Book IV, 443–445

443a “he, rather than men who are not of this kind, would do such a thing?”“No one,” he said.“Would he not also be far from sacrilege, theft, and betrayal, whether of friends in private life or of cities in public life?”“Far from them.”“Nor would he be unfaithful in any way to his oaths or other agreements.”“How could he be?”“Adultery, neglect of parents, and failure to honor the gods belong to anyone rather than to such a man.”“To anyone rather than him,” he said. 443b“And is the cause of all this not that each part within him does its own work, whether in ruling or in being ruled?”“That, and nothing else.”“Do you still seek justice as anything other than this power, which produces men and cities of this kind?”“By Zeus, I do not,” he said.“Then the dream we spoke of has come wholly true: we suspected that, as soon as we began to found our city, some god had led us upon a beginning and a pattern 443c of justice.”“Most certainly.”“And so, Glaucon, what we said about the man born a shoemaker rightly practicing shoemaking and doing nothing else, the carpenter doing carpentry, and the others likewise—this was an image of justice, and that is why it helped us.”“So it appears.”“But justice in truth was, it seems, something of this kind: not concerned with the outward performance of one's own work, but with what is 443d within, with oneself and one's own in the truest sense. The just man does not permit the parts of himself to do one another's work or the kinds within his soul to meddle in one another's affairs. Instead, he sets his own house in order in truth; he rules himself, brings himself into order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts, exactly like the three notes marking a harmony—the highest, the lowest, and the middle—and any notes that may lie between. He binds all these together 443e and becomes entirely one out of many, temperate and in tune. Only then does he act, if he acts at all, whether in acquiring wealth, caring for his body, conducting public affairs, or making private agreements. In all these matters he judges and calls just and noble the action that preserves and helps bring about this disposition, and calls the knowledge that governs such action wisdom; but an action that continually dissolves it he calls unjust, and the belief that governs such action ignorance.

444a “Entirely true, Socrates,” he said.“Very well,” I said. “If we were to say we have found the just man and the just city, and what justice is within them, I do not think we would seem to be lying.”“By Zeus, we would not,” he said.“Shall we say it, then?”“Let us.”“So be it,” I said. “For next, I think, we must examine injustice.”“Clearly.” 444b“Must it not, in turn, be a kind of civil war among these three parts, a meddling in one another's affairs and doing one another's work, and a rebellion by some part against the soul as a whole, seeking to rule it without right, though its nature is such that it should be a servant to the part whose kind is fit to rule, not to serve? Some such disorder, I think, and the confusion and wandering of these parts, is what we shall call injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance, and, in sum, every kind of vice.”“Exactly so,” he said. 444c“Then,” I said, “what it is to act unjustly and commit injustice, and again to do what is just, must now be plainly evident, if injustice and justice themselves are evident.”“How so?”“Because,” I said, “these actions are no different from what produces health and disease in the body: they work in the soul as those things work in the body.”“In what way?” he said.“Healthy practices produce health, and unhealthy ones disease.”“Yes.”“And just actions produce justice, 444d while unjust ones produce injustice?”“Necessarily.”“And producing health means establishing the parts of the body so that they rule and are ruled by one another according to nature; producing disease means making them rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature.”“It does.”“And likewise,” I said, “producing justice means establishing the parts of the soul so that they rule and are ruled by one another according to nature; producing injustice means making them rule and be ruled contrary to nature?”“Precisely,” he said.“So virtue would seem to be a kind of health, beauty, and good condition 444e of the soul, and vice its disease, ugliness, and weakness.”“That is so.”“And do not noble pursuits lead to the attainment of virtue, shameful pursuits to vice?”“Necessarily.”“What remains for us to examine now, it seems, is

445a whether it is profitable to act justly, pursue what is noble, and be just, whether or not one is known to be so; or to commit injustice and be unjust, so long as one does not pay the penalty or become better through punishment.”“But Socrates,” he said, “the question now seems ridiculous to me. If the body is so corrupted in its nature that life seems unlivable, even with every kind of food and drink and all wealth and power, can life be livable when the nature of that very part by which we live is thrown into disorder and 445b corrupted? Could it be livable if a man could do whatever he wished, except the one thing that would free him from vice and injustice and enable him to acquire justice and virtue—now that each of these has been shown to be what we have described?”“It is ridiculous,” I said. “Yet since we have come this far, we must not weary of seeing as clearly as possible that these things are so.”“By Zeus,” he said, “this is the last thing we should weary of.” 445c“Come then,” I said, “and you will see how many forms vice has, at least those I think worth seeing.”“I am following,” he said. “Only speak.”“Indeed,” I said, “now that we have climbed to this lookout in our argument, it seems to me that virtue has one form, while vice has countless forms, four of which are worth noting.”“What do you mean?” he said.“There seem to be as many kinds of soul as there are distinct forms of constitution,” I said.“How many?” 445d“Five constitutions,” I said, “and five kinds of soul.”“Tell me what they are,” he said.“I say,” I answered, “that the constitution we have described is one kind, though it may bear either of two names. If one man outstanding among the rulers arises, it may be called kingship; if several, aristocracy.”“True,” he said.“This, then,” I said, “I count as one form. For whether 445e several men or one arise to govern, they will change none of the city's laws worth speaking of, if they have received the upbringing and education we have described.”“That is unlikely,” he said.

443a that such a man would do it, rather than someone who isn’t like him?”

“No one would,” he said.

“So he would also keep clear of robbing temples, stealing, and betraying friends in private or cities in public?”

“Yes, he would.”

“And he would never break faith, whether under oath or under any other agreement.”

“How could he?”

“Adultery, neglecting parents, and failing to honor the gods would be more likely in anyone else than in such a person.”

“In anyone else,” he said. 443b

“And isn’t the reason for all this that each part within him does its own work, both in ruling and in being ruled?”

“That and nothing else.”

“Are you still looking for justice to be something other than this power that produces people and cities like these?”

“By Zeus, I’m not,” he said.

“Then the dream we spoke of has come completely true. We suspected that, as soon as we began founding the city, some god had led us to a starting point and an outline 443c of justice.”

“Absolutely.”

“So, Glaucon, the rule that a person suited to shoemaking should make shoes and do nothing else, that a person suited to carpentry should work as a carpenter, and so on, was a kind of image of justice. That’s why it helped us.”

“So it seems.”

“But real justice seems to be something like this. It doesn’t concern doing your own work in outward actions. It concerns what happens 443d inside you, with yourself and what is truly yours. A just person doesn’t let the parts within him do one another’s jobs or interfere with one another. Instead, he puts his own inner affairs in good order. He rules himself, brings order to himself, and becomes his own friend. He brings the three parts into harmony, just like the three main notes of a musical scale: the lowest, the highest, and the middle. If there are any parts between them, he binds them all together. He becomes 443e a single person out of many, self-controlled and in tune. Only then does he act, whether the matter is making money, caring for his body, public affairs, or private agreements. In all of these, he calls an action just and good if it preserves and helps produce this inner condition. He calls the knowledge that guides such action wisdom. He calls an action unjust if it keeps breaking down this condition, 444a and he calls the belief that guides such action ignorance.”

“What you say is entirely true, Socrates,” he said.

“Well,” I said, “if we claim to have found what a just person and a just city are, and what justice is within them, I don’t think anyone could fairly accuse us of lying.”

“No, by Zeus,” he said.

“Shall we claim it, then?”

“We shall.”

“Let’s do that,” I said. “Next, I think, we must examine injustice.”

“Clearly.” 444b

“Then injustice must be a kind of conflict among these three parts. One part meddles in another’s work and does what doesn’t belong to it. A part that should naturally serve rebels against the whole soul and tries to rule, though another part is naturally fit to rule and not to serve it. Things like that, and the disorder and confusion they cause, are what we’ll call injustice, lack of self-control, cowardice, ignorance, and, in short, every kind of vice.”

“That’s exactly what they are,” he said. 444c

“Then if we know what justice and injustice are,” I said, “we can also clearly see what it is to act justly or unjustly and to do wrong.”

“How?”

“Because they’re no different from healthy and unhealthy things, except that those affect the body and these affect the soul,” I said.

“What do you mean?” he asked.

“Healthy things produce health, and unhealthy things produce disease.”

“Yes.”

“So just actions produce justice, 444d and unjust actions produce injustice?”

“They must.”

“To produce health is to arrange the parts of the body so that they rule and are ruled by one another in the way nature intends. To produce disease is to make them rule and be ruled contrary to nature.”

“That’s right.”

“And likewise,” I said, “to produce justice is to arrange the parts of the soul so that they rule and are ruled by one another in the way nature intends. To produce injustice is to make them rule and be ruled contrary to nature?”

“Exactly,” he said.

“So virtue, it seems, is a kind of health, 444e beauty, and good condition of the soul. Vice is disease, ugliness, and weakness of the soul.”

“That’s so.”

“And don’t good ways of living lead to virtue, while shameful ones lead to vice?”

“They must.”

“It seems that the question left for us is this:

445a Is it profitable to act justly, live well, and be just, whether or not anyone knows you’re just? Or is it profitable to do wrong and be unjust, so long as you aren’t punished or made better by punishment?”

“But Socrates,” he said, “the question now seems ridiculous to me. If the body’s natural condition is ruined, we think life isn’t worth living, even with every kind of food and drink, all wealth, and all power. So are we supposed to think life is worth living when the nature of the very thing by which we live is disturbed and 445b ruined? Is it worth living if a person does whatever he wants except the one thing that would free him from vice and injustice and give him justice and virtue? After all, we’ve shown what each of these things is like.”

“Yes, it’s ridiculous,” I said. “Still, since we’ve come this far, we shouldn’t give up before seeing as clearly as possible that things really are this way.”

“By Zeus,” he said, “that’s the last thing we should give up on.” 445c

“Come here, then,” I said, “and you can see how many forms vice has, or at least the ones I think are worth looking at.”

“I’m with you,” he said. “Just tell me.”

“Well,” I said, “now that our discussion has brought us up to this vantage point, it seems to me that virtue has one form, while vice has countless forms. Four of the forms of vice are worth mentioning.”

“What do you mean?” he asked.

“There seem to be as many types of soul as there are distinct kinds of constitution,” I said.

“How many is that?” 445d

“Five kinds of constitution,” I said, “and five kinds of soul.”

“Tell me what they are,” he said.

“One kind of constitution,” I said, “is the one we’ve described. It could be given either of two names. If one outstanding man holds power, we could call it kingship. If several do, we could call it aristocracy.”

“True,” he said.

“But I count that as one kind,” I said. “Whether the rulers are many or one, they wouldn’t change any of the city’s important laws, provided they had the upbringing and education we described.”

“They probably wouldn’t,” he said.