Part I, Chapter VI, 1

OF THE INNER BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS, AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED

Animals have two kinds of motion peculiar to them. One is called vital: it begins at generation and continues without interruption throughout life, as in the circulation of the blood, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, excretion, and so on. These motions need no help from imagination. The other is animal motion, also called voluntary motion: walking, speaking, or moving any of our limbs in the manner first imagined in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and inner parts of the human body, caused by the action of things we see, hear, and so on, and that imagination is only what remains of that motion after sensation, has already been said in the first and second chapters. Since walking, speaking, and similar voluntary motions always depend on a prior thought of where, by which route, and what to do, imagination is evidently the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. Although those who have not studied the matter cannot conceive of motion where the moving thing is invisible, or where the distance it travels is too small to perceive, that does not mean such motions do not occur. However small a space may be, whatever moves over a larger space that includes it must first move over that smaller space. These slight beginnings of motion inside the human body, before they appear as walking, speaking, striking, or other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOR.

When this endeavor is directed toward something that causes it, it is called APPETITE or DESIRE. Desire is the more general name, while appetite is often restricted to the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst. When the endeavor is away from something, it is generally called AVERSION. We derive the words appetite and aversion from Latin, and both signify movements, one of approach and the other of withdrawal. The Greek words for them, orme and aphorme, do the same. Nature itself often presses truths upon people over which they stumble afterward when they look for something beyond nature. The schools find no actual motion at all in the mere appetite to go or move. But because they must acknowledge some motion, they call it metaphorical motion, which is an absurd expression: words may be metaphorical, but bodies and motions cannot.

What people desire they are also said to LOVE, and what they are averse to, to HATE. Desire and love are therefore the same thing, except that desire always signifies the absence of its object, while love most often signifies its presence. Similarly, aversion signifies the absence of its object, and hate its presence.

Some appetites and aversions are innate: appetite for food and for excretion and relief, though the latter might more properly be called aversions from something felt within the body; and a few other appetites besides. The remaining appetites, for particular things, arise from experience and from testing their effects on ourselves or others. For what we do not know at all, or do not believe exists, we can have no desire beyond the wish to taste and try it. But we have aversion not only to things we know have hurt us, but also to things whose power to hurt us is uncertain.

Things we neither desire nor hate we are said to DESPISE. CONTEMPT is nothing but an immobility or stubbornness of the heart in resisting the action of certain things, arising either because more powerful objects already move the heart in another direction or because we have no experience of those things.

Since the constitution of a person's body continually changes, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause the same appetites and aversions in that person; still less can everyone agree in desiring almost any single object.

Whatever is the object of anyone's appetite or desire is what he, for his part, calls good. The object of his hate and aversion he calls evil; the object of his contempt, worthless and insignificant. For the words good, evil, and contemptible are always used in relation to the person using them. Nothing is simply and absolutely so, nor can any common rule of good and evil be drawn from the nature of objects themselves. The rule comes instead from the person himself where there is no Common-wealth; in a Common-wealth, from the person representing it; or from an arbitrator or judge whom disputing parties agree to appoint, making his decision the rule.

Latin has two words whose meanings approach good and evil but do not precisely match them: pulchrum and turpe. The first signifies what promises good by some visible signs, and the second what promises evil. We have no equally general names for them in English. For pulchrum we say, according to the case, fair, beautiful, handsome, gallant, honorable, comely, or amiable; for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like. In their proper contexts all these words mean nothing but an appearance or aspect promising good or evil. There are therefore three kinds of good: good in promise, or pulchrum; good in effect, as the desired end, called jucundum, delightful; and good as a means, called utile, profitable. There are likewise three kinds of evil: evil in promise, called turpe; evil in effect or as an end, called molestum, unpleasant or troublesome; and evil as a means, called inutile, unprofitable or harmful.

As in sensation what is truly within us, as I have said before, is only motion caused by the action of external objects, while what appears to sight is light and color, to hearing sound, to the nostril odor, and so forth, so when the action of the same object continues from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, its real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavor, consisting in appetite toward, or aversion from, the moving object. But the appearance, or sensation, of that motion is what we call either DELIGHT or TROUBLE OF MIND.

This motion called appetite, and in its appearance delight or pleasure, seems to strengthen and assist vital motion. Hence things that cause delight were appropriately called jucunda, from a juvando, helping or strengthening; their opposites were called molesta, offensive, because they hinder and trouble vital motion.

Pleasure or delight, then, is the appearance or sensation of good; vexation or displeasure is the appearance or sensation of evil. Consequently all appetite, desire, and love are accompanied by some degree of delight, and all hatred and aversion by some degree of displeasure and offense.

Some pleasures or delights arise from sensing an object present. These may be called pleasures of sense; the term sensual, used only by those who condemn them, has no place before laws exist. This kind includes all filling and emptying of the body, and whatever is pleasant to sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from expectation, born of foreseeing the end or consequence of things, whether those things please or displease the senses. These are pleasures of the mind that traces those consequences, and are generally called JOY. Likewise some displeasures belong to sensation and are called PAIN; others belong to the expectation of consequences and are called GRIEF.

The simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief acquire different names under different considerations: first, when they succeed one another, according to a person's opinion of his chances of obtaining what he desires; second, according to the object loved or hated; third, according to several passions considered together; and fourth, according to the change or succession itself.

Hope— Appetite accompanied by an opinion that one will attain its object is called HOPE.

Despair— The same appetite without that opinion is DESPAIR.

Fear— Aversion accompanied by an opinion that its object can hurt us is FEAR.

Courage— The same aversion, with hope of avoiding the harm by resistance, is COURAGE.

Anger— Sudden courage is ANGER.

Confidence— Steady hope is CONFIDENCE in ourselves.

Diffidence— Steady despair is DIFFIDENCE in ourselves.

Indignation— Anger at great harm done to another when we conceive it as an injury is INDIGNATION.

Benevolence— Desire for another's good is BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, or CHARITY; if directed toward humanity generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousness— Desire for riches is COVETOUSNESS, a name always used in blame because people competing for riches resent one another's success, although the desire itself deserves blame or approval according to the means used to seek those riches.

Ambition— Desire for office or precedence is AMBITION, another name used in an unfavorable sense for the reason just mentioned.

Pusillanimity— Desire for things that contribute little to our ends, together with fear of things that present only slight obstacles, is PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity— Disregard for small helps and hindrances is MAGNANIMITY.

Valor— Magnanimity in the face of death or wounds is VALOR or FORTITUDE.

Liberality— Magnanimity in the use of riches is LIBERALITY.

Miserliness— Pusillanimity in the same matter is WRETCHEDNESS, MISERLINESS, or PARSIMONY, according as it is approved or disapproved.

Kindness— Love of people for companionship is KINDNESS.

Natural lust— Love of people for the pleasure of the senses alone is NATURAL LUST.

Luxury— Love of the same, acquired through brooding, that is, imagining past pleasure, is LUXURY.

The passion of love; jealousy— Love of one particular person, with a desire to be loved by that person alone, is THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same love, joined to fear that it is not returned, is JEALOUSY.

Revengefulness— Desire to hurt another so as to make him condemn some deed of his own is REVENGEFULNESS.

Curiosity— Desire to know why and how is CURIOSITY. It belongs to no living creature but man; thus man is distinguished from other animals not only by his reason but also by this singular passion. In them, the appetite for food and other pleasures of sense predominates and crowds out any concern for causes. That concern is a lust of the mind which, through the lasting delight of continually and tirelessly producing knowledge, surpasses the brief intensity of every bodily pleasure.

Of the Internal Beginnings of Voluntary Motions Commonly Called the Passions, and the Speech That Expresses Them

Animals have two kinds of motion peculiar to them. One is called vital motion. It begins when an animal is conceived and continues without interruption throughout its life. The circulation of blood, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, and excretion are examples. These motions need no help from imagination. The other is animal motion, also called voluntary motion: walking, speaking, and moving our limbs in ways we first imagine in our minds. I said in the first and second chapters that sensation is motion in the organs and inner parts of the human body, caused by the action of things we see, hear, and so on. Imagination is the remainder of that same motion after sensation has ended. Walking, speaking, and similar voluntary motions always depend on a prior thought about where to go, which way to move, or what to do. So imagination is clearly the first internal beginning of every voluntary motion. People who have not studied the matter cannot conceive of any motion where the moving thing is invisible or moves too short a distance to be noticed. But the motion exists all the same. However tiny a distance is, anything moving across a longer distance that includes it must first cross that tiny distance. These small beginnings of motion inside the human body, before they appear as walking, speaking, striking, or other visible acts, are commonly called endeavor.

When this endeavor is directed toward what causes it, it is called appetite or desire. Desire is the general term; appetite is often restricted to the desire for food and drink, or hunger and thirst. When endeavor moves away from something, it is generally called aversion. Appetite and aversion are Latin words for the motions of approaching and withdrawing. The equivalent Greek words, orme and aphorme, mean the same things. Nature often presses truths on people that they later stumble over when they look for something beyond nature. The schools claim that a mere desire to go or move contains no actual motion. Because they must acknowledge some motion, however, they call it metaphorical motion. That is absurd: words can be metaphorical, but bodies and motions cannot.

We also say people love what they desire and hate what they feel aversion to. Desire and love are the same thing, except that desire always refers to an absent object, while love usually refers to one that is present. Likewise, aversion refers to an absent object, while hate refers to one that is present.

Some appetites and aversions are inborn: the appetite for food, the urge to excrete and to relieve the body—which might more accurately be called aversions to something felt within it—and a few others. The remaining appetites, for particular things, come from experience and from testing their effects on us or on other people. When we know nothing about something or do not believe it exists, we can desire no more than to sample and test it. But we can feel aversion not only toward things we know have hurt us, but also toward things we do not know to be safe.

When we neither desire nor hate something, we are said to hold it in contempt. Contempt is simply the heart's stillness or resistance to the action of certain things. It occurs because stronger objects already move the heart in another direction or because we have no experience of those things.

The state of a person's body is always changing. The same things therefore cannot always produce the same desires and aversions in him. It is even less possible for everyone to agree in desiring almost any single object.

Whatever anyone desires is what he, for his own part, calls good. What he hates or feels aversion to he calls evil, and what he holds in contempt he calls worthless or insignificant. The words good, evil, and contemptible always refer to the person using them. Nothing is good or evil simply and absolutely. There is no shared rule of good and evil drawn from the nature of objects themselves. Where there is no Common-wealth, that rule comes from the individual. Within a Common-wealth it comes from the person who represents it, or from an arbitrator or judge whom people who disagree agree to appoint, accepting his judgment as their rule.

Latin has two words close in meaning to good and evil, but not precisely the same: pulchrum and turpe. The first means what shows signs promising good; the second, what promises evil. English has no names as general as these. For pulchrum we say, depending on the thing, fair, beautiful, handsome, splendid, honorable, becoming, or lovable. For turpe we say foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseating, and the like. In each proper use, these words mean only an appearance or expression that promises good or evil. Thus there are three kinds of good: good in promise, or pulchrum; good in effect, as the desired end, called jucundum or delightful; and good as a means, called utile or useful. There are likewise three kinds of evil: evil in promise, called turpe; evil in effect or as an end, called molestum, unpleasant or troublesome; and evil as a means, called inutile, useless or harmful.

As I have said before, what actually happens within us when we sense something is only motion caused by an external object. But what appears to us is light and color to the eye, sound to the ear, smell to the nose, and so on. Likewise, when an object's action continues from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, its real effect there is only motion or endeavor: appetite toward the object or aversion from it. What this motion appears or feels like is what we call delight or mental trouble.

The motion called appetite, which appears to us as delight or pleasure, seems to strengthen and help vital motion. So people quite reasonably called things that cause delight jucunda, from the Latin for helping or strengthening. They called the opposite molesta, or offensive things, because these obstruct and disturb vital motion.

Pleasure or delight, then, is the appearance or feeling of good. Trouble or displeasure is the appearance or feeling of evil. Consequently every appetite, desire, and love comes with some degree of delight, and every hatred or aversion with some degree of displeasure or offense.

Some pleasures and delights come from sensing an object that is present. We can call these pleasures of sense. The word sensual, as used only by those who condemn these pleasures, has no place until laws exist. This category includes all the body's filling and emptying, and everything pleasant to sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Other pleasures arise from expecting something because we foresee the end or consequence of things, whether or not the things themselves please us when sensed. These are pleasures of the mind of the person who works out the consequences. They are generally called joy. In the same way, some displeasures are felt through the senses and called pain, while others concern expected consequences and are called grief.

These simple Passions—appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief—receive different names under different circumstances. First, when one follows another, their names vary according to what people think their chances are of getting what they desire. Second, names vary with what is loved or hated. Third, they vary when several Passions are considered together. Fourth, they vary with the change or succession itself.

Hope—Desire combined with a belief that we will obtain its object is called hope.

Despair—The same desire without that belief is despair.

Fear—Aversion accompanied by an expectation of harm from its object is fear.

Courage—The same aversion, joined with the hope of avoiding harm through resistance, is courage.

Anger—Sudden courage is anger.

Confidence—Steady hope is confidence in ourselves.

Lack of confidence—Steady despair is lack of confidence in ourselves.

Indignation—Anger over great harm done to another, when we believe the harm is an injustice, is indignation.

Benevolence—The desire for someone else's good is benevolence, goodwill, or charity. When directed toward people in general, it is good nature.

Covetousness—The desire for riches is covetousness. This name always carries blame because people competing for riches resent others who obtain them. But the desire itself deserves blame or approval according to the means used to seek riches.

Ambition—The desire for office or precedence is ambition. This name also carries blame, for the reason just given.

Small-mindedness—Desiring things that do little to advance our aims, and fearing things that do little to obstruct them, is small-mindedness.

Greatness of mind—Disregarding minor helps and obstacles is greatness of mind.

Valor—Greatness of mind when facing death or wounds is valor or fortitude.

Generosity—Greatness of mind in the use of riches is generosity.

Miserliness—Small-mindedness in the use of riches is wretchedness, miserliness, or thrift, depending on whether people dislike or approve of it.

Kindness—Love of people for the sake of their company is kindness.

Natural lust—Love of people solely for sensory pleasure is natural lust.

Luxury—Love of the same sort arising from dwelling in the imagination on pleasure experienced before is luxury.

The passion of love; jealousy—Loving one person alone, with a desire to be loved exclusively in return, is the passion of love. If accompanied by fear that the love is not returned, it is jealousy.

Revengefulness—The desire to hurt someone in order to make him condemn something he has done is revengefulness.

Curiosity—The desire to know why and how is curiosity. No living creature but a human being has it. Thus humans differ from other animals not only in reason but also in this special Passion. In other animals, the stronger appetite for food and other pleasures of sense crowds out any concern to know causes. Curiosity is a desire of the mind. Through lasting pleasure in the continuous and tireless production of knowledge, it surpasses the brief intensity of any bodily pleasure.