no other part of virtue?”

“It would be absurd to choose anyone else,” he said, “if they lack nothing in the other respects; for in this very thing, virtually the greatest, they would excel.”

485a “Then let us explain how the same people can possess both this and the other qualifications.”

“Certainly.”

“As we said at the beginning of this discussion, we must first understand their nature. And I think that if we reach sufficient agreement on that, we shall agree both that the same people can possess these qualities and that no others should lead cities.”

“How?”

“Let this, then, be agreed about philosophic natures: 485b they are always in love with the learning that reveals to them that being which is forever, untouched by the wanderings of coming-to-be and decay.”

“Agreed.”

“And further,” I said, “they love all of it and willingly let go of no part, small or great, more honored or less, as we explained earlier in speaking of lovers of honor and of other lovers.”

“You are right,” he said.

“Now consider whether those who are to be what we described must also possess 485c this further quality in their nature.”

“What quality?”

“Truthfulness: they must willingly admit no falsehood whatever, but hate it and cherish truth.”

“That is likely,” he said.

“Not only likely, my friend; one who is by nature a lover of something must love everything akin and dear to the beloved.”

“Right,” he said.

“Can you find anything more closely akin to wisdom than truth?”

“How could I?”

“Can the same nature, then, love both wisdom and 485d falsehood?”

“Not at all.”

“Then the genuine lover of learning must strive for every kind of truth, as ardently as possible, from earliest youth.”

“Absolutely.”

“And we know, surely, that when a person's desires flow powerfully in one direction, they are weaker elsewhere, as when a stream is diverted into one channel.”

“Of course.”

“In the person whose desires have flowed toward learning and everything of that sort, they will, I think, be concerned with the pleasure of the soul itself, in its own right, and abandon pleasures that come through the body—provided he is a philosopher in truth, not 485e merely in appearance.”

“Necessarily so.”

“Such a person will be temperate, too, and in no way a lover of money; for the things that make money, with all its expense, an object of eager pursuit are more properly someone else's concern than his.”

“So it is.”

486a “Here is something else you must consider when judging whether a nature is philosophic or not.”

“What?”

“Watch lest it harbor any illiberality. Pettiness, surely, is the very opposite of what belongs to a soul destined always to reach toward the whole of things, divine and human alike.”

“Most true,” he said.

“Then do you suppose that someone whose mind possesses grandeur and a vision of all time and all being can regard human life as a thing of great importance?”

“Impossible,” he said. 486b

“And such a person will not regard death as something terrible?”

“Least of all.”

“So a cowardly and illiberal nature, it seems, could have no share in true philosophy.”

“I think not.”

“What, then? Can someone orderly, neither money-loving nor illiberal nor boastful nor cowardly, become harsh in dealings with others or unjust?”

“No.”

“So when you examine whether a soul is philosophic, you will look even in youth to see whether it is just and gentle, or unsociable and savage.”

“Certainly.” 486c

“Nor, I think, will you overlook this.”

“What?”

“Whether it learns easily or with difficulty. Can you expect anyone ever to love a pursuit adequately if he follows it with pain and scarcely makes a little progress?”

“No.”

“And if he cannot retain anything he learns, being full of forgetfulness, can he possibly be anything but empty of knowledge?”

“How could he?”

“Then, laboring to no purpose, don't you think he will end by hating both himself and his pursuit?”

“How could he not?” 486d

“Let us never, then, include a forgetful soul among those sufficiently fit for philosophy; we must require a good memory.”

“By all means.”

“And surely we would say that a nature without grace or harmony tends nowhere but toward excess.”

“Of course.”

“Do you think truth is akin to excess or to measure?”

“To measure.”

“Then besides the other qualities, let us seek a mind naturally measured and gracious, whose inborn disposition will readily guide it toward the Form of each thing that is.”

“Certainly.” 486e

“Well, do you think any of the qualities we have described are unnecessary, or fail to follow one another in a soul destined to have a sufficient and complete share in being?”

487a “They could not be more necessary,” he said.

“Can you find fault, then, with a pursuit that no one could practice adequately unless he were by nature retentive, quick to learn, great-souled, gracious, and a friend and kinsman to truth, justice, courage, and temperance?”

“Not even Momus,” he said, “could find fault with that.”

“And when people of this kind have matured through education and age,” I said, “would you not entrust the city to them alone?” 487b

Then Adeimantus said, “Socrates, no one could contradict you on these points. But here is what happens to your listeners whenever you speak like this. They think that, through inexperience in questions and answers, they are led a little astray by the argument at each question; when all those small deviations are added together at the end, a great error appears, contradicting their original position. And just as unskilled players are finally hemmed in by experts at the board game and have no move to make, so they too are finally hemmed in and have nothing 487c to say, by a different kind of game played not with pieces but with words. Yet this does nothing to settle the truth. I say this with an eye to our present case. Someone might say to you now that he cannot oppose you in words on each separate question, but sees in practice that those who take up philosophy and, instead of studying it in youth for the sake of an education 487d and then leaving it, linger with it longer—the great majority become altogether eccentric, not to say thoroughly wicked; while even those thought most decent are rendered useless to their cities by the very pursuit you praise.”

Hearing this, I said, “Do you think those who say this are lying?”

“I don't know,” he said, “but I should be glad to hear what you think.”

“You would hear that I think they speak the truth.” 487e

“Then how can it be right to say that cities will never be rid of their troubles until philosophers rule in them, when we agree that philosophers are useless to them?”

“You ask a question,” I said, “that calls for an answer in the form of an image.”

“And you, I suppose,” he said, “are quite unaccustomed to speaking in images.”

“Very well,” I said. “You mock me after drawing me into so 488a hard a demonstration! Hear the image, then, and see all the better how clumsy I am at making comparisons. What happens to the best men in their dealings with cities is so strange that there is no single other situation like it; one must draw the likeness from many things in defending them, as painters combine goat-stags and other such creatures. Imagine this happening on one ship or several: a shipowner larger and 488b stronger than everyone aboard, but rather deaf, rather shortsighted, and no better equipped in seamanship; and sailors quarreling with one another over the helm, each thinking he ought to steer, though none has ever learned the art or can name his teacher or the time when he learned. What is more, they insist it cannot be taught, and stand ready to cut to pieces anyone who says it can. They continually crowd around 488c the shipowner, pleading and doing everything they can to make him hand over the rudder to them. Sometimes, if others prevail over them, they kill those others or throw them off the ship. Then, having subdued the noble shipowner with mandrake, drink, or some other means, they take command of the ship and use up its stores, drinking and feasting as men of their sort might be expected to do while they sail. Moreover, they praise 488d and call a man a sailor, a pilot, and a master of seamanship if he is clever at securing command for them by persuading or coercing the shipowner; anyone who is not they condemn as useless. Of the true pilot they have no understanding: that he must attend to the year, the seasons, the heavens, the stars, the winds, and everything else belonging to his art if he is truly to command a ship. As for learning how to steer 488e whether others want it or not, they think it impossible to acquire both that skill and its practice together with the art of navigation. When such things happen aboard ships, don't you think the true pilot would actually be called a stargazer, a chatterer, and a useless man 489a by those sailing on ships organized in this way?”

“Certainly,” said Adeimantus.

“I don't think,” I said, “you need the image explained in detail to see its likeness to the attitude of cities toward true philosophers; you understand what I mean.”

“Indeed I do,” he said.

“Then first teach this image to the man who wonders why philosophers are not honored in cities, and try to persuade him that it would be far more astonishing 489b if they were honored.”

“I will,” he said.

“And tell him that you speak truly when you say that the best philosophers are useless to the many. But bid him blame their uselessness on those who do not make use of them, not on the decent men themselves. A pilot does not naturally beg sailors to accept his command, nor do the wise naturally go to the doors of the rich. The man who devised that clever saying spoke falsely. The truth is that anyone who is ill, whether rich or poor, must go to the doors of physicians, 489c and everyone needing to be ruled must go to the person capable of ruling. It is not for a ruler, if he is truly of any use, to beg those he rules to let him rule. You will not err if you compare today's political rulers to the sailors we described, and those whom they call useless and star-gazing talkers to the true pilots.”

“Quite right,” he said.

“Under these circumstances, then, it is not easy for the best pursuit to win esteem among people who pursue its opposite. But by far the gravest and strongest slander against philosophy comes from those who claim to practice it. Your critic of philosophy says that 489d most of those who turn to it are utterly wicked, and the best are useless; and I agreed that you spoke truly. Did I not?”

“Yes.”

“Have we now explained the reason for the decent ones' uselessness?”

“Fully.”

“Shall we next examine why the majority inevitably become wicked, and try, if we can, to show that philosophy is not responsible for this either?” 489e

“By all means.”

“Let us speak and listen, then, recalling the point from which we described the nature a person must have to become noble and good. 490a Truth, if you remember, led that nature first of all; a person had to pursue it in every way, or else, being a fraud, have no share in true philosophy.”

“That is what we said,” he replied.

“And this one point is sharply at odds with current opinion about him, isn't it?”

“Very much so,” he said.

“Would this be a fair defense of our position, then? The genuine lover of learning is by nature driven to contend for being, and does not 490b rest with the many particular things that seem to be. He goes forward; his love neither grows dull nor gives out until he touches the very nature of what each thing is, with that part of the soul suited to grasp it—the part akin to it. Drawing near with that part and joining with what truly is, he gives birth to understanding and truth; then he knows, truly lives and is nourished, and only then is delivered of his labor pains, not before.”

“That is as fair a defense as could be,” he said.

“Then would such a man have any part in loving falsehood, or rather in hating it altogether?” 490c

“In hating it,” he said.

“When truth leads the way, I think we could never say that a chorus of evils follows her.”

“How could we?”

“Rather, a sound and just character follows, with temperance attending it.”

“Right,” he said.

“And why marshal the rest of the philosopher's natural company all over again? You remember that courage, greatness of soul, quickness to learn, and memory proved to be their proper companions. You objected that everyone would have to 490d agree with what we say, yet, setting aside our arguments and looking at the people in question, would claim to see some who are useless and most who are wicked in every way. We are now examining the cause of this slander, asking why most become wicked; and this is why we have taken up the nature of true philosophers once more and defined it as necessity required.”

“So we have,” he said. 490e

“Now,” I said, “we must look at the corruption of this nature: how it is destroyed in most people, though a small remnant escapes, those called not wicked but useless. 491a After that, we must look at the natures that imitate it and take up its pursuit: what kinds of souls come to a pursuit unworthy of them and beyond their powers, go astray in many ways, and everywhere attach to philosophy, in everyone's eyes, the reputation you speak of.”

“What kinds of corruption do you mean?” he asked.

“I shall try to describe them if I can,” I said. “Everyone, I think, will agree that a nature possessing all the qualities we assigned it just now, if it is to become a philosopher in the fullest sense, arises rarely among human beings, and in very few. Don't you think so?” 491b

“Very much so.”

“Consider, then, how many great perils beset these few.”

“What perils?”

“Strangest of all to hear, each one of the qualities for which we praised this nature destroys the soul that possesses it and tears it away from philosophy. I mean courage, temperance, and all the qualities we listed.”

“That sounds strange,” he said. 491c

“And besides these, all the things called good corrupt and draw it away: beauty, wealth, bodily strength, powerful family connections within the city, and everything akin to these. You see the general shape of what I mean.”

“I do,” he said, “but I would gladly hear a more exact account.”

“Then grasp the whole matter properly,” I said, “and it will become clear to you, and what we said before about these things will no longer seem strange.”

“How shall I do that?” he asked. 491d

“We know that every seed and living thing, whether a plant of the earth or an animal, if it fails to obtain the nourishment, season, and place appropriate to it, is deficient in what it needs in proportion to its strength: the stronger it is, the more it lacks. For what is bad is more opposed to what is good than to what is not good.”

“Of course.”

“It stands to reason, then, that the finest nature fares worse under unsuitable nourishment than an inferior one.”

“It does.” 491e

“Shall we say likewise, Adeimantus, that the best-endowed souls become exceptionally bad when they meet with a bad education? Or do you think great crimes and unalloyed wickedness spring from an inferior nature, not a vigorous one ruined by its upbringing, while a weak nature can never be the cause of great good or great evil?”

“No,” he said, “it is as you say.”

492a “So the nature we assigned to the philosopher, if it receives the learning appropriate to it, must, I think, grow into every virtue; but if it is sown and planted where it does not belong and brought up there, it grows toward every opposite, unless some god happens to come to its aid. Or do you too believe, as most do, that certain young men are corrupted by sophists, and certain private sophists corrupt them to any significant degree? Is it not rather the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists, educating most completely and shaping young and old, men and women, into whatever they wish?” 492b

“When do they do this?” he asked.

“When the multitude sits together in assemblies, law courts, theaters, camps, or any other gathering of a crowd, and with a great uproar condemns some things said or done and praises others, extravagantly in either direction, shouting and clapping, while the rocks and the place where they meet echo back 492c twice the din of their praise and blame. In such a setting, what heart do you think a young man has, as the saying goes? What private education of his [could] hold out, rather than be overwhelmed by such blame and praise and swept along wherever that current carries him? Will he not call the same things beautiful and shameful as they do, pursue what they pursue, and become just like them?”

“He can hardly do otherwise, Socrates,” he said. 492d

“And yet,” I said, “we have not mentioned their greatest compulsion.”

“What is it?” he asked.

“What these educators and sophists add in deeds when words do not persuade. Don't you know they punish anyone who disobeys them with loss of rights, fines, and death?”

“I know it very well,” he said.

“What other sophist, then, or what private person's arguments directed against these could possibly prevail?” 492e

“None, I think,” he said.

“No,” I said; “indeed, even to attempt it is great folly. For a human character educated by them toward a different kind of virtue neither comes into being nor has come into being nor ever will. We must except a divine character from our account, my friend, as the proverb says. You may be sure that whatever survives and

484a “So, Glaucon,” I said, “after a long discussion, we have barely managed to show who the philosophers are and who the others are.”

“Perhaps,” he said, “it isn't easy to do in a short discussion.”

“It doesn't seem so,” I said. “Still, I think we could show it better if that were our only subject. But we have many other things to cover if we are going to see how a just life differs 484b from an unjust one.”

“What comes next for us, then?” he asked.

“What else but the next question?” I said. “Philosophers can grasp what always stays the same. Those who cannot, but wander among the many things that change in every way, are not philosophers. Which group should lead a city?”

“How should we put the answer fairly?” he asked.

“We should appoint as 484c guardians the ones who show they can protect a city's laws and customs,” I said.

“Right,” he said.

“And this,” I said: “Is it clear whether a guard watching over anything should be blind or sharp-sighted?”

“Of course it's clear,” he said.

“Then do those who lack knowledge of what each thing really is seem any different from blind people? They have no clear model in their souls. They cannot look toward the truest reality as a painter looks toward a model, constantly refer back to it, 484d and examine it as precisely as possible. So they cannot establish rules here about what is beautiful, just, and good, if rules need establishing, or protect the rules already in place.”

“By Zeus, they aren't much different,” he said.

“Should we appoint them guardians instead of people who know what each thing is, and who are no less experienced than the others and lack nothing else in virtue?”

“It would be strange to choose anyone else,” he said, “provided they lack nothing else. This knowledge is probably their greatest advantage.”

485a “Then let's ask how the same people can have both that knowledge and those other qualities.”

“Yes, let's.”

“As we said at the start of this discussion, first we must understand their nature. I think that if we agree on it adequately, we'll also agree that the same people can have these qualities and that no one else should lead cities.”

“How?”

“Let's agree on this about philosophical natures: 485b they always love the kind of learning that shows them the reality that always exists, without being tossed about by coming into being and passing away.”

“Agreed.”

“And,” I said, “they love all of it. They willingly leave out no part, small or large, more honored or less honored. That's like what we said earlier about ambitious people and lovers.”

“You're right,” he said.

“Now consider whether people who are to be as we described must also have 485c this quality in their nature.”

“Which one?”

“Truthfulness. They must refuse to accept lies willingly, hate them, and love the truth.”

“That seems likely,” he said.

“It's more than likely, my friend. Anyone naturally in love with something must love everything related and close to what they love.”

“Right,” he said.

“Can you find anything closer to wisdom than truth?”

“How could I?” he said.

“Then can the same nature love both wisdom and 485d lies?”

“Not at all.”

“Someone who really loves learning, then, must reach for every kind of truth as much as possible from youth onward.”

“Absolutely.”

“But when a person's desires lean strongly in one direction, we know they are weaker in the others. It's like a stream diverted into one channel.”

“Yes.”

“When a person's desires flow toward learning and everything like it, I think they will care about the soul's own pleasure. They will give up bodily pleasures, if they are a 485e genuine philosopher rather than a fake one.”

“They must.”

“Such a person will be self-controlled and no lover of money. The reasons people work hard to get money and spend so much of it matter more to someone else than to this person.”

“That's so.”

486a “And there's something else to look for when deciding whether someone has a philosophical nature.”

“What?”

“Make sure there is nothing petty or ungenerous in it. Small-mindedness is the exact opposite of a soul that will always reach for everything, divine and human.”

“Very true,” he said.

“When a mind has a broad view and can look at all time and all reality, do you think it can regard human life as a great thing?”

“It can't,” he said. 486b

“And such a person won't regard death as something terrible?”

“Not at all.”

“So a cowardly, ungenerous nature, it seems, cannot share in true philosophy.”

“I don't think it can.”

“Then can someone who is orderly, not greedy, not small-minded, not boastful, and not cowardly be hard to get along with or unjust?”

“No.”

“So when you examine a young person for a philosophical soul, you will check right away whether they are just and gentle, or unsociable and savage.”

“Certainly.” 486c

“And I think there's something else you won't overlook.”

“What?”

“Whether they learn easily or with difficulty. Could you expect anyone to love doing something that hurts them and that they barely make progress in?”

“No.”

“And if someone can't retain anything they learn because they're full of forgetfulness, can they avoid being empty of knowledge?”

“How could they?”

“If all their efforts achieve nothing, won't they end up hating themselves and that activity?”

“Of course.” 486d

“Then let's never count a forgetful soul among those fit for philosophy. We must look for a good memory.”

“Absolutely.”

“And we would say an uncultured, clumsy nature tends toward excess, wouldn't we?”

“Yes.”

“Do you think truth is related to excess or to a sense of measure?”

“To a sense of measure.”

“So, along with the other qualities, let's seek a mind naturally measured and graceful. Its nature will readily lead it toward the Form of what each thing is.”

“Of course.” 486e

“Do you think any of these qualities we have gone through are unnecessary, or unrelated to one another, for a soul that will have a full and complete grasp of reality?”

487a “They are all absolutely necessary,” he said.

“Can you find fault with a pursuit that no one can practice properly without being naturally able to remember and learn easily, broad-minded and graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and self-control?”

“Not even Momus, the god of faultfinding, could find fault with that,” he said.

“And once education and age have brought such people to maturity,” I said, “wouldn't you entrust the city to them alone?” 487b

Then Adeimantus said, “Socrates, no one could contradict what you've just said. But people listening to arguments like yours have a certain experience. They think their lack of practice in questions and answers lets the argument nudge them a little off course with each question. By the end, those little steps add up to a big mistake, the opposite of where they began. It's like a game in which skilled players finally trap the unskilled, leaving them no move 487c to make. They too feel trapped at the end, with nothing to say. This is a different sort of game, played with words rather than counters. But the truth is no more on your side because of that. I'm talking about the present case. Someone might say that they cannot answer each of your questions with a counterargument. But in practice they see what happens to people who take up philosophy: if, instead of touching it when young as part of their education 487d and then leaving it, they stay with it longer, most become downright odd, if not thoroughly bad. Even those who seem best end up, because of the practice you praise, useless to their cities.”

After hearing this, I said, “Do you think the people who say that are lying?”

“I don't know,” he said, “but I'd like to hear what you think.”

“Then you'll hear that I think they're telling the truth.” 487e

“How can it be right,” he asked, “to say that cities won't be free of troubles until philosophers rule them, if we agree that philosophers are useless to those cities?”

“That question,” I said, “needs an answer in the form of a comparison.”

“And I suppose,” he said, “you aren't used to using comparisons.”

“All right,” I said. “You make fun of me after getting me into an argument that's so 488a hard to prove! Listen to my comparison and see how much trouble I have making one. The best philosophers' situation in relation to cities is so difficult to describe that no single example matches it. To make a case for them, I have to put together several things in a comparison, like painters who combine a goat and a stag or other creatures in a picture. Imagine this happening on one ship, or on many. The shipowner is taller and 488b stronger than everyone aboard, but he is rather deaf, his sight is just as poor, and his knowledge of sailing is no better. The sailors fight one another over who will steer. Each thinks he ought to steer, though he has never learned the skill and cannot name a teacher or a time when he studied it. They say it cannot be taught at all. They're even ready to cut to pieces anyone who says it can. They constantly crowd around 488c the shipowner, begging and doing everything possible to get him to hand over the rudder. Sometimes another group wins him over instead. Then they kill those rivals or throw them off the ship. They drug the noble shipowner with mandrake, get him drunk, or disable him some other way. They take control of the ship and use its supplies. They drink and feast as they sail, as you would expect. On top of this, 488d they praise anyone good at helping them gain control by persuading or forcing the shipowner. They call him a sailor, a pilot, and an expert on ships. They call anyone who cannot do that useless. They don't even understand that a true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons, the sky, the stars, the winds, and everything else belonging to the skill, if he is really going to command a ship. They think there is no way to acquire either the skill or the practice of steering 488e when people want you to, or when they don't, while also acquiring the art of navigation.

“When this is how ships are run, don't you think the sailors aboard would call the person who really knows how to pilot one a stargazer, 489a a chatterbox, and useless to them?”

“They certainly would,” said Adeimantus.

“I don't think,” I said, “you need the comparison explained in detail to see that it resembles the attitude of cities toward true philosophers. You understand what I mean.”

“I certainly do,” he said.

“First, then, tell this comparison to anyone surprised that philosophers aren't honored in cities. Try to convince him it would be much more surprising 489b if they were honored.”

“I will,” he said.

“And tell him he's right that the best philosophers are useless to most people. But tell him to blame those who don't use them for their uselessness, not the good philosophers themselves. It isn't natural for a pilot to beg sailors to let him command, or for wise people to go begging at rich people's doors. Whoever made that clever remark was lying. The truth is that anyone who is sick, rich or poor, must 489c go to the doctor's door. And anyone who needs to be governed must go to someone who can govern. A ruler who truly does people good does not need to beg those people to accept his rule. You would be right to compare today's political leaders to the sailors we described. And you would be right to compare the people they call useless stargazers to true pilots.”

“Exactly,” he said.

“So in these conditions the best pursuit won't easily gain respect from people pursuing its opposite. 489d But the greatest and strongest slander against philosophy comes from people who claim to practice it. You said that its critic calls most who turn to it thoroughly bad, and the best useless. I agreed that you were telling the truth. Didn't I?”

“Yes.”

“Haven't we explained why the good ones are useless?”

“We certainly have.”

“Shall we next explain why most become bad, and try to show, if we can, that philosophy isn't responsible for that either?” 489e

“Yes.”

“Let's return to the point where we described the nature a person must have to become good and honorable. Remember, truth led that person first. They had to pursue it 490a in every way. Otherwise they would be a fraud with no share in true philosophy.”

“Yes, that's what we said.”

“Isn't that one point completely at odds with what people now think about philosophers?”

“It certainly is,” he said.

“Then wouldn't it be a fair defense to say that a genuine lover of learning is naturally driven toward what really is? Such a person won't stop at the many things that only appear to be real. They will keep going. Their love won't grow dull or stop before they grasp what each thing itself is, with the part of the soul 490b suited to grasp it. And that part is related to what is. When they draw near and join with what truly is, they give birth to understanding and truth. Then they know, truly live, and are nourished. Only then are they free of their labor pains, not before.”

“That is as fair a defense as possible,” he said.

“Will such a person have any love for lies, or exactly the opposite, a hatred of them?” 490c

“A hatred,” he said.

“When truth leads, I don't think we can say a crowd of evils will follow it.”

“Of course not.”

“Instead, a sound and just character will follow, and self-control along with it.”

“Right,” he said.

“And why do we need to line up all the other qualities of a philosophical nature again? You remember that courage, breadth of mind, ease in learning, and memory went with these. You objected that everyone would have to 490d agree with our argument, but would say, if they set it aside and looked at the actual people under discussion, that some were useless and most were bad in every way. We are now looking for the cause of that bad reputation, asking why most are bad. That's why we have gone back to the nature of true philosophers and had to define it.” 490e

“Yes, that's right,” he said.

“Now,” I said, “we must look at how this nature gets ruined in most cases, while a tiny number escape. These are the ones called not bad but useless. After that, we must look at the natures that imitate it and enter its pursuit. What sort of souls are these that take up a pursuit 491a beyond them and greater than they deserve? Their many failures have given philosophy, everywhere and among everyone, the reputation you described.”

“What kinds of ruin do you mean?” he asked.

“I'll try to explain them if I can,” I said. “I think everyone will agree that a nature with all the qualities we just required for a fully developed philosopher arises only rarely among human beings, and in only a few people. Don't you?” 491b

“Very much so.”

“Now see how many serious dangers face these few.”

“What are they?”

“The most surprising thing to hear is that each quality we praised in that nature can ruin the soul that has it and pull it away from philosophy. I mean courage, self-control, and everything else we discussed.”

“That's strange to hear,” he said. 491c

“Besides these,” I said, “all the things called good can corrupt and draw it away: beauty, wealth, physical strength, a powerful family in the city, and everything connected with these. You get the general idea.”

“I do,” he said, “but I'd like a clearer explanation.”

“Take the whole point in the right way,” I said, “and it will become clear. What I said about these qualities won't seem strange.”

“How do you want me to do that?” he asked. 491d

“We know that if any seed or growing thing, plant or animal, doesn't get the food, season, and place it needs, then the stronger it is, the more it lacks what it needs. Bad conditions are more opposed to a good nature than to a poor one.”

“Of course.”

“So it makes sense that the best nature fares worse than an inferior nature when raised in conditions that don't suit it.”

“It does.” 491e

“Then, Adeimantus,” I said, “shall we say that the most gifted souls become especially bad when badly brought up? Do you think great crimes and unchecked wickedness come from a weak nature, rather than a powerful one ruined by its upbringing? A weak nature will never cause anything great, good or bad.”

“No,” he said, “it's as you say.”

492a “So the nature we assigned to the philosopher must, I think, grow toward every virtue if it gets a suitable education. But if it is sown, planted, and raised in unsuitable ground, it will grow in the opposite direction in every way, unless some god comes to its rescue. Or do you agree with most people that certain young people are corrupted by sophists, and that some private sophists do the corrupting in a way worth talking about? Isn't it the people making that claim who are the greatest 492b sophists? They give a thorough education to young and old, men and women, and turn them into whatever they want.”

“When does that happen?” he asked.

“When large numbers sit together in an assembly, a court, a theater, an army camp, or any other gathering of a crowd,” I said. “With a great uproar they condemn some things said or done and praise others, going to extremes in both cases. They shout and clap, while 492c the stones and the place around them echo and double the noise of praise and blame. In such a place, what sort of heart do you think a young person has, as the saying goes? What private education [could] stand up to it? Won't it be swept away by the flood of praise and blame and carried along with the current? The young person will call the same things beautiful and shameful as they do, follow the same habits, and become like them.” 492d

“He has little choice, Socrates,” he said.

“And we haven't yet mentioned the strongest pressure,” I said.

“What is it?” he asked.

“What these educators and sophists do when words fail to persuade. Don't you know they punish anyone who doesn't obey with loss of rights, fines, and death?”

“I know it very well,” he said.

“Then what other sophist, or what argument from a private person, do you think can oppose them and win?” 492e

“None, I think,” he said.

“No,” I said, “and it's foolish even to try. No human character educated by them has become, or is becoming, or ever will become different and grow toward virtue. We can set aside the divine exception, as the saying goes, my friend. You should know that if anyone is preserved and”