Adam Smith · Complete work
Part II, Section I, Chapter IV
Part II, Section I, Chapter IV of 54. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters.
We do not, therefore, thoroughly and heartily sympathize with the gratitude of one man towards another, merely because this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we entirely go along with. Our heart must adopt the principles of the agent, and go along with all the affections which influenced his conduct, before it can entirely sympathize with, and beat time to, the gratitude of the person who has been benefited by his actions. If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial soever its effects, it does not seem to demand, or necessarily to require, any proportionable recompense.
But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we entirely sympathize and go along with the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his own account, enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who owe their prosperity to his good conduct. His actions seem then to demand, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for a proportionable recompense. We then entirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to bestow it. The benefactor seems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and approve of, that sentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard the person towards whom it is directed as its proper and suitable object.
2 In the same manner, we cannot at all sympathize with the resentment of one man against another, merely because this other has been the cause of his misfortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into. Before we can adopt the resentment of the sufferer, we must disapprove of the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all sympathy with the affections which influenced his conduct. If there appears to have been no impropriety in these, how fatal soever the tendency of the action which proceeds from them to those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve any punishment, or to be the proper object of any resentment.
But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives of the agent, we then heartily and entirely sympathize with the resentment of the sufferer. Such actions seem then to deserve, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of, that resentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender necessarily seems then to be the proper object of punishment, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and thereby approve of, that sentiment which prompts to punish. In this case too, when we approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard the person against whom it is directed, as its proper and suitable object.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete sixth-edition English text of all parts (the appended Dissertation on the Origin of Languages is not included) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
A recapitulation of the preceding chapters.
We do not, then, fully and wholeheartedly sympathize with one person's gratitude toward another merely because the latter has caused his good fortune, unless his motives are ones we entirely share. Our heart must adopt the agent's principles and share all the feelings that guided his conduct before it can fully sympathize with and keep time to the gratitude of the person benefited by his actions. If the benefactor's conduct appears to lack propriety, however beneficial its effects, it does not seem to demand or necessarily require a corresponding return.
But when an action's beneficial tendency is joined to propriety in the feeling from which it springs, when we fully sympathize with and share the agent's motives, the love we feel for him in his own right strengthens and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those whose prosperity they owe to his good conduct. His actions then seem to demand, and, if I may say so, cry out for an adequate return. We fully enter into the gratitude that prompts such a return. The benefactor then appears to be the proper object of reward because we fully sympathize with, and approve of, the feeling that prompts us to reward him. When we approve of and share the feeling from which the action springs, we must also approve of the action and regard the person toward whom it is directed as its proper and fitting object.
2 Likewise, we cannot sympathize at all with one person's resentment against another merely because the latter has caused his misfortune, unless the latter acted from motives we cannot share. Before we can adopt the sufferer's resentment, we must disapprove of the agent's motives and feel our heart reject all sympathy with the feelings that guided his conduct. If those feelings appear to involve no impropriety, then however fatal the resulting action may be for those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve any punishment or to be a proper object of resentment.
But when an action's harmfulness is joined to impropriety in the feeling from which it springs, when our heart recoils in abhorrence from all fellow-feeling with the agent's motives, we then fully and wholeheartedly sympathize with the sufferer's resentment. Such actions seem to deserve, and, if I may say so, cry out for, an adequate punishment; we fully enter into and thereby approve of the resentment that prompts its infliction. The offender then necessarily appears to be the proper object of punishment, because we fully sympathize with and thereby approve of the feeling that prompts us to punish him. Here too, when we approve of and share the feeling from which an action springs, we must approve of that action and regard the person against whom it is directed as its proper and fitting object.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete sixth-edition English text of all parts (the appended Dissertation on the Origin of Languages is not included).
Review of the preceding chapters.
We do not fully share one person's gratitude toward another simply because that other person brought him good fortune. We must also agree with the reasons why the benefactor helped him. We must approve of the benefactor's principles and share all the feelings that guided his conduct before we can fully share the recipient's gratitude. If the benefactor acted without propriety, the benefits of his action, however great, do not seem to demand a matching reward.
But when a helpful action also comes from an appropriate feeling, we fully share the benefactor's reasons. Our affection for him as a person then strengthens and deepens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who owe their good fortune to what he did. His actions seem to demand an appropriate reward, almost as if they were crying out for one. We fully share the gratitude that moves the recipients to reward him. We see a benefactor as a proper object of reward when we fully share and approve of the feeling that leads people to reward him. When we approve of and share the feeling that leads someone to act, we must approve of the action too. We must also see the person to whom the action is directed as a proper and fitting object of it.
2 Likewise, we cannot share one person's resentment against another just because that other person caused his misfortune. We must also be unable to share the reasons why the other person caused it. Before we can join in the victim's resentment, we must disapprove of the actor's motives and find ourselves unable to share the feelings that guided him. If those feelings contain nothing improper, the action does not seem to deserve punishment or resentment, however harmful it may be to those it affects.
But when a harmful act also comes from an improper feeling, we reject the actor's motives with horror and cannot share them. We then fully share the victim's resentment. Such actions seem to deserve an appropriate punishment, almost as if they were crying out for one. We share and therefore approve of the resentment that leads to punishment. We see the offender as a proper object of punishment when we fully share and approve of the feeling that leads people to punish him. Here too, when we approve of and share the feeling that leads someone to act, we must approve of the action. We must also see the person against whom it is directed as a proper and fitting object of it.